North Korea:  U.S. Envoy Begins Second Day of Talks

A U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly began a second day of talks today with North Korean officials in Pyongyang (see GSN, Oct. 3).

Kelly met yesterday with a North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan and then ate an informal dinner with the officials, State spokesman Richard Boucher said.  Kelly plans to continue discussions today before returning to Seoul Saturday, according to Boucher.

“His mission is ... to explore comprehensive dialogue with North Korea and, based on close coordination with South Korea and Japan, to explain U.S. policy and seek progress on a range of issues of long-standing concern to the United States,” Boucher said of Kelly’s discussion plans (Martin Nesirky, Reuters/Yahoo.com, Oct. 4).

North Korea expects the visitors to outline the U.S. policy on Korea and to “exchange views of issues of bilateral concern,” the state-run Korean Central News Agency reported.  Kelly is the highest-ranking U.S. official to travel to North Korea since a visit in 2000 by then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, according to the agency (Korean Central News Agency, Oct. 3).

IAEA Waits for Final Confirmation on Inspections

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency is awaiting final confirmation from Pyongyang to begin inspections of North Korea’s nuclear program, the agency said yesterday.

“We have made initial contact with North Korea’s diplomatic mission here in Vienna and are awaiting a response to a follow-up fax we sent to Pyongyang,” IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.  “We’re ready to go there anytime, the same as (with weapons inspections) in Iraq.  We’ve even developed some specialized equipment tailored to North Korea’s nuclear fuel to analyze its contents” (Reuters, Oct. 3).

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United States:  Air Force Begins Peacekeeper ICBM Dismantlement

The U.S. Air Force Tuesday began dismantling 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs stationed at Warren air base in Wyoming (see GSN, Sept. 27).  The dismantlement should help the United States reach the maximum limit of 2,200 deployed warheads that the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty dictates.

Air Force technicians Tuesday began removing 10 warheads from the first Peacekeeper scheduled to be dismantled, according to the Associated Press.  They sent the warheads Wednesday to an Energy Department site for storage.  U.S. officials plan to use the warheads to replace older ones on Minuteman 3 ICBMs stationed at bases in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming, AP reported.

Officials plan to dismantle each Peacekeeper in sections because of its sophistication, Air Force Col. John Faulkner, commander of the air base’s 90^th Maintenance Group, said.  Technicians plan to remove one section per day from a missile, resulting in a 17-day process for each missile.  Each launch facility will be maintained as a nuclear site until the missile is completely deactivated, and then the Pentagon will decide what to do with it, Faulkner said.

“I honestly didn’t think this day would happen when I left the service in the early 1980s ... I’m delighted this day is here,” Air Force Secretary James Roche said during a visit to the air base.  The deactivation “is a reflection of how the world has changed and is adapting to a new era.  In that new era we don’t need as many nuclear systems,” he said (Sarah Cooke, Associated Press, Oct. 4).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

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U.S.-Russia:  HEU Deal Eliminates Equivalent of 6,000 Warheads

More than 150 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium, the equivalent of 6,000 nuclear weapons, has been eliminated to date through the U.S.-Russian “Megatons to Megawatts” program, the U.S. Enrichment Corporation said yesterday (see GSN, May 10).

Under the program, USEC purchases uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons for use as fuel in U.S. nuclear power plants.  Since 1994, the program has provided enough fuel to power a city the size of Boston for about 230 years, USEC said in a press release.

When the Megatons to Megawatts program is completed — scheduled to be in 2013 — 500 metric tons of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons will have been converted into enough nuclear fuel to power the entire United States for two years, USEC said.  So far, the program has completed about one-third of its 20-year goal, USEC and Techsnabexport, the Russian agent for the program, said in a joint statement.

“Each and every day, the Megatons to Megawatts program eliminates more nuclear warhead material.  And from this warhead material we derive a valuable resource — clean-burning nuclear fuel, used to light and power our nation from coast to coast,” USEC President and Chief Executive Officer William Timbers said at a press conference yesterday in Washington.

“We have reached a milestone on the way to a better future,” said Techsnabexport General Director Vladimir Smirnov.  “The celebration today would be inconceivable without the constant cooperation of the executive agents, the goodwill they have demonstrated so many times and their constant readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions.”

The United States and Russia signed an agreement in 1993 to create the Megatons to Megawatts program.  Russia is expected to receive $8 billion from its participation (U.S. Enrichment Corporation release, Oct. 3).

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Russia:  United States Still Funds Useless Plants

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency is spending $1.2 million to maintain U.S. facilities in Russia that earlier this year were discovered to be useless, according to a report released Sept. 30 by the Pentagon Inspector General (see GSN, May 29).

The Defense Department spent $95.5 million to build facilities to convert rocket fuel into commercially usable products, but officials learned in February that Russia had already used the fuel for its space program, according to the report from the Pentagon Inspector General.

The report, signed by Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Auditing David Steensma, says that in the future DTRA should require “a commitment from Russia to provide the weapon systems and their components.”

The United States could also save $197,000 a month if a decision is made on the future of the facilities, the report says (Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Oct. 3).

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International Response:  IAEA Officials Participate in Anti-Smuggling Training Exercise

International Atomic Energy Agency officials arrived in Vladivostok, Russia, today to participate in anti-nuclear smuggling exercises, part of an IAEA training course for customs inspectors.  The course began Sept. 16 and involves experts from the energy ministries of Russia and other former Soviet states (RIA/BBC Monitoring, Oct. 3).

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United Kingdom:  Weapons Program Should End With Trident, Scientists Say

The United Kingdom should immediately declare that it will abandon nuclear weapons once the Trident missile system reaches the end of its service life, a group of scientists said today.

Such a declaration would not endanger British national security and would increase pressure on other countries to also give up their nuclear weapons, according to a report prepared by the Pugwash group, released on the 50-year anniversary of the first British nuclear test.  The report’s authors include Joseph Rotblat, a Nobel peace prize laureate who was involved in U.S. efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

“Were the U.K. to show a more determined commitment to nuclear disarmament, especially following a decision not to replace Trident, it could expect to become a leading member, if not the leader, of the group of states actively working for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free world,” the report says.

In the 1998 British strategic defense review, a “sub-strategic” role was referred to for the Tridents, but no further details were provided.  It would be even more dangerous, however, to arm the missiles with smaller, low-yield nuclear weapons, the report says.

“Trident in its current form is less provocative to non-nuclear weapon states than justifying U.K. nuclear weapons afresh by placing new emphasis on sub-strategic nuclear capability,” the report says.  Instead it would be better “for the U.K. to oppose apparent U.S. moves to incorporate low-yield nuclear weapons into areas of conventional defense planning,” it says (Richard Norton-Taylor, London Guardian, Oct. 3).

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Cuba:  Havana Moves to Ratify Nuclear Treaties

By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire

Cuba yesterday confirmed its intention to ratify two major nuclear arms treaties, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the pact banning nuclear weapons from all of Latin America.

“Cuba has already initiated the necessary national domestic procedures to become a state party of both treaties in the shortest possible time frame,” Cuban Ambassador Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla told the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on disarmament and international security.

NPT

“Our country has decided to become a state party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a signal of the clear political will of the Cuban government and its commitment to an effective disarmament process that ensures world peace,” Parrilla said.

His speech reinforced a Cuban statement delivered in September to the General Assembly that said Cuba would “adhere” to the NPT.

Parrilla said, “Cuba intends to actively join the preparatory process of the coming NPT Review Conference and work together with other state parties that share our concerns on the limitations of the treaty and the lack of fulfillment of obligations by the nuclear states.”

Treaty of Tlatelolco

“Cuba will also ratify” the treaty making Latin America and Caribbean a nuclear weapon-free zone, Parrilla said.  Of 33 eligible states, Cuba is the sole state that has not yet ratified the treaty.

The treaty was opened for signature in 1967, but nuclear-capable states did not join the pact until much later.  Rivals Argentina and Brazil joined in 1994 soon after reaching a bilateral nuclear inspections agreement.  Cuba signed the treaty in 1995.

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International Response:  Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Likely to Receive Limited Support

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

Of the five declared nuclear-weapons states, China is the only one likely to participate in a treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, according to report released yesterday by Scott Parrish, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (see GSN, Oct. 1).

The five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — appear ready to sign the treaty at a ceremony at a former Soviet nuclear test site in Kazakhstan during a visit to the region by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in mid-October, the report said.

The treaty contains a protocol that declared nuclear states are invited to sign, stating that they agree to respect the zone and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against zone members.  China, which has openly supported creating the zone, appears to be the nuclear-weapons state most likely to sign the protocol, according to the report.

The United States has not openly supported creating the zone, preferring to wait until the final treaty was completed, the report said.  Washington will probably have reservations about several measures in the treaty, including transit issues, negative security assurances and possible expansion of the zone, according to the report.  Such reservations might prompt the United States to refuse to sign the treaty’s protocol.

The United Kingdom and France will probably base their support of the treaty’s protocol largely on the U.S. position.  Russia has previously expressed concerns over creating the zone and might use its influence among Central Asian states to try to modify the treaty or block its signature, the report said.

The nuclear-weapons states have rejected protocols to past nuclear weapon-free zone treaties for several reasons.  For example, no nuclear-weapons state has signed the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty to create a Southeast Asian nuclear weapon-free zone, saying it might be interpreted to interfere with sea-based activities, the report said.

Stumbling Blocks

The idea to create the Central Asian treaty, which establishes the first nuclear weapon-free zone located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere, originated in 1997 when the five countries in the region issued a declaration calling for the zone’s creation.  Throughout the treaty’s development, two main issues arose to hinder negotiations:  how the treaty would treat the possible transit of nuclear weapons through the zone and the relationship of the treaty to overlapping international agreements.

Russia wanted to continue to be allowed to deploy nuclear weapons in the area, according to the report.  Kazakhstan, which has maintained close relations with Russia, said that each state should be allowed to resolve the issue independently.  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which had further distanced themselves from Russia, urged more restrictive language, the report said.

The 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, to which Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan belong, prompted concerns about overlapping international agreements.  Russia has interpreted that treaty as allowing it to deploy nuclear weapons within treaty countries if members jointly approve, the report said.  While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan wanted previous agreements to supercede the nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan disagreed.

Reaching Agreement

Negotiators reconciled the main stumbling blocks in the treaty’s development in several ways.  The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, in which the United States deployed military forces in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, helped reduce Russian pressure on the Central Asian states, and the region’s new prominence as a terrorism “hotspot” also helped move the treaty closer to completion, the report said.

The final impetus for negotiations on the treaty came after a visit to the region by U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala in August, according to the report (see GSN, Aug. 13).  Dhanapala’s meetings with the foreign ministers and three presidents of the Central Asian states helped further efforts to create compromises on unresolved issues, ultimately leading to agreement.

For further information, see:

Bangkok Treaty Text

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United States:  Navy Prepares to Convert Oldest Trident Submarine

Within the next few weeks, the U.S. Navy plans to begin converting the USS Ohio — the first and oldest Trident ballistic missile submarine — to carry conventionally armed cruise missiles, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 27).

The Ohio will undergo the $900 million, 18-month conversion process at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Wash.  Once the conversion is completed, the Ohio will be able to carry more than 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles and other equipment, instead of 24 long-range ballistic missiles it now carries, according to AP.  The Ohio is one of four U.S. Trident submarines being converted to carry conventional weapons (see GSN, Feb. 22).

“This is an historic event,” said Capt. Stan Mack, chief of staff of the Ohio submarine group.  “The military in general and the submarine force in particular is sometimes accused of preparing for the last war and being Cold War-centered.  The USS Ohio is the answer to that accusation” (Associated Press, Oct. 2).

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U.S.-Russia:  Duma Committees Debate Reductions Treaty

Russian lawmakers are meeting today to discuss the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in closed door debates in the State Duma committees on international affairs and defense (see GSN, Sept. 19).  Analysts in Russia believe the Duma might ratify the Moscow Treaty before winter, ITAR-Tass reported (ITAR-Tass, Oct. 1).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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United States:  Boeing Abandons Non-U.S. Sales Effort for Bomber

Australia and the United Kingdom have rejected an informal effort by U.S. defense contractor Boeing to resell U.S. Air Force B-1B long-range bombers, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, June 24).  As a result, Boeing will not attempt to sell the aircraft to any additional countries, according to a company official.

Australia and the United Kingdom were put off by “a perception of high operating cost,” the official said.

Last year the Pentagon decided to retire more than 30 B-1Bs to a base in Arizona while refitting the remaining 60 (see GSN, Aug. 12; Stephen Trimble, Aerospace Daily, Oct. 1).

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International Response:  Central Asian Negotiators Complete Draft Treaty

Representatives from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan agreed last week to the text of a Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone treaty (see GSN, Sept. 4).  Treaty talks in Uzbekistan ran Sept. 25-27, completing five years of work on the agreement.  Negotiators were hopeful that the treaty would be signed quickly (U.N. release, Sept. 30).

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CTBT:  Samoa Ratifies Treaty

Samoa ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Friday (see GSN, Sept. 30).  The country hosts one auxiliary seismological station that contributes to the treaty’s International Monitoring System.  To date, 166 nations have signed the treaty and 96 have ratified it, including 31 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter into force (CTBT Organization Web site, Oct. 1).

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North Korea:  U.S. Envoy Schedules Pyongyang Visit for Early October

A U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly is scheduled to travel to North Korea Oct. 3-5, the White House announced yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 26).

“Assistant Secretary Kelly will explain U.S. policy and seek progress on a range of issues of long-standing concern to the United States and the international community,” the White House said in a press release (White House release, Sept. 26).

The trip is the first step in what will probably be a long and involved series of negotiations, a U.S. official said.

“We’ll have wide-ranging discussions on a series of issues including missile production, proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons human rights and humanitarian issues,” the official said.  “We want to pursue these issues in a comprehensive dialogue.  It will require much work to address our long-standing concerns.”

U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to send Kelly to North Korea has not changed his views toward the country, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said.

Bush still opposes North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s “starvation of his own people, the militarization efforts that he is leading, the massive number of conventional weapons that he has on the border with South Korea, as well as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” Fleischer said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Sept. 27).

Foreign policy officials within the Bush administration are divided between those who want to further examine North Korea’s new signs of openness and those who think North Korea is merely trying to obtain more international aid, according to the Wall Street Journal.  Some administration officials are encouraged by Pyongyang’s recent moves.  Others, however, are more doubtful, the Journal reported.

“Kim Jong Il is trying to exacerbate tensions between Tokyo, Washington and Seoul,” a U.S. policy-maker said (Murray Hiebert, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 27).

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U.S.-Russia:  Nuclear Fuel Program Needs More Support, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A U.S.-Russian program to develop fuel alternatives for small nuclear reactors fueled with weapon-grade uranium needs more political and economic support, according to a report released today by the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (see GSN, Sept. 26).

The U.S.-Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program works to develop low-enriched uranium fuel for Soviet-designed test and research reactors that currently use highly enriched uranium. Poorly secured HEU could be an attractive target for terrorists seeking material for a nuclear or radiological weapon. 

There are currently about 40 research reactors in Russia that use HEU fuel, plus three in former Soviet states and six in other countries such as North Korea and Libya, according to the report.

“It is vitally important that this effort receive renewed political and financial support in both the United States and Russia,” the report says.  “The program could make an important contribution to the effort to eliminate vulnerable HEU stockpiles in Russia and those other countries that posses Soviet-designed research and test reactors.”

The RERTR program faces several obstacles to its full implementation, however, including financial, political and technical concerns, the report says.  One of the program’s main concerns is a lack of adequate funding, it says.  Currently, the RERTR program’s efforts in Russia are funded through a $1.5 million grant from the U.S. State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, but that grant is set to expire soon.

Energy has not attempted to obtain the funds needed to keep the program running at an effective level, the report says.  In fiscal 2003, according to the report, the program will need an additional $3.5 million above the department’s request to continue LEU fuel development and reactor conversion efforts, according to the report.  A large-scale program to convert Russian reactors to use the new fuel would need even more funding, which is unlikely to be available from Russia or other former Soviet states, the report says.

Politics

Political concerns have always hampered the RERTR program, according to the report.

“Perhaps more than any other U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear security program, the RERTR effort has been directly impacted by larger U.S.-Russian disputes,” the report says.

An example of this involves the Russian Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering, Russia’s chief institute for RERTR efforts, according to the report.  In 1998, the institute was banned from participating in any U.S. nonproliferation activities over concerns that the institute was aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  The sanctions ended the institute’s role in managing Russia’s side of the RERTR contract and has stopped the institute from taking part in any U.S.-Russian cooperation under the program, the report says.

Another political problem is the differing ways U.S. and Russian officials view the program, according to the report.  The United States sees the program as primarily a nonproliferation activity.  Russia, however, also anticipates commercial benefits such as more international nuclear sales, some of which the United States might oppose, the report says.

Technical Issues

RERTR participants have had success in developing LEU alternatives for small reactors, but they have had difficulties in converting reactors to use the new fuel, according to the report (see GSN, April 16).  Some Russian reactor operators are skeptical of the idea of reactor conversion, while some Russian nuclear officials oppose cooperating with the United States on secrecy grounds, the report says.

Russian nuclear experts have also noted dissatisfaction among some Western reactor operators and have said the Energy Department is reluctant to convert some of its own reactors to use LEU fuel, the report says.  These developments have increased fears among Russian nuclear specialists that using LEU fuel would increase their costs and offer poor reactor performance, the report says.

Russian research reactor operators might be persuaded to begin using LEU fuel, if offered a package of incentives, according to the report.  Those incentives could include a guaranteed supply of LEU fuel, assistance in transporting spent fuel off site and payment for and disposal of unused highly enriched uranium fuel, the report says. 

The U.S.-Russian “Megatons to Megawatts” program, under which the Untied States is committed to purchasing HEU taken from Russian nuclear weapons, could be expanded to include small HEU stockpiles from test and research reactors, according to the report (see GSN, June 20).

While the RERTR program is already playing an important role in nonproliferation efforts, increased support could help broaden the program’s scope, the report says.

“The U.S.-Russian RERTR program is serving a critical role in reducing the nonproliferation and security threat associated with the HEU-fueled research reactors in Russia and other countries with Soviet-built reactors,” the report says.  “With adequate funding, political support and coordination with other U.S. nuclear threat reduction efforts, the program could be an effective tool in eliminating highly vulnerable HEU stockpiles in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.”

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U.S. Testing:  Scientists Conduct Successful Subcritical Test

Scientists from the Los Alamos National Laboratory successfully conducted the “Rocco” subcritical nuclear experiment yesterday at the Nevada Test Site (see GSN, Sept. 26).  The test, designed to collect data to help maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal, was the 19^th conducted since the subcritical testing program began in 1997 (Associated Press, Sept. 26).

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United States I:  Officials Prepare to Dismantle Peacekeeper ICBMs

The U.S. Air Force is expected to begin dismantling 50 MX Peacekeeper ICBMs next week at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming (see GSN, Aug. 2).  The dismantlements will help the United States reduce to the 2,200 deployed warhead limit called for by the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.  The Peacekeeper dismantlement is expected to take at least three years.

Air base officials received the order last month to dismantle, according to the Associated Press.  Missile sections are slated to be shipped to an Air Force base in Utah and to an unknown U.S. Energy Department location.  The warheads from the Peacekeepers will be used to replace aging warheads on Minuteman 3 ICBMs, base spokesman Sgt. Bryan Gatewood said (see GSN, Aug. 12).

“The Peacekeeper did its job,” said Col. Thomas Shearer, commander of the 90^th Space Wing, responsible for the Peacekeepers at the base, along with 150 Minutemen 3 missiles.  “There’s no doubt it helped win the Cold War, and its place in history is undisputed” (Sarah Cooke, Associated Press, Sept. 27).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

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United States II:  General Dynamics Wins Contract to Convert  Submarines

Defense company General Dynamics has won a $443 million U.S. Navy contract to convert four nuclear submarines to carry non-nuclear missiles, Bloomberg.com reported yesterday (see GSN, Apr. 8).

The four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines will be converted to carry non-nuclear Tomahawk missiles (see GSN, Feb. 22).  The Navy expects the work to be completed by September 2007.  The submarines will be able to carry 154 Tomahawk precision guided missiles and 66 Navy SEALs (Tony Capaccio, Bloomberg.com, Sept. 27).

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Pakistan:  U.S.-Pakistani Defense Officials Hold Meeting

The relaunched U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group yesterday held its first formal meeting since 1998, when the United States imposed sanctions after Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests (see GSN, Sept. 24).  U.S. and Pakistani defense officials began informal meetings in Pakistan Tuesday.

During yesterday’s meeting, Pakistani officials outlined their military needs.  Pakistani Defense Secretary Lt. Gen. Hamid Nawaz Khan said the meeting would help improve U.S.-Pakistan ties and would help formalize military cooperation efforts.

Heading the U.S. delegation, U.S. Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith said the meeting would help improve relations between the United States and Pakistan through the development of joint military training exercises and exchanges (Dawn, Sep. 27).

U.S. members of the group also met with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf yesterday.  He praised the history of U.S.-Pakistani military cooperation and said he hoped for increased efforts (Dawn, Sept. 27).

For further information, see:

Pakistani Government

Pakistani Embassy to the United States

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China:  Beijing Prepares for ICBM Test

China has begun preparations to test-fly a Dongfeng 31 intercontinental ballistic missile, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 3).  A U.S. spy satellite detected preparations taking place at the Wuzhai missile test center in central China, according to the Times.

The Dongfeng 31 would be the first truck-mounted ICBM developed since the Russian SS-25, the Times reported (see GSN, July 15).  A previous Dongfeng 31 test conducted in January failed, officials said (Gertz/Scarborough, Washington Times, Sept. 27).

For further information, see:

Carnegie Endowment World Missile Chart

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U.S. Response:  Experts Call for Revitalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — To expand critically important nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the United States and its allies must take immediate steps to remove unnecessary hurdles and coordinate new public and private initiatives to secure nuclear weapons materials across the globe, experts told the U.S. Congress this week.

In frank assessments of the current state of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, two nuclear experts testified Sept. 24 that while progress has been made in preventing nuclear and radiological material from reaching terrorists, overall efforts in this regard remain wholly inadequate in light of the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism.

Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, urged nations to increase financial support for these programs, chided the United States and other countries for placing unnecessary restrictions on nuclear nonproliferation aid and criticized remaining opposition in some quarters to nuclear security cooperation.

In testimony to the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, they proposed a series of new measures to expand what they currently consider to be a paucity of investment in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

“We cannot take the chance that the next terrorists attacking the United States could make use of nuclear material that escaped through a hole in a Russian facility fence that would have been repaired” if nonproliferation programs were better implemented, Gottemoeller said.  “The burden of such an outcome would be difficult to bear for all in our policy and government communities.”

One weak link is financing.  “The threat reduction budget for the whole year is what the Defense Department spends in a single day,” Bunn said.

“While a number of key officials in the Bush administration have worked hard in the last year to accelerate efforts to secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients around the world, the reality is that the president’s program does not yet match his rhetoric.”

Nevertheless, the United States, which spends an estimated $1 billion a year on nuclear and related nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, has been far more committed to these programs than Washington’s allies, Gottemoeller said.  “Frankly, I wish other countries would do more.”

The Group of Eight economic powers have pledged $10 billion over the next decade to match an equal investment by the United States, but how that money will be raised, managed and spent remains unclear, lawmakers were told (see GSN, Sept. 18).

Overcoming Hurdles

Holding back U.S. and allied nuclear nonproliferation efforts are a series of bureaucratic hurdles and an overall lack of vision, the experts said.

“It remains true that bureaucratic wrangling, lack of coordination, failure to conceive and pursue new approaches, unimaginative program execution, limited planning, and low priority are slowing many of these programs and limiting their success,” Bunn said.

For example, some in Congress remain hesitant to approve a permanent waiver to an annual certification that says Russia is abiding by all arms control agreements. Washington’s has been unable to make such a certification and as a result nonproliferation aid has been delayed (see GSN, Aug. 9). 

At the same time, U.S. nonproliferation aid is currently limited to only the former Soviet Union, although legislative attempts are underway to change that (see GSN, March 20).

Meanwhile, U.S.-Russian disputes continue to delay progress on nuclear security cooperation.  “Because of disputes between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense over exactly how much access U.S. experts would be given to sensitive sites, there is today urgently needed security upgrade equipment that was purchased five years ago that is still sitting in warehouses, uninstalled, while the vulnerabilities it was intended to fix go unaddressed,” Bunn said.

In addition, the United States lacks some key ingredients in its nuclear nonproliferation efforts, according to Bunn.

“To do an important job, you need three things:  someone in charge, a plan and the resources to get it done,” he said.  “Unfortunately, for this mission, few of these essential ingredients are in place.”

Another major barrier is U.S. unwillingness — and legal prohibition — to participate in nuclear nonproliferation efforts with nations that have not signed certain arms control treaties, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Gottemoeller suggested that the United States review this policy, which is hindering much-needed progress.  One venue for cooperating with such countries is the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“The agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service offers, even [to] those not cooperating in other aspects of the regime, the opportunity for consultations on improving the security of their civilian nuclear facilities,” she said.

Meanwhile, if Washington engaged such nuclear proliferation concerns as India and Pakistan, it would go along way in advancing nonproliferation as a whole.

“If the United States worked separately with India and Pakistan to share information on protection and control of nuclear assets, the United States would be taking the first step toward transformation of these countries from adversaries to partners in the nonproliferation arena,” she said (see GSN, March 18).

Greater International Cooperation, New Ideas

Gottemoeller and Bunn agreed that, building on the G-8 pledge for new resources, the United States and others must work to build an international coalition against nuclear terrorism, including identifying new sources of financing and international cooperation.

 “Now it is important to engage other countries in new regions, with the primary goal of ensuring the protection of nuclear and radiological assets from terrorists.  This goal is in the national interest of every country,” Gottemoeller testified.

“In the current era, with burgeoning concerns about a larger, more widespread threat, especially involving radiological materials, international efforts to set priorities, divide labor, and establish partnerships will be critical.”  The G-8 pledge, she said, is the perfect means for establishing this enhanced coordination.

She said “Russia should be called upon to play a responsible role, both in facilitating the initiative and contributing resources.”

The two experts outlined a series of new initiatives that could propel nuclear security efforts significantly forward in the coming years.

One novel idea, according to Bunn, would be to relieve Russian debt in exchange for arms control expenditures.  This “debt for nonproliferation swap,” he said, would be modeled after past debt for environment swaps, in which a portion of Russian debts would be canceled in return for Russian financing of agreed arms reduction and nonproliferation projects (see GSN, July 26).

Gottemoeller suggested that new partnerships be established as a way of getting around restrictions to U.S. nonproliferation aid.  For example, if the United States cannot directly provide nuclear security assistance to Pakistan because of sanctions, neighboring Kazakhstan could be enlisted to help dispose of spent nuclear fuel.

“If Pakistan is interested in assistance to improve the secure storage of its spent and fresh fuel at civilian reactors, it might benefit from partnership with a regional player,” she said.  Kazakhstan has particular expertise in this area.

There is a major need to identify more finances for nuclear nonproliferation efforts, she said.  One way is to tap into private financial sources.

“Commercial means should be sought to finance new projects,” she said.  “The goal should be to discover public-private partnerships that lessen the burden of these projects on national budgets …  Such partnerships, in my view, will be an important piece of the resource base necessary to tackle the expanded nuclear terrorism threat.”

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Congo:  Kinshasa Seeks U.S. Removal of Uranium

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been negotiating with the United States for a year to remove uranium from two sites — a reactor in Kinshasa and a uranium mine in the southern part of the country, a senior Congolese official said yesterday.

Officials have not yet made any decisions on requests for the United States to remove uranium from the reactor, but they are continuing negotiations, said Victor Mpoyo, a Congolese minister of state and a close adviser to former President Laurent Kabila.

There has been speculation that the D.R.C. paid North Korea for military aid by granting it mining concessions around the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Sept. 25).  The North Korean interest in the mine has increased concerns that that area might become a haven for illicit trafficking, the Times reported.  Zimbabwean military forces loyal to D.R.C. President Joseph Kabila currently control the area around the mine.

“Anyone who expresses an interest in Shinkolobwe, or tries to get there, has a habit of disappearing,” a mining industry source familiar with the area said yesterday (Mark Huband, Financial Times, Sept. 26).

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U.S. Testing:  NNSA Plans Rocco Subcritical Test Today

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is conducting a subcritical nuclear experiment today at the Nevada Test Site, the office said in a press release (see GSN, Sept. 3).

The test, named “Rocco,” is designed to examine what happens to plutonium when chemical high explosives shock it.  Researchers believe the test will help “maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,” according to the press release (NNSA release, Sept. 24).

Today’s experiment is the 19^th subcritical test the United States has conducted and the sixth under President George W. Bush (Kyodo News Service, Sept. 24).

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Russia:  Nuclear Weapons Losses Are Reporting Errors, Former Official Says

Reports of suitcase-sized nuclear devices lost by Russia are more likely the result of faulty accounting than the actual disappearance of weapons, a former Russian diplomat has said (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).

Nikolai Sokov, now a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in the United States, wrote in a Los Angeles Times commentary that there has never been “credible information about the loss of even a single nuclear weapon.”

Additionally, small Russian nuclear devices require frequent servicing and if they have been lost, they would be useless by now, Sokov said.  He suggested that resources spent searching for these devices might be used more productively against other threats (Nikolai Sokov, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 26).

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China:  New Report Details Chinese Missile Defense Countermeasures

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Although the development of Chinese missile defense countermeasures is not likely to keep pace with U.S. technologies, the United States should still monitor China’s efforts, says a report released this week by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (see GSN, July 23).

Building on years of research, China has created a broad program to develop countermeasures to defeat a U.S. missile defense system, according to a chapter in the report, China’s Growing Military Power:  Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities.  The chapter was prepared by Mark Stokes, country director for China and Taiwan in the U.S. defense secretary’s office, in an unofficial capacity.

Countermeasures developers have focused on two main avenues, countersurveillance and counterintercept, the report says.

Countersurveillance

The countersurveillance strategy is designed to prevent U.S. sensors from detecting ballistic missiles and their warheads, the report says.   To this end, China has worked to develop passive electronic countermeasures such as chaff to confuse X-Band radar systems and active electronic countermeasures such as radar jammers.  Analysts at the Chinese National University of Defense Technology have researched electronic countermeasures to sensors on the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and the Sea-Based Midcourse interceptors, which have been proposed for use in the U.S. missile defense system, according to the report.

China is also examining ways to reduce sensors’ ability to detect ballistic missiles during their midcourse and terminal flight phases, the report says.  Engineers have experimented with altering the shape of reentry vehicles to reduce their radar signatures, the report says.  They also are working to reduce infrared signatures.  Researchers have conducted experiments on “cold screen technology,” in which a warhead is encased in an aluminum alloy and liquid nitrogen is placed between the warhead and the shell, the report says.  In some experiments, infrared sensors normally capable of detecting an unshrouded reentry vehicle 3,000 kilometers away were unable to detect a cold-screen-protected warhead at more than three meters, the report says.

Chinese engineers have worked to develop two kinds of decoy measures — saturation and deception.  Saturation measures such as balloons have been praised for their relative ease of technology and low costs, the report says.  Researchers are also working on electronic decoys that emit a radar return similar to an actual reentry vehicle.

To counter U.S. anti-missile lasers, Chinese engineers have worked on fast-burn boosters, the report says, adding that concerns have been raised over possible quality control problems related to stage separation and accuracy (see GSN, July 15).  The report also says that some observers have reported research efforts into boost-phase maneuvering systems, but there is so far no hard evidence as to any actual development.

Counterintercept

China has worked on several measures to block interceptors from engaging targets.  One method that has been examined is the use of multiple warheads, the report says, adding that China has researched multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology since the 1970s (see GSN, Feb. 12).  The report cites Chinese missile designers who have said that real and decoy warheads could be combined through the use of MIRV technology.

Researchers are also working to develop maneuverable reentry vehicles to complicate missile defense tracking, according to the report.  Efforts have focused on programming a reentry vehicle to maneuver during its terminal flight phase — about 20 to 30 seconds before engaging a target, the report says.

To counter U.S. boost-phase intercept systems such as the Airborne Laser, China is researching missile spinning and hardening, the report says.  Missile spinning, designed to reduce the concentration of a laser on a single spot, and hardening might not render a missile immune to boost phase defenses, but they probably would lower the number of laser shots available per mission, the report says.

Other Measures

China also has several other missile defense countermeasures under consideration, including non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-satellite measures and anti-radiation missiles, according to the report.  Chinese engineers have experimented with the use of EMP weapons, such as a high-powered microwave warhead, to knock out space-based and ground-based missile defense sensors, the report says.

“PLA [People’s Liberation Army] writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a relatively high priority,” the report says.

China has also conducted research on anti-satellite measures since the 1960s, according to the report.  To counter a missile defense system, ASAT measures would be directed against satellite systems in low-Earth orbit — for example, the Space Based Infrared System-Low system — or in highly elliptical orbits — for example, SBIRS-High (see GSN, Sept. 4).  China has also increased efforts to distinguish actual satellites from decoys, the report says.

To destroy radar installations within a missile defense system, China is attempting to acquire or develop anti-radiation missiles such as the Russian Kh-31P, according to the report.

“There are persistent rumors of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement on the Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note was specifically developed to counter the Patriot’s MPQ-53 radar and Aegis SPY-1D phased array radar,” the report says (see GSN, June 19).

China’s countermeasure research program is apparently well advanced, but could also overwhelm China’s entire ballistic missile program, the report says (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“Chinese research and development of missile defense countermeasures is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated.  However, countermeasures introduce an added element of complexity into an already complex system,” the report says.  “Despite significant investment, P.R.C. [People’s Republic of China] countermeasures on longer-range ballistic missiles are unlikely to keep pace with U.S. technologies. ... Nevertheless, the U.S. should hedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in P.R.C. countermeasure technology.”

For further information, see:

MDA Basics of Missile Defense

MDA Missile Defense System

MDA Boost Defense Segment

MDA Midcourse Defense Segment

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

PAC 3 Fact Sheet

Sea-Based Midcourse

Airborne Laser Fact Sheet

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Africa:  Region Could Be Source of Uranium for Rogue States

Uranium-producing countries in Africa such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa could be a source of fissile material for rogue states, including Iraq, attempting to develop nuclear weapons, the London Guardian reported today.

A dossier released by the United Kingdom yesterday accuses Iraq of attempting to obtain uranium from Africa (see GSN, Sept. 24).  While the dossier did not identify which countries might have been involved, analysts said the two most likely countries were the D.R.C. and South Africa.

Leaders of the Mayi-Mayi, a militia group involved in the D.R.C. civil war, traveled to Baghdad twice to offer gold and diamonds, according to documents.  While uranium was not specifically mentioned, the Mayi-Mayi would have been able to obtain the mineral in areas under its control, a western intelligence officer said.

Other rogue states and groups have attempted to obtain uranium from the D.R.C., according to reports.  In 1998, North Korea provided the D.R.C. with military trainers under an agreement with former President Laurent Kabila, the Guardian reported.  The trainers were withdrawn under U.S. pressure after allegations that they had reopened a uranium mine, the Guardian reported.

In addition, French radio reported last year that supporters of Mobutu Sese Seko, the former leader of then-Zaire, shipped 22 pounds of uranium bars to Libya (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001; Astill/Carroll, London Guardian, Sept. 25).

In 1998, Italian police arrested a group of men who attempted to sell a uranium fuel rod to the Mafia, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Nov. 9, 2001).  The rod had been stolen from a nuclear reactor in Kinshasa.  A second fuel rod missing from the reactor has still yet to be found, nuclear industry sources said yesterday.  Experts consider the reactor, which was damaged during civil war, to be highly insecure, the Times reported (Financial Times, Sept. 25).

South Africa

It is highly unlikely that Iraq was able to obtain uranium from South Africa, which had a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, said Jakkie Cillers, head of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa.

“As a past nuclear power we are an obvious suspect but it is unlikely because the program was dismantled under the observation of the ... International Atomic Energy Agency,” Cillers said.

South Africa ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991 and signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Cillers said, however, that former South African officials or military officers might have had contacts with Iraq since then (Astill/Carroll, London Guardian).

Other Producers

In other African countries with uranium, production is strictly monitored and sales are made under exclusive contracts, the Financial Times reported.  It is unlikely that any uranium could have been smuggled out to rogue states, experts said.

In Niger and Gabon, two of the continent’s main uranium producers, the French company Cogema controls the production operation, according to the Times.  In Namibia, another chief source, production is controlled by the international mining company Rio Tinto and primarily sold to the French electricity company EdF under a long-term agreement (Financial Times).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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IAEA:  Agency Completes a Year of Expanding Its Mission

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has capped a year of dramatic expansion in which it initiated new efforts to stop the spread of nuclear-related materials and to more fully address threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism (see GSN, Sept. 12).

At an annual meeting in Vienna that ended last week, the agency reported on preparations for returning IAEA monitors to Iraq and attempted to break a logjam over on-site inspections in North Korea.

Meanwhile, representatives from the agency’s 134 members reviewed a variety of new measures designed to step up nuclear power plant security, track radioactive sources worldwide and dispose of at-risk materials.  The members pledged to expand their efforts further as international cooperation and investment in nuclear and radioactive safeguards continues to expand.

A year into the global war on terrorism, the IAEA has emerged as a key component of international efforts to enhance defenses against the prospect of catastrophic terrorism.

“The IAEA continues to play a central role … through its long-standing work to verify compliance with nonproliferation obligations,” U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan told conference attendees. 

Noting the growing and critical need to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist hands, Annan urged the agency to continue programs aimed at safeguarding nuclear material, securing nuclear facilities and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.

IAEA Reacts to Sept. 11

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the security of the world’s nuclear power plants and nuclear-related industrial material and waste has been a rising concern, particularly in light of new information about al-Qaeda terrorist plans.

The IAEA reviewed its efforts to prevent acts of terrorism involving nuclear or radiological materials, resulting in a $12 million per year effort to enhance security in eight areas, including protecting nuclear material and facilities and securing radioactive sources.

“In just over five months, a plan of enhanced and new activities to upgrade nuclear security worldwide was developed,” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the general conference.

He reported that, to date, 12 member states and one nongovernmental organization — the Nuclear Threat Initiative — have pledged a total of $8 million to implement the new measures in the first year.  More pledges are expected, he said.

Nuclear Power Plants

One IAEA focus has been nuclear power plant safety and security.  Information gained after the Sept. 11 attacks indicates that the al-Qaeda terrorist network has considered attacking nuclear power plants.  New IAEA security guidelines adopted over the past year are the “highest caliber,” according to ElBaradei.

“It is satisfying to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide,” he said.  However, “more work needs to be done, and public demands are widely voiced in many countries for greater transparency and accountability on safety issues.  The need for a more effective and transparent international safety regime, therefore, continues to be a high priority.”

Tracking Radioactive Sources

In June, the IAEA established a working group with the United States and Russia on “securing and managing radioactive sources.”  The group plans to develop a strategy “to locate, recover, secure and recycle orphan sources throughout the former Soviet Union,” according to the IAEA.  A month earlier the two countries had agreed to cooperate in this area and Washington had pledged $1 million for security upgrades at Russia’s largest radiological repository.  It is the first international effort to safeguard materials necessary to build a “dirty bomb.”

Radioactive materials in industrial and medical facilities around the world have become a new proliferation concern because terrorists could make a so-called dirty bomb by mating the materials with conventional explosives.

“Plans found in al-Qaeda bunkers revealed in detail the interest of al-Qaeda in radiological dispersal devices,” according to the U.S. Energy Department.  “The discovery of these plans demonstrates the importance of incorporating radiological dispersal devices into the world’s nonproliferation and counterterrorism strategy.”

At the Vienna conference, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham proposed expanding U.S. and Russian cooperative efforts and called for an international conference to address the threat posed by the misuse of radioactive materials to make radiological weapons (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“Although these dirty bombs are not comparable to nuclear weapons in destructiveness, they are far easier to assemble and employ,” Abraham said.

At-Risk Nuclear Material

Meanwhile, a scenario in which terrorists would acquire nuclear weapons is considered a nightmare, prompting the IAEA to increase efforts to secure at-risk fissile material around the world.

One such security effort occurred in August when the agency and the United States — with funds from the Nuclear Threat Initiative — removed 100 pounds of bomb-grade nuclear material from a scientific academy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (see GSN, Aug. 23).

IAEA officials have said they are planning additional missions in the coming months at as many as two dozen facilities around the globe (see GSN, Sept. 3).

Proliferating Countries

IAEA officials have also reported on agency efforts to monitor the activities of countries considered to be some of the world’s most immediate proliferation concerns (see GSN, Sept. 16).

On Iraq’s nuclear efforts, IAEA has “no additional information that can be directly linked without inspection to Iraq’s nuclear activities,” ElBaradei said Sept. 16.  “Resumption of inspections is therefore a crucial step towards providing assurance to the international community that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has been neutralized and is not being revived.”

“We do have access to commercial satellite images of specific facilities in Iraq,” he added, “and some of those images show changes.  But we have not been physically present in Iraq since 1998, and without the return of inspectors we cannot verify anything.”

Another proliferation concern, North Korea, has continued to delay agency inspections called for under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

“The agency continues to be unable to verify … that the D.P.R.K. has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to the agency safeguards measures under its NPT safeguards agreement,” ElBaradei said.  Further inaction could lead to a “substantial delay” in the construction of the light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea called for under the 1994 international agreement in which Pyongyang exchanged its nuclear programs for two nuclear power reactors.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]

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U.S. Testing:  Los Alamos Tries Cheaper Linux-Based Simulations

Los Alamos National Laboratory is buying a relatively inexpensive $6 million dollar Linux supercomputer for nuclear weapons simulations, CNET News.com reported Monday (see GSN, June 25).

The laboratory has traditionally run nuclear simulations on systems that can cost $215 million from computer manufactures Silicon Graphics and Hewlett-Packard.  Los Alamos has seen success using less expensive components and the Linux operating system to build supercomputers but has not used them for nuclear simulations, according to News.com.  The shift requires that software be reworked to run on the less expensive machine.

The new system, known as Science Appliance, will be able to complete 10 trillion calculations per second and is due by the end of 2002 (Stephen Shankland, CNET News.com, Sept. 23).

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United States:  Commercial Plant Wins Approval to Make Tritium

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Monday approved a plan to make tritium at the Watts Bar commercial nuclear power plant near Spring City, Tenn. (see GSN, June 28).

The United States stopped producing tritium, an isotope of hydrogen used in nuclear weapons, in 1989, but it has sought to resume production to replace losses caused by natural radioactive decay.

The use of a commercial plant has raised concerns.

“It crosses the imaginary line that separates the civilian nuclear industry and military production in the U.S.,” said Bob Schaeffer of the Alliance For Nuclear Accountability.  “This is the first time that the U.S. is using a civilian power reactor to make nuclear weapons” (Associated Press, Sept. 25).

Irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods are to be taken from the Watts Bar facility in Tennessee to Savannah River, S.C., where Energy Department technicians will extract the tritium.

“Producing tritium is a key element in the U.S. national security strategy to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent,” said Linton Brooks, acting administrator of the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (Energy Department release, Sept. 24).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Budget Issues Delay Russian Ratification of Moscow Treaty

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov has said the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty will be sent to the lower house of the Russian Parliament sometime in the near future, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye reported last week (see GSN, Sept. 13).

“The procedure of budget forming,” however, has delayed sending the treaty to the Duma for ratification, Mamedov said.  In a June 14 resolution, the Duma criticized the treaty and offered several measures in an attempt to improve upon it.

A hearing on the treaty is expected in October, according to the newspaper.  Mamedov indicated that the Russian Parliament might confirm the treaty by the end of this year (see GSN, June 13; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Sept. 20).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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U.S.-Russia II:  Moscow Proposes Talks on Reductions, Missile Defense

Russia has proposed convening just-established working groups with the United States this fall to discuss missile defense issues and the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty on nuclear weapons, the Russian Foreign Ministry said today (see GSN, Sept. 19).

The groups could meet in “late October or early November of this year in Moscow,” according to the statement.  Officials established the groups during a recent meeting of the U.S.-Russian Consultative Group on Strategic Security in Washington (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 25).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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NPT:  Mali, Chile, South Africa Sign Additional Protocols to Treaty

Mali, Chile and South Africa this month signed additional protocols to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency said yesterday.  The agreements expand the agency’s authority to detect undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei last week urged members of the organization to sign additional protocols so the agency can continue to provide assurances about nuclear materials (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“The number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force remains well below expectations,” ElBaradei said at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna.  “I urge all States who have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date.”

This week the IAEA’s Board of Governors also approved an additional protocol with El Salvador, the agency said in a press release (IAEA release, Sept. 24).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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CTBT:  Monitoring System Expanding, Treaty Organization Says

Six years after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature, great progress has been made in creating the global verification regime called for under the treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 18).  The treaty was opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996.

Out of the 337 International Monitoring Station facilities called for in the treaty, site surveys have been completed for 280 stations, the organization said in a release.  So far, 135 stations have been built and an additional 104 are currently under construction (see GSN, April 15).  About 70 stations are contributing data to the organization’s International Data Center in Vienna, according to the release.

On the treaty’s anniversary this year, 166 countries had signed the treaty and 94 had ratified it, including 31 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force (see GSN, Sept. 18).

“Today, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is recognized as a cornerstone in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament,” the organization said.  “States which sign and ratify the Treaty join a global community committed to ensuring that the world is a safer and more secure place” (CTBT Organization release, Sept. 24).

For further information, see:

CTBT Text

States Parties to the CTBT (Federation of American Scientists)

CTBT Organization

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