U.S. Response:  China Formally Joins Container Security Initiative

China has formally agreed to join the U.S. Container Security Initiative, U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner said last week (see GSN, July 23).

Under the agreement, U.S. inspectors will be stationed at the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen, which account for eight percent of all sea containers that enter the United States.  With China joining the CSI, countries representing 19 out of the top 20 ports in the world have now joined the initiative, Bonner said (U.S. State Department release, Aug. 5).

Back to top

Iraq:  Biological, Chemical Weapons Largely Ruled Out in U.S. Pneumonia Cases

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army has dispatched two epidemiological teams to Iraq and the surrounding region to investigate a recent rash of pneumonia cases among U.S. troops in the region, U.S. Defense Department officials said yesterday.  Of the 100 cases diagnosed since March, two soldiers have died and more than a dozen have been hospitalized.

“We’re sparing no effort to fully analyze and diagnose this condition,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Clinical and Program Policy David Tornberg said at a Pentagon briefing.

Streptococcus has been identified as the cause of pneumonia in at least two of the cases, Col. Robert DeFraites of the Office of the Army Surgeon General said at the briefing, but no such cause has been established for the two deaths.

No evidence so far indicates any biological warfare agent has played a role in any of the cases, DeFraites said.

“We’ve found no evidence of anthrax, smallpox or any other biological agent [to which] we can attribute the pneumonia,” DeFraites said.

“Based on all the information we have to date, there’s been no positive findings of any anthrax or smallpox or any other biological weapons.  So [I have come] pretty close to ruling it out,” he said.

DeFraites added after the briefing that chemical weapons have also been ruled out as a cause of the pneumonia cases.

Pneumonia is generally caused by infections, usually bacterial, or by noninfectious factors such as inhalation of dust, metals or smoke.  The American Lung Association lists inhaled food, liquid, gases and dust as noninfectious causes of pneumonia.  The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Web site indicates a kind of “chemical pneumonia” can result from exposure to mustard gas.

Deaths Led to Dispatch of Special Teams

Fifteen of the U.S. troops with pneumonia have been placed on respirators, 10 of them in Iraq, DeFraites said, adding that the last confirmed case emerged last Wednesday.  No link has been established so far among the troops that developed pneumonia, and none of them appears to have transmitted any infection to any of the others, he said.

DeFraites said the total number of cases, at about 100, is within the range one would expect under normal conditions, given that up to 500 pneumonia cases are registered worldwide each year in the U.S. Army.

Nevertheless, the two deaths, which both occurred over the last two months, spurred the Army to send in the investigative teams, DeFraites said.  Seventeen Army troops died of pneumonia during the five-year period ending last year, he said.

Back to top

International Response:  U.S. Delays Call for South Korea to Join Proliferation Security Initiative

A rough draft of a speech given yesterday by Gen. Leon LaPorte, the top U.S commander in South Korea, included a call for Seoul to join an international effort to intercept shipments of WMD-related cargo, but the general left out that section when he delivered the speech, according to the Korea Times (see GSN, Aug. 4).

“The navy of the future must join in the effort to interdict WMD (weapons of mass destruction) delivery,” said the draft of LaPorte’s speech, which was prepared for the eighth International Sea Powers Symposium, hosted by the South Korean Navy.

LaPorte did not mention that South Korea should join the Proliferation Security Initiative, however, when he actually gave the speech, according to the Korea Times.  Lee Ferguson, a spokeswoman for U.S. Forces Korea, said the rough draft of the speech had been provided to reporters by mistake.

A South Korean official said no decision has been made yet on South Korea joining the initiative.

“Nothing has been decided on South Korea’s participation in the PSI so far, as the meeting itself has not yet progressed to a stage where it can court new members,” the official said.

The official also said that South Korea may be asked to join the initiative during the next meeting of PSI members, scheduled to be held next month in Paris (Seo Soo-min, Korea Times, Aug. 6).

Back to top

British Response:  Hundreds Have Received WMD Response Training This Year

More than 700 British health care workers have received training this year in responding to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, the British Health Protection Agency said yesterday (see GSN, May 29).  The agency is also “scanning the horizon” for new biological and chemical threats, agency Chief Executive Pat Troop said (Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 6).

Back to top

Iran I:  Tehran Reports “Positive” Talks With IAEA Legal Experts

Iran this week held “positive and constructive” talks with legal experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Reuters reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The legal team arrived in Tehran Monday to discuss Iran’s possible signing of the Additional Protoco to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow for more intrusive monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities.  The talks were set to continue today, the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency announced.

Conservatives in Iran have denounced the Additional Protocol.

“The notion that accepting the Additional Protocol will exculpate Iran is an infantile and amateurish supposition,” said Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the hard-line Kayhan newspaper.  “The only thing which can foil the plot hatched jointly by America, the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency against Islamic Iran is our withdrawal from the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty],” he added (Reuters/Yahoo!News, Aug. 6).

Members of the reformist-dominated legislature, however, are pushing for Iran’s accession to the protocol.

First Deputy Speaker Mohammed Khatami called for leaders to sign the protocol to build confidence with the international community.

“Iran has always welcomed cooperation on global issues,” he said (IRNA/BBC Monitoring, Aug. 6).

Pakistan Denies Nuclear Assistance

Pakistan yesterday denied a Los Angeles Times report that said Pakistani nuclear scientists had assisted Iran in developing a nuclear weapon (see GSN, Aug. 4).

“Pakistan’s commitments, affirmed at the highest level, that it would not export any sensitive technologies to third countries remains unquestionable,” the Pakistani embassy in Washington said in a statement (Pakistan Embassy release, Aug. 5).

Back to top

Iran II:  Tie Russian Nuclear Assistance to Additional Protocol, Report Says

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Russia should continue its nuclear assistance to Iran only if Tehran agrees to allow intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities, according to a report from a Russian think tank released last month (see GSN, Aug. 5).

Iran is currently considering signing the Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, which would allow the agency to conduct unannounced inspections and environmental testing.  A team of legal experts is currently in Tehran discussing the fine points of the agreement (see related GSN story, today).

In an effort to boost its nuclear industry, Moscow is helping Tehran build a nuclear plant in the southern Iranian city of Bushehr.  The United States has accused Iran of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons, and using the Bushehr technology to aid that effort.  Iranian leaders have denied the charges and said that the nuclear development is to provide power to their burgeoning population.

“Russia must stiffen its position on Iran’s accession to the Additional Protocol and directly link further cooperation in the field of nuclear power engineering to the resolution of this question,” wrote Vasily Lata and Anton Khlopkov of the PIR Center in Moscow.

Russia should also demand that Iran return used nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Moscow, so that it could not be used to develop fissile material for nuclear weapons, the report says.

“Negotiations over the details of the protocol on the return of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] have been going on a long time; however, to date no agreement has been signed,” according to the report (see GSN, July 17).

Lata and Khlopkov played down the potential for Iran to apply Russia’s civilian nuclear assistance to a nuclear weapons effort.

An Iranian opposition group this year revealed several secret nuclear facilities in Iran, including a centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz.  U.S. officials said that these sites are part of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.  The report acknowledges the enrichment site as a cause for concern and says that there are reasons to worry about Iran’s intentions. 

“The fact that Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle facilities (from the uranium mines to the uranium enrichment plant …) and launchers for the Scud-B, Scud-C, and Shahab attack missiles are located in the same region is an additional reason for concern,” the report says.

Iran’s nuclear and missile technologies could come together within the next three years, according to the report.

“The authors’ estimates indicate that by 2006, one year after the enrichment complex at Natanz has become operational, Iran will have acquired the technical capability to join the club of states that possess nuclear missile capabilities,” the report says.

Still, the authors urged Moscow to remain involved in Iran’s nuclear industry.  According to the report, the Bushehr work provides the Russian economy with more than $1 billion and about 20,000 jobs.  Moscow is currently negotiating with Washington over possible U.S. funding for improved containers to transport spent nuclear fuel back to Russia, according to the report.

Ultimately, the report says that the light-water reactor development at Bushehr does not help Iran develop nuclear weapons.

“At the present time there are no good reasons making it worthwhile for Russia to harm its trade and economic relations with Iran,” the report says.

Back to top

United States:  Nevada Does Not Want Pit Production Site

Nevada officials this week issued their opposition to the U.S. Energy Department’s consideration of the Nevada Test Site as the location for a new facility to produce plutonium triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons, according to Energy Daily (see GSN, Aug. 1).

In comments submitted in response to Energy’s draft environmental impact statement on the Modern Pit Facility, Nevada officials said the department did not consider “the potential stigmatizing effects” of the facility on the state, Energy Daily reported.  Nevada officials also said the department could not be counted on to operate the facility safely due to its record of favoring weapons production over safe operations at other nuclear weapons sites.

“DOE’s track record in this regard at almost all its facilities is atrocious, and nothing in the draft EIS demonstrates that DOE has learned the management, oversight and ‘cultural’ lessons of the past,” the officials said in their comments (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, Aug. 6).

Back to top

U.S. Response:  Two Groups Urge Better Health Communication, Coordination

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States needs better communication and coordination among agencies at various levels of government in order to better respond to fast-moving disease outbreaks, such as in the case of a bioterrorism attack, two groups of researchers said yesterday in new reports.

According to the first report, released yesterday by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Washington must commit long-term funding to build a nationwide health communication system if the nation’s health system is to be adequately equipped to detect or respond to a potential bioterrorism incident.

Funded by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, the report was prepared over 18 months.  It includes a broad variety of recommendations for improving public information and intra- and interagency communication to better deter and respond to a potential terrorist attack.

Led by Michael Powers, a senior fellow at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and former arms control and nonproliferation analyst with Boeing, the authors said U.S. public health officials need more “robust” communications systems at and among all levels of government to foster better outbreak monitoring, communication before and during crises and training and education programs.

“Federal funding must be provided with a long-term commitment to support a national health communication system,” the authors wrote, adding that state and local governments do not have the requisite resources to fund such an enterprise.

“The foundations for a nationwide health and medical communications network have just been established.  In the end, only a serious and sustained financial commitment can put the technical infrastructure in place and build the social network to make a truly effective public health information and communication system a reality.  Efforts to build the necessary technical and social infrastructure are ongoing, but not at the needed levels of intensity,” the report reads.

Powers said in an interview that the U.S. public safety and public health spheres present two separate problems where communications infrastructure is concerned.  Public safety networks exist that can be gradually integrated into an adequate national system, he said, while public health presents a chance to build infrastructure that in many cases is sorely lacking.

“What you’re trying to do is almost, in a sense, build from scratch,” Powers said of information technology infrastructure in some parts of the country’s health system.

Powers said health facilities in even some medium-sized cities rely on antiquated computers and do without the most basic networking capabilities.

“For them to put together some kind of IT-based monitoring system or communication system [would] be very difficult,” he said.

Institute senior fellow Jonathan Ban said existing Centers for Disease Control systems — including the Health Alert Network, which relies in part on faxes and e-mail, and the nascent National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, which now has at least a small presence in most states — could provide a basis for an eventual national network capable of detecting and responding to a bioterrorism incident in timely fashion.

The National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, he said, could support the wide dissemination of data from many small-scale systems such as the University of Pittsburgh’s Real-time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance project (see GSN, Dec. 3, 2002) and the Rapid Syndrome Validation Project in New Mexico.

Ban cautioned, though, that any rapid, truly national disease surveillance system will take time to emerge.

“It’s a long-term prospect to get this into place. … If we put a lot of money at it, we might be able to get something in the five- to seven-year range,” he said.

Despite their call for federally funded infrastructure improvements, the researchers stressed the importance of improving health workers’ ability to recognize signs of a chemical or biological attack.

“Technical surveillance systems should not be viewed as a ‘silver bullet,’” they wrote, calling for improved training and education programs for health workers that “include response techniques for a wider variety of terrorism contingencies.”

Trust for America’s Health Calls for More Coherence

The Trust for America’s Health said yesterday in a separate report that U.S. handling of animal-borne diseases is largely uncoordinated and in need of reform.

The study, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Palmer Foundation, focused on recent outbreaks of monkeypox, West Nile virus, “mad cow” disease, Lyme disease and chronic wasting disease (see GSN, June 12).

The authors, who included American Public Health Association Executive Director Georges Benjamin and Trust for America’s Health Executive Director Shelley Hearne, said that up to seven Cabinet-level agencies and hundreds of state and local organizations have participated in responding to the outbreaks, with little discernible overall coordination.

The researchers called for congressional hearings on creating a national system to handle such diseases and for a national tracking network.

“Leadership is needed to ensure that the various governmental agencies — at the federal, state and local level — are coordinated, well-functioning and capable of responding rapidly across jurisdictional boundaries.  Just as the Department of Homeland Security coordinates different aspects of national security, there must be a concerted effort to ensure that we, as a nation, attack animal-borne diseases in a high-priority, unified, coherent, streamlined and well-managed way,” the report reads.

Back to top

United States I:  Army Delays Anniston Incineration

The U.S. Army has agreed to delay the incineration of chemical weapons agents at an incinerator in Anniston, Ala., until a hearing can be held on an environmental group’s request for a temporary restraining order, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The Army was originally set to begin the incineration today.  U.S. District Judge Thomas Jackson, however, scheduled a hearing for Friday to consider a request by the Chemical Weapons Working Group for a temporary restraining order to delay the disposal process. 

An incinerator spokesman said the Army believes the judge would dismiss the environmental group’s request.

“The Army believes that it has fully complied with all legal requirements pertaining to the (incinerator) startup and emphasizes that public safety remains its primary concern,” spokesman Jim Abrams said (Associated Press/Washington Times, Aug. 6).

Back to top

United States II:  Officials Find Leaking Mustard Gas at Deseret Depot

Officials detected leaking mustard agent Monday at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah, the Tooele Transcript Bulletin reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 1, 2002).

Vapor from the mustard agent was detected during standard monitoring, and workers in protective suits discovered the leaking 155 mm munition.  About 1 teaspoon of the gas had leaked, and it was neutralized.

The surrounding area was not endangered, the Transcript Bulletin reported (Tooele Transcript Bulletin, Aug. 5).

Back to top

United States III:  Army Will Pay Fines for Johnston Atoll Violations

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has announced that the U.S. Army has agreed to pay a fine to resolve environmental violations at the now-closed nerve agent disposal plant on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the Honolulu Advertiser reported yesterday (see GSN, April 30).

According to the EPA, the Army has agreed to pay a fine of $91,125 to resolve alleged violations that arose from a December 2000 discovery of VX in a bin of incinerator ash, according to the Advertiser.  The Army has also agreed to spend more than $180,000 to restore native plants on part of the atoll. 

The Johnston Atoll nerve agent disposal facility was closed in 2001 (Jan TenBruggencate, Honolulu Advertiser, Aug. 5).

Back to top

United States IV:  Odor Concerns May Slow Treatment of CW Disposal Byproducts

Concerns about bad smells have prompted an Ohio air pollution control agency to demand improvements at a Dayton waste treatment plant before that facility receives a byproduct from the planned chemical weapon disposal operation at the U.S. Army’s Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana (see GSN, July 16).

The Regional Air Pollution Control Agency said the plant, operated by Perma-Fix Environmental Services Inc., has violated regulations.  Until it address concerns, the company should not accept a U.S. Army contract to dispose of 300,000 gallons of hydrolysate, which is created through the neutralization of VX, said agency Director John Paul.

“They need to convince us they can operate odor-free right now before they bring in new products that have a high probability of more odor,” Paul said.

Perma-Fix officials said they have worked to reduce emissions from the plant and are installing new equipment to control odors (Associated Press, Aug. 6).

Back to top

North Korea:  Pyongyang and Tehran Discussing Missile Purchase

The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported today that North Korea is currently negotiating to sell Iran Taepodong 2 long-range ballistic missiles, according to Reuters (see GSN, July 25).

North Korea plans to ship Taepodong 2 components to Iran, where they will then be assembled at a factory near Tehran, according to the Japanese newspaper.  North Korea is also planning to dispatch missile experts to Iran and to work with Tehran on the joint development of nuclear warheads (see related GSN story, today).

North Korea and Iran have been discussing plans for increased missile and nuclear weapons cooperation for about a year, the Japanese newspaper reported.  The two countries are expected to reach an agreement by mid-October (Reuters/CNN.com, Aug. 6).

Clinton Invited Kim to White House to Reach Missile Agreement

Meanwhile, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has disclosed in a new book that former President Bill Clinton invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to visit Washington to reach an agreement to stop Pyongyang’s missile program.

In late 2000, Clinton secretly asked Kim to travel to Washington in an attempt to persuade Kim to sign an agreement ceasing all North Korean missile activities, including missile-related exports, according to Albright’s book Madam Secretary, excerpts of which are to be published in the September issue of Vanity Fair.  Clinton issued the invitation after determining that time constraints and other issues would prevent him from accepting Kim’s public invitation to travel to Pyongyang. 

Kim, however, turned down Clinton’s invitation (George Gedda, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 6).

Back to top

U.S. Plans:  Pentagon Delays GMD Booster Rocket Tests

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has decided to delay tests of competing booster rockets being developed by defense contractors Lockheed Martin and Orbital Sciences for use in the Ground-based Missile Defense system, Inside Missile Defense reported today (see GSN, April 18).

In February, the agency sent Congress a proposed testing schedule that called for two booster verification tests to be held in the second and third quarter of fiscal 2003, according to Inside Missile Defense.  Under that schedule, Lockheed Martin’s booster would be tested first followed by Orbital’s booster.  The agency said last week that it has decided to test Orbital’s booster this month, and Lockheed’s booster will probably be tested in September.

Once those tests have been conducted, the agency plans to test the boosters carrying payloads in two integrated flight tests, which were originally scheduled to be held in the third and fourth quarters of fiscal 2003, Inside Missile Defense reported.  Those tests are now set to be held in the fall at the test site on Kwajalein Island, the agency said.

If the integrated flight tests are successful, the agency plans to conduct an intercept test using one of the two booster designs, according to Inside Missile Defense.  That test had originally been scheduled for first quarter of fiscal 2004, but is now scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal 2004 (Thomas Duffy, Inside Missile Defense, Aug. 6).

Back to top

United States:  Officials Providing Mixed Signals on Patriot’s Record in Iraq

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. military officials have been presenting mixed signals on how well Patriot missile defenses worked during the Iraq war, with the release of details on a much-awaited U.S. Army study on the performance experiencing delay and a second, Army inspector general review underway.

For several months since Patriots were fired against nine Iraqi missiles during the conflict, some officials, Patriot commanders in particular, have characterized its performance as nearly or fully effective.  Two senior missile defense officials, however, have publicly said such judgments should wait for the conclusion and release of results from a formal performance review.

Statements by those officials, one as recently as July 8, suggested reported conclusions about Patriot’s high effectiveness were based largely on tallied successful “engagements,” which are the number of Iraqi missiles, fired at by Patriot interceptors, and that did not cause any damage.

The aim of the Army review, however, has been to determine whether those nine reported successful engagements were caused by Patriot “intercepts,” where Patriot missiles or Patriot warhead fragments hit the Iraqi missile, possibly “killing” the Iraqi warhead, as opposed to bad Iraqi technology or aim.  The review, officials have said, includes surveying the desert for signs of warhead explosions and reviewing recorded “black box” and radar data.

Senior Army officials appear reluctant to rely primarily on engagement statistics to publicly characterize the Patriot’s record, as they did to claim a high success rate during the 1991 Gulf War.  Later analyses suggested that while Patriots successfully “engaged” many Iraqi missiles at the time, very few Patriots actually intercepted their targets or killed the warheads.

Reports of Effectiveness

Some U.S. military officials mostly without being identified have been telling reporters that the Patriots were successful against eight or nine of the nine Iraqi missiles engaged during the recent war (see GSN, April 16).  One official told Global Security Newswire Friday that the “battle damage assessment” from the “air-defense community” is “eight-of-nine enemy warheads killed” in the air by the Patriots.

In a rare on-the-record comment, Lt. Col. Joe DeAntona, who commanded a Patriot battalion that actually launched interceptors during the war, said Patriots “destroyed” nine Iraqi missiles, according to a July 15 Associated Press report.

Two of the military’s most senior missile defense officials, however, have cautioned against drawing such conclusions before the study of the Patriot’s record is complete.

“Here’s what we don’t know.  We don’t know the overall effectiveness of the Patriot system.  The Army’s assessing that and will be presenting that shortly,” Army Maj. Gen. Peter Franklin, then the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency, said July 8.

“We’re sorting through all of that data now to give the scientific answer as to how effective Patriot was,” Army Space and Missile Defense Command Director Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano said in April.  Cosumano is overseeing the review.

A major aspect of the Army’s unfinished review is to determine exactly what the Patriot’s record was in terms of intercepts and kills, said Army spokesman Maj. Gary Tallman last week.

“That’s working right now.  That’s going to be part of the official performance review,” he said.

Counting Engagements

Despite the controversial claims of 1991 Patriot success and the pending review, some officials have continued to equate the lack of damage from Iraqi missiles with Patriot success in the recent war.

In his April 24 remarks, Cosumano indicated that this was how the Patriot’s battlefield commander viewed the success of the U.S. missile defense system.

“The commander in the field says it was apparently very effective because there was nothing damaged,” he said.

Maj. Gen. Stanley Green, then commander of the Army’s Air Defense Artillery Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, appeared to use such a formulation to characterize Patriot’s success for a May 8, Boston Globe story.

“We think that we engaged missiles that saved hundreds of lives at the least and allowed us to execute and prosecute the war on our terms from the start,” he said.

Some unidentified officials have gone further, asserting to the press that actual intercepts and kills have been confirmed.

In the first such story, on April 16, the Boston Globe reported that eight Iraqi missiles were “destroyed in the air,” while another was “significantly damaged and landed without causing harm,” attributing the information to an unidentified U.S. Central Command official.

Counting Intercepts, Kills

A week after that story, in an apparent corrective, Cosumano told reporters that while Patriots “engaged” nine Iraqi missiles, various radar and other data was being collected to determine how many Patriots actually connected with Iraqi missiles (see GSN, April 24).

“There’ve been some quotes out of CENTCOM, and I’ll just re-emphasize what those were.  Of the nine potential TBMs [theater ballistic missiles] that could be engaged by Patriot, they were engaged and appeared to be effective,” he said.

Cosumano said, though, that the formal review would determine the “scientific answer of how effective Patriot was.”

“So now, the next step of that is the science and engineering questions that always have to be answered, of ‘OK, what does effectiveness mean?’  To the combatant commander there was no damage on the ground, so you did what you were supposed to do.  You protected the force,” he said.

The Army last week declined a Global Security Newswire request for definitions for the terms it will use to describe the Patriot’s performance until it provides its briefing.  Army spokesmen have said they are not authorized to comment officially on the review until it is completed and a public briefing is given.

Questions About Evidence

Reviewing the Patriot’s record does not appear to be a cut and dry endeavor from either a technical or public relations perspective. 

Potentially complicating the Army’s data assessment, according to a prominent Patriot critic, is the fact that recording devices on some of the Patriot batteries were not operating during the action, a situation that officials have acknowledged.

Data from those “black boxes” is key for determining exactly how the Patriots performed and its absence would make conclusions about the system’s success questionable, said Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Theodore Postol.

Without the data, he said, “They don’t have information to justify the performance claims.”

Cosumano has suggested otherwise, saying in April that while some Patriot black boxes did not operate, “new sources of data” such as from Aegis ship radars would be assessed in the review.

An alternative method for assessing the Patriot’s record, Postol said, is to survey the desert for craters, or a lack of craters, to attempt to judge how many warheads were destroyed in the sky, or rather, exploded when hitting the ground.

He questioned that method, however, saying it would require a search by many people over a large area using strong information about where to look.

Postol also questioned the Army’s commitment to thoroughly searching for such evidence, citing a 1992 General Accounting Office report that said the Army’s damage assessment following the Gulf War was limited because a single engineer in Saudi Arabia had conducted a search for 24 days in February and March 1991.  That investigator had relied heavily on photographs and interviews with military personnel assigned to the Patriot units, and conducted the search days and weeks after the missile engagement, when craters might have been filled or missile debris removed, that report said.

Franklin, in his July 8 comments, said the Army’s review was still conducting a search of the ground for debris.

“We don’t know the complete battle damage assessment.  We don’t have an assessment of the debris impact at this point,” he said.

An official said last week the disclosure of the results of the review were delayed after Cosumano asked its preparers to provide additional information for addressing potential questions from the press.

The Army is not expected to release the actual study, the official said.

In another development said to cause further delay, the Army’s inspector general has begun his own review of the Patriot’s record.

According to another official, the Army might not brief the public on its review until the inspector general’s assessment is known, perhaps to “reconcile” differing conclusions.

Back to top