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BWC: States Dispute Plan for Future MeetingsBy David Ruppe Delegations are disagreeing over recommendations to change language in the plan that might allow members to discuss topics that U.S. officials have said they are opposed to discussing, diplomats and observers said. The review conference, which meets every five years, serves as a forum for treaty parties to discuss and modify the treaty and other tools to address the proliferation of biological weapons. Experts and diplomats said they are concerned that this meeting might now end without any common declaration of intentions or plans to prepare for the next conference. This week’s meetings were scheduled when the review conference could reach no decision last year and conference Chairman Tibor Toth called for reconvening the meeting one year later (see GSN, Dec. 10). The next full review conference is scheduled for 2006. Toth, who authored the draft conference decision that is now under consideration, has been shuttling between two groups of countries passing messages and trying to encourage consensus. One U.N. source described the activity as “pingpong” diplomacy. If at some point Toth believes he has achieved consensus, a general committee would be convened to consider forwarding the plan to a final plenary meeting. If no state speaks up in opposition, the plan would then be adopted. “Western Group” Adamant Against Changes The Toth plan calls on treaty parties to discuss five subjects involving possible national and international controls for discouraging proliferation and use of biological weapons. Virtually every state is believed to support such meetings. Nevertheless, some developing states, part of a group known as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), are pressing for certain changes to the proposal that would allow for a broader range of subjects to be considered. A collection of developed states known as the Western Group, on the other hand, continues to push for approving the plan strictly as it is written. The United States has supported that position, diplomats said, and one Western diplomat said all group members support it. “It is a view that is shared by all,” the diplomat said. “We have been unwilling to countenance any change” to the Toth proposal, the diplomat said. U.S. Concerns Some NAM members, including Iran, have argued for introducing the language into a key phrase specifying the subjects that might be discussed at the annual meetings, diplomats said. Such language would open the door to discussing treaty issues not specifically identified in the draft decision. The U.S. delegation reportedly opposes such a change over concerns that it might allow discussions to create an inspections mechanism for the treaty, which the Bush administration opposes. U.S. officials declined to discuss their positions until a resolution is achieved. Some NAM members have also proposed another change that might allow discussion of export control regimes. That might lead to discussions at the meetings on separate Australia Group restrictions, which limit transfers of certain biological and chemical technologies to developing countries, said Ed Hammond, co-director of the Sunshine Project. Some NAM members have complained that the United States should not be allowed to dictate the terms of the process or proposal, diplomats said. Others complained that “the way the topic has been framed is meant to accommodate U.S. sensitivities and nobody else’s,” the U.N. source said. “It’s not clear whether they [the NAM] have difficulty in accepting the proposal based on substance or on procedural grounds, as it was presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition,” said Alexander Kelle, a research associate at the University of Bradford. Western diplomats said nonspecific language regarding the topics of discussion could cause the annual meetings to be occupied with debates over the agenda rather than substance. Time a Possible Factor There is a general concern among participants that if discussions become protracted the United States may walk out and effectively end the conference. Toth has been trying to convince member delegations that “his proposal represents one shot,” said the U.N. source, to “keep the United States involved in the process.” At a September meeting, U.S. officials told Western Group members that they preferred an extremely short meeting at this resumed conference and no further meetings until 2006 (see GSN, Sept. 6). The fact that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker is involved in these negotiations, observers said, suggests the administration has reconsidered its opposition to holding annual meetings. A Second Best Alternative While possibly all treaty parties are believed to support Toth’s proposal in some form, most also see it as a second-best alternative to creating a legally binding protocol that would create an inspections mechanism to investigate treaty compliance. U.S. officials indicated before the review conference opened last November they were withdrawing U.S. support from just such a protocol that had been negotiated over a seven-year period. All non-U.S. Western Group states still favor adopting a protocol to create such a mechanism, but are unwilling to do so without U.S. participation, according to a Western group diplomat. Oliver Meier, an Arms Control Association analyst following the proceedings here, said states now have maneuvered themselves into positions where they are unable to address substantive issues. “The Western Group is holding the line of the Americans and not moving at all. In the nonaligned movement, there are deep divisions about how and whether to address substantive issues and to approve the proposal that is on the table.” “The real danger is if such empty exercises in diplomatic procedure are continued over the next three years and such mechanisms not used to talk about real issues, this convention runs the danger of becoming more and more irrelevant,” Meier said.
From November 13, 2002 issue.Anthrax: Postal Officials Postpone Brentwood FumigationThe U.S. Postal Service has decided to wait to fully decontaminate the anthrax-tainted Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington because technicians have found cracks in the plastic piping that was to carry the toxic decontaminant, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 7). The cracks were found last week among 7,000 feet of piping that was to be used to pump chlorine dioxide gas into the facility, postal officials said. The cause of the cracks is still unknown, but officials think they occurred during the regular course of manufacturing, delivery or on-site handling, said Postal Service spokeswoman Kristin Krathwohl. Officials plan to replace the damaged section of the piping, according to Krathwohl. The remaining sections have been examined and no additional leaks were discovered, she said. The piping cracks caused postal officials to delay a planned Nov. 9 test of the fumigation procedures and equipment and to postpone the full decontamination of the facility, which Postmaster General John Potter had hoped would begin at the end of the week, the Post reported. Officials might conduct the test Saturday after replacement piping is installed, postal officials said. While no new date for the full fumigation has yet been set, officials said they anticipate a delay of approximately one week. “We are doing constant quality-control assurance testing and reviewing, and we are going to do this safe and right, not fast,” Krathwohl said (Manny Fernandez, Washington Post, Nov. 13). For further information, see: GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001) Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax
From November 12, 2002 issue.Smallpox: United States Needs More Vaccine AntidoteU.S. officials are contracting with two companies for thousands of doses of vaccinia immune globulin, the only clinically tested antidote for many reactions to the smallpox vaccine, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Nov. 7). If U.S. officials were forced to begin mass inoculations against smallpox today, they would not have enough of the globulin, known as VIG, according to the Times. Regardless of which smallpox immunization plan U.S. President George W. Bush chooses, the United States will need substantial quantities of VIG, which is produced from plasma extracted from the blood of people who have been recently immunized against smallpox (see GSN, Oct. 17). Health officials have told the Defense Department’s VIG producer to expect one case of severe adverse effects from the vaccine for every 8,000 immunizations (see GSN, Nov. 8). “Given the uncertainties here, that may not be a bad estimate,” said Raymond Strikas, an epidemiologist at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In October, the United States had less than 700 doses of VIG, but U.S. health officials hope to have 5,000 doses by the end of the year, enough to treat the complications of 40 million immunized people. It might take as long as two years to produce enough VIG to protect the entire country safely. Officials are unsure exactly how much they need because conditions that cause adverse reactions — including suppressed immune systems and a variety of skin rashes — have increased substantially since the last study on side effects in the 1960s (see GSN, Oct. 18). VIG Production Underway The United States has ordered VIG from DynPort Vaccine Company in Maryland and Cangene Corporation of Winnipeg, Canada. Using stored plasma from immunized soldiers, DynPort has produced VIG to treat 660 reactions, according to David Smith, the company’s chief scientist. DynPort has tested the antidote on volunteers, and no adverse side effects have arisen, even with dramatically increased dosages, Smith said. The U.S. government has tasked Cangene with producing as many as 100,000 doses over the next five years, the Times reported. The company plans to immunize 10,000 volunteers — who must be previously immunized and are medically screened — and use their plasma to produce the VIG. The company has found 1,300 donors to date and has not experienced any adverse reaction to the immunization (McNeil/Altman, New York Times, Nov. 12).
From November 11, 2002 issue.BWC I: Review Conference Reconvenes; Toth Introduces ProposalBy David Ruppe Tibor Toth, president of the treaty’s fifth review conference that reconvened here at the United Nations today, described his proposal as a “rescue operation” for the conference. The review conference was suspended in December (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001), and now faces the prospect of concluding without an enforcement protocol or final declaration. Toth has shown “patient and constructive diplomacy” in producing a document “that represents a modest achievement for the review conference,” said U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala, speaking with Toth at a press briefing. Toth’s proposal is designed in part to appeal to the United States, which scuttled last year’s review conference with its opposition to establishing a new treaty monitoring and verification protocol, the product of seven years of negotiations. The core of the proposal — annual meetings to discuss five particular issues — he said, is based on a proposal by the U.S. delegation last year as an alternative to a protocol. “My feeling is it would be extremely difficult for the United States not to agree to these proposals, Toth said. Concerned about a re-emergence of protocol discussions, however, U.S. officials told other states in September they would oppose any further meetings of states parties until the 2006 conference (see GSN, Sept. 6). Toth said he has not yet heard from the U.S. delegation regarding the proposal. He said he has asked party members to consider the proposal and reconvene tomorrow afternoon to consider whether to vote on it. The five items Toth proposes discussing annually include adopting national measures to implement the treaty, including the enactment of penal legislation; creating national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of possible biological weapons attacks or suspicious disease outbreaks; strengthening and broadening national and international efforts for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants; and adopting a code of conduct for scientists. The proposed annual discussions are intended to promote “understanding and effective action,” according to the draft document Toth circulated to treaty parties. His proposal does not recommend any discussion of a mechanism for ensuring treaty compliance. The Bush administration has said it is opposed to any such mechanism, citing commercial and national security concerns. “Compliance measures are totally missing from this package,” Toth said. Some developing countries have reportedly criticized the absence of such measures and nonaligned nations are meeting today to discuss Toth’s proposal. The proposal has received mixed reviews from nongovernmental arms control organizations. “Compared with the protocol we could have had, the present proposal is obviously much more limited,” said Martin Dando, professor of international security at the University of Bradford. “It’s better than nothing … we would still have a process going forward and multilateral negotiations to help strengthen the convention, so in that sense, thank goodness for that.” “If only this decision is adopted, the member states of the BWC will have failed to take the long-sought, stronger actions that are needed to guard against biological weapons proliferation and to ensure compliance with the global ban on biological weapons,” said Oliver Meier, an analyst with the Arms Control Association, in a statement. Toth said member states indicated last year they were opposed to pursuing a protocol without U.S. support and continued conversations with members indicates that view has not changed. For further information, see: BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department) BWC State Parties (U.S. State Department)
From November 11, 2002 issue.Anthrax: Experts Praise New FBI Investigative TacticBy Mike Nartker The bureau has been working for months to reconstruct the spores, FBI Director Robert Mueller said Nov. 1, according to the Washington Post. “We’re replicating the way or ways it might be manufactured, but it is not an easy task,” the Post quoted Mueller as saying. “We are going into new territory in some areas,” he added. Several experts agreed that this new tactic in the FBI’s “Amerithrax” investigation could provide information needed to better determine who might be a possible suspect. By knowing how the spores were produced, the FBI might be able to determine how many people were needed and whether sophisticated materials and equipment were acquired and used, said Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a biologist at State University of New York who has often publicized her views on the anthrax investigation. With the information learned through the experiments, the FBI will also be able to better educate its field agents, improving their abilities to investigate sites and conduct interviews, said Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax researcher at Louisiana State University. It is “a very sensible decision,” Hugh-Jones said in a written response to questions from GSN. Charles Pena, a senior defense policy analyst at the CATO Institute in Washington, agreed that the experiments should enable FBI investigators to learn what kind of technical expertise was needed to produce the spores. The FBI should be able to determine whether the spores were made by “an individual in their basement” or if the spores were more sophisticated — something “you need more than high school chemistry, high school biology” to produce, Pena said. The bureau might also be able to learn whether specialized equipment was needed — and what kind — which could then be used to determine where such equipment could be obtained and by whom, Pena said. “This isn’t the kind of stuff you can go down to K-Mart and get,” he added. No Solid Leads The FBI’s decision to attempt to recreate the spores might also be a sign that investigators lack other concrete evidence, Pena said. The bureau’s decision reflects the fact that it does not have any solid leads in the case, and instead is choosing to go back to fundamentals, he said, suggesting that this is a tactic the FBI should have considered earlier. Pena also criticized the FBI’s apparent decision to base its investigation on a profile that a lone U.S. scientist is responsible for the attacks (see GSN, Oct. 28). In a large-scale investigation, officials tend to follow their initial assumptions, Pena said, adding that it is often difficult to shift an investigation away from those initial assumptions. The FBI might now be asking, “If we start from zero, where would we go?” Pena said. Research into how the anthrax spores were produced might help dissuade the bureau away from the lone U.S. scientist profile, said Richard Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1994 to 1998. “If it gets them [the FBI] off the kick that it can be easily and cheaply made, it will be helpful,” Spertzel said in a written response to GSN. The FBI’s acknowledged months of research into recreating the spores should be an indication that they were probably difficult to produce, Spertzel said. He added that this high level of difficulty should also convince the bureau to shift the focus of its investigation away from Steven Hatfill, the former U.S. Army biologist who has been the public focus of the FBI investigation (see GSN, Oct. 23). If the FBI were to determine through its research that the spores were coated with a silica compound and created with the use of a spray dryer — expensive and specialized equipment — it might narrow the field of suspects toward a state-run program such as Iraq, Spertzel said. BWC While the FBI has not publicly provided technical details of its anthrax-manufacturing research, such as whether it is using or producing live anthrax, experts agreed that the work probably does not violate the Biological Weapons Convention. The convention prohibits signatories from producing biological weapons agents except in small quantities for defensive purposes. Attempt to reverse-engineer the spores would not violate the BWC as long as the quantities of anthrax used are small, Spertzel said. “Such ‘small quantities’ are acceptable for defensive purposes and investigating a crime would certainly fall into that category,” he said in a written response to questions from GSN. The FBI might not even need to use actual anthrax in its research, Rosenberg said, noting that simulants would probably be as effective. If the FBI is using live anthrax, however, it should explain the necessity for doing so, she said. “I don’t see any point in secrecy on this,” Rosenberg said in a written response to GSN. “It just adds to doubts about [the FBI’s] competence in pursuing this case,” she added. For further information, see: GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001) BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)
From November 11, 2002 issue.BWC II: Nongovernmental Groups Launch Alternative Treaty Compliance NetworkBy David Ruppe The organization was conceived as a way for civil organizations to “step into the breach” created when BWC parties failed to create a treaty enforcement mechanism last year, Chandre Gould, a researcher with the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, told a press conference here. The press conference coincided with resumption of the treaty’s fifth review conference today (see related GSN story, today). The Geneva-based Bioweapons Prevention Project is composed of eight prominent arms control groups from Europe, the United States and South Africa. One of its two principal goals is to produce an annual report called the Bioweapons Monitor, describing global offensive biological weapons activities and developments in the biotechnology field that could be used in violation of the treaty. To help accomplish this, the organization hopes, like the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, to build a vast network of groups to gather and report information from countries around the world. Information will be collected from publicly available documents, such as annual reports BWC members are required to produce detailing compliance with the treaty and other open-source materials. Some participating organizations have begun looking for support from the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, according to Malcolm Dando, of the University of Bradford’s Peace Studies Department. Participating organizations may also use government contacts worldwide to elicit information on programs that may not already be available. Participants also hope that vast network will help build momentum for global treaty compliance. The organizations will both “feed into the process of information gathering and analysis and on the other hand strengthen civil society’s understanding about the nature of biological weapons,” said Gould. It will help “strengthen the norm against using disease as a weapon,” she said. The project this afternoon received support from U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala. “This is a very timely and significant initiative,” he said. While member states missed an opportunity last year in failing to negotiate a protocol, Dhanapala said, “civil society and nongovernmental organizations are not going to accept any more missed opportunities.” The founding project members include the British American Security Information Council, the Center for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, the University of Bradford’s Peace Studies Department, the Federation of American Scientists, the Program for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Switzerland, the Sussex Program at the University of Sussex, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility in Germany and the Verification Research, Training and Information Center in the United Kingdom.
From November 8, 2002 issue.United States: U.S. Technology Exported to Suspected Bioweapons StatesBy David Ruppe U.S. officials defended the approvals, saying they were made only after a thorough interagency review to ensure that the recipient governments would not divert the technology for illicit purposes, and that exports of controlled pathogens were in minute quantities intended for public health uses. Between October 1999 and December 2001, Commerce licensed exports of dual-use pathogens or technology to Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates, “none of which have ratified the BWC,” according to the GAO report. In addition, Commerce cleared China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Russia to receive exports even though they “are mentioned as possibly violating the BWC and carrying on offensive biological weapons research,” the report says. U.S. officials have repeatedly criticized Cuba this year for exporting dual-use equipment to Iran and other so-called “rogue nations.” Iran is a party to the convention but is suspected by the United States of producing biological weapons and supporting terrorism (see GSN, May 22). “Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states,” Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in May (see GSN, May 7). “We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.” Review Process Cited A State Department official Thursday said the difference between the U.S. approvals and the Cuban exports is “very much apples and oranges.” “The kinds of things we are going to be exporting are the kinds of things, even though they are classified as dual-use … that won’t contribute to a weapons program, that are going to contribute to legitimate purposes,” the official said. Without speaking specifically to what was approved, the official said such things generally tend to include “gram quantities of a controlled pathogen” or “regular laboratory equipment.” “I think the concern about people selling things to Iran is when they’re selling production technology or equipment to manufacture CW or BW. They are the real significant things, they are not the gram quantities of a controlled substance or material,” the official said. “So on the face of it, it might seem a little hypocritical, but it’s really not,” the official said. The report, Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, was sent in late September to U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), who chairs the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, and released to the public late last month. Reviewing the report before publication, Commerce expressed concern the report suggested it had acted “negligently.” “The Department of Commerce is concerned that … the report could give the incorrect impression that the United States is negligently authorizing the export of pathogens that could be diverted to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or other illicit uses,” wrote Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Borman. He wrote it was “important to note” that such licenses to non-Biological Weapons Convention countries and certain countries of concern were authorized after “careful scrutiny” by Commerce, the State Department and the Pentagon, with intelligence community involvement. The review, Borman wrote, was intended “to ensure the proposed end users are not involved in WMD programs and that the exports are not otherwise likely to be diverted.” The items approved to nonsignatories were for human health purposes only, he wrote, such as “minute” quantities of aflatoxin for use to establish quality control standards to test food items for contamination. The State Department official said if the department had a problem with any of the approvals they could have opposed them, bumping the decision up the chain to the president if need be. “I don’t know of any case that have been escalated that high,” the official said. “I imagine that a lot of these licenses have to do with gram quantities of a controlled pathogen or something that might be used in test kits, testing food, or water, or that kind of things,” the official said. “So it’s very legitimate, benign uses, we see a lot of that kind of stuff, and then, regular laboratory equipment as well.” The GAO report, however, contended that it is difficult to verify compliance with the treaty, because pathogens, knowledge and technology can have both commercial and military applications. “Many pathogens that can be used to produce biological weapons also have commercial applications in the health and biotechnology spheres,” it says. Difficult to Prove The main focus of the report was to analyze various efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. The report says the absence of a strong verification mechanism is a factor making it difficult to prove suspicions of illicit programs. The report says it is difficult to find proof by monitoring a country’s imports, because biological items that can be used for commercial research and production purposes also can be used for military purposes. “The difference between developing a vaccine for humans and developing a biological weapon may be very small. When developing a vaccine, a large volume of pathogen is created. The development of the vaccine would require killing the pathogen. But if the pathogen were to be used as a biological weapon, one would keep it alive,” it said. The report says the BWC is weak because it lacks a strong verification mechanism. The Bush administration last year rejected a draft protocol intended to create such a mechanism, saying it would be ineffective and could harm U.S. security interests and commercial interests. The GAO report says, though, “With no verification procedures, it is difficult to prove or disprove these allegations within the auspices of the BWC.” U.S. officials have maintained that strengthening the BWC is not the solution for dealing with biological weapons proliferation and have proposed a list of other measures for international action. They include criminalizing violations by individuals of prohibited activity and enhancing infectious disease surveillance and response. U.S. officials are pushing for a quick resolution, without a protocol to the treaty, of the fifth annual BWC review conference scheduled to begin Monday in Geneva (see GSN, Nov. 7). For further information, see: BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department) BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department) Fifth Review Conference of BWC
From November 8, 2002 issue.Smallpox: Rumsfeld Recommends Smallpox Vaccine Plan For MilitaryU.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday recommended a military smallpox immunization plan to President George W. Bush, but many of the president’s concerns were left unanswered, according to a White House official (see GSN, Oct. 15). The plan would vaccinate up to 500,000 troops, beginning with emergency and medical personnel and moving on to U.S. forces in the Middle East that might see combat soon, the Washington Post reported. “There’s a lot of issues on both sides,” the official said of Bush’s caution in making a decision on the vaccine. “He’s concerned not just about whether to do it, but how you do it. You don’t want to do it if you can’t do it right,” the official added (Allen/Graham, Washington Post, Nov. 8).
From November 7, 2002 issue.Smallpox I: Threat of Attack Deemed Low, U.S. Official SaysBy David Ruppe “I think we’re looking at it at this point as a low risk of it being used as a weapon,” D.A. Henderson, the Health and Human Services Department’s top science adviser for public health preparedness, said. He also said the information the United States has on suspected smallpox stores in other countries is “simply not terribly good.” That view is relevant to the Bush administration’s pending decision on whether to vaccinate the entire U.S. population, about 290 million people, which Henderson said could cause an estimated 300 to 400 deaths and possibly 1,400 serious illnesses from the side effects of the vaccine. An alternative under consideration would be to vaccinate up to 500,000 medical and emergency response personnel (see GSN, Oct. 17). Henderson’s view provides a counterpoint to a CIA assessment, reported by the Washington Post Tuesday, which concluded that Russia, France, North Korea and Iraq maintain undisclosed stocks of the virus. The story also said al-Qaeda terrorists had sought the virus but had not successfully acquired it. Concerns about the perceived threat, the Post said, have strengthened the position of some in the administration pushing for vaccinating the U.S. population. There are others, however, who support the more limited vaccination strategy, leaving President George W. Bush to make the decision, the story said. Differing Degrees of Certainty Following a successful campaign to eradicate smallpox amid a global outbreak in the 1960s and 1970s, the World Health Organization requested that all stores of the virus around the world be destroyed or turned over to the organization for storage at only two sites, one each in Russia and the United States. By late 1983, all but those two countries had reported no longer possessing the virus. Henderson has previously said he believes Iran and Iraq may have obtained samples when that outbreak passed through their respective countries. In a briefing sponsored by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute Tuesday, Henderson described as “probable” the possibility Russia was working on smallpox at one undeclared site. “The Ministry of Defense production center, the principle center, at Sergiyev Posad, is still intact, it is a secret facility. What all may be going on in there is very difficult to find out and frankly very little is known about that, except it is still wholly intact,” he said. He listed as “possible” illicit stores at a number of other sites. “We’ve had rumors from Russia of several other sites where smallpox virus might be present,” he said. He said there were “varying degrees of certainty or uncertainty” regarding suspected stocks in North Korea, Iraq and Iran. “The information we have as to where smallpox might be present, is simply not terribly good, and it is very hard to ascertain this,” he said The CIA report also rated the levels of confidence in the intelligence on suspected stocks from high with respect to Russia, to not as high for Iraq and France, to medium for North Korea, according to the Post. A French Foreign Ministry spokesman yesterday said the country does not have any smallpox stocks (see GSN, Nov. 6). With respect to France, Henderson said, “I can’t verify or endorse what was said in the Washington Post.” He suggested French stocks of smallpox vaccine might have served as a source of confusion, just as Swiss vaccine stocks recently were misinterpreted as the smallpox virus. “Certainly, this allegation with regard to France. I had no idea where that came from,” he said. Henderson said the United Kingdom and the United States once also had trouble keeping track of their own stocks. After making their declarations to the WHO, he said, “one of our military laboratories, one of our state health department laboratories, several places in Britain, discovered after they’d thought they’d destroyed it that they hadn’t destroyed it.” “So they went ahead and autoclaved it and told us afterwards, ‘Oops, we didn’t realize that we had it,’” he said.
From November 7, 2002 issue.Smallpox II: In Case of Smallpox Attack, Immunize EveryoneBy David McGlinchey “There’s nothing else that one can really do at that point, other than make the vaccine available,” D.A. Henderson told Global Security Newswire. Contracting the smallpox virus is much more dangerous and lethal than complications that arise from the vaccine, Henderson said. Nevertheless, no U.S. officials are supporting mandatory immunization because the vaccine carries serious implications as well, he said. “If we were vaccinating a hundred million people, [there would be] a fair number of deaths and a fair number of people with serious enough complications to wind up in the hospital,” Henderson said during a seminar hosted by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. “There is no other vaccine which comes close to this in terms of severity of impact, and this is something that has to be recognized. This is not influenza vaccine or polio vaccine,” he added. Significant Medical Risks In the midst of a debate on how to protect the United States from smallpox terrorism, health officials have noted that people with a variety of medical conditions are at high risk of adverse side effects. Eczema, atopic dermatitis, pregnancy, and depressed immune systems are the primary ailments that increase the risk of adverse affects. Officials do not agree on how many people fall into this category — estimates range as high as 30 percent of the U.S. population — but most say that the number is far higher than it was 30 years ago, when the United States last immunized against smallpox. “There are significantly more people at risk for adverse reactions to the smallpox vaccine than there were three decades ago when the program ended,” said analyst David Evans, of the Washington-area ANSER research firm, in a written reply to questions. “There is an increased number of people who are immune-suppressed. This includes people with AIDS, hepatitis B and C [and an] increased number of individuals who have had organ transplants and may be taking immune suppressing drugs.” Eczema is also a much more common ailment for people who live in the United States, and medical experts are not sure why, Henderson said. Those with suppressed immune systems — particularly those infected with HIV — might be in the most danger. Officials do not completely understand the effect of the vaccine on an HIV-positive person because HIV itself was not understood during the last wave of immunizations. If the vaccine was found to result in certain death for those with HIV, health officials would need to find another solution to protect that population, Furmanski said. Some analysts noted that the smallpox virus might also wreak havoc in other parts of the world. There is no guarantee that a smallpox attack in the United States would respect international borders. The factors that the United States faces in dealing with an immune-suppressed population become “significantly worse” if the virus surfaces in Africa, Evans said. “An outbreak of wild smallpox would devastate an unprotected HIV-positive population. One is appalled to think of what would happen in sub-Saharan Africa,” said independent researcher Martin Furmanski. Weighing Consequences Experts have generally agreed that in the face of a direct threat in the United States, the at-risk population would be better off taking their chances with the smallpox vaccine than with the virus. Many of the vaccine’s side effects do not require hospitalization, Evans said. “In the event of a confirmed smallpox outbreak … everyone who was actually exposed to smallpox should be vaccinated, without any exclusions because the extreme threat of wild smallpox presents a much greater danger than that of the vaccinia virus,” said Furmanski. It is unclear, however, when it would become imperative to immunize everyone. “Suppose we got an outbreak in Washington, D.C.? What are you going to do in Minneapolis? Are you going to recommend that everybody be vaccinated?” Henderson asked. “At this stage, we probably would say no, unless we felt that there was some greater risk,” he said. Planning for Contingencies The U.S. Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta is trying to ensure that warnings to those at risk would spread quickly and effectively if the need were to arise, but several experts noted that it is difficult to form a single plan when there are many reasons a person might be at risk from the vaccine. “It is a fairly random group in some sense,” Evans said. The primary focus of the strategy is informing people who have not been immunized of what steps to take, according to Lisa Rotz, a medical epidemiologist in the CDC’s bioterrorism preparedness and response program. “Right now we don’t have any other proven alternatives [to the vaccine],” Rotz said. In the case of an outbreak or a heightened threat, health officials would probably try to reach at-risk people through local public health officials and media outlets, Rotz said. “There are certain things you might not want to do, getting on public transportation and sitting next to someone you don’t know,” she said. If a smallpox outbreak occurred, the disease would be spread by people who are unaware, she added, “someone who is coming down with symptoms but has had tickets to a sporting event for a while, and is going to go, no matter what.” Scientists at the National Institute of Health are also developing a safer vaccine, continuing work that began years ago and was discontinued. “Work was underway towards the end of the last inoculation. It just so happened that they got rid of smallpox,” Rotz said.
From November 7, 2002 issue.BWC: Review Conference Could End QuicklyThe chairman of the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention — scheduled to begin next week in Geneva — plans to end the conference quickly without attempting to discuss a protocol to strengthen the treaty, a U.N. source said today (see GSN, Sept. 6). Hungarian Ambassador Tibor Toth plans to introduce his proposal to end the conference quickly after it begins Monday, the U.N. source said. Toth’s proposal also calls for a new review conference timetable, with shorter meetings to be held every year instead of every five years (Agence France-Presse, Nov.7). The BWC Fifth Review Conference was originally scheduled to run from Nov. 11 to Nov. 22 (Xinhua.net, Nov. 11). For further information, see: BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department) BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department) Fifth Review Conference of BWC
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