U.S. Response:  Agencies Have Not Yet Created United Terrorist “Watch List”

U.S. agencies have yet to create a unified terrorist “watch list” out of the dozen separate lists currently in use, USA Today reported today (see GSN, July 24).

The Homeland Security Department has said it is working to combine various lists of potential terrorists currently maintained by at least nine separate agencies, but there is no timetable set for creating a final list.  Officials said there have been technical delays involving computers and databases not designed to share information.

“The administration is getting closer to the end of its planning process,” said Homeland Security spokesman Gordon Johndroe.  “But this is a very complicated issue, and we’re not going to rush something out that isn’t completely effective,” he said.

Some experts, however, have criticized the delay.

If U.S. agencies had been sharing information, “then 9/11 might not have happened,” Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution said.  “I find it criminal that it hasn’t happened yet,” he said (Mimi Hall, USA Today, Aug. 11).

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Iraq:  White House Description of Nuclear Threat Exceeded Intelligence

Leading up to the recent war in Iraq, the Bush administration made a number of allegations heightening the threat posed by Iraq’s nuclear weapons program that went beyond what the available intelligence would support, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 3).

In August 2002, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card created the White House Iraq Group (WHIG), which was to create strategy for each stage of the U.S. confrontation with Iraq, according to the Post.  Regular participants in the group’s meetings included Karl Rove, U.S. President George W. Bush’s senior political adviser; national security adviser Condoleezza Rice; deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley; and I. Lewis Libby, chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney. 

One senior official described the group as “an internal working group, like many formed for priority issues, to make sure each part of the White House was fulfilling its responsibilities.”

A WHIG “strategic communications” task force was created to begin preparing speeches and white papers on the threat posed by Iraq, according to the Post.  The first white paper that examined specific Iraqi WMD programs was the never-published A Grave and Gathering Danger: Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons.  During the paper’s creation and revision, the WHIG wanted to use vivid imagery that was not available in the typically hedged language of intelligence reports, according to three officials who followed the paper’s creation.

The draft white paper contained a number of exaggerated, or false claims, later made by Bush administration officials, such as the now-disputed claim that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium from Africa, according to the Post. 

The draft paper also said that U.N inspectors had said that satellite imagery showed “many signs of the reconstruction and acceleration of the Iraqi nuclear program.”  However, the inspectors said no such thing, the Post reported.  A national intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA in October 2002 on Iraq’s WMD programs cited new construction at facilities once linked to the Iraqi nuclear program, according to the Post.  By February, however, U.S. specialists had visited the sites and had seen that no forbidden activities were being conducted.

In addition, Bush and other officials claimed that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein held a number of meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists.  They did not say, however, that the work the scientists were known to have been conducting was mostly peaceful, such as for industrial purposes, the Post reported.

In January, a CIA analyst described by the Post as “Joe” traveled to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to present the U.S case that Iraq was attempting to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes for use in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to the Post.  The IAEA, however, believed that the tubes were for use in conventional rockets.

During his meeting, Joe told the IAEA that the aluminum in the tubes Iraq had sought to purchase was “overspecified,” “inappropriate” and “excessively strong,” according to people familiar with his presentation.  No country would waste the aluminum by using it in a rocket, Joe said.

There was a rocket, however, that used such aluminum tubes — the Italian-made Medusa 81, the Post reported.  Experts from the U.S. national laboratories told the Energy Department and U.S. intelligence analysts that Iraq was producing copies of the Medusa 81.  The aluminum tubes in dispute matched both the alloy and the dimensions of the Medusa 81, according to the Post.

Following Joe’s presentation to the IAEA, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other administration officials denied that the tubes could have been used for rockets.  They did so even after intelligence analysts photographed in Iraq a near-identical tube marked with the logo of the Italian company that produces the Medusa 81 rocket and the words “81mm rocket” in English, the Post reported.

Two senior U.S. policy-makers that supported the U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq said the White House exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq’s nuclear efforts.

“I never cared about the ‘imminent threat,’” said one of the policy-makers.  “The threat was there in (Hussein’s) presence in office.  To me, just knowing what it takes to have a nuclear weapons program, he needed a lot of equipment.  You can stare at the yellowcake (uranium ore) all you want.  You need to convert it to gas and enrich it.  That does not constitute an imminent threat, and the people who were saying that, I think, did not fully appreciate the difficulties and effort involved in producing the nuclear material and the physics package,” the policy-maker said (Gellman/Pincus, Washington Post, Aug. 10).

Iraqi Diplomat Denies Traveling to Niger to Purchase Uranium

Meanwhile, Iraqi diplomat Wissam al-Zahawie has denied that the reason for his visit to Niger in 1999 was to purchase uranium for Iraq, according to the London Independent.

The United States and the United Kingdom have previously accused Iraq of attempting to obtain uranium from Africa.  One of the key pieces of evidence used to support that claim though — documents purporting to show an attempt by Iraq to purchase uranium in Niger — was later revealed to be fraudulent.  Al-Zahawie said he believed he was suspected of attempting to arrange a uranium purchase during his visit because his name appeared on the forged documents.

Al-Zahawie, former Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, said he traveled to Niger to invite the then-president to visit Iraq.

“My only mission was to meet the president of Niger and invite him to visit Iraq,” al-Zahawie said.  “The invitation and the situation in Iraq resulting from the genocidal U.N. sanctions were all we talked about.  I had no other instructions, and certainly none concerning the purchase of uranium,” he said (Raymond Whitaker, London Independent, Aug. 10).

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North Korea:  Three-Day Nuclear Talks Set to Begin Aug. 25

Six-nation talks to defuse the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula are scheduled to begin Aug. 25 and to last three days, the Sydney Morning Herald reported today (see GSN, Aug. 8).

The talks will also involve more senior officials than those who took part in an inconclusive April meeting, according to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  The talks are not expected to produce an immediate solution to the crisis, the Morning Herald reported.

The negotiations are “just a beginning,” according to Chinese President Hu Jintao (Hamish McDonald, Sydney Morning Herald, Aug. 11).

Meanwhile, Russia will hold talks with North and South Korea in Moscow this week, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov.

“The consultations will begin literally the day after tomorrow,” Losyukov said yesterday.  “We are working on the possibility of conducting a similar meeting with Japan in the near future,” he added (Reuters/Pakistan Business Recorder, Aug. 11).

Another senior Russian official dismissed reports that North Korea agreed to multilateral talks only after receiving assurances they would be allowed to meet with U.S. diplomats directly.

“The North Korean side has put forward no conditions, and to my understanding Pyongyang is interested exactly in six-way talks,” said Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov (Reuters/Planet Ark, Aug. 8).

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United States I:  Nuclear “Bunker Busters” May Disperse WMD Agents, Not Destroy Them, Expert Says

By Shawn M. Schmitt
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — An explosion caused by low-yield nuclear “bunker-busting” devices meant to destroy deeply buried chemical and biological weapons would probably not sterilize those agents, but rather would disperse them into the surrounding environment, a Council on Foreign Relations expert said recently (see GSN, Aug. 8).

According to Robert Nelson, senior fellow in science and technology at the council, a nuclear weapon used to attack an underground storage facility would not emit enough heat to properly destroy all the chemical or biological agents that may be stored there.  Because low-yield nuclear weapons would probably need to bore through several feet of solid rock to reach their target, the surrounding earth would simply absorb much of the heat from the nuclear explosion.

The U.S. understanding of the heat produced by nuclear explosions was developed during Cold War-era atmospheric nuclear tests, Nelson said, and many low-yield weapon development advocates may be under a false impression that an underground explosion would produce the amount of heat necessary to disarm the hazardous weapons.

This year, the Bush administration has asked Congress to lift a 1994 ban to allow the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, those with yields below five kilotons.

“The scenarios for bunker busting [and] agent defeat that proponents use to justify new weapons are either ineffective, or only marginally more effective, than conventional alternatives,” said Nelson, who has written a paper on the topic that will be published in the journal Science & Global Security.  “Using a nuclear weapon to destroy CBW [chemical and biological weapons], for example, is more likely to disperse active agent into the environment,” he added.

The U.S. military’s precision-guided weaponry won’t help either, Nelson claimed.  Even the most technologically advanced missiles would still have to hit any chemical and biological weapon cache head-on, with little room for error.

According to Nelson, even if a bunker buster missed its target by only a few feet, there would be a strong possibility that the targeted agents could be released.  The chances for success are decreased even further, Nelson said, when one further considers the uncertainty of military intelligence and the possibility of an enemy routinely shifting the location of its underground stockpiles.

In addition, Nelson noted, the fallout from a low-yield explosion could produce devastating effects and could contaminate civilians and members of the U.S. military in the theater with radiation or dispersed WMD agents.

“Everyone seems to agree that earth-penetrating weapons would produce a lot of fallout,” he said.  “I was surprised at the agent-defeat scenario.  My intuition was wrong like everyone else:  I assumed the heat would sterilize the germs.  But our intuition based on air explosions like the Hiroshima weapon is just wrong when you detonate below ground, where the density of dirt is 2,000 times higher than air.

“There just isn’t enough heat available to sterilize more than a few percent of the material ejected from the crater,” Nelson added.

Nelson said the best way to ensure that chemical and biological agents are properly secured is to seal off the site and sterilize the weapons using conventional means.

“If they are buried underground, the best thing to do is to leave [them] there” until military crews can safely disarm them, he said.

Nelson released his findings during a recent press conference to launch the new book Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, to which he contributed a chapter that focused on the low-yield nuclear issue.  Nelson said officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration are aware of his pending paper, but they plan to conduct their own study.

Resumed Testing Could Answer Questions

Heritage Foundation Fellow Baker Spring said Nelson’s assertions may very well prove true, and the United States could only learn for certain if it resumed nuclear testing.

Nelson said he isn’t opposed to “conceptual” work inside laboratories, but he opposes a U.S. return to explosive testing or the deployment of new weapons.

“By returning to new weapon development and/or testing, the United States would signal that it is still interested in finding new uses for nuclear weapons — especially low-yield tactical or battlefield weapons to be used in Third World conflicts,” he said, noting that various countries may decide to counter the perceived threat from the United States by building and testing their own weapons.

“Russia and China would likely test if the U.S. tests,” Nelson said.  “Russia is also more dependent now on its nuclear forces given that NATO has such conventional superiority.  A renewed U.S. program would give ammunition in Russia and China to their nuclear proponents who wish to develop new weapons of their own,” he said.

Spring, however, said he suspects Nelson’s research is a political work disguised as a scientific study.

Nelson’s technical argument “asserts the ineffectiveness of the weapon prior to testing it,” Spring said.  “Dr. Nelson may well be right.  He believes strongly in his position, so he should have no fear of being proven wrong by the testing program.  Indeed, I suspect he does not fear being proven wrong.  I suspect what he fears is that the testing program itself has policy implications he dislikes,” he added.

“Though I have a different view in this case, there is nothing wrong with Dr. Nelson arguing for a particular policy.  What is wrong is to hide policy arguments behind technological arguments and use the supposedly unassailable technological arguments to imply that all informed and reasonable people must agree to support the same policy position,” Spring said.  Unless direct and compelling policy arguments against undertaking development and testing of this class of weapons are made, it is my view that the program should go forward.”

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Japan:  Taboo Eases on Discussing Nuclear Weapon Possession

The Japanese taboo of discussing the development of nuclear weapons is disappearing, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Feb. 20).

“People are clearly waking up to the idea,” said opposition lawmaker Shingo Nishimura, who was forced to step down in 1999 as vice minister for defense after he suggested that Japan should consider acquiring nuclear weapons.

Senior ruling party officials Yasuo Fukuda and Shintaro Abe have suggested this year that Tokyo consider the nuclear option, AP reported.

“Japan must start saying right now that it might go nuclear,” said Tadae Takubo, a professor of policy at Kyorin University.  “For a nation to entirely forsake nuclear weapons is like taking part in a boxing match and promising not to throw hooks,” Takubo added.

While the discussion of nuclear weapons is becoming more acceptable, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Japan will not seek a nuclear capability.

“Our country’s stance on this will not change,” he said.  “We will do our utmost to advance the call for smaller nuclear arsenals and nuclear nonproliferation while working toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons,” Koizumi added (Yuri Kageyama, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Aug. 9).

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Russia:  Moscow to Begin Testing Bulava SLBM in 2004

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Alexei Moskovsky has said Russia plans to begin testing the new Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile next year, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported today (see GSN, Aug. 7).

Russia is set to begin testing the Bulava SLBM in 2004 on a Typhoon-class submarine, Moskovsky said.  The missile is then set to be installed on three Borey-class submarines, which are scheduled to be operational by 2010, he said. 

Each Borey-class submarine will be armed with 12 Bulavas, Russian defense industry sources said.  Each Bulava, designed to have a range of more than 8,300 kilometers, is expected to be equipped with multiple warheads, according to Jane’s.

The Borey-class submarine has a displacement of 17,000 tons, measures 170 meters in length and has a crew of 130, Jane’s reported.  The submarine is equipped with both a nuclear reactor for high speeds and a low-noise electric engine.  The submarine is also equipped with the latest in underwater noise reduction measures, project officials said (Nikolai Novichkov, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Aug. 13).

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United States II:  GAO Finds Management Problems With Stockpile Maintenance

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Congressional auditors have found budgeting, cost accounting and management problems associated with a U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to extend the operational life of U.S. nuclear weapons, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report released Friday (see GSN, Aug. 5).

In 1996, the U.S. Energy Department created the Stockpile Life Extension Program, which is now conducted by the NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs.  The purpose of the program is to use a standardized approach to refurbish nuclear weapons to extend their operational life. 

As of May, three types of nuclear weapons were undergoing research activities in advance of their refurbishment — the W-80 warhead, the B-61 bomb and the W-76 warhead, according to the report.  The W-80 is intended for use on a cruise missile launched from an attack submarine or B-52 bomber and is scheduled to begin refurbishment in February 2006.  The B-61 bomb is designed to be carried on the B-52 and B-2 bombers and is expected to begin refurbishment in June 2006.  The W-76 warhead is designed to be used on the Trident 2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and is scheduled to begin refurbishment in September 2007.

In its report, the GAO said there are opportunities to improve the budgeting, accounting and management of the stockpile extension program.  The report also says that NNSA officials agreed with the need to improve the management of the program.

The GAO found the NNSA budget for the stockpile extension program to be neither comprehensive nor reliable, the report says.  For example, the NNSA fiscal 2003 budget for the program was developed by broad function, such as research and development activities, instead of by an individual weapon system or program, such as the stockpile extension program, it says. 

The report did find, however, that the NNSA has begun to create a more comprehensive picture of the stockpile extension program for fiscal 2004.  In its fiscal 2004 budget, the NNSA attributed a larger portion, but not all, of life-extension work to the stockpile extension program, the report says.  It recommends that the NNSA further improve budgeting procedures associated with the stockpile extension program by including it as a formal section in the overall NNSA budget submission.

The NNSA also lacks a system for tracking refurbishment costs, according to the report.  It says that the NNSA has yet to create a cost accounting system that provides full costs of refurbishment activities.  Instead, the NNSA has several systems to track various portions of refurbishment costs, but these are used for various purposes and cannot be reconciled with each other, the report says, adding that the NNSA administrator should improve cost accounting procedures associated with the stockpile extension program.

In addition, there are other management concerns related to the planning, organization and oversight of cost and schedule factors for the stockpile extension program, the report says.  For example, the NSSA has yet to prioritize the stockpile extension program among other Office of Defense Program activities or to prioritize the various refurbishment activities, it says.  The report also says that the NNSA lacks an adequate process to report cost and schedule changes against established baselines.  The GAO has recommended that the NNSA begin improving specific management-related activities associated with the program.

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CTBT:  Kyrgyzstan Ratifies Treaty

Kyrgyzstan has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced last week (see GSN, July 23).

In a statement released Aug. 6, the ministry praised Kyrgyzstan’s decision to ratify the CTBT, saying the move was “another step toward ensuring the universal nature of this treaty, which is one of the important tasks facing the international community now” (Russian Foreign Ministry release, Aug. 6).

When Kyrgyzstan submits its ratification to the United Nations, it will become the 105th party to the treaty.  Kyrgyzstan is not one of the 44 nations that must ratify the treaty before it can enter into force.  Of those 44 nations, 32 have ratified the treaty (CTBT Organization).

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Iraq:  DIA Experts Believe Trailers Were for Hydrogen Production

U.S. officials have said engineering experts from the U.S Defense Department’s Defense Intelligence Agency believe that two trailers recovered in Iraq were intended to produce hydrogen, and not biological weapons agents, the New York Times reported Saturday (see GSN, June 27).

A team of DIA engineering experts has determined that the trailers were probably intended to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, as Iraqi scientists had previously claimed, according to the Times.  The views of the DIA experts has caused the DIA to “pursue additional information” to determine the validity of the Iraqi scientists’ claims, a Pentagon official said. 

In May, the CIA and the DIA released a public report saying the trailers were intended for use as mobile biological facilities.  The DIA experts had not completed their work by the time that report was prepared, so their views were not included, U.S. officials said.

Both the CIA and DIA continue to stand by their report that the trailers were intended to produce biological agents, Pentagon and CIA officials said Friday.

“We stand by the white paper,” a Pentagon official said.  “But based on the assessment of the engineering team, it has caused us to pursue additional information about possible alternative uses for the trailers,” the official said (Douglas Jehl, New York Times, Aug. 9).

In late May, U.S. President George W. Bush cited the trailers as direct evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

“For those who say we haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong, we found them,” Bush said during an interview with Polish TV, referring to the two recovered trailers (The State, May 31).

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Anthrax:  FBI Continues to Withhold Letter Accusing Scientist of Planning Biological Attack

The FBI will not release to Ayaad Assaad — an Egyptian-born scientist who formerly worked at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases — a letter sent shortly before the 2001 anthrax attacks that accused Assaad of having the ability to conduct a biological attack, the Washington Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 1).

Shortly before the anthrax attacks became known, the FBI received an anonymous letter that described Assaad as an anti-U.S. fanatic with the knowledge to conduct a biological attack, according to the Times (see GSN, Feb. 27, 2002).  Assaad has been attempting to obtain a copy of the letter since the FBI questioned him about it in October 2001.

Assaad said he believes the letter is connected to anthrax attacks culprit.

“They know damn well that this letter is connected to the anthrax sender,” Assaad said.

The FBI, however, has continued to refuse to provide Assaad with a copy of the letter, the Times reported.  In a note sent to Assaad July 7, the bureau said releasing the letter “could reasonably be expected to disclose the identities of confidential sources and information by such sources.”

An FBI spokeswoman Friday said the letter is “unrelated to the anthrax mailings” (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, Aug. 10).

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United States:  Chemical Weapons Disposal Begins at Anniston

After receiving clearance from a federal judge, the U.S. Army began destroying chemical weapons at the Anniston Army depot in Alabama this weekend (see GSN, Aug. 8).

Community and environmental activists, concerned about possible contamination, have protested the incineration plans at the depot.

“We’re very disappointed today,” said David Christian, an Anniston architect and a protest leader.  “They’re putting poisons in the air and we may not know for years what the effects will be,” he added.

The disposal began with an M-55 rocket that was drained of sarin nerve agent and incinerated.

“That rocket is now history,” said Mike Abrams, a spokesman for the depot.  “This community is now one rocket safer,” he added.

The depot still has tens of thousands of rockets to destroy, the New York Times reported (Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, Aug. 10).

Officials took 36 minutes, which was longer than anticipated, to ensure the smooth destruction of the first rocket.

“The operation was flawless,” said project manager Tim Garrett.  The Army destroyed two rockets Saturday.

Depot officials hope to destroy 40 rockets per hour by next year (Associated Press/Washington Post, Aug. 10).

An additional eight rockets were dismantled Sunday (Associated Press, Aug. 11).

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Japan:  Pentagon Forming Team to Help Joint Missile Defenses

The U.S. Defense Department is establishing a support team to help Japan cooperate with the United States on missile defense, Defense Daily reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The joint service team will not negotiate an agreement on international cooperation, but will work to establish the official links needed to develop Japan’s missile defense systems.  A similar support team has been working with British officials for a year, Defense Daily reported.

The team will likely have a large percentage of Navy personnel because Japan is interested in a sea-based missile defense system, according to an industry official.  The unit “will gradually come online,” the official added (Kerry Gildea, Defense Daily, Aug. 11).

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U.S. Plans:  Army Missile Defense Division Will Work With STRATCOM

The U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command will expand its role within the U.S. Strategic Command in October, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, Aug. 7).

SMDC is set to address global missile defense as part of its integration into STRATCOM, according to Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, SMDC commander.

Army officials plan to begin operating with STRATCOM in October and will be fully operational by January, Aerospace Daily reported.

Cosumano said one of his highest priorities is the establishment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense System at Fort Greely, Alaska.

“We have to be operational at the end of September ’04,” he said.  Cosumano said Army space and missile defense personnel are “providing the ground floor of all that, standup and operations.”

“Colorado National Guard will have the brigade unit that’s stationed here for command and control; the Alaska National Guard will have the unit that’s on the ground at Fort Greely, the actual operators.  All that’s moving very quickly,” he added (Rich Tuttle, Aerospace Daily, Aug. 11).

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