Global Security Newswire: By National Journal

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    Issue for Thursday, September 4, 2003

  Terrorism  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Warns Nuclear Plants of Online Virus Threat Full Story
Recent Stories

  Weapons of Mass Destruction  
British Analysts Expressed Concern Over September 2002 Dossier, Retired Official Says Full Story
Officials Plan Shipping Interdiction Effort at Paris Meeting Full Story
U.N. Weapons Inspectors Ready to Return to Iraq If Asked Full Story
Recent Stories

  Nuclear Weapons  
IAEA Contradicts Iranian Claims on Testing Methods Full Story
China Appears Ready to Ratify CTBT, Conference Official Says Full Story
China Continues to Pin Talks Failure on Washington Full Story
Washington Pushing IAEA for Strong Resolution on Iran Full Story
Indian Nuclear Authority Orders Military to Transfer Control of Arsenal to New Command Full Story
Russian Nuclear Material Used in Cancer Research Full Story
Recent Stories

  Biological Weapons  
U.S. Announces $350 Million for Regional Research Centers Full Story
University Professor Faces Broad Set of Charges Stemming From Plague Incident Full Story
Researchers Identify Key Medical Symptoms Differentiating Anthrax From Influenza Full Story
Recent Stories

  Chemical Weapons  
United States Will Miss Chemical Weapon Destruction Deadline; Will Seek Extension Full Story
Recent Stories

  Missile Proliferation  
Recent Stories

  Missile Defense  
Recent Stories

  Missile Defense  
Russian Officials Arrest Nuclear Official Suspected of Smuggling Full Story
Recent Stories
 

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What you have in this report is a steady drumbeat that says, “We still don’t know whether Iran is telling the truth when it says it never enriched uranium in Iran.”
David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, on an IAEA report assessing Iran’s nuclear program.


IAEA Contradicts Iranian Claims on Testing Methods

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Contradicting Iranian denials, the International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that uranium enrichment technology visible at the country’s Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) could not have been developed without conducting tests involving uranium hexafluoride...Full Story

United States Will Miss Chemical Weapon Destruction Deadline; Will Seek Extension

The U.S. Defense Department formally announced yesterday that it will not meet a treaty deadline to destroy 45 percent of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by April 29, 2004 (see GSN, May 7)...Full Story

British Analysts Expressed Concern Over September 2002 Dossier, Retired Official Says

A number of British Defense Ministry analysts expressed concerns last September over the claims made in a British dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, a retired ministry official told a parliamentary inquiry yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 3)...Full Story



Current Issue Thursday, September 4, 2003
Terrorism

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Warns Nuclear Plants of Online Virus Threat

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Tuesday that it has issued a warning to nuclear power plant operators about threat of possible computer system failures caused by Internet viruses (see GSN, Aug. 15).

The NRC learned of the vulnerability of plant computer networks to Internet viruses in January, when the Microsoft SQL Server worm caused two systems at the closed Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio to be made unavailable for several hours, according to a commission press release.  Public safety was not affected during the incident, the commission said (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission release, Sept. 2).


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Weapons of Mass Destruction

British Analysts Expressed Concern Over September 2002 Dossier, Retired Official Says

A number of British Defense Ministry analysts expressed concerns last September over the claims made in a British dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, a retired ministry official told a parliamentary inquiry yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 3).

Some analysts believed the dossier exaggerated claims about Iraq’s chemical weapons production capabilities, said Brian Jones, a retired senior official with the defense intelligence analysis staff.  While some experts believed Iraq was continuing to produce chemical weapons, there was no solid evidence to support such a judgment, he said.

There was a tendency to “shall we say, over-egg certain assessments in relation particularly to the production of (chemical warfare) agents and weapons since 1998 — the difference between making a judgment that the production of CW agent had taken place as opposed to that judgment being that it had probably taken place or even possibly taken place,” Jones said.

There were also doubts over a claim in the dossier that the Iraqi military could deploy biological and chemical weapons within 45 minutes of being ordered to do so, Jones said.

“We had not seen the weapons being produced,” Jones said.  “We had no evidence of any recent testing or field trials and things like that.  So that all cast some doubts in our mind on that particular piece of intelligence,” he said (Glenn Frankel, Washington Post, Sept. 4).

Jones also said, however, that none of his team of analysts had argued that the claim should not have been included.

“We at no stage argued that this intelligence should not be in the dossier.  We thought it was important intelligence,” he said (Warren Hoge, New York Times, Sept. 4).

Jones told the inquiry that his team’s concerns were for the most part ignored and not included in the final draft of the dossier — a process that he said was “very unusual.”

A second witness who testified before the inquiry yesterday, a chemical weapons consultant identified as “Mr. A,” said the dossier had incorrectly focused on an Iraqi plant that produced phosgene — a chemical that can be used both as a weapon and to produce plastics and pesticide.  There was no evidence, however, that the plant had been used to produce weapons, Mr. A. said.

The dossier’s focus on the plant was “a stupid mistake for the British to make,” Mr. A said (Frankel, Washington Post).


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Officials Plan Shipping Interdiction Effort at Paris Meeting

Eleven nations began two-day talks yesterday in Paris to further develop the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led effort to interdict illicit shipments of WMD cargo, according to U.S. State Department release (see GSN, Aug. 4).

The U.S. delegation is being led by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton.

“The Paris meeting will focus on the further development of a statement of interdiction principles that will enable countries to better work together within domestic and international law to enhance and expand efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related technologies to and from countries of concern,” said a State Department spokesman.

The group — including Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States — held meetings in June and July (U.S. State Department release, Sept. 3).

Intelligence experts were scheduled to meet behind closed doors yesterday, with a plenary session scheduled for today.  Representatives from the participating countries are seeking to “make life more difficult for ships with suspicious cargo” by getting permission from nations to conduct at-sea inspections, according to French diplomats (Agence France-Presse/SpaceWar.com, Sept. 3).


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U.N. Weapons Inspectors Ready to Return to Iraq If Asked

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.N. weapons inspectors are ready resume their work in Iraq on “short notice” if the U.N. Security Council were to request them to do so, according to a report released late last month by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (see GSN, June 19).

According to the report, most of the inspectors’ equipment has been safely maintained in storage on Cyprus.  In addition, UNMOVIC technical experts received valuable experience from their work in Iraq before Operation Iraqi Freedom and international weapons experts have indicated their “continuing interest” in serving as inspectors, the report says.

The U.N. inspection infrastructure in Iraq experienced a blow in mid-August with the attack on the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Center, the report says (see GSN, Aug. 20).  It is currently unknown if the center can be repaired for future use or if a new facility would have to be found, it says.

“Apart from this, UNMOVIC would be able and ready to resume field operations in Iraq, including confirmation of any findings related to disarmament, at short notice if the [Security] Council so requests,” the report says.

Since inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in March, shortly before the war began, they have continued work on several disarmament-related projects such as the development of a new monitoring plan for postwar Iraq, according to the report.  Other projects include the compilation of information on aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs, such as financing, staffing and procurement; as well as the compilation of technical files on Iraq’s efforts to destroy its WMD stockpiles, the report says.


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Nuclear Weapons

IAEA Contradicts Iranian Claims on Testing Methods

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Contradicting Iranian denials, the International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that uranium enrichment technology visible at the country’s Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) could not have been developed without conducting tests involving uranium hexafluoride.

Iran has acknowledged testing some of its centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride beginning June 25, but has denied introducing the material before then.  The IAEA said last week that full safeguards measures are in place for the current testing.

The agency added, as was reported last week by several media outlets, that IAEA environmental samples taken from Natanz between March and June “revealed particles of high enriched uranium” (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The assertions appear in a confidential report submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors last week by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and obtained yesterday by Global Security Newswire.

Brookings Institution Science and Technology Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies Michael Levi said yesterday “the report is more damning than the press leaks have suggested.”

The report is to be discussed beginning Monday at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, and the matter could be referred to the U.N. Security Council if the board is not satisfied with Iran’s transparency.

“The biggest issue is:  Did Iran enrich uranium?” said Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright.

“What you have in this report,” said the former IAEA inspector, “is a steady drumbeat that says, ‘We still don’t know whether Iran is telling the truth when it says it never enriched uranium in Iran.’”

Also at issue is whether Iran will sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, a move that would permit the agency to conduct more intrusive monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities.  While urging Iran to adopt the measures, many observers say the protocol would be an insufficient check against potential Iranian development of nuclear weapons.

IAEA Findings Contradict Iranian Assertions

Iran has acknowledged that in 1991, China provided it with 1,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, as well as smaller quantities of uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide.

According to the IAEA report, though, officials from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization told IAEA experts who visited the country this summer that the centrifuge facility had been developed with information acquired from open sources, without conducting any tests involving uranium.  Specifically, Iranian officials told the IAEA last month that “no experiments with inert or UF6 gas were conducted,” according to the report.  Iran first said in February that its tests of centrifuge rotors, as part of design and development work begun in 1997, were conducted without nuclear material.

The Iranian statements are contradicted by the IAEA’s assertion that testing with uranium hexafluoride must have taken place at Natanz.  The IAEA report says its experts concluded that “it is not possible to develop enrichment technology to the level seen at Natanz based solely on open source information and computer simulations without process testing with UF6.”

In a related finding, IAEA experts determined in March that about 1.9 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride was missing from two cylinders at an Iranian site.  Iran has said the loss could have resulted from “leakage from the cylinders resulting from mechanical failure of the valves and possible evaporation,” according to last week’s report.

Levi expressed doubt about Iran’s leakage claim, though, and both he and Albright said the quantity of material in question could be used to test uranium centrifuges.  “It’s enough to operate one test stand for a while,” said Albright.

Meanwhile, the IAEA said in its report that it is waiting to test a third, larger cylinder, but cannot do so until necessary equipment is installed at Natanz by Iran.

“So basically,” Levi said, “the Iranians control the timeline.”

In the case of the highly enriched uranium discovered at Natanz, the finding contradicts Iran’s assertion that, as paraphrased in the IAEA report, “no nuclear material was introduced to the PFEP prior to the agency’s having taken its first baseline environmental samples.”  The IAEA’s sampling was completed before June 11, when it submitted results to Iran, and Tehran denies introducing uranium hexafluoride into a centrifuge before June 25.

Iran said last month that the enriched uranium particles found at Natanz “must have resulted from contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been imported by Iran,” according to the report.

In media reports, experts have identified Pakistan as the foreign source in question, a charge Pakistan has denied.  Albright said yesterday that last week’s report appears to support the charge.

“The finger points at Pakistan as the source … probably not the government, but scientists or companies or agents of Pakistan,” he said.

IAEA Work Continues

“Additional work is … required to enable the agency to arrive at conclusions about Iran’s statements that there have been no uranium enrichment activities in Iran involving nuclear material.  The agency intends to complete its assessment of the Iranian statement that the high enriched uranium particles identified in samples taken at Natanz could be attributable to contamination from imported components,” the report reads.

“Iran has agreed to provide the agency with all information about the centrifuge components and other contaminated equipment it obtained from abroad, including their origin and the locations where they have been stored and used in Iran, as well as access to those locations, so that the agency may take environmental samples,” the IAEA went on.

One location where the IAEA has already taken such samples is a Kalaye Electric Co. facility in Tehran.  IAEA inspectors took the samples last month “with a view to assessing the role of that company in Iran’s enrichment R&D [research and development] program,” according to the report, but the facility had undergone “considerable modification” since a prior visit in March, a fact experts called suspicious.

The results of sampling on the Kalaye premises were not yet available when the IAEA report was issued last week.

Additional Protocol, Other Measures Sought

In remarks issued in response to last week’s media reports on the director general’s report, the IAEA said that “ultimately … the only way to build high confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear program is for Iran to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA.”

Albright said Iran “has to demonstrate transparency and implement the protocol.”  He dismissed concerns that a failure to sanction Iran for its acknowledged past omissions in reporting and for the inconsistencies implicit in the latest IAEA findings could set a bad example.

“You’re so used to being lied to,” said Albright, “that progress is when people start telling you the truth.”

Levi said the protocol could be useful if accompanied by further concessions from Iran.

“There’s a point in concluding an Additional Protocol if it is concurrent with Iran giving up everything except the Bushehr power plant,” he said, referring to Iran’s major nuclear power plant, which is currently being built by Russia.

Albright said the Bush administration would like to see Iran give up even the Bushehr facility but that there is “no way” Iran will halt work at the facility.  As for Natanz, he said, “many countries cannot live with Iran operating” the facility, but “you have to offer Iran something” in return for shutting Natanz down.

The concern about Natanz stems from the facility’s high potential for producing nuclear weapon material.  In an article in the September/October issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Albright and ISIS colleague Corey Hinderstein estimate that the eventual production capacity at Natanz would fall far short of the amount needed to fuel all the reactors Iran says it plans to build, but that “the same capacity would be sufficient to produce about 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually.”

“At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for roughly 25-30 nuclear weapons per year,” they write, adding that Iran could also make low-enriched uranium fuel at Natanz for a time, eventually gaining the capacity to “produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in a few days.”

Levi said Iran should be required “at the very least … [to] halt further work until the further tests can be done” by the IAEA, but he expressed doubt about whether the IAEA board in its current form would remit the matter to the Security Council, where the threat of economic and other sanctions could sway Iran.  In June, 15 Nonaligned Movement (NAM) countries on the board prevented the matter from going to the council (see GSN, June 19).

“For the NAM,” said Levi, “the priority is … to minimize the barriers to nuclear power. … I don’t know what will convince the NAM folks.”

Levi and Hinderstein write in their Bulletin article that, in order to encourage progress in the matter, the United States and others should offer “incentives” for Iran, Iran’s security concerns should be respected, and Washington and others should seek to restart talks on regional arms control in the Middle East.

The IAEA said in its report that Iran has already demonstrated “an increased degree of cooperation” since June, but the agency added that “information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and that … there remain a number of important outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran’s enrichment program, that require urgent resolution.”

“Continued and accelerated cooperation and full transparency on the part of Iran are essential for the agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by member states,” the report says.


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China Appears Ready to Ratify CTBT, Conference Official Says

International officials expect China to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty soon, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“They seem ready to ratify,” said Wolfgang Hoffmann, secretary general of the CTBT Organization, the Vienna institution responsible for the implementing the treaty banning all nuclear explosions.  Leading a three-day conference to promote the treaty’s entry into force, Hoffman said, “I got this impression from talks I had last July in Beijing with both sides, civilian and military.”

Other sources close to the conference also said China appears willing to ratify the treaty, AFP reported. 

“The question is no longer whether China will sign the ratification document, but when,” a source close to the conference said.  “If they do this, it will be a big step towards ensuring that the treaty enters into force,” the source said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 4).

China said today that it hoped the treaty would soon enter into force, but did not say exactly when it would ratify the treaty.

“We attach great importance to (the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) because we believe it has an important role in the nonproliferation process, especially the disarmament process,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.

The treaty was sent to the National People’s Congress for ratification in March 2000.  Although the NPC met in August, the treaty was not discussed, sources said.  The NPC is scheduled to meet again in late October, according to Agence France-Presse.

“We hope for the early ratification and coming into force of the treaty,” Kong said.  “We hope the National People’s Congress in accordance with the relevant legal procedures will go through the procedures,” he said (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 4).

Meanwhile at the Vienna conference, Chinese delegate Zhang Yan said his country had established a national preparatory authority for the implementation of the treaty, according to a CTBT Organization press release.  In addition, China has agreed to host 12 of the international monitoring system facilities that are part of the treaty’s verification regime, Zhang said.

Also during the conference, delegates from several countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro and Sri Lanka, announced their countries’ progress on moving forward on ratifying the treaty (CTBT Organization release I, Sept. 4).  Renald Clerisme, Haiti’s delegate to the conference, said his country’s ratification of the treaty was imminent.

In addition, a number of delegates expressed the need for a strong final document to be issued at the conference’s conclusion, according to a CTBT Organization press release (CTBT Organization release II, Sept. 4).


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China Continues to Pin Talks Failure on Washington

Echoing comments made several days before by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a Chinese official close to nuclear negotiations said that the United States holds the key to progress on the Korean Peninsula, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“It depends on the United States,” the official said.  “It depends on if the United States can have a more unified position and more specific proposals to induce North Korea back to the negotiating table,” the official added.

A high-ranking South Korean official said that regional powers are attempting to find common ground.

“For us to come to an agreement … all the countries at the table will need to compromise,” the official said.

The talks last week were attended by China, the United States, Japan, Russia, North Korea and South Korea (Pomfret/Faiola, Washington Post, Sept. 4).

South Korea, meanwhile, said that it was opposed to suspending construction on light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.

“We have spent no less than $930 million so far.  If the project is terminated, we would be left with $1.4 billion of losses,” Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun said today.  The United States has expressed concerns about the project, but inherent safeguards make it difficult to use the facilities for military ends, according to Jeong (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 4).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, meanwhile, reaffirmed that North Korean diplomats at the recent six-nation talks said they were prepared to test a nuclear weapon.

“That’s what they said, I don’t know if it was a promise or just a statement,” Powell said (Agence France Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 4).

“But the way forward is not helped by threats and truculent statements that are designed to try to frighten the international community or try to frighten us,” he added (CNN.com, Sept. 3).


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Washington Pushing IAEA for Strong Resolution on Iran

The United States is pushing the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to release a strong condemnation of Iran’s controversial nuclear development, the Financial Times reported today.  The agency’s Board of Governors is scheduled to begin a two-day meeting on Monday (see GSN, Sept. 3).

If the board finds Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the issue would be forwarded to the U.N. Security Council.  Some diplomats, however, believe that Washington is asking for a noncompliance finding to ensure the board at least adopts a strongly worded resolution.

U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Ken Brill said yesterday that Washington wants “a strong resolution that will help the IAEA get Iran to stop violating its NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferattion Treaty] Safeguards Agreement and come clean on what it has been up to” (Roula Khalaf, Financial Times, Sept. 3).


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Indian Nuclear Authority Orders Military to Transfer Control of Arsenal to New Command

The Indian Nuclear Command Authority has ordered the Indian military to transfer control of India’s nuclear arsenal to the Strategic Forces Command, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The strategic command was created in January, along with the Nuclear Command Authority, as part of India’s efforts to formalize its nuclear command-and-control structure.  The Indian military, however, has been reluctant to make the transfer, saying that the authority is not prepared to receive or implement the command-and-control systems (Bulbul Singh, Aerospace Daily, Sept. 4).


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Russian Nuclear Material Used in Cancer Research

Researchers at the University of Maryland are attempting to use material from Russian nuclear weapons to fight cancer, the Associated Press reported today.

Scientists want to use a uranium extract to shut down blood vessels that run to cancerous tumors.

“One of the ways that most solid tumors grow is to induce the body to feed it,” said Bruce Line, the university’s director of nuclear medicine.  “If we can stop that process by cutting off the blood supply to tumors, then we can keep the tumor from growing and also help to reduce its size and keep it from eventually taking the patient’s life,” he added.

The Atoms for Peace initiative has provided $800,000 toward the effort, much through the work of Representative Steny Hoyer (D-Md.).

The university expects six to eight shipments of the material in the next few months, according to AP (Associated Press/Washington Times, Sept. 4).


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Biological Weapons

U.S. Announces $350 Million for Regional Research Centers

U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson today announced the release of $350 million in grants over the next five years to establish eight “Regional Centers of Excellence” to conduct biological defense research.

The new regional centers will be established at Duke University, Harvard Medical School, New York State Health Department, the University of Chicago, the University of Baltimore, the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, the University of Washington and Washington University in St. Louis, according to a U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases release.

Each center will conduct research on developing new treatment and vaccines against biological weapons agents, such as anthrax, smallpox, plague and tularemia, the NIAID release said.  In addition, the centers will conduct research on bacterial and viral disease processes and will design new diagnostic approaches for biological defense.

NIAID will be responsible for administering the grants and the overall program.

“The new RCE program provides a coordinated and comprehensive mechanism to support the interdisciplinary research that will lead to new and improved therapies, vaccines, diagnostics and other tools to protect the citizens of our country and the world against the threat of bioterrorism,” NIAID Director Anthony Fauci said in a statement (U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases release, Sept. 4).


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University Professor Faces Broad Set of Charges Stemming From Plague Incident

Some U.S. scientists and legal experts have complained that the United States is going too far in its attempts to prosecute Texas Tech University professor Thomas Butler, who early this year allegedly falsely reported that plague samples were missing from his university laboratory, the Baltimore Sun reported today (see GSN, Jan. 22).

In January, Butler told university officials that 30 vials of plague were missing from his laboratory, which prompted an investigation by law enforcement and the FBI, according to the Sun.  Later the same day, Butler signed a statement that said the vials had been accidentally destroyed and that his report that they were missing was “inaccurate.”

Since the initial incident, prosecutors have increased the number of charges against Butler beyond making a false statement.  U.S. prosecutors yesterday expanded the charges against Butler to also include allegations of mail fraud and embezzlement in connection with research he conducted for two pharmaceutical companies, the Sun reported.  Butler yesterday pleaded not guilty to the 69-count indictment and remains free on $100,000 bond.

Butler’s lawyers have argued that the expanded charges against their client are an attempt to hide the fact that the bioterrorism scare ignited by the FBI’s initial search of Texas Tech in January was unjustified.

“What happened in the Butler case is that by the time the FBI realized there was no bioterrorism conspiracy or danger, the story was already in newspapers around the world,” said Jonathan Turley, a George Washington University law professor and one of Butler’s defense attorneys.  “This is a face-saving attempt by the government to secure a conviction at any cost,” Turley said.

Some scientists have also said they do not understand the vast array of charges against Butler, according to the Sun.

D.A. Henderson, a senior U.S. bioterrorism adviser, said he was “puzzled” by the large indictment against Butler.  Noting that some of the charges against Butler allege improper transport of plague samples between facilities, it now appears that some scientific practices are clashing with new biological security regulations, according to Henderson.

“The question is, what was Butler’s intent?”  Henderson said.  “Did he intend to use plague as an agent to harm people?  No, no one believes that.  He’s done some very good research on plague.  So, my question is, what is the FBI up to here?” he added (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Sept. 4).


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Researchers Identify Key Medical Symptoms Differentiating Anthrax From Influenza

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. researchers have identified key symptoms differentiating infections of inhalational anthrax from influenza and other respiratory conditions.  The development could lead to improved screening following a biological weapons attack, according to a study published earlier this week in Annals of Internal Medicine (see GSN, Sept. 3).

The study, conducted by researchers at Weill Cornell Medical Center in New York, examined the features of anthrax-related illnesses in 28 cases — the 11 that occurred during the 2001 anthrax attacks along with 17 earlier cases dating back to 1920 — with the features of more than 4,000 cases of common viral respiratory track diseases, such as the flu.  According to the study, anthrax and influenza share some symptoms, such as fever and cough.  Other symptoms, however, including neurological symptoms such as loss of consciousness and dizziness and gastrointestinal symptoms such as nausea, were more common in those infected with anthrax.  Symptoms such as sore throat and runny nose were more often associated with viral infections.

The results of the new study have helped Weill Cornell Medical Center develop a new screening protocol for use by physicians to be able to differentiate possible anthrax infections from flu cases in the event of a bioterrorist attack, according to a Cornell University press release.  The three-step protocol is a set of questions, the first of which is whether the patient has suffered any neurological symptoms such as confusion, according to the study.  If the answer is yes, the patient is immediately sent for further testing for anthrax and started on a preventive antibiotic regimen because such symptoms are highly uncommon in viral respiratory infections, the study says.

The second question in the protocol is whether the patient has experienced any fever, chills or cough.  If the patient answers no to both this and the first question, they can then be considered to be at low risk for inhalational anthrax, according to the study.  If the patient answers yes to the second question, however, they are then asked if they have experienced nausea or vomiting.  If the patient answers yes to having experienced nausea or vomiting, or exhibits abnornmal lung sounds, then they are considered to be a higher risk for anthrax.  If the patient says they have experienced fever or chills, but no nausea and vomiting, and has a runny nose or sore throat, then they are considered to be at low risk for anthrax.

The new protocol could help physicians and health officials to quickly and accurately identify cases of anthrax, which in turn could help preserve scare hospital capacity in the event of a biological terrorism attack, according to Nathaniel Hupert, assistant professor of public health and medicine and Weill Cornell Medical College and lead author of the study.

“In the case of bioterrorist attack, it is vitally important that physicians’ offices and hospital emergency departments accurately diagnose anthrax,” Hupert said in a statement.


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Chemical Weapons

United States Will Miss Chemical Weapon Destruction Deadline; Will Seek Extension

The U.S. Defense Department formally announced yesterday that it will not meet a treaty deadline to destroy 45 percent of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by April 29, 2004 (see GSN, May 7). 

As a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States is committed to destroying its stockpile in specific stages, leading to complete destruction by 2007.  The treaty allows parties, however, to request an extension if necessary.

Pentagon officials plan to ask the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to push the 45-percent deadline back to December 2007, according to a Defense Department release. 

As for meeting the final deadline, the release says the United States “has been trying to complete destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile in order to meet the CWC’s final 2007 deadline,” but “there have been significant obstacles.”

The United States has so far destroyed about 23 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile.

The Pentagon release says the obstacles to destruction faced so far include “political and operational issues that forced operational shutdowns or postponed start-up dates.”

Specifically, the Pentagon cited an eight-month investigation at the Tooele Chemical Destruction Facility in Utah, caused by incident in which a worker was exposed to chemical agent (Defense Department release, Sept. 3).


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Missile Proliferation



Missile Defense



Other Issues

Russian Officials Arrest Nuclear Official Suspected of Smuggling

Russian authorities have arrested a senior official at a state-owned company, and some reports indicate he may have been involved in smuggling radioactive materials, Bellona reported Monday.

Alexander Tyulyakov is the deputy director for administrative issues at Atomflot, the state agency responsible for repair work and spent nuclear fuel storage for Russian nuclear icebreakers and nuclear submarines. 

Police in Russia’s Mursmansk region, along with Russian Federal Security Service agents, said that they have evidence linking Tyulyakov to a weapons smuggler who was seeking a nuclear source.  The smuggler was allegedly seeking to resell the material to a buyer in the Baltic region (Charles Digges, Bellona, Sept. 1)

 


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