By Joe Fiorill Global Security Newswire
VIENNA — International Atomic Energy Agency governing board members unexpectedly adjourned current talks here before noon today and are now holding behind-the-scenes discussions on a U.S.-backed proposal that would give Iran until Oct. 31 to address allegations that it is covertly conducting activities that appear related to nuclear weapon development (see GSN, Sept. 9).
France, Germany and the United Kingdom yesterday submitted the draft resolution, which was obtained today by Global Security Newswire. The United States and Japan have associated themselves with the measure, as have at least 10 other countries on the 35-member board, according to diplomats.
A competing South African resolution, which has no other official sponsors but is apparently supported by a number of Nonaligned Movement countries, would have the board call on Iran to step up cooperation with the IAEA but, under the version seen today by GSN, would set no deadline.
Speaking on behalf of the NAM, Malaysian Ambassador Hussein Haniff told Reuters today that setting a deadline for Iran would also imply a deadline for the IAEA.
“We want to give [IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei] a free hand to decide,” he said, adding, “If you have a specific deadline, then there is also a sense that you’re telling (ElBaradei) that you must complete your job by that time.”
Iranian envoy Ali Akbar Salehi said Iran has objections to both texts but that the South African draft is “more negotiable.”
“This business of a deadline, this idea of a deadline, is just absurd,” Salehi said.
Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi also criticized the U.S.-European position, according to Agence France-Presse.
“The posture of certain countries is irresponsible and arrogant,” he said, adding, “If the extremists take control of the matter and do not recognize our legitimate rights to have peaceful nuclear activities, we will then be obliged to review the situation and the current level of cooperation with the agency.”
The board has now wrapped up its whole agenda for the meeting except for an item on Iran’s nuclear programs. It is expected to reconvene tomorrow morning to discuss Iran.
ElBaradei told reporters just after the board adjourned that “intensive consultations” are taking place.
“There’s a broad agreement that the board would like to see a deadline,” he said, adding that he thinks “Iran should come with an immediate, complete declaration.”
The United States has been the leader in pushing for international action to counter Iran’s alleged bid to develop nuclear weapons under cover of legitimate nuclear activities. The U.S.-backed draft would have the board call on Iran to “provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency,” “ensure there are no further failures” in reporting of nuclear activities, and suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs “as a confidence-building measure.”
Under the draft, the board would deem it “‘essential and urgent’ … that Iran remedy all failures identified by the agency and cooperate fully with the agency to ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003.” A Western diplomat said the deadline would give Iran a “significant enough period of time … to comply.”
The “necessary actions” in question, according to the draft, include “a full declaration of the sources and types of all imported material and components relevant to the enrichment program”; “unrestricted access” for IAEA inspectors to conduct facility visits and environmental sampling; the resolution of a contradiction between IAEA experts’ assessment that Iran must have introduced uranium into centrifuges before June and Iran’s claim that it did not do so; the provision of “complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments”; and all other actions deemed necessary by the agency.
The board would also call on Iran to “promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement” the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive monitoring by the agency.
The language on the Additional Protocol is one of several key areas where the U.S.-backed draft differs from the South African text. The former draft would have the board urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol immediately rather than waiting until it can be signed and ratified, while under South Africa’s draft, the board would ask Iran only to “consider” such interim implementation.
In general, the South African draft implies patience on the board’s part and highlights countries’ right to nuclear energy, while the U.S.-backed text seeks immediate and dramatic action from Iran and stresses the IAEA’s responsibility for helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. South Africa repeatedly refers to further work that is necessary in order for the board to reach any conclusions about Iran, while the Europeans stress Iran’s alleged failures to comply with IAEA requests and cite Iran’s “heavy responsibility to the international community regarding the transparency of its nuclear activities.”
Both resolutions would have ElBaradei report back to the board at a meeting in November on Iran’s compliance.
“I don’t think it [the South African text] really rises to the same level … of gravitas” as the European draft, said the Western diplomat. Asked whether the matter will come to a vote, rather than being decided by consensus, the diplomat said, “I’m afraid so.”
Salehi scoffed at the idea of a measure not supported by the whole board.
“If there is a resolution adopted that is not in accordance with our … wishes, then that resolution … is just to be kept in the archives,” he said.
Negotiations between Moscow and Tehran on an agreement to return spent fuel from Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor to Russia are stalled over a payment dispute, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 8).
Russia is helping Iran build the Bushehr plant and is planning to supply the plant with nuclear fuel. Russian officials are insisting, however, that Iran return the spent fuel so that it cannot be reprocessed and used to develop nuclear weapons.
Iran is demanding compensation for the nuclear fuel it returns to Moscow, according to Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Govorukhin, but Russian leaders would not accept the deal, he said.
“Iranians believe they must get paid for the nuclear fuel being returned to Russia for storage and reprocessing, considering it their property,” Govoruhkin said. If Iran will not alter its position, he added, Russia intends to charge a higher original price for the nuclear fuel it ships to Iran (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Sept. 10).
The guard force at the U.S. Energy Department’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California is not fully staffed, nor has it been fully tested, to defend against the type of terrorist attack the facility could face, the Tri-Valley Herald reported Sunday (see GSN, Feb. 27).
While the facility’s security force is considered to be the best it has been in five years, it is still recovering from its dismantlement in the early 1990s, according to the Herald. At that time, budget cuts forced Lawrence Livermore to turn over security responsibilities to local law enforcement, but the Energy Department re-established the facility’s Special Response Team in 1998.
Since 1998, however, the team has faced management problems, low pay and weak oversight, resulting in poor morale and training, the Herald reported. Some team members have questioned its effectiveness if a band of terrorists were to attempt to attack the facility, which contains large amounts of nuclear material.
“Some guys I know I can count on. But there are some guys I know who are going to tuck tail and run,” said team member Rodney Harrison. “They’re headed out Westgate Drive. They’ll say, ‘I didn’t sign up for this,’” he said.
In May, the Energy Department revised the Design Basis Threat, which is the type of terrorist attack a facility must be able to defend against. At Lawrence Livermore, the DBT increased by 50 percent, envisioning an attacking terrorist force consisting of about 10 members assumed to be suicidal and heavily armed, conducting an attack with a large truck bomb, chemical weapons, or both, according to the Herald.
U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration acting security chief Toby Johnson said he did not know when the guard forces at Lawrence Livermore and other sites would be able to defend against the revised DBT.
“I can’t make an expression of confidence,” Johnson said. “I think we would say we felt we were generally in good shape against the old design basis threat. We don’t have enough information on the new one yet,” he added.
Former Energy security consultant Ronald Timm said he did not believe Lawrence Livermore’s security force was capable of defending against the new threat.
“I can tell you right now, your SRT (Special Response Team) is not adequate out there to meet the new threat,” said Timm, president of RETA Security Inc.. “Anybody who says it’s business as usual is just lying to themselves,” he said.
An Energy spokesman expressed confidence that Lawrence Livermore’s security force could repel a terrorist attack. “We feel the nuclear material is adequately protected,” said John Belluardo, spokesman for the department’s Livermore Site Office.
Lawrence Livermore security officers expressed doubts that terrorists would even attempt to attack the facility.
“History is on our side: It hasn’t happened,” said Kory Porter, deputy leader of the laboratory’s Protective Force Division (Ian Hoffman, Tri-Valley Herald, Sept. 7).
Jack Pritchard, a former U.S. State Department expert on North Korea, wrote today that his recent resignation was not a protest to the Bush Administration’s policy toward Pyongyang but rather a reaction to being shut out of the multilateral talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis (see GSN, Sept. 8).
In a Los Angeles Times commentary, Pritchard said, “I was brought into this administration precisely because of my experience in dealing with North Koreans, but was now perceived as too soft on North Korea. I had tendered my resignation April 18 when I was not selected to lead the trilateral talks in Beijing. Secretary of State Colin Powell asked me to stay on for a while and, out of enormous respect for him, I did,” Pritchard wrote.
He repeated earlier criticism of the White House refusal to participate in direct talks with North Korea.
“It is not possible to have serious, sustained discussion in a plenary setting over a few days. Six delegations, 24 interpreters and many note-takers guarantee that the reading of scripted remarks is about the only thing that will take place in open session,” he wrote. “The structure of the six-party talks is useful and will ultimately be a significant part of the solution, but we must be able to engage the North Koreans at length,” he added (Jack Pritchard, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10).
The U.S. Air Force today test-launched a Minuteman 3 ICBM, officials said (see GSN, Aug. 8). The missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and traveled 4,800 miles to the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean, base spokesman Lloyd Conley said (Associated Press/Newsday, Sept. 10).
The test missile was expected to carry three unarmed re-entry vehicles (Air Force release, Aug. 28).
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