U.S. Response: Bioterrorism Response Funding Is Insufficient, Experts Say

By Greg Seigle

Global Security Newswire

While the $3 billion biodefense authorization bill currently under scrutiny in the U.S. Senate appears poised to pass soon and distribute $1 billion across all 54 U.S. states and territories next year—dwarfing the $10 million the White House initially proposed—state and local medical communities could still experience dangerous budget shortfalls in their efforts to prepare for nightmare scenarios, analysts said.

“If we spend less than $2 billion [next] year on local, state [and] city health departments, then our leaders don’t know what’s going on and don’t get it,” Tara O’Toole, director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, said during a recent speech.

“Some of that money is going to waste. There’s no help for that,” added O’Toole, who served as assistant secretary of energy for environmental safety and health during the Clinton administration. “We have got to get money to the local level very quickly in order to just get some raw capacity in there.”

Roughly two-thirds of the $3 billion offered in the bipartisan bill is slated for federal coffers, much of it earmarked to develop, purchase and stockpile smallpox vaccines (see GSN, Nov. 29). A similar bill being formulated in the House is expected to make similar recommendations, according to congressional staffers (see GSN, Dec. 11).

While the boosting of vaccine stockpiles is sorely needed—including vaccines for biological agents other than smallpox—a national bioterrorism response strategy should give equal weight to preparing local medical authorities, sources said.  It is these people who will be on the front lines should biological weapons ever be unleashed by terrorists.

The Senate bill, introduced by Senators Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) (see GSN, Nov. 15), initially sought to provide $5 billion—a large chunk of which was aimed at providing resources to the states and local governments. But Bush administration officials have vowed to veto any bills that surpass the $686 billion budget for 2002—or the $40 billion already designated for terrorism response.

“If we invested the kind of monies now that we did when [the Soviet satellite] Sputnik went up [and led to the creation of the] Apollo project, I think we would not only remove biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction threats, but I think we would also give the world great aid in dealing with malaria, [tuberculosis] and AIDS,” O’Toole said.

“It’s not a matter of [states receiving] $1 billion or $2 billion, it’s a matter of slowly building up your capabilities,” said Jonathan Ban, a research associate with the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. “You do need a smallpox vaccine and you do need vaccines for all the other [diseases], even though you might not use them. But you can’t do it at the expense of state and local resources because you’re definitely going to use them.”

A “System of Systems” Needed

“You can have all the stockpiles of vaccines you want but if you don’t have a system in place to distribute them there’s going to be hell to pay,” Ban said.

“You have to have a system of systems to combat bioterrorism” at the vital local level, Ban said. “You need a system that has detection capabilities, laboratory diagnostics, epidemiological capabilities … Currently there isn’t any of that.”

Ban served as the lead analyst for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report “Bioterrorism in the United States,” released in July after a 15-month study that examined the response capabilities of seven large cities, including New York, which is considered the leader in civilian biological defense preparedness.

In the last couple years New York has established an evolving monitoring system that enables local authorities to track and categorize hospital admissions, 911 calls, water supplies and even absenteeism rates with large employers. If authorities notice a spike in one or more of the categories they might be able to head off a biological outbreak before it spreads too fast, sources said.

Quick Response is Key

“If you don’t detect [a biological attack] early it’s going to be a big problem, the way people move around [the world] today,” Ban said.  “The better you respond, the better you can handle the situation and mitigate the consequences.”

Currently the CDC advocates a “ring containment” strategy (see GSN, Nov. 27) modeled after the World Health Organization method that successfully eradicated smallpox from the world by 1980. If one person is exposed to a contagious, potentially lethal biological agent, local authorities need to quarantine them quickly and at least the last 20 people who had been in contact with them. Sources said the crucial factor in such worrisome scenarios is rapidly identifying the outbreak, so it can be contained. Hence, doctors, emergency crews and other local officials on the front lines need to have as much funding as training as possible, they said.

“I think it’s pretty apparent to people by now, following the anthrax attacks, that medicine and public health is at the heart of a response to bioweapons threats,” said O’Toole.

Public Health Vulnerabilities

“There are a lot of vulnerabilities” at the local level, she said. “First of all, [doctors] haven’t seen anthrax. They haven’t seen smallpox. They don’t know what to look for. They don’t know how to diagnose it. The big problem we saw [was] with the two patients, one in D.C. and one in Maryland who went to their doctor’s offices, went to the emergency room and were sent home with anthrax and later tragically died.”

In addition, there is no surge capability in the medical system, sources said. Hospitals keep just enough supplies and workforce on hand for daily needs—and they are pitted against each other as competitors and not prepared to work together, sources added.

“In the search for [financial] efficiency we have eliminated all excess capability,” said O’Toole.  “The public health system is even worse shape … We have not invested sufficiently in this system … The local health departments are bereft of resources. Half of them do not have Internet connections.”

“Connectivity is a major problem,” Ban added. “Hospitals are unprepared, doctors are unaware … Many of the locales don’t even have distribution systems.”

In the event of a biological attack, CDC plans call for federal authorities to fly in vaccines and other emergency supplies and drop off them at a prearranged airport hangar, sources said. Then it is up to local officials to distribute these crucial supplies.

One big-city fire chief interviewed by Ban for the CDC study said he planned to take the vaccines and other supplies to fire stations, then go on local television to inform the public to come get their shots.

“Can you imagine the psychological effect, the mad runs on the fire house?” Ban asked. “And would the fire chief himself be the one administering antibiotics?”

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Anthrax:  U.S. Army Reconstructs Spores Used in Attacks

The spores used in the U.S. anthrax incidents match those recently produced by the U.S. military for investigative purposes, the Baltimore Sun reported today.  As the “Amerithrax” investigation continues, however, critics are questioning theories that point to a U.S. military connection, according to reports.

Scientists at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah have produced small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax that is nearly identical to the spores used in the incidents, U.S. sources said.  The production of weaponized anthrax is apparently the first since former U.S. President Richard Nixon ended the U.S. offensive biological weapons program in 1969, the Sun reported.

Dugway researchers sent the newly produced anthrax—via Federal Express—to the U.S. Army Military Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMIID) for sterilization.  USAMIID shipped the spores back to Dugway as a coarse paste, according to the Sun.  Dugway researchers then used the killed spores to minimize risks to workers while conducting experiments.  Some experiments, such as those on decontamination methods and detection systems, needed to use live and weaponized anthrax, according to government sources.

Army officials said the anthrax stored at Dugway and USAMIID were protected by several security measures.  At Dugway, security measures included video cameras, intrusion alarms and a “buddy system,” which does not allow researchers to handle anthrax and other microbes alone, according to one scientist.

Dugway produced the live anthrax because vaccines and other preventive measures need to be tested against aerosolized anthrax, according to David Huxsoll, a former head of the USAMIID’s biodefense program.  “When you’re building a program to defend against biological weapons on the battlefield, you have to be prepared for an aerosol exposure,” Huxsoll said.

The Army’s production of small amounts of weapon-grade anthrax at Dugway would not violate the Biological Weapons Convention, said University of Maryland expert Milton Leitenberg.  The convention only bans the production of biological warfare agents for non-protective measures.  “There’s no specific limit in grams or micrograms,” Leitenberg said.  “But if you got up in the hundreds of grams, people would be very, very skeptical” (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 12).

Rosenberg Theory Questioned

A recent report that suggests someone connected to the U.S. military is responsible for the anthrax incidents has several inaccuracies that call its conclusions into question, according to the New Republic (see GSN, Dec. 4).

One false conclusion made in the report, prepared by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, head of the Federation of American Scientists’ Working Group on Biological Weapons Verification, is that the limited circle of research facilities with access to the Ames strain of anthrax—the same strain used in the incidents—suggests a domestic source, the New Republic reported. 

Terrorists could just as easily obtain Ames strain spores from a recently dead cow, according to David Huxsoll, interim director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York.  The Ames strain, which was first isolated in 1929, is a monomorphic disease—one in which strains mutate slowly, or not at all—Huxsoll said.  Spores taken from a cow that died recently would be virtually the same as the Ames strain used by researchers, he said.

“One should not be at all surprised that you could find something very much the same—it would be a surprise to find something very different,” said Huxsoll.  “If I were a terrorist, I’d just go where the disease occurs naturally and dig it up.”

The Rosenberg report also said the United States first researched a strain of anthrax called Vollum 1B as a weapon (see GSN, Dec. 10), but then “the search undoubtedly continued for better strains.  The U.S. bioweapons program apparently switched to the Ames reference strain because of its high virulence.” 

There is no evidence of such a switch in research having taken place, according to the New Republic.  The U.S. biological weapons program never gave up working with Vollum 1B, according to a law-enforcement official.  Instead, when researchers saw how slowly anthrax killed its victims, they abandoned work on it altogether, the New Republic reported.  “Who the hell wanted a weapon that would take 60 days to kill?” asked the official.

If any former employees of the U.S. biological warfare program kept supplies of old anthrax, they would be Vollum 1B spores, not Ames, according to the New Republic.  There is no evidence the United States has produced weaponized Ames strain anthrax, the New Republic reported.

Rosenberg also wrote in her report that “The extraordinary concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the letter anthrax is believed to be characteristic of material made by the U.S. process.”  This does not mean, however, that other countries could not produce anthrax of similar quality, according to the New Republic.

The former Soviet biological weapons program deliberately used anthrax powder that consisted of only 25 percent anthrax by weight, according to Ken Alibek, former deputy director of the Soviet biological weapons program.  This was done not because the Soviets could not produce better quality anthrax, but because more concentrated anthrax was unnecessary for use in a missile weapon, the New Republic reported.

“I still don't see any geography here ... we are not going to find a smoking gun,” said former USAMIID commander David Franz.  “The anthrax could have been made in any place at any time. We have to get away from the idea that you can just analyze these samples and tell who made them” (Wendy Orent, New Republic, Dec. 11). 

University Inspections Begin

Research facility inspections began yesterday at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (see GSN, Dec. 10), a university official said.  Investigators from the U.S. Health and Human Services Department’s Office of the Inspector General are examining the security of biological samples and computer data, said university spokesman Tom Curtis. The investigation could last up to four weeks, Curtis said.  “It amounts to an audit.”

The university is fully cooperating with the investigation, Curtis said.  “I don’t question the need for someone to look into dangerous materials and make sure they are being handled appropriately” (CNN.com, Dec. 12).

Information Needs to be Shared

New York Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik yesterday asked the U.S. Senate to pass proposed legislation that would make it easier for local law enforcement to obtain information from the FBI.  The walls between the two agencies were “the worst kind of dysfunctional thinking in government,” Kerik said.

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight in the Courts, Kerik discussed the anthrax incident involving a suspicious letter sent to NBC’s studios on Oct. 12.  New York police did not learn about that letter until almost a week after the FBI had been notified, Kerik said. 

That example showed the need for better communication between local and federal law enforcement, according to Kerik.  “We could have been on the issue instantly,” Kerik said.  “And that sort of brought all of this to light.  The FBI had not let us know.”

The proposed legislation, sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), would allow federal authorities to share information gathered from sources such as wiretaps, grand juries and foreign intelligence operations with local law enforcement officials.  The new bill, however, would not require federal law enforcement to do so.

Witnesses at the hearing said that while the legislation would not eliminate the withholding of information between federal and local law enforcement, it would remove an oft-cited reason federal law enforcement uses to do so. 

“It’s possible that countless New Yorkers were unnecessarily put at risk simply because the law and culture makes information-sharing taboo,” said Subcommittee Chairman Schumer.  “That’s a risk that none of us should ever be forced to take” (Raymond Hernandez, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Canadians Knew of Anthrax Letter Dangers

Canadian military officials knew several months before the U.S. anthrax incidents that letters filled with anthrax spores posed a risk to mail handlers and that opening a tainted letter could send spores into the air, according to the Wall Street Journal.

A Canadian study was discussed yesterday at a meeting called by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding the anthrax incidents.  Canadian officials said they had e-mailed the study to the CDC soon after reports of the discovery of anthrax at the American Media Inc. headquarters in Florida.  The e-mail, however, was never opened, said Bradley Perkins, a CDC anthrax investigator.

Perkins said he regretted that the report was not read.  “It is certainly relevant data, but I don’t think it would have altered the decisions that we made,” Perkins said (Chad Terhune, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12).

Organizers of the CDC meeting also asked participants to come up with the answers to several research questions concerning anthrax, according to the New York Times. The questions included the following:  

*         What is the minimum number of spores needed to infect a human (see GSN, Nov.16)?

*         How long do exposed people need to take antibiotics?

*         When is a decontaminated office or building safe?

“We wish we had the answers today,” said James Hughes, the CDC official overseeing the anthrax investigation (Lawrence Altman, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Hart Building Cleanup Continues

Small items, such as files, computers and books, which may have been tainted with anthrax inside the Hart Senate Office Building, will be shipped to Richmond, Va., for further decontamination, officials said yesterday.

The items have been fumigated once during the decontamination of the entire building, but this move is an extra dose of caution, officials said (see GSN, Dec. 4).  The process, which uses ethylene oxide, could take a week, a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spokeswoman said.  EPA officials said they hope to reopen the Hart building by the end of the year (Goldstein/Nakashima, Washington Post, Dec. 12).

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Sudan:  Organization Criticizes U.S. Claims Sudan Has BW

The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, a London-based advocacy group, Monday criticized U.S. allegations that Sudan was pursuing a biological weapons program.

The council made the announcement in response to a statement by U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton at a U.N. meeting in November (see GSN, Nov. 20).  The council said Bolton’s statements were “unsustainable and deeply irresponsible.”

“For its own credibility on this serious issue, the Bush administration cannot allow its reputation with regard to arms control and nonproliferation to be sullied for the sake of cheap propaganda attacks on Sudan,” the council said (U.N. Integrated Regional Information Networks/AllAfrica.com, Dec. 11).

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Anthrax:  Tests Show Potency of Daschle Letter Spores

Federal scientists discovered that they could aerosolize already-settled anthrax spores in the offices of U.S. Senate Majority leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) simply by moving about the office.  The finding reaffirms the suspicions that the anthrax in the letter received by Daschle was highly refined and professionally produced, according to the New York Times.  Meanwhile, investigators are continuing to track down who is responsible for the anthrax incidents, according to reports.

Anthrax spores floated back up into the air when researchers in Daschle’s office simulated normal office activity a month after their initial release, according to scientists.  The tests, conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Public Health Service, countered earlier claims by the U.S. military that once spores landed on a surface, they would rarely become airborne again.

The test results were announced yesterday during a meeting conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on research needs for combating bioterrorism.  Participants discussed new testing and cleanup measures, including what liquid disinfectants are most effective, new environmental sampling techniques and methods for determining when a decontaminated building is safe, EPA official Dorothy Canter said.  (Lawrence Altman, New York Times, Dec. 10).

More than 200 scientists and experts attended yesterday’s CDC meeting.  Participants came from the CDC, the military, universities and research facilities.  “We are very mindful this is not over,” said Julie Gerberding, deputy director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases.  “If we thought it was over, there would perhaps be less need for a meeting like this” (M.A.J. McKenna, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Dec. 11).

“Amerithrax” Investigation Continues

More than 700 FBI agents plus agents from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, state and local police and others are working on the anthrax investigation, which is code-named “Amerithrax,” the Wall Street Journal reported today.

The investigation is proceeding on three theories, the Journal reported.  One theory is that the person responsible is acting alone like the Unabomber.  The second is that a domestic terrorist group is responsible, and the third is that a foreign or state-sponsored terrorist group is responsible.

One source of clues for investigators are the four tainted letters sent to Senator Daschle, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw and the New York Post.  One clue found in the Post letter was that the handwritten note was on paper of a size that is uncommon in this country, an FBI official said.  Few other clues have been found in the three early letters, law-enforcement officials said.

The handwriting on the envelopes and enclosed notes (see GSN, Nov. 1) has been run through the Secret Service’s Forensic Information System for Handwriting (FISH), according to the Journal.  The Secret Service scanned the handwriting into a system that includes digital images of thousands of threats sent to presidents and officials.  The FISH system searched for similar handwriting and syntax between the sample and the database, but there were no matches, the Journal reported.

The U.S. Capitol Police is also comparing the anthrax letters, by hand, with its file of threatening letters sent to members of Congress, said Capt. David Callaway, head of the Capitol Police’s investigation division.

Leahy Letter Could Provide New Leads

Testing on anthrax spores taken from the recently decontaminated Leahy letter will focus on three areas, according to a member of the FBI group that will conduct the tests (see GSN, Dec. 6).  One area consists of the biological traits of the spores, such as their genetic makeup.  The second consists of the chemical components of the powder, such as what drying agents were used, and the third consists of the physical properties of the powder.

The CDC has a process that could detect other biological agents in the anthrax powder, said Mitchell Cohen, director of the CDC’s bacterial and mycotic diseases division.  The process could help determine the origin of the anthrax, especially if a microbe was found in the powder that only came from a specific part of the world, Cohen said.

Military Connection

FBI officials said any U.S. military connection to the anthrax incidents was just one path of inquiry they are investigating (see GSN, Dec. 10).  The FBI issued a subpoena for a list of everyone who worked at the U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMIID) at Fort Detrick, Md., according to a USAMIID senior employee.

“There are people who left here under less-than-the-best circumstances who are being investigated—where did they go and what are they doing?” the employee said.

Other military research facilities also had access to anthrax, according to the USAMIID employee.  He noted the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah and described it as a bleak and isolated place.  “They work with anthrax there, and they have just one hell of a turnover.  It’s 17 miles of just open desert from the main gate to the main lab,” the USAMIID employee said.  Working in such an environment could cause anger among employees, according to the Journal.  “It’s like going to a penitentiary,” he said (Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11).

Backlog of Mail Returning to Congress

At an irradiation plant in Lima, Ohio, workers are sanitizing congressional mail in 147 trucks before the mail heads back to Washington over the next few weeks, according to the Los Angeles Times.  Another 507 bags of mail taken by the FBI as possible evidence have tested negative for anthrax and are ready to be sanitized.

About 65 bags of mail taken by the FBI at the onset of the anthrax incidents tested positive for anthrax, the Times reported.  Members of Congress debated what to do with this mail.  House Administration Chairman Bob Ney (R-Ohio) wants it destroyed. “Why truck it across state lines?” asked Ney’s communications director Jim Forbes.

“I want to see each letter,” said Representative Adam Schiff (D-Calif.).  “It’s very time consuming, but it’s an important part of the job” (Johanna Neuman, Los Angeles Times/Chicago Tribune, Dec. 10).

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BWC: Review Conference Collapses

The Fifth Review Conference of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention ended Friday (see GSN, Dec. 7) with no agreements after the United States moved to end future talks on a verification protocol to the treaty.

With only an hour left to go before the three-week conference came to an end, the United States introduced a proposal to the conference's final declaration that called for an end to the Ad Hoc Group, a committee of nations that had been working on a 210-page protocol outlining enforcement measures for the convention (see GSN, Nov. 27).  “The conference takes note of the work of the Ad Hoc Group and decides that the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate are hereby terminated,” the U.S. proposal read (Associated Press/New York Times, Dec. 9).

Following the U.S. motion, the chairman decided to suspend the conference and adjourn until November rather than bring the declaration up for a vote in its current state.

The United States had appeared Thursday to be accepting of vague wording in the final declaration that would have allowed the Ad Hoc Group's mandate to continue, according to the Financial Times (Frances Williams, Financial Times, Dec. 9).  Other states had reportedly presumed that, absent a measure terminating the Ad Hoc Group, it would continue to meet and discuss a mandatory inspections regime, which the United States opposes (UN Wire, Dec. 7).

Delegates React

The final U.S proposal shocked and angered many conference delegates, according to the Financial Times.  “The U.S. was willing to let the conference fail,” said Oliver Meier of the Verification Research, Training and Information Center.  “While U.S. citizens are dying from biological weapons, even the most modest proposals to strengthen the bioweapons ban were not acceptable to Washington” (Williams, Financial Times).

“We had a kind of agreement with the United States ... to be informed of their proposals, and that one took us totally by surprise, and that was totally different from what the [European Union] wants,” said Jean Lint, head of the EU delegation.  “So for us, this was totally unacceptable,” Lint said (Emma Kirby, BBC Online, Dec. 7).

“They treated us like dirt,” said another EU delegate.  “They are liars.  In decades of multilateral negotiations, we've never experienced this kind of insulting behavior” (Sunshine Project release, Dec. 7).

The European Union said in a statement that it remains committed to “multilateral” negotiations and that the Ad Hoc Group's 1994 mandate remains “completely valid” (Richard Waddington, Reuters/Yahoo! News, Dec. 7).

U.S. Answers Critics

The Bush administration believes the enforcement and verification protocol being designed by the Ad Hoc Group would do little to stop rogue nations, such as Iraq, from obtaining biological weapons, according to a U.S. State Department official.  “If the conference had continued, there was a danger that continued negotiations would have undermined our concerted efforts to strengthen the convention,” the official said.

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton agreed that creating a meaningful way to strengthen the convention is the most important thing.  “We believe compliance is essential for any arms control regime to be meaningful,” Bolton said.  He added that while the Bush administration is “disappointed” that an agreement could not be reached, it was better than “trying to paper over substantive disagreements with artful drafting.”

“I wish we could have continued talking, but it was obvious that we would not reach an agreement,” Bolton said.  “A cooling-off period will be a good thing” (Allen/Mufson, Washington Post, Dec. 8).

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Al-Qaeda:  Anthrax Found in Al-Qaeda Home

Samples of substances found in the Kabul home of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri tested positive for anthrax spores, according to U.S. intelligence officials, Newsweek reported yesterday.  The samples were to be retested.

U.S. operatives in Afghanistan have also discovered evidence indicating that one or more Russian scientists were helping al-Qaeda develop anthrax, and that the terrorist network might have stockpiled anthrax spores.  U.S. bombing raids destroyed most of any stockpiles, intelligence sources said.  The sources did not know how much anthrax was removed from Afghanistan, if any, they said.

The Kabul office of Pakistani scientist Sultan Bashiru-din Mehmood (see GSN, Nov. 28) also contained documents indicating an interest in anthrax (Newsweek, Dec. 9).

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Anthrax:  U.S. Military May Have Ties to Incidents

Those responsible for the recent U.S. anthrax incidents may have some connection to the U.S. military and may even be members, according to reports (see GSN, Dec. 4).

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) said Saturday that he believes it probably was someone formerly in the military who sent him a tainted letter.  Daschle said no one could say conclusively that a domestic source is responsible, but “as we look at all the possibilities, that one has the greatest degree of credibility right now” (Agence France-Presse, Dec. 9).

Scientists who worked on the U.S. biological warfare program at Fort Detrick in Maryland said they were surprised that the FBI has not done more to question them.

“That is really, really, surprising,” said I. Michael Greenberger, former head of counterterrorism at the U.S. Justice Department.  “That just takes my breath away.  This is supposed to be a no-stones-unturned investigation,” Greenberger said. “My first instinct would be to go to these guys and ask them what it’s like to make stuff like this.  Plus, they’re potential suspects, because of their experience.”

The remaining former scientists, of whom only two dozen are still living, have been waiting for the FBI to contact them about what they know or about any possible connection to the incidents, according to the Baltimore Sun.  “I’ve got the education to do it.  I live alone.  I’ve got two baths, so I could use one as a lab,” said 84-year-old James Smith, a researcher at Fort Detrick from 1943 to 1971.  “I want to be examined as a potential terrorist.”

Several scientists said the anthrax used in the incidents has no connection to the strains used for research as part of the former offensive biological warfare program in the United States (see GSN, Dec. 4).  At the time of the program, U.S. researchers used a type of anthrax called the Vollum strain.  Genetic tests have shown that the strain in the current incidents is the Ames strain, which is similar to Vollum but not identical, according to the Sun.

The anthrax culprit, however, could have learned more about making an anthrax weapon from the research conducted by the former bioweapon scientists.  Bill Walter, a former Fort Detrick scientist, said that in 1970 he spent months reading and organizing more than 6,000 papers on biological warfare research written during the 27 years of the U.S. program.

Those papers were later sent to other military facilities, Walter said.  He added that he was afraid that routine declassification might have made some of them available to whoever is behind the anthrax incidents.  “A lot of us are shook up by this declassification thing,” Walter said.  “It would give the terrorists a cookbook” (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 9).

Campus Labs Examined

The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston is scheduled to be the first U.S. university laboratory inspected by the Health and Human Services Department Office of the Inspector General, the Christian Science Monitor reported today.  The inspection, planned for tomorrow, is part of a Congressional effort to examine the security of U.S. research facilities (see GSN, Nov. 27).

The UTMB is scheduled to begin construction in January of a new “level 4” laboratory—the highest biosafety designation.  It will be the first U.S. university laboratory with that level of biosafety, which allows researchers to handle the most dangerous microbes.

Only a rough estimate can be made of the number of facilities that handle anthrax samples because no inventory is kept, according to the Monitor.  About 250 laboratories are registered with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to work with “select agents,” such as Ebola, smallpox and anthrax.  Of those, it is estimated that up to 30 work with anthrax, according to the Monitor.

In order to remedy disparities between research facilities in the way they handle microbes, the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) has asked Congress to consider new safety and security measures.  The new measures would include a better tracking system, a better communications network and increased staffing, among others.  “For years and years and years, the nation did not see the need to spend money on these labs, until recently,” said APHL Executive Director Scott Becker (Kris Axtman, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 10).

Copiers Could Conceal Clues

Since the note inside the anthrax-tainted letter sent to Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) appears to be a photocopied version of the one sent to Sen. Daschle, it may be easier to determine who mailed it, according to FBI sources.

A photocopier can leave behind a “fingerprint,” made up of the tiny scratches and bits of dirt on the copier’s glass and lens, the New York Post reported.  The FBI plans to investigate the Leahy letter for this kind of fingerprint, which could help narrow down what copier the sender used.  The information would allow investigators to focus on businesses and libraries near the homes of potential suspects, according to the Post.

Copy-making stores such as Kinko’s have become increasingly interesting due to terrorist customers, according to the Post.  The newspaper reported that several of the hijackers involved in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks made airplane reservations at a Florida Kinko’s.  Anti-abortion militant Clayton Lee Waagner, believed to be responsible for hundreds of anthrax hoax letters mailed to reproductive health clinics, was recently arrested (see GSN, Dec. 6) outside of a Kinko’s in Ohio (Brad Hunter, New York Post, Dec. 10).

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