NTI: Global Security Newswire

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

From October 30, 2002 issue.

Russia: Theater Gas Was Fentanyl, Hostage Death Toll Rises

Russia used a chemical compound that included the anesthetic fentanyl to incapacitate Chechen extremists — and their hostages — in a Moscow theater Saturday, Russian Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko said today (see GSN, Oct. 29).

The compound would not have killed the hostages if they were not exhausted, dehydrated, hungry, unable to move and severely stressed, Shevchenko said. After much international speculation, this is the first Russian admission of the use of fentanyl in the raid that freed several hundred hostages (Judith Ingram, Associated Press, Oct. 30).

Two hospitalized former hostages died yesterday, bringing the civilian death toll from the three-day siege to 119, Moscow’s chief medical officer Andrei Seltsovsky said. At least 116 of those died as a result of the chemical (News24.com, Oct. 30).

Russian authorities pumped the chemical compound through the ventilation system before storming the theater; U.S. officials have said they believe the gas was an opiate, possibly fentanyl. Soldiers also killed 50 Chechen hostage-takers in the assault, Russian officials said.

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow today criticized Russian officials’ refusal to tell doctors what chemical had affected the hostages.

“We regret that the lack of information simply contributed to the confusion after the immediate operation to free the hostages was over,” Vershbow said. “It’s clear that perhaps with a little more information at least a few more of the hostages would have survived.”

A Russian doctor who has been treating the freed hostages agreed that the lack of information has cost lives.

The opiate is mostly harmless if used properly, but emergency responders at the scene “weren’t prepared for detoxification,” the doctor said.

“If people were intubated and helped to breathe with artificial ventilation while still in the vehicles, almost everyone would have survived,” the doctor said. “Everyone brought to my hospital alive is still alive” (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 30).

From October 29, 2002 issue.

Russia: U.S. Believes Russian Gas Was an Opiate

U.S. officials believe Russian authorities used an aerosol version of a fast-acting opiate called fentanyl in Saturday morning’s raid on a Moscow theater held by Chechen extremists, the New York Times reported today. Opinion remains divided on whether the gas represents a violation of the treaty banning chemical weapons (see GSN, Oct. 28).

The gas used in the assault killed 117 hostages; the Chechens killed one hostage during the raid. The United States has acknowledged, however, that its findings are inconclusive, as Russia has not provided details about the gas (Miller/Broad, New York Times, Oct. 29).

A number of reports surfaced yesterday supporting the theory that the gas was an opiate of some sort. According to Western doctors who examined survivors and information recently released by Russia, the gas was not a nerve agent but rather a morphine-related opiate. A key indication came from reports that Russian doctors successfully used naloxone to treat gas victims; the drug is used to treat heroin and morphine overdose victims (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 29).

German doctors who treated two survivors in a clinic in Munich also concluded that fentanyl was used in the raid (Daniel McGrory, London Times, Oct. 29).

Doctors reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to treat the victims with atropine — an antidote to nerve agents — but were instead successful with Narcan, a brand of naloxone also designed to address the effect of opiates (Matt Kelly, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 29).

The gas used in the raid might also have been an aerosol form of the morphine-based etorphine hydrochloride, the Washington Times reported. A surgical anesthetic, aflentanyl, could also have been used (Gertz, Scarborough, Washington Times, Oct. 29).

U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the gas was fentanyl “or a derivative that has a narcotic effect,” according to a senior U.S. official. If that is the case, Bush administration officials do not believe the gas would be a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Times reported (Miller/Broad, New York Times).

The Chemical Weapons Convention does not outlaw anesthetics such as fentanyl, according to Andy Oppenheimer, a weapons expert with Jane’s Defense Weekly.

“There are gray areas in the way these gases can be used and the Russians may be exploiting this to be able to develop chemical weapons without contravening international law,” he said (McGrory, London Times).

Some experts disagreed, saying the gas was a clear violation of the 1997 treaty and could encourage other countries to develop similar agents.

“It’s very troubling for the chemical arms control regime if the Russians get away with this,” said Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Other experts were impressed with the effectiveness of the gas.

“Somebody has actually found something that can turn off the body in seconds,” said Julian Robinson, a biological and chemical weapons expert at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom (Financial Times, Oct. 29).

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has not commented on the raid since the hostage fatalities became public, Russian officials yesterday defended the use of the gas.

“Our special forces did everything possible,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko said. “Huge casualties were avoided. It is hard to say what might have happened and how many casualties there might have been if the building had been blown up” (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post).

A Russian official told the Financial Times yesterday that the gas was a “medical gas of the type used in anesthesiology, which in normal conditions would not lead to lethal results.”

Russia may want to use the gas in the future, however, and will not release its name, the official said. Russian officials had tested the gas recently, but in the hostage situation the gas proved particularly lethal because of the theater’s poor ventilation and the stress and fatigue of the victims (Financial Times).

For further information, see:

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

From October 28, 2002 issue.

Russia: Moscow Refuses to Identify Deadly Theater Gas

All but two of the hostages killed in a Moscow theater died from the gas that was used to incapacitate the Chechen separatists who had taken the building, a senior Russian health official said yesterday. Russian officials would not identify the gas; some experts are saying it might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention.

More than 115 hostages died “from the effects of the gas exposure,” said Andrei Seltsovsky, head of the Moscow health department. About 650 former hostages remained hospitalized yesterday, 45 of whom were in critical condition.

The gas was described as an incapacitating agent, used as an anesthesia, by Yevgeny Yevdokimov, chief anesthetist in Moscow (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

Seltovsky said he did not know the name of the gas.

Russian authorities have been criticized for not releasing information on the gas, which was pumped in through the theater’s ventilation system early Saturday morning. Russian officials turned away a request for information on the gas from the U.S. Embassy.

Chemical Speculation

Lev Fedorov, president of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, said the chemical agent used in the raid was apparently a Valium-based military gas, developed during the Soviet era.

Vil Mirzayanov, a former colleague of Fedorov at the State Scientific and Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, said the Soviet Union had altered the molecular structure of the incapacitating agent BZ, and it proved effective as an anesthetic. Mirzayanov suggested the gas used in the raid was an anesthetic.

The gas used in Saturday’s assault might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention but conflict with the treaty is unclear, some experts said. The treaty bans the use of all lethal gasses. It allows incapacitating gasses for domestic law enforcement, but the effects must diminish quickly.

Because the gas was pumped into the theater, without regard to dosage for children, the sick or the elderly, the move violates the intent of the convention, Mirzayanov said.

Fedorov disagreed, saying that other countries research similar agents (Steven Myers, New York Times, Oct. 28).

The gas might have been a version of sleeping gas Adamsite, and the refusal to identify it could be because undeclared stocks of the gas would be in violation of the convention, the Financial Times reported (Andrew Jack, Oct. 28, Financial Times).

Treaty Implications

Amy Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at the Henry L. Stimson arms research organization in Washington, said there many questions remained regarding Russia’s compliance with the chemical treaty.

“This is kind of like pornography, you know it when you see it,” Smithson said. “There are going to be people on both sides who will argue that the treaty does not prohibit it. But how it was used, I think, is going to make it a huge debate.”

Federov said Russian officials would probably never disclose the nature of the chemical.

“We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was because in this country the state is more important than the people,” he said (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post).

The fact that the hostages had been weakened by stress and hunger made the gas much more deadly, health officials said. Fedorov agreed with this assessment.

“This weapon was developed to be used on healthy men who serve in the army,” he said. “It was used here on some of the so-called risk groups — women, children, people with liver and kidney problems” (Myers, New York Times).

Russia Will Not Disclose Gas

Officials have come under criticism as well for not disclosing the agent to doctors who treated the hostages. The doctors were themselves confused, according to a hospitalized former hostage.

“Some of the doctors were telling us it was nerve gas, some were saying it was tear gas,” said a freed hostage identified only as Natasha (Susan Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

None of the victims suffered symptoms associated with lethal — and therefore prohibited — chemical weapons.

Yevdokimov described the gas a “psychotropic.”

“It is safe if used as a general anesthetic, but large doses can affect basic functions of the organism, causing unconsciousness, respiratory and blood circulation problems,” he said.

A British doctor said the effect of anesthesia varies based on the subject.

“The range of human reaction to any anesthetic is very great,” said David Scott, an anesthesiologist at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary. “If, for example, 50 percent of the people in the auditorium were put to sleep, you would expect another 40 percent to be unaffected and 10 percent would die” (McGrory/Hartley, London Times, Oct. 28).

Russian authorities, meanwhile, are investigating a link between the Chechen militants and the al-Qaeda terrorist group.

“There were definitely Arab terrorists in the building with links to al-Qaeda,” a senior Western diplomat said. “The Russians will now want to know how much help the Chechens received from [Osama] bin Laden’s organization” (Lab/Aris, London Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 27).

For further information, see:

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

From October 28, 2002 issue.

CWC: Budget Problems Have Thwarted Treaty Inspections

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in recent years was unable to conduct some inspections of chemical facilities for illicit chemical weapons production because of budget troubles, the U.S. General Accounting Office said last week (see GSN, Oct. 25).

Problems cited by the GAO included failures by some states to pay their annual dues and by certain states to reimburse the organization for monitoring the destruction of their declared chemical weapons. The organization also underestimated personnel expenses for the last three years, the report said.

States owe nearly $1 million in unpaid dues and, as of June, owed more than $2 million in reimbursements.

The OPCW was $2.8 million in deficit in 2000 and has a potential deficit of $5.2 million in 2002, the report said.

The GAO concluded, “Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization’s ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention,” noting it had to reduce the number of planned inspections for 2001 and 2002.

A U.S. State Department response included in the report said the GAO analysis does not take into account OPCW changes underway in recent months. The GAO report was based largely on an audit of documents collected from the OPCW in May.

Changes Underway

The organization’s budgeting difficulties have been well known for some time. The Bush administration until earlier this year had withheld some of its dues while publicly criticizing and pressing for removal of the previous OPCW director general, Jose Bustani (see GSN, April 12).

There have been recent signs, however, of a turnaround. A U.S. campaign to remove the official was successful last April. A new director general, Rogelio Pfirter, took charge in July and is beginning a management review this week. Washington has resumed payments, as have other key contributors, and has donated an additional $2 million to the organization for 2002.

Treaty parties also voted this month to increase the organization’s $54 million 2003 budget by 10 percent and to allow OPCW to use its 2001 cash surplus and its working capital fund.

Pfirter in an interview last week with Global Security Newswire said the additional money would put the organization back on its feet for the near term and would provide for a substantial number of additional inspections, approved by the member states, in the coming year.

The GAO report did specify several changes made by OPCW under Pfirter, including creation of a more accurate and timely invoicing process for inspection reimbursements and exclusion of the dues assessments of states in arrears. The State Department had hired a budgeting consultant to aid the organization, it said.

The GAO further noted Pfirter’s stated commitment to address the organization’s financial difficulties by ensuring that adequate funding be available for the 2003 budget.

Additional Changes Recommended

The report, however, concluded that some changes are still needed and recommended developing a comprehensive plan for dealing with the budgeting issues.

“Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent budgeting weaknesses,” it said.

The GAO assigned the overall blame for the budgeting shortfalls to the OPCW, as opposed to states.

“Unless the organization improves its planning, budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections,” the report said.

“The organization’s budgets (like those of other international organizations) are based on the presumption that all member states will pay their assessments in full,” it said.

Pfirter, last week, said the organization would be able to conduct the additional inspections voted for by member states for 2002 as long as members paid their dues in full.

“The member states worked out a compromise formulation whereas in which 60 DOCs [inspections of discrete organic chemical facilities] are anticipated and we will have the financing for that, if member states again comply with their assessed contributions,” he said.

The State Department said the GAO’s observation that “there is no coherent plan to address these problems, while accurately portraying the situation for the first part of 2002, does not reflect the current situation.”

It suggested a comprehensive plan was not needed, as the organization currently was addressing its budgeting issues in a comprehensive way, including by discounting expected income by one-sixth, based on historical experience, as opposed to already discounted expectations.

From October 25, 2002 issue.

CWC: Director General Says Organization ‘Back on its Feet’

By David Ruppe and Scott Hartmann
Global Security Newswire

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which administers the global treaty banning chemical weapons, has returned to good financial health but could soon face budget problems as its activities increase, according to its director.

“While we still are faced in the future with a very lean budget, I’m confident the organization is back on its feet and will be able to cope with future commitments, including the crucial ones on verification and will be able to address the expectations in terms of international cooperation,” said OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter in an interview this week with Global Security Newswire.

Pfirter, who assumed the position of director general in July, cited “renewed political support” leading to an increase in the OPCW budget this month and a voluntary contribution of $2 million by the United States as helping to turn things around (see GSN, Oct. 15).

“What I believe is that the present budget does contain sufficient resources for the number of inspections member states want us to make, both on the chemical weapons as well as on the industry sites,” he said.

The organization could find itself short on resources in the future, however, as the destruction activities of chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia are increased, which could result in the expansion of the organization’s monitoring activities, Pfirter said. Speaking at the United Nations this week, he cited estimates such activities might increase fivefold in “the very near future.”

“Certainly the verification load on the organization will be heavier if all of these facilities come into operation,” he told GSN. “So member states will have to look I believe inevitably in the future at how to distribute the resources and whether they really will be all the resources we need.”

A recent study by the U.K.-based organization VERTIC concluded OPCW’s resources are devoted too heavily to verification of declared stocks to the detriment of investigations to detect illegal new chemical weapons production (see GSN, Oct. 16).

Pfirter said more attention and resources will be devoted to those inspections in accordance with the recent decision by the conference of the states parties, which this month also approved a “compromise formulation” to fund 60 such inspections. The conference also decided to rebalance the number of inspections next year to include “more of the relevant installations producing, consuming or processing discrete organic chemicals,” he told the United Nations.

The ability to conduct all field inspections, and the OPCW’s general financial health, however, could depend on the willingness of treaty parties to pay their full dues to the organization, he said.

“There is a renewed political support for the organization. So, I hope that member states are confident, and that member states will reflect that in terms of coming forward with assessed contributions.”

A Change of Administration

Pfirter, who is from Argentina, succeeded a controversial Brazilian director general, Jose Bustani, who was removed from office in April by a vote of the member states (see GSN, April 23). A number of major contributing states, including the United States, had withheld dues citing Bustani’s management approach and other issues (see GSN, Jan. 15).

Member states voted last week to increase the organization’s budget by 10 percent and Pfirter said he is planning to initiate a “management review” next week that will examine the organization’s operations during the past five years and seek possible areas for improvement, including finding ways to improve efficiency.

Pfirter said relations with the United States, the organization’s largest contributor, have been good so far during his administration. Relations between the OPCW and the United States were strained earlier this year during the semipublic U.S. campaign to oust Bustani.

“I think those relations are excellent. I personally feel very reassured about the support of the United States for the organization,” he said, citing expressions of support received during a recent trip to Washington, the voluntary $2 million U.S. contribution, and his understanding the Bush administration will appoint a permanent representative to the organization.

Ambassador Eric Javits, the U.S. permanent representative to the stalemated Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, will be moving to take the job, according to U.S. State Department officials (see GSN, March 27).

For many in the arms control community, the treaty is considered an important arms control symbol, as it is the single multilateral instrument providing for WMD disarmament, nonproliferation, verification and assistance at the same time.

“The CWC stands as an example of what can be achieved when the political will exists to tackle questions of global concern through the formidable power of an internationally agreed instrument,” Pfirter said Wednesday in an address to the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in New York.

Pfirter “is doing a good job on all accounts,” said VERTIC Executive Director Trevor Findlay, but he anticipated continued differences among treaty parties over how much further OPCW should expand its activities.

“There will be tensions between states that want to keep strengthening the organization and moving it forward and those that think it is doing enough already.”

Universality

The treaty currently has 146 parties and the OPCW is responsible for recruiting uncommitted states until the treaty has the universal membership of all 193 independent countries.

Pfirter said achieving universality “is crucial also to the success of the organization.”

He said the organization has launched a “program of action” in Africa to attract the 17 nonmembers there, and also is working to encourage nonmembers in the Pacific and the Caribbean.

For such countries, he said, “we have to work on demonstrating to them that there is a good case for joining the convention, there are benefits that have to do with peace, security, and international cooperation.”

Pfirter says the Middle East is a special case, where tensions may make it difficult to recruit members.

“The eventual decisions of countries in the Middle East have to do with a much larger problem than chemical weapons themselves and so we look with expectation and a sense of anticipation to that when that happens. But I don’t think the issue of chemical weapons can be taken in isolation of the overall situation there,” he said.

According to Henry L. Stimson Center release, U.S. government and open source information suggest that more than a dozen countries have active chemical weapons programs, including China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

Eleven countries have acknowledged existing or former stocks and four of those have acknowledged existing stocks that are expected to be destroyed under the treaty, including India, Russia, the United States and South Korea, the center says.

For further information, see: