Iraq: U.S. Should Focus on Inspections, Report Says

Renewing robust inspections to detect and prevent Iraqi efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear and biological weapons—should be a top priority for the United States and the U.N. Security Council, said a Monterey Institute of International Studies report released last week. 

Iraq would pose a serious threat to Middle East stability and U.S. security if it gained nuclear ability or developed numerous intermediate-range missiles weaponized with biological or chemical agents.  Preventing such a scenario should take precedence over other possible U.S. goals, the report said, such as enhancing sanctions or overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  Iraq’s weapons capability will remain uncertain until inspections begin again, the report said.

“Iraq must either give up its prohibited programs and accept intrusive inspections or face a harsh military reaction,” the report said.

David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, the report’s authors, advocate a proposal by former International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team Leader Gary Dillon to move away from U.N. Security Council resolution 1284 and revert back to Security Council resolution 687.  Resolution 687, adopted in 1991, required Iraq to destroy all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related assets and longer-range missiles before the international community would lift economic sanctions.  Resolution 1284—adopted in December 1999 after weapons inspectors had left Iraq—established the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor to the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), lifted the cap on oil exports Iraq could use to pay for imports under the oil-for-food program and allowed for 120-day renewable suspensions of sanctions once inspection and verification systems were established and Iraq complied with tasks to fulfill its disarmament obligations under resolution 687.

Dillon, however, believed that Iraq did not see any way to regain control of oil revenue under resolution 1284, so it refused to comply with any of the inspection requirements, according to Albright and O’Neill.  Reverting to resolution 687, however, would provide incentive for Iraq to allow inspections because it could gain control of oil revenues once it complied with instructions related to weapons of mass destruction.  Albright and O’Neill believed that under Dillon’s proposal, Iraq would likely invite inspectors to return, and the inspectors would later report to the Security Council about Iraq’s compliance.  If the Security Council believed Iraq had complied with resolution 687, it would lift the oil embargo and sanctions on exporting civil goods to Iraq.  The council would also continue prohibitions against Iraq’s possession of and ability to produce weapons of mass destruction and certain missiles. 

Albright and O’Neill proposed the Security Council commit itself to taking “all necessary actions, including military” to destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction ability if inspectors discover Iraq has failed to comply with Security Council demands.  The United States would be far more likely to gain international support for military action if proof existed Iraq had defied the Security Council, the report said. 

Problems With Sanctions, Containment and Overthrowing Hussein

Albright and O’Neill said the sanctions imposed on Iraq since the Gulf War have failed to force Iraq to comply with U.N. resolutions, and international support for the sanctions has decreased to the point that, as U.S. President George W. Bush said, they are as porous as “Swiss cheese.”  The authors noted that an imperfect containment policy may be the only way to deal with Iraq under the present circumstances but sanctions and containment would not prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction.  “One must recognize that sanctions alone cannot prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons, nor can sanctions lead to a workable strategy if Iraq succeeds in acquiring such weapons,” the report said. 

The Bush administration’s plan regarding Iraq has been to restructure sanctions to decrease the negative impact on Iraqi civilians, tighten sanctions on military items and reinvigorate support for the sanctions, according to the report.  This plan faces several important obstacles, the authors said, particularly opposition from Russia. 

The authors said the Bush plan also would not likely lead to a quick resumption of inspections.  Dillon’s proposal could work better because it would provide Iraq with the incentive of controlling its oil revenues to allow inspectors to return, the report said.  The authors said that developing weapons of mass destruction is not very expensive, and Saddam Hussein has gained sufficient funds from illicit oil sales, so controlling official Iraqi oil expenditures would not necessarily halt unconventional weapons programs.  “Preventing Iraq from rearming conventionally is more effectively accomplished by robust, and internationally supported, military sanctions than controls on oil revenues,” the report said. 

Another proposal favored by some U.S. analysts is to renew efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  The report said a coup would be unlikely to change Iraqi attitudes and could result in a more dangerous leader.

Why Inspections Work

Some critics have questioned the efficacy of inspections, but Albright and O’Neill advocated “the most robust inspections,” adding that the international community is more likely to combat Iraqi noncompliance with inspections than it would combat Iraqi opposition to sanctions. 

The authors say the history of inspections proved their worth.  “While ongoing monitoring and verification activities were in place, the action team’s continuous presence in Iraq made it difficult for Iraq to coherently and systematically resume its nuclear weapons work,” the report said, adding that UNSCOM also had many successes, although both inspections groups left Iraq with a number of unanswered questions about Iraq’s weapons programs.  The absence of inspectors working in the country “severely limits the ability to understand Iraqi activities,” the report said. 

Inspectors were able to achieve some success in Iraq because they were backed by a united Security Council and had popular support from the international community and because Iraq faced a “plausible threat” of military action if “the inspections did not go well,” the report said, quoting Robert Gallucci, former UNSCOM deputy executive director. 

Remove LEU

The Security Council should also remove existing uranium stocks from Iraq, especially the country’s low-enriched uranium, the report said.  Iraq possesses about 1.7 metric tons of LEU and several hundred metric tons of natural uranium, which it could convert into highly-enriched uranium to produce weapons if Iraq successfully developed the necessary enrichment technology. 

The report suggests the Security Council could compensate Iraq for uranium removal with extra funds in the U.N. oil-for-food escrow account.  The IAEA should immediately apply “remotely verified seals to reduce the time needed to detect a possible diversion of this material [for weapons-use] from a year to weeks or even a few days” until the uranium is removed, the authors said (Albright/O’Neill, Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001). 

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Pakistan: Army Drills for WMD

The Pakistani army yesterday conducted its first major exercises to test its response to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, according to a Pakistani military release.  The exercises, named the Winter Collective Training Program, tested skills including decontaminating weapons, machinery and uniforms (New Delhi PTI news agency/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Nov. 13).  The exercises were held at Kharian, near the India border (India Statesman, Nov. 14).

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U.S. Response: WMD Sites Bombed

U.S. forces bombed sites in Afghanistan that suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization might have used to produce chemical or biological weapons (see GSN, Nov. 12), U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Sunday.

“We have bombed some of them,” Rumsfeld said on CBS’s Face the Nation.  “We don’t know where all of them are.  You can be certain that if we had very good information as to the location of a chemical or a biological development area, that we would do something about it.”

Some of those same places that produced chemical or biological weapons might also have been used in the development of the illegal narcotics trade, Rumsfeld said (U.S. State Department transcript, Nov. 12).

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Threat Assessment: Possible Taliban CBW Sites Found

The United States has identified sites in Afghanistan that Osama bin Laden may have used to produce chemical and biological weapons, according to U.S. military and intelligence officials.  None of the sites has been bombed since the U.S. military campaign began in Afghanistan, the officials said.

One site was a crude chemical weapons research facility which may have already produced cyanide gas, a chemical poorly suited for use as a weapon, according to U.S. officials.  The plant is in Derunta, a small village near the eastern city of Jalalabad.

Another site of concern is a fertilizer plant in Mazar-e-Sharif, the city recently captured by Northern Alliance opposition fighters.  Intelligence analysts suspect that bin Laden’s terrorist network al-Qaeda was interested in the plant because its equipment could produce either biological or chemical weapons.

An anthrax vaccine site in Kabul has also raised concern among intelligence analysts (see GSN, Oct. 19), according to the New York Times.  The International Committee of the Red Cross has provided funds for the plant, but has acknowledged that the plant is operated by the Taliban’s Ministry of Agriculture, according to the Times.

The Bush administration had chosen not to bomb these sites in part for fear that such action would raise complaints that the United States was destroying public health and agricultural sites in Afghanistan, said an administration official (Risen/Miller, New York Times, Nov. 10).

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