U.S. Response:  Power Blackout Did Not Result in System-Wide Security Increase at Nuclear Plants

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While some of the nine U.S. nuclear power plants affected by yesterday’s massive power failure in the northeastern United States heightened security, there was no systemwide security increase, officials and plant operators told Global Security Newswire today (see GSN, Aug. 12).

Yesterday, nine nuclear plants in Michigan, New York and Ohio shut down because of power grid instabilities, which were not believed to be terrorism-related, according to reports.  All nine plants are in “safe condition” and were using backup diesel generators where appropriate, according to a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission press statement released yesterday.  The NRC said today that eight of the plants had declared an “unusual event,” which is the lowest of four emergency levels. 

An NRC spokesman told GSN today that the unusual events were declared solely because of the blackout and that no “unusual” security measures had been implemented during the blackout.  

Some of the affected plants, however, did heighten security.  Mark Durbin, a spokesman for First Energy, which operates the Perry nuclear power plant in Northeastern Ohio, said emergency teams were activated and would remain in place until the cause of the blackout was determined.  Durban refused to provide further details as to specific security measures the plant had implemented.

The blackout gave the Perry plant a good opportunity to test security procedures, including an opportunity to determine if appropriate measures were in place and if they would work as had been expected, Durbin said.  “That’s a ‘yes’ on both of those counts,” he said.

Steven Stamm, a nuclear industry official, said a power blackout, even one caused by a terrorist attack on the power grid, would have little safety impact on a nuclear plant.

“Taking out the grid is not the way to get to nuclear plants,” Stamm said.

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North Korea:  Pyongyang Uses Covert Approach to Acquire WMD-Related Items

In recent years, North Korea has sought to further its WMD aims by covertly importing related goods and technologies from abroad, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Aug. 13).

The interception earlier this year of a shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes, which could be used to build uranium enrichment centrifuges, helps to illustrate North Korea’s covert purchases, according to the Post.  In early April, the French cargo ship Ville de Virgo docked in Hamburg, where it picked up a shipment of 214 high-strength aluminum tubes apparently purchased by the Chinese Shenyang Aircraft Corp.  Shortly after the ship left Hamburg, however, German intelligence officials learned that the true destination for the tubes was North Korea for use in its nuclear weapons program, the Post reported.

In mid-April, French and German authorities tracked the Ville de Virgo to the eastern Mediterranean and captured the tubes, according to the Post.  German police arrested the owner of a small export firm and discovered plans for North Korea to obtain as many as 2,000 high-strength aluminum tubes, which could have given Pyongyang the ability to produce as many as 3,500 gas centrifuges if it had succeeded, the Post reported.

“The intentions were clearly nuclear,” said a Western diplomat familiar with the investigation.  “The result could have been several bombs’ worth of weapons-grade uranium in a year,” the diplomat said.

Also in early April, a cargo ship left the Japanese port of Kobe Harbor with direct-current stabilizers, which are also used to enrich uranium, according to the Post.  The stabilizers were being shipped to Thailand, where they were then set to be sent to North Korea, the Post reported.  In mid-May, a German manufacturer sold 33 tons of sodium cyanide, which can be used to make tabun, to a buyer believed to be a company based in Singapore (see GSN, May 19).  That shipment as well was to be diverted to North Korea.  Both transfers, however, were blocked.

“There are countries in the world where you can pay $2,000 to a government minister and he’ll sign anything — and then confirm to you that he signed it,” said Rastislav Kacer, a former Slovak deputy defense minister who helped lead an investigation into a covert attempt by North Korea to buy sophisticated radar equipment.  “Documents that are fake can be made to appear very real,” Kacer added (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 15).

Covert Missile Sales

As part of its efforts to generate badly needed hard currency, North Korea allegedly exports ballistic missile-related items and technologies covertly, according to the Washington Post. 

For example, in late June 1999, Indian authorities searched the North Korean freighter Kuwolsan while it was docked in the port of Kandla.  Inside boxes labeled “water refinement equipment,” they found a cache of missile-related items, such as tips of nose cones, machine tools and guidance systems, according to the Post.  They also found in other crates a large number of blueprints for Scud ballistic missiles.  The intended destination of the missile-related items was Libya, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

“In the past we had seen missiles or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale,” an Indian official said.  “This was a complete technology transfer,” the official said.

The missile-related cargo onboard the Kuwolsan might not have been discovered had the ship’s crew not tried to make extra money by picking up a cargo of sugar, according to documents and interviews with officials.  Soon after leaving the North Korean port of Nampo, the ship traveled to two Thai ports to pick up 14,000 tons of sugar to sell along the way, according to records.  When an attempt to sell the sugar to some Algerians collapsed, the ship decided to sell it to an Indian company, requiring the stop at Kandla.

While the ship was sailing to the Indian port, Indian customs officials learned that it might be carrying contraband, according to the Post.  The ship was suspected of carrying weapons or ammunition, possibly to Pakistan.  When the ship arrived in Kandla, Indian port officials were waiting, the Post reported.

“It was crazy,” an Indian investigator said.  “If you’re carrying 200 tons of sensitive equipment, you don’t go picking up extra cargo left and right,” the investigator said (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 14).

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North Korea:  Kelly to Head Delegation for Six-Nation Nuclear Talks

Although he has been deemed “arrogant” and “high-handed” by North Korean officials, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly has been tapped to lead the U.S. delegation to talks this month aimed at easing the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear standoff, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Aug. 14).

Countries involved in the six-nation talks, slated for Aug. 27 to 29 in Beijing, include North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and the United States.

“We have been on the same page for a long time; we are all agreed what the goal is,” a U.S. State Department official said.

Kelly met with officials from Japan and South Korea yesterday in Washington to formulate a unified front when dealing with Pyongyang (Agence France-Presse/YahooNews, Aug. 15).

Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said he is concerned that the six-nation talks could fail if North Korea is not guaranteed a nonagression pact from the United States, AFP reported.

“We face a nuclear problem.  There are expectations for a good settlement but it is true that there is a danger,” Li said (Agence France-Presse II/Singapore Straits Times, Aug. 15).

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India:  Two U.S. Businessmen Win Appeal on Illegal Export Conviction

U.S. District Court Judge Douglas Woodlock last month voided the convictions of two U.S. defense company executives who had been found guilty of selling ballistic missile-related equipment to India without a license, the Boston Globe reported today.

Walter Lachman and Maurice Subilia were convicted in 1995 of violating U.S. export regulations by shipping equipment to India that could have improved its Agni missile (see GSN, April 7).  The two men faced up to 10 years in prison and $5 million in fines, according to the Globe.

At the time, the jury found that Lachman and Subilia knew they needed a license to export the equipment.  In a decision unsealed yesterday, however, Woodlock said he was persuaded by the two’s lawyers who had argued that even U.S. Commerce Department officials were unsure if the equipment was covered under the regulations.

Woodlock said that while Lachman and Subilia’s actions were wrong, they were not illegal.

“I have no doubt … that the defendants here sought — for their own private economic advantage and heedless of the national security interests of this country — to exploit imprecision in the regulatory regime for controlling exports,” Woodlock said in his decision.

Prosecutors said they were “perplexed” by Woodlock’s decision to overturn the guilty verdicts.

“We’re extremely disappointed,” said U.S. Attorney Michael Sullivan.  “The jury heard the evidence with very specific instructions related to the meaning of the statute itself and concluded these defendants violated the act.  He knew they did it and what they were doing is wrong — that’s irreconcilable,” Sullivan said (Andrea Estes, Boston Globe, Aug. 15).

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U.S. Plans I:  Sea-Based Defense Against Boosting Missiles Could Work, Scientist Says

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A prominent scientist yesterday contended that developing missile defenses against intercontinental missiles that are in the boost phase could be feasible in some cases, challenging some conclusions drawn in a recent high-profile technical study.

In a panel presentation at the U.S. military’s National Defense University yesterday, physicist Richard Garwin of the Council on Foreign Relations said he agreed with the recently published calculations of a report by the American Physical Society, calling the report an “excellent job, technically” (see GSN, Aug. 15).

However, Garwin said he differed on some of its “implications,” in particular that U.S. land- or sea-based interceptors would not have sufficient time to intercept missiles launched from North Korea or Iran.

The APS study concludes that sea- and land-based boost-phase missile defenses currently pursued by the Bush administration for defending the U.S. homeland generally would not be feasible, and space-based defenses might be prohibitively costly.

The report concludes that the three to four minutes needed for an enemy rocket to launch into space would probably provide the United States with insufficient opportunity to destroy it unless U.S. sea- or land-based forces were prepositioned as close as 400 kilometers to the enemy missiles.

That would mean, the report calculates, that U.S. missiles would need to be fired from China or Russia — an unlikely scenario — to defend effectively against North Korean-launched missiles as they headed toward the United States.  In addition, the United States would need to place missiles in Central Asia to intercept an Iranian missile launch, the report says.

To solve the problem, “interceptors would have to be built substantially larger and capable of higher performance than any that have yet been built or deployed,” the report says.

Plus, there also would be a risk the U.S. interceptors could be mistaken for missiles attacking China or Russia, the report says.

Firing Earlier

Garwin challenged those conclusions by arguing that a U.S. ship could fire on a suspected attacking missile soon after its launch, even before knowing precisely where to aim the interceptors.

“Before there is a firing solution, we could cover the uncertainty by firing two interceptors,” he said.

Garwin said it would not be necessary to wait for a solution because there would be no risk that the U.S. interceptors would strike anything but a ballistic missile and, if unsuccessful, they could be destroyed in mid-air to avoid casualties on the ground, he said.

“The question is, what is the downside risk of launching an interceptor in error?  The only thing it can kill is a boost-phase rocket,” he said.

The APS report presumes that an exact firing solution would be needed before launching an interceptor, requiring possibly 45 to 65 seconds after launch, and that more time would be used to make and communicate the decision on whether or not to fire, factoring the possibility that the targeted launch may be for peaceful purposes, such as launching a satellite into space.

Garwin previously has written that countries such as North Korea and Iran would probably give notification prior to a peaceful launch to avoid such an incident.

“At worst, the United States would destroy a satellite launch and pay for it,” he wrote in an Arms Control Today article.

With respect to positioning a defense against an Iranian launch, Garwin further said it might not be too difficult to base U.S. interceptors in Central Asia.

“That’s not so unlikely as it sounded in the past, because Turkmenistan has been for some time an ally of ours [with respect to military activities in] Afghanistan,” he said.

Panel moderator Hans Binnendijk, director of NDU’s Center for Technology and Security Policy, said the APS report tended to “understate” the potential that a sea-based option could be effective against a North Korean liquid-fueled missile launch.

“At least in this one case, which turns out to be the most likely case, the conclusion would be that there is real capability,” he said.

Other Differences

Garwin also disagreed with the judgment that that a missile-defense launch might be mistaken as an attack on Russia or China.

“If we wanted to launch a nuclear missile against Russia or China … it is very unlikely we would take the opportunity to launch it from a ship off North Korea or from someplace in the Caspian Sea,” he said.

Garwin challenged the APS conclusion that it might take 10 years to deploy an effective surface-based boost-phase missile-defense system, saying the technology for faster rockets exists but has not been used for boost-phase and that a defense could be available in five years.

The APS report concludes, “We see no means for deploying an effective boost-phase defense against ICBMs within 10 years.”

Various Disadvantages to Boost-Phase Approach

Garwin’s comments were not universally supportive of the boost-phase approach.

He said deploying interceptors in space, another option considered by the Bush administration, would be inferior to basing them on the Earth’s surface, citing the difficulties of positioning enough multiton interceptors in orbit to ensure that some would always be in place over a target country.

The approach would be “vastly more expensive” than terrestrial-based interceptors, he said.

He also said there was a disadvantage to the boost-phase approach in general: that a successful intercept would not necessarily disable a nuclear warhead or biological weapons bomblets on an enemy missile, raising the possibility that they would land on a populated area.

The APS study called such a munitions “shortfall” on a populated area or other country a “key problem inherent in boost-phase defense.”

Garwin said though that it might still be considered a success, saying the trajectory of the warhead would probably be changed by the intercept, causing it to fall on a less-populated area than on a targeted major city, potentially decreasing the damage by a factor of 100.

“We should do so well with the other military capabilities we deploy,” he said.

Garwin said North Korea or Iran would probably not attack the United States using an intercontinental ballistic missile in the first place.

“That would not be the delivery means of choice,” he said.

More likely scenarios would be a shorter-range attack from a vessel off the U.S. coast or a weapon smuggled in a shipborne container, he said.

The APS study concludes that existing technology intended for sea-based boost-phase defenses could be effectively used against such shorter-range missile threats, where interceptors are positioned within 10 kilometers of a launched threat.

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U.S. Plans II:  Missile Interceptor Booster Test Delayed, Set for Saturday

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has delayed until tomorrow a planned test of a booster vehicle developed for use in the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense program, according to Defense Daily (see GSN, Aug. 6).

The test of the booster, developed by Orbital Science Corp., had originally been scheduled for today, but was delayed because of software problems, Defense Daily reported.  To reboot the software required recertification from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and the Western Test Range and resulted in the one-day delay, agency spokesman Rick Lehner said yesterday (Kerry Gildea, Defense Daily, Aug. 15).

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U.S. Plans III:  Army to Detail Proposal in October for Patriot, MEADS Program Merger

This fall, the U.S. Army is expected to provide more details on its proposal to merge the Patriot missile interceptor program and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, June 9).

Michael Wayne, acting defense undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, has called on the Army to present a detailed plan in October for the merger of the two programs, according to a Pentagon “information paper” released yesterday. 

The proposal is expected to contain information on how to the Army will fund the combined program in the fiscal 2005-2009 future years defense program, according to Aerospace Daily (Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily, Aug. 15).

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Nuclear Waste:  U.S. Energy Department Could Further Improve Security of Spent-Fuel Shipments, GAO Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While studies indicate that the transportation of spent nuclear fuel is generally safe, the U.S. Energy Department can do more to further reduce the risk of an accidental release, either through a transportation accident or intentional attack, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report released yesterday (see GSN, July 29).

Currently, there are more than 50,000 tons of spent fuel stored at more than 70 sites located at, or near, nuclear power plants in 33 states.  This spent fuel is to be shipped to a long-term nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, which the Energy Department plans to have constructed and operational by 2010.  The department has estimated that it will require 175 shipments annually for 23 years by both road and rail to move the 50,000 tons to the Yucca repository, according to the report.

Studies conducted by the Energy Department and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicate a low risk of public harm from an transportation accident or terrorist attack on a spent-fuel shipment, the report says.  The spent fuel itself is neither explosive nor volatile and it cannot be easily dispersed to contaminate an area with radiation.  In addition, the casks used to transport the spent fuel have been found to allow little release of material if penetrated.

Some experts, however, have argued that the release of spent fuel could put the public at risk.  During the congressional debate last year over whether to approve the construction of the Yucca Mountain repository, Nevada officials, who strenuously oppose the project, warned that studies conducted on their behalf indicated that a successful attack on a spent fuel shipment could result in latent cancer deaths in the surrounding population (see GSN, May 24, 2002).

Congressional auditors found that while spent-fuel shipments may be relatively safe, the Energy Department could do more to further improve security, according to the report.  For example, Energy could choose to reduce the overall number of spent-fuel shipments by moving more of the material per shipment, the report says.  The department is required under contract with the spent fuel owners, mostly nuclear power plants, to transport spent fuel to a repository based on when the fuel was removed from a nuclear reactor.  If Energy maintained that schedule for the 12 largest nuclear plants, more than 575 shipments would be needed.  If Energy was allowed to move larger quantities of spent fuel from each site, however, about 300 shipments could be eliminated, according to the report.

Energy could also improve the security of spent-fuel shipments by transporting older stockpiles first since they are less radioactive, the report says.  Spent-fuel owners, however, have the authority to determine which material will be transported to a repository, which could result in owners choosing to move more radioactive material out of wet storage pools to free up additional storage space, it adds.

Representative Joe Barton (R-Texas), who requested the report, said the GAO’s findings helps to dispel security concerns raised by Yucca Mountain opponents, who he said wanted to shut down the nuclear power industry.

“Spent nuclear fuel belongs at Yucca Mountain when that facility is licensed,” Barton said yesterday in a press statement.  “Opponents of nuclear power exploited fears of terrorist activity and said waste should not be moved off-site.  Not only is that a backdoor way to try and stop nuclear power, but that argument is also wrong, as this GAO report indicates,” he said.

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