By Mike Nartker Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — CIA Director George Tenet will probably keep his job despite recent calls by some in Congress for his resignation, intelligence experts told Global Security Newswire this week. In a statement last week Tenet publicly took responsibility for allowing U.S. President George W. Bush to make the now-discredited claim that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Africa (see GSN, July 16).
Intelligence experts said Tenet’s record as a “team player” within the Bush administration is likely to play a major role in helping him remain as CIA director. In addition, the White House could end up creating more problems for itself politically if it forced Tenet to resign, or if he were to do so on his own, they said. Some experts said, however, that the Bush administration might call on Tenet to resign or dismiss him if the controversy over the administration’s handling of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq begins to have a major political impact on Bush himself.
Tenet’s Troubles
Tenet’s current difficulties can be traced back to late 2001, when Italy obtained documents that indicated Iraq had tried to purchase processed uranium, known as “yellowcake,” from Niger, according to Time. When the United States received the information, it came to the attention of the vice president’s office, which dispatched Joseph Wilson, a former U.S. ambassador to Gabon, to Niger in February 2002 to investigate the claim (see GSN, July 7).
In a commentary published July 6 in the New York Times, Wilson described his trip to Niger, which included meetings with current and former Nigerien officials and people associated with the country’s uranium industry. “It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place,” Wilson said.
Wilson said that when he returned to the United States in early March 2002, he “promptly” provided a detailed briefing on his findings to the CIA. While the CIA cabled the White House with information that Nigerien officials had denied that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium, the information was attributed to an anonymous source, not Wilson, the Washington Post reported last month.
The African uranium claim came up again in September 2002 when it was included in a British dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Sept. 24, 2002). While not specifically naming Niger, the dossier said, “there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium in Africa” (see related GSN story, today).
Iraq’s purported attempts to purchase uranium from Africa, including Niger, were also included in a U.S. national intelligence estimate prepared in October 2002, according to Tenet’s recent statement. While the claim was not offered as evidence that Iraq was seeking to relaunch its nuclear weapons program, the NIE included three paragraphs describing reports that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger and two other African countries, Tenet said in his statement. He also quoted the NIE as saying: “We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.”
The White House, however, wanted to use the NIE’s Niger reference in a speech Bush was slated to give Oct. 7 in Cincinnati, Ohio, the Washington Post reported. Tenet personally told White House officials, including deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley, that the claim should not be included in that speech because it came from only one source, a senior official told the Post. The reference was ultimately excluded from Bush’s Cincinnati speech (see GSN, Oct. 8, 2002).
In early December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of WMD-related information to U.N. weapons inspectors, as required by the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Dec. 9, 2002). On Dec. 19, the U.S. State Department issued a fact sheet listing a number of alleged omissions from the Iraqi declaration, which specifically raised the Niger claim.
“The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger,” the State Department fact sheet says. “Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?” it says [emphasis included in original copy].
Soon after State released the fact sheet, the International Atomic Energy Agency requested that the United States provide evidence to support the claim that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger, according to a letter the agency sent last month to Representative Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House Government Reform Committee.
Meanwhile, in January the African uranium claim received its most significant endorsement when Bush included it in his State of the Union address in the now-infamous “16 words.”
“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa,” Bush said in his address.
While apparently being significant enough for Bush to include it in his State of the Union address, the African uranium claim was not included in U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February presentation to the U.N. Security Council on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Feb. 6).
“When I made my presentation to the United Nations and we really went through every single thing we knew about all of the various issues with respect to weapons of mass destruction, we did not believe that it was appropriate to use that example anymore,” Powell said last week during a press conference in Pretoria, South Africa. “It was not standing the test of time. And so I didn’t use it, and we haven’t used it since.”
Also in February, the United States responded to the IAEA’s request for evidence to support the claim that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger. According to the agency’s letter to Waxman, it only took about 10 days to determine that an alleged contract between Iraq and Niger for the delivery of uranium could not have been honored. The agency then examined the veracity of the documents, finding a number of flaws, such as incorrect references to the date of the Nigerien constitution, the incorrect name of the Nigerien foreign minister at the time the alleged documents were signed and the use of obsolete letterhead and the incorrect symbol of the Nigerien presidency.
According to a State Department letter sent to Waxman earlier this month, the department told the IAEA when it provided the alleged Nigerien documents that the reports of Iraq’s attempts to purchase uranium there could not be confirmed and that the department had questions regarding specific claims (see GSN, July 9).
The first major blow was dealt to the African uranium claim in March when IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei publicly announced that the documents purporting to show Iraq’s attempt to purchase uranium from Niger were forgeries (see GSN, March 10).
“Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents are in fact not authentic,” ElBaradei told the Security Council March 7, according to a U.N. press release.
Newsweek reported yesterday that the FBI is conducting an investigation into the forged Nigerien documents (see GSN, March 13). Sources told the magazine that the bureau’s Counterintelligence Division has decided to investigate the issue after prompting by Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), whose earlier request three months ago was denied.
The African uranium claim came crashing down earlier this month when the White House publicly acknowledged that it should not have been included in Bush’s State of the Union address (see GSN, July 8).
“After the speech, information was learned about the forged documents,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said during a July 9 press conference in Pretoria, referring to the Nigerien documents. “With the advantage of hindsight, it’s known now what was not known by the White House prior to the speech. This information should not have risen to the level of a presidential speech,” he said.
Two days later, Tenet issued his statement taking responsibility for the CIA’s approval of Bush’s address (see GSN, July 14).
“First, CIA approved the president’s State of the Union address before it was delivered. Second, I am responsible for the approval process in my agency. And third, the president had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound,” Tenet said. “These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the president,” he said.
Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday that his staff did not bring the uranium statement to his attention before Bush gave the speech, the Washington Post reported. Tenet told the committee during a closed hearing that he had taken responsibility for the speech because a CIA official had approved it after meetings with the White House, congressional and Bush administration sources told the Post.
“Members were stunned because he said he basically wasn’t aware of the sentence until recently,” the Post quoted a Democratic senator as saying.
Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) said today that Tenet also told the Senate intelligence committee that a White House official had insisted that the African uranium claim be included in the State of the Union address.
“He (Tenet) certainly told us who the person was who was insistent on putting this language in which the CIA knew to be incredible, this language about the uranium shipment from Africa,” the Associated Press quoted Durbin as saying on ABC’s Good Morning America.
“And there was this negotiation between the White House and the CIA about just how far you could go and be close to the truth, and unfortunately those 16 words were included in the most important speech the president delivers in any given year,” Durbin said.
Tenet’s Future
Soon after Tenet released his statement, Bush and other senior White House officials expressed support for both him and the CIA.
“President Bush has confidence in Director Tenet, and President Bush has confidence in the CIA,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said Saturday.
“George Tenet is an enormously talented public servant, and the intelligence community does a darn good job,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Sunday on ABC’S This Week. “There it is, end of story,” he said.
Yesterday though, two contenders for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination — Senator Joseph Lieberman (Conn.) and former Vermont Governor Howard Dean — publicly called for Tenet to resign.
“The reason the director should step aside is that he is now part of the shifting of the blame,” Dean told the Associated Press.
Lieberman was even stronger in his criticism of Tenet, saying he would have little confidence in Tenet if Lieberman were president.
“Unlike the current president, I would not continue to have confidence in my CIA director, and would ask him to resign,” Lieberman told AP. “This president ought to hold someone accountable for causing him to say something that was not true,” he added.
Tenet’s reputation as one of the better CIA directors in recent history and as a “team player” within the Bush administration could go a long way, however, in helping him to keep his job, according to experts.
If Tenet were to be removed from his CIA position after taking personal responsibility for the statement, some career CIA officials would likely retaliate with even more embarrassing revelations if they felt the White House had treated him “dirty,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org.
“Tenet’s been a stand-up guy. He’s kept the secrets and carried the water,” Pike said.
The White House also risks portraying Tenet as a “scapegoat” if it engineers his resignation, which could cause political difficulties, said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy.
While Tenet was appointed to his position by former President Bill Clinton, and therefore not seen as a Bush loyalist, he does have a strong team player reputation, said Charles Pena, director of Defense Policy Studies at the CATO Institute. Even so, the impact of the intelligence-handling controversy on Bush’s personal approval rating could determine Tenet’s status, with his position in danger if the rating dips below 60 percent, Pena said.
If there were “any one guy to hang out to dry on this one,” it would be Tenet, Pena said.
Pike said, however, that previous administrations — such as those of former Presidents John Kennedy and Richard Nixon — had experienced difficulties in blaming controversies on the CIA.
“Nixon tried to blame Watergate on the CIA. Look where it got him,” Pike said. “Kennedy tried to blame Bay of Pigs on the CIA. Look where it got him,” he said.
In fact, the lessons of Watergate may not be lost on some senior Bush administration officials, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld, who served in the Ford administration during the aftermath of that scandal, Pike said.
“They got some adults over there who’ll take a hand to this and make it go away,” Pike said. “They all saw Nixon self-destruct and don’t want to go there,” he said.
U.S. and British intelligence agencies did not fully share information with each other on claims that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Africa, resulting in differing conclusions, British officials said yesterday (see related GSN story, today).
British officials said the CIA had attempted last year to persuade the British government to drop the African uranium claim from a September report on Iraq’s WMD programs. In a letter to a parliamentary committee conducting an inquiry into the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war with Iraq, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said the CIA request was denied because of “reliable intelligence which we had not shared with the U.S.” and because the CIA had made the request “unsupported by explanation.”
While British officials will not provide further detail about the additional evidence they say supports the Africa uranium claim, they have said they have multiple sources, including at least one foreign intelligence agency, that said its information could not be shared with other countries, according to the Washington Post.
Straw also said the CIA did not inform British officials about a visit to Niger by Joseph Wilson, a former U.S ambassador to Gabon, who found there was no evidence to support a claim that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium there.
“I want to make clear that neither I nor, to the best of my knowledge, any U.K. officials were aware of Ambassador Wilson’s visit until reference first appeared in the press” last month, Straw said in his letter. “In response to our questions, the U.S. authorities have confirmed that Ambassador Wilson’s report was not shared with the U.K.,” he said.
British officials have said they have now seen a summary of Wilson’s report on his visit to Niger, adding that they view it as inconclusive.
“We can see why it wasn’t passed on to us because it doesn’t point in one direction,” an official said, adding that the summary confirmed that an Iraqi trade delegation had visited Niger in 1999, but no trade agreements were reached. “Uranium is Niger’s top export; it’s unlikely the Iraqis were looking for livestock, which is their second export,” the official said (Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, July 17).
Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency has criticized the United Kingdom for failing to hand over its additional evidence supporting claims that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Africa.
“Despite requests, the British government has provided no such evidence,” said a Western diplomat close to the IAEA. “Senior officials at the agency think it is involved in an information blackout,” the diplomat said (Andrew Buncombe, London Independent, July 17).
British Prime Minister Tony Blair yesterday defended the claim that Iraq had sought to obtain uranium from Niger, saying the British intelligence justifying the claim was not based on documents later found to be forgeries by the IAEA.
“It may just be worth pointing out to the House and also to the public, it’s not as if this link between Niger and Iraq was some invention of the CIA or Britain. We know (that) in the 1980s that Iraq purchased from Niger over 270 tons of uranium, and therefore it is not beyond the bounds of possibility,” Blair said before the House of Commons. “Let’s at least put it like this, that they went back to Niger again,” he said (Xinhua News Agency, July 17).
Blair is scheduled to arrive in the United States today to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush and make a rare address before a joint session of Congress.
While Blair is not expected to discuss the intelligence-handling controversy in his address to Congress, it is expected to have an effect on his meeting with Bush, the Boston Globe reported.
The issue “is going to overshadow this meeting, and it’s going to be a much tenser meeting than previous summits,” said Nile Gardiner, a foreign policy adviser to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. “This is going to be a much more combative meeting than previous ones between Blair and Bush,” Gardiner said (Anne Kornblut, Boston Globe, July 17).
The now-discredited documents used by the United Kingdom and the United States to prove that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger had mistakes that were easily detectable, Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported yesterday after gaining access to the letters and documents.
According to the newspaper, for instance, a letter dated Oct. 10, 2000, which was supposed to be the draft of the protocol of the agreement between Niger and Iraq, was signed by Nigerien Foreign Minister Allele Habibou, who had left the position in 1989.
In addition, a letter referring to supposed agreements made between Niger and Iraq on June 29, 2000, was signed and dated July 1999. The text of a letter dated July 27, 2000, had many spelling mistakes and the logo of Niger’s national symbol was obviously fake, according to the newspaper.
There are two theories on who forged the letters and documents, according to La Repubblica: low-level diplomats from the embassy of Niger in Rome, which is the theory that CIA supports, or Italian intelligence services that sold the letters to an African diplomat in 2001. The diplomat then passed the letters to British authorities.
The newspaper also reported on the possible link between the forged documents and a robbery that occurred in Niger’s embassy in Rome on a night between Dec. 29, 2000, and Jan. 1, 2001. According to the newspaper, the embassy was found on Jan. 2 to have been vandalized, with paper strewn about and drawers turned upside down. Despite creating the mess, the intruders stole only a steel clock and three small perfume bottles.
The theory, according to La Repubblica, is that the break-in was staged to cover the removal of material needed to forge the documents (Bonini/D’avanzo, La Repubblica, July 16, GSN translation).
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