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Yugoslavia: Chemical Production Equipment Readied for DestructionYugoslavia is set to begin destroying chemical production equipment by next March. The equipment could be used to manufacture poison gas, a senior Yugoslav official said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 23). The equipment is now stored at a warehouse in the city of Krusevac and is being inspected by a team of U.S. experts, said Prvoslav Davinic, president of the National Commission for the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It will cost between $300,000 to $400,000 to destroy the equipment, which will be funded by the United States, Davinic said (Tanjug news agency/BBC Monitoring, Oct. 17). For further information, see:
From October 17, 2002 issue.United States: Newport Depot Receives Funding for Accelerated DisposalThe U.S. Congress has approved $161 million to accelerate the disposal of VX stockpiles at the Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Aug. 8). The funding is included in the recently approved defense appropriations bill awaiting President George W. Bush’s signature (see related GSN story, today). The funding is about equal to what the Army had said it needed to dispose of the 1,269 tons VX stored at the depot three years ahead of schedule, said Senator Evan Bayh (D-Ind.). The disposal project is scheduled to begin next year and is expected to take about nine months (Associated Press, Oct. 17). For further information, see: Federation of American Scientists Information on Chemical Weapons
From October 16, 2002 issue.U.S. Response: Researchers Develop Ricin VaccineResearchers at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center have developed a ricin vaccine found to be effective in mice, Gene Therapy Weekly reported this week (see GSN, Aug. 20). Ricin is a chemical toxin made from castor beans, which produces flu-like symptoms and causes death in a few days. It can be administered through food and water or via an aerosol spray. “Ricin is not only dangerous, but it is also cheap and easy to make,” said Ellen Vitetta, director of the university’s Southwestern Cancer Immunobiology Center and senior author of the study on the ricin vaccine, set to be published in the medical journal Vaccine. The vaccine, developed through recombinant technology, will be tested against airborne ricin once the experiments can be conducted in a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory, Vitetta said, adding that arrangements for such a facility were in the planning stage. “We have only tested it against injected ricin, but, based on past experience, there’s every reason to believe it will be protective against aerosolized ricin,” she said. Once vaccinated mice have been tested against airborne ricin, the next step would be to begin production and storage of the vaccine, as well as human trials, Vitetta said. U.S. agencies or private companies would have to step in and conduct the clinical trials because of limited resources, she said (Gene Therapy Weekly, Oct. 17).
From October 16, 2002 issue.CWC: Treaty Organization Must Redirect Focus, Report ClaimsBy David McGlinchey Verifying the destruction of existing chemical weapons is eclipsing the convention’s role in ensuring new chemical weapons are not created, according to the Verification Research, Training and Information Center (VERTIC). While treaty parties have declared 4,881 chemical production sites since the CWC came into effect in 1997, there have been only 452 inspections. Some of those sites — Schedule 1 and 2 facilities that produce extremely dangerous chemicals or dual-use chemicals —were inspected more than once, meaning that the number of different plants inspected is even lower. “There is no implication in the CWC that at any stage industry verification should be a secondary activity to CW destruction verification,” the report says. “Contrary to this vision, in the first five years of the convention, verification activity has concentrated largely on existing CW stocks, former CW production facilities and CW destruction plants, while industry inspections have been relatively neglected.” The report cites several causes for the lack of industry inspections, including late industry declarations, declining political support for industry verifications and financial constraints. Indeed, while it is getting the lion’s share of the OPCW’s attention, the destruction of chemical weapons is moving much slower than planned. The organization uses scarce resources to verify destruction of stockpiles, and little is left over for industry, the report says. As more chemical weapons are destroyed in coming years, the OPCW will need to shift more attention to verifying industry compliance, the report says. It is important, however, to expand the industry verification now in order to establish continuity and begin risk assessment in earnest, the report says. Solutions The report recommends that the OPCW spend at least one-quarter of its budget on industry verification in each of the next three years, with an increased emphasis on industry coming after 2006. In 2001, the OPCW spent 15 percent of its budget on industry inspections. The report also cites remote monitoring and the use of instruments such as flowmeters to monitor the destruction process, which would free up much needed resources. Although such equipment would be expensive, the money would be spent up front and savings would be seen in the long run, the report says. The report also recommends the organization simplify inspections to reduce costs and make at least one inspection of a facility in every member country that declared any chemical facility. For further information, see:
From October 15, 2002 issue.CWC: Treaty Parties Grant Significant Budget IncreaseBy David Ruppe Chemical Weapons Convention members approved a 10 percent budget increase to $67 million for 2003, the organization said in a press release today. Two other decisions made by the conference will allow the organization to use a budgetary surplus from 2001 and money from a working capital fund, serving “to improve markedly the OPCW’s financial situation,” it said. The increased funding will enable more spending on inspections, the organization said. The group will also be able to spend more on “protection and assistance” against chemical weapons, “which is important in the context of the OPCW’s contribution to international efforts to combat terrorism,” it added. In addition, the U.S. delegation said last week that it plans to voluntarily contribute $2 million in addition to its annual assessment. “The news was well received,” said John Hart, a U.S. researcher with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden. “That extra $2 million will go a long way toward addressing any financial problems in the coming year.” Hart cautioned, however, that the organization still might face serious budgetary difficulties resulting from an expected increase in chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia and the United States that will need to be monitored. He added, “It is still unclear whether the conference of states parties have adequately addressed structural problems of the budget process.” Changed Climate Earlier this year, the very survival of the organization seemed in jeopardy. Citing mismanagement, the United States and other key states withheld their dues pending the removal of the organization’s former director general, Jose Bustani. Member states voted in April to remove Bustani, a Brazilian diplomat (see GSN, April 23), and they voted in July to approve Argentina’s Rogelio Pfirter to head the organization (see GSN, July 26). “It was quite clear that there was a new atmosphere … in each case, doors were left open for negotiation and compromise. That was in stark contrast to what happened over the past two years,” said Jean Pascal Zanders, who is the project leader on chemical and biological warfare for SIPRI and who attended the conference. “Following from the removal of Bustani, many states parties, including key states parties such as the United States, appear to have given the OPCW a second chance,” he said. Other Proposed Changes In addition to the funding increases, the assembled states approved in principle extensions to Russia’s obligations to meet two treaty deadlines: one for destroying 1 percent and the other for destroying 20 percent its chemical weapons stockpiles (see related GSN story, today). They approved a Russian request to convert rather than destroy nine former chemical weapons production facilities, at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk in Russia, to peaceful purposes. The states also approved an extension for another unidentified party to meet its timeline for destruction of 20 percent of its stockpile by April 2003. Analysts say the party is South Korea, which has requested the OPCW not state it has a chemical weapons stockpiles. By making these extensions, the state’s parties are begrudgingly accepting the reality of delays in destruction, while trying to maintain control of the process by reviewing it each year, Zanders said. “States parties refused to give Russia a blanket extension,” he said. To help curb the projected costs of a growing workload of OPCW inspections, states requested the director general to prepare proposals for greater use of monitoring equipment at chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities, apparently as an alternative to inspection. The states also asked the director general to consider proposals for the “optimization” of verification activities during inspections of chemical weapons related and industrial facilities, including the intensity of inspections, sizes of inspection teams, and other related issues, according to the press release. “The major problem here is that approximately 70 percent of inspector days have been spent at chemical weapons destruction facilities,” Hart said. The amount is expected to increase as destruction is stepped up, he said, potentially sapping funding from other inspection activities. “The number of chemical weapons destruction facilities is rising, and something is going to have to change,” he said. “You can reduce the cost of these inspections by reducing the size of inspection teams, and some of that has been done, and you can increase your emphasis on using certain types of equipment on site.” For further information, see:
From October 15, 2002 issue.Russia: OPCW Extends Destruction DeadlinesThe Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which oversees the Chemical Weapons Convention, has granted Russia extensions for two of its chemical weapons destruction deadlines, the organization said today (see GSN, Oct. 9). During a conference held last week at The Hague, the OPCW agreed in principle to grant Russia extensions for two deadlines — the destruction of 1 percent and of 20 percent of its chemical weapons arsenal, the OPCW said in a press statement. The conference authorized the OPCW Executive Council to set a new date for the first deadline by the end of this year and to recommend a date for the second deadline by October 2003. The conference also agreed to grant a deadline extension to another, unspecified OPCW member for the destruction of 20 percent of its chemical weapons (see related GSN story, today). The OPCW established detailed reporting requirements for Russia and called on other countries to assist in destroying Russia’s chemical weapons. It agreed to a Russian request to convert, rather than destroy, nine former chemical weapons production sites (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons release, Oct. 15). Sergei Kiriyenko, chairman of the Russian state commission on chemical disarmament, praised the OPCW’s decision to grant the conversion request. “Conversion is very important to us: It means about 2,000 jobs,” Kiriyenko said in an interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant. “People who are experts in the chemical weapons sphere will not be left unemployed. This is relevant to the question of control of technology drain” (Kommersant/BBC Monitoring, Oct. 14). For further information, see:
From October 15, 2002 issue.United States: Chemical Weapons Incinerator Has Cracks, LeaksU.S. Army inspectors have discovered cracked bricks, cracked pipes and broken seals at the U.S. Umatilla Chemical Depot incinerator, which was shut down Oct. 2 after failing test incinerations, Oregon environmental officials said. While “crawling into units and taking them apart” at the depot to figure out why potentially harmful metals have been escaping into the air, inspectors have discovered areas that need recaulking, according to Wayne Thomas, project manager for Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality. The depot plans to suspend further test burns until November or later, Army officials said (see GSN, Oct. 4). Officials had planned to begin incinerating live agents from the depot’s chemical weapons stockpile by February 2003, but that schedule might change now, according to the AP (Associated Press, Oct. 11).
From October 11, 2002 issue.Japan: Sarin Scientist Sentenced to HangA Japanese scientist was sentenced to death today for his part in a sarin gas attack that killed 12 and sent thousands to the hospital (see GSN, June 26). Seiichi Endo, 42, was sentenced to death for making the sarin gas used in a 1995 Tokyo subway attack carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. He has also been convicted of producing the sarin used in a 1994 attack that killed seven people in the central city of Matsumoto. Capital punishment in Japan is administered by hanging. Endo is the 10th Aum Shinrikyo member to be sentenced to death for the attacks, although none of the sentences has been carried out and several are under appeal. Endo joined the cult in 1987 when he was in graduate school at Japan’s Kyoto University, studying virology (Kozo Mizoguchi, Associated Press, Oct. 11). As Aum Shinrikyo’s “health and welfare minister,” Endo was responsible for the cult’s involvement with sarin, VX gas and anthrax. His sentencing followed a seven-year trial (Agence France Presse, Oct. 11).
From October 11, 2002 issue.United States: Army Says Contractor Made Safety Mistakes in UtahA series of mistakes and safety violations by a defense contractor contributed to a July incident in which two workers were exposed to sarin at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah, the Salt Lake Tribune reported yesterday (see GSN, July 17). In the July 15 incident a worker reacted to trace amounts of sarin, becoming disoriented and complaining of blurry vision and head and chest pains. His red blood cell count dropped as well. Another worker was not affected, despite exposure to the sarin. EG&G Defense Materials, a contractor for the Army at the depot, had relaxed safety regulations despite discovering a leaking valve on an incinerator in January, a recently released Army investigation says. The defective incinerator discovered in January is identical to the one connected to the July leak. The contractor also failed to document the defective valve and a flawed pressure regulator from the first leak, the Army report said (see GSN, Jan. 8). The report also faulted officials at the depot for not taking medical or decontamination measures after the workers were exposed. In response to the accidents, the Army has ordered safety education for workers, improved communication among personnel at the incinerators and proper safety checks. “The corrective language sounds great on paper,” said Jason Groenewold, director of the Salt Lake City organization, Families Against Incinerator Risk. “But we’ve been hearing that same thing from the Army for nearly a decade now, yet nothing has changed” (Dawn House, Salt Lake Tribune, Oct. 10).
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