North Korea I:  Pakistan Probably Gave Nuclear Aid Recently, Officials Say

The Bush administration has evidence that Pakistan aided North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program as recently as three months ago, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 21).

Publicly, the United States has said that while Pakistan aided North Korea’s nuclear weapons efforts in the past, it had cut off assistance after the Sept. 11 attacks.  The White House believes, however, that Pakistan continued to exchange technical nuclear information, and possibly materials, in exchange for missile components until this summer, White House and congressional sources said.

White House officials refused to comment on the evidence.

“Let’s put it this way:  There were still shenanigans going on three months ago,” a Bush administration official said.

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has provided assurances that he is ending all suspicious trade with North Korea, and U.S. officials believe he wants to stop the nuclear aid, according to the Post.  The U.S. officials said they question, however, how much control Musharraf has over the Pakistani entities doing business with Pyongyang.

“In the end, we may find he is only partially truthful,” an official said.

Pakistan’s suspected involvement in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program could put the Bush administration, which considers Islamabad an ally, in a difficult position, the Post reported.  Under U.S. law, if the president determines that a country has provided nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or technologies without international safeguards, the United States must impose sanctions, accordin to the Post.  The United States imposed such sanctions on Pakistan in 1979, but U.S. President George W. Bush waived them last year after Pakistan agreed to aid the war on terrorism (see GSN, Oct. 30, 2001).

Instead of calling on Pakistan to provide full information on its transactions with North Korea, U.S. officials said they have noted the new evidence, according to the Post.  They believe Pakistan understands that future violations will not be tolerated, the Post reported.

It will be difficult for the United States to understand the scope of North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program without knowing what kind of aid Pakistan might have provided, several experts said.

“We have asked North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear enrichment program,” said Robert Einhorn, former U.S. assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation in the Clinton and Bush administrations.  “How will we know if North Korea has done that unless we know precisely what Pakistan has transferred to North Korea?” he added (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Nov. 13).

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North Korea II:  Tanker Awaits KEDO Meeting Tomorrow

International officials are expected to decide tomorrow whether to allow a tanker traveling from Singapore to deliver its oil shipment to North Korea as called for under the 1994 Agreed Framework (see GSN, Nov. 12).

In the meantime, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which oversees international energy assistance to North Korea, has ordered the Sun River, a naval tanker loaded with 47,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, to travel at slower speeds, according to the Los Angeles Times.

“The ship is sailing at a very slow speed in the international sea awaiting further instructions,” Koo Byong-sam, a Seoul-based KEDO official said yesterday.

Representatives from the United States, South Korea, Japan and the European Union are expected to decide on the fuel shipment during a meeting tomorrow in New York.  The United States funds the oil shipments while South Korea and Japan fund the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors, which KEDO agreed to build in exchange for a freeze on North Korean nuclear activities.  The three countries are expected to have an equal say at tomorrow’s meeting, the Times reported.

“There is no vote,” said South Korea’s KEDO representative Chang Sun-sup.  “We will make a decision by consensus,” Chang said.

South Korean officials said they expect the United States to ultimately permit this month’s fuel oil shipment to be delivered, postponing a decision on whether to continue further energy assistance for at least another month.  If the oil is not delivered, however, Pyongyang could interpret the move as a provocation, said Lee Jong-seok, a North Korean specialist at the South Korean Sejong Institute.

“If the ship is stopped, it will cause huge damage.  We are entering winter, and the North Koreans need the oil desperately,” Lee said.  “They will interpret the decision as meaning that the United States is bent on destroying North Korea.  It will escalate the risk of military confrontation,” he added (Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 13).

North Korean Threats

North Korea has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to expel international nuclear inspectors if the United States decides to end the fuel oil shipments, diplomatic sources close to Pyongyang said.

North Korea “would prepare to ditch the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if oil shipments were halted,” said one source.  “If the delivery of fuel oil was halted then Pyongyang would most likely remove or expel International Atomic Energy Agency monitors from the nuclear complex at Yongbyon,” the source added (Khang Hyun-sung, South China Morning Post, Nov. 13).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

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International Response:  IAEA Chief Discusses Iraq, North Korea, Nuclear Terrorism

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday said that nuclear nonproliferation concerns are broader than Iraq and North Korea, and include nuclear terrorism and the need to secure nuclear weapon-grade materials.

Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly as it took up the IAEA’s annual report, ElBaradei said the new inspection regime for Iraq — adopted Friday when the Security Council approved Resolution 1441 — depends on “five interrelated prerequisites” (see GSN, Nov. 8).  These include “full and explicit authority for inspection, with immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq;” access to all sources of information, from Iraq and other countries; “unified and full support” from the Security Council; “the preservation of integrity and impartiality” of inspections; and “active cooperation from Iraq.”

ElBaradei said that before the inspections ended in late 1998, the IAEA “had successfully thwarted Iraq’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program by destroying, removing or rendering harmless all of Iraq’s facilities … relevant to nuclear weapons production.”  Since the inspectors left, he said, “We have continued to use satellite monitoring and conduct other analytical work.  However, no remote analysis can enable us to reach conclusions without thorough on-site inspections.”

No Progress on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Not only Iraq, but the whole of the Middle East is on the IAEA’s agenda.  ElBaradei said the agency’s General Conference gave him the mandate to consult with nations in the region “on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East … that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in that region” (see GSN, Sept. 25).  He added, “I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make progress in the implementation of this important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East.”

The General Assembly was debating a draft resolution welcoming the IAEA’s report.  The report covers calendar year 2001 and was published in August 2002, thus it does not include the latest revelations about North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs or recent developments on weapons inspections for Iraq.

The Iraq section of the report simply says the IAEA has been “unable to implement its inspection program as mandated by [Security Council] resolutions.”  The IAEA has conducted inspections in Iraq under the more limited provisions of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — only a few sites are subject to NPT safeguards — and reported that none of the nuclear material under safeguards has been diverted (see GSN, Jan. 31).  NPT inspections “do not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, nor do they provide the assurances sought by the council,” the report says.

On North Korea, the report says the IAEA is “unable to verify the correctness and completeness” of North Korea’s declarations of its stock of weapons-grade nuclear materials, therefore the country “remains in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement.”  ElBaradei added, “Our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and completeness of [North Korea’s] declaration could take up to three or four years.”

Nuclear Terrorism

ElBaradei said his agency has stepped up efforts to counter nuclear terrorism.  After Sept. 11, he said, ”the IAEA moved swiftly to conduct a thorough review of its programs related to preventing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism, and to develop a comprehensive plan for upgrading nuclear security worldwide.”  The plan includes physical protection of material and facilities and “the detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, such as illicit trafficking across borders.”  The report details the agency’s effort to assist states in securing nuclear material against theft and, failing that, setting up a system to detect nuclear material being taken illegally across international borders (see GSN, Mar. 20).

Monitoring the weapons-capable programs of other countries is also part of the IAEA mandate.  After Iraqi evasions came to light in the mid-1990s, “the international community committed itself to provide assurance not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for nonpeaceful purposes, but equally important, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist,” said ElBaradei. 

The broader authority is in new safeguard agreements the agency concludes with the 188 parties to the NPT.  However, he said, only 28 such agreements have entered into force (see GSN, Sept. 25).  “This is clearly not a satisfactory situation … The agency can only provide the required assurances if we are given the corresponding authority,” he added.

Voting 138-1, the General Assembly adopted the resolution endorsing the report.  North Korea voted against the resolution, and Angola and Vietnam abstained.  Iraq cannot vote in the assembly because it is more than two years behind in its dues to the United Nations.  The resolution asks governments to enter into safeguards agreements on their nuclear weapons-capable facilities with the IAEA, to improve nuclear safety, to fully fund the IAEA and commends the agency’s efforts to monitor the Iraq’s and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

It has been a routine matter over the last several years for Iraq and North Korea to object to how they are portrayed in the report and the resolution.  In recent years, when the resolution accepting the report has been debated, Iraq wanted the resolution changed to acknowledge its cooperation with the agency.  Rather than vote down the amendments, opponents of the Iraqi proposals vote not to take action on them.

This year, the paragraph on Iraq noted “the increasing concern” that inspectors have been out of the country for nearly four years and that the longer they are out, “the more difficult it will be to re-establish a level of knowledge of the status of Iraq’s nuclear-related assets.”  The paragraph also notes Iraq’s September decision to readmit inspectors.  Iraq wanted to replace that wording with its own that would welcome the September decision to allow the return of inspectors “without conditions” and quoted Secretary General Kofi Annan’s remark at the time that the move was “the indispensable first step towards an assurance that Iraq” has no weapons of mass destruction and “towards a comprehensive solution that includes the suspension and eventual ending of the sanctions.”  Iraq’s representative, Mohammad Salman, called this a “factual text” that provided “needed balance.”  The sponsors of the resolution, led by Kuwait, the current chair of the IAEA’s Board of Governors, won on a vote not to consider the amendment, 86-11, with 26 abstentions.

The IAEA report also covers nuclear power, safe disposal of radioactive waste and the use of nuclear technology in agriculture and medicine.

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North Korea:  United States Must Abide by Agreed Framework, East Asian Diplomats Say

The United States’ two main East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, yesterday increased pressure on Washington to continue to provide energy assistance to North Korea as agreed to under the 1994 Agreed Framework (see GSN, Nov. 6).

During a meeting in Seoul, Japanese and South Korean Foreign Ministers Yoriko Kawaguchi and Choi Sung-hong agreed that the framework has been “effective” in slowing North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, according to the Financial Times.  The officials also agreed that the framework has effectively prevented North Korea from developing plutonium-based weapons, and that a way must be found to prevent enriched uranium weapons, a Japanese official said.

Critics of the framework have said that shipments of fuel oil to North Korea and the planned construction of two light-water nuclear reactors — all of which has been provided to North Korea under the framework in exchange for a freeze on any nuclear development — should be stopped because of suspicions that Pyongyang has restarted its weapons program.

Japan and South Korea have claimed, however, that stopping energy assistance to North Korea would seriously damage U.S.-North Korean relations and threaten the collapse of the North Korean economy, according to the Times.  The United States, South Korea and Japan are expected to make a decision on the future implementation of the framework during a meeting scheduled for Thursday in New York (Ward/Ibison, Financial Times, Nov. 12).

China

Meanwhile, China today also called on the United States to continue implementing the framework (see GSN, Nov. 8).

“It is our view that the parties concerned should continue earnestly to implement the framework document,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.

The two countries should attempt to resolve concerns over the nuclear issue through dialogue, Kong said.

“The nuclear question on the Korean peninsula is of major concern,” he said.  “We hold that dialogue, consultations and peaceful means should be resorted to for the settlement of the issue,” he added.

The framework has had a positive impact on U.S.-North Korean relations, Kong said.

“We believe that such a document [the framework] has played an important role in relaxing the tensions between the two parties,” he said.  “It has not come easily,” he added.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly has arrived in Beijing for a meeting tomorrow with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi to discuss North Korea and other issues, Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse, Nov. 12).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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North Korea:  Bush in No Hurry to Resolve Nuclear Weapons Crisis

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States has few quick diplomatic solutions to deal with the latest North Korean nuclear crisis and the Bush administration is likely to put off resolving it at least until next year, according to U.S. officials and experts.  In the meantime, Washington will seek to further isolate the North Korean regime and force its hand, they predicted (see GSN, Nov. 6).

U.S. allies in the region and critics of the Bush approach, however, have warned that a policy that is too confrontational and chooses isolation over engagement is likely to backfire, prompting Pyongyang to continue its nuclear developments and in the process threaten stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith held meetings with counterparts in South Korea and Japan this week, saying North Korea’s reported admission last month that it is seeking to enrich uranium does not lend itself to simple diplomacy.

“This is an authentically difficult subject,” Feith told reporters in Seoul Wednesday.  “It is not a problem that presents an easy and obvious solution.  There are debates about the best way to proceed and how to make diplomacy effective.”

A Range of Options

A variety of proposals have been floated in recent weeks for how to respond to North Korea’s revelations, which came when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted North Korean officials with new U.S. intelligence pointing to a covert uranium enrichment program, according to published reports (see GSN, Oct. 17).

Some are calling for isolating the regime entirely — including freezing diplomatic talks, a 1994 nuclear agreement and all but critical humanitarian aid — to force it to disarm.  South Korean and Japanese officials, however, have warned the Bush administration that doing so could be a dangerous move given North Korea’s unpredictability.  Japan, seeking to keep dialogue open with the North, went ahead with normalization talks this week.

Others support immediate negotiations with Pyongyang to resolve not only the nuclear issue but also other long-standing disagreements dating back to the Korean War.  Still others are calling for a combination of negotiation, diplomatic pressure and the threat of credible military force to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear program once and for all in return for Western aid and acceptance.

According to U.S. officials and a variety of North Korea experts, however, the Bush administration is unlikely to seek a resolution in the coming months, as it concentrates on a possible military campaign in Iraq and awaits scheduled January elections in South Korea in the hopes that a more conservative government will replace the administration of Kim Dae-jung and be more supportive of a confrontational policy toward the North.

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday reiterated his long-held view that North Korea poses a serious national security threat the United States, but indicated that Washington will play for time while it decides what it wants to do in the longer term.

“As I said from the beginning of this new war in the 21^st century, we’ll deal with each threat differently,” he told a news conference.  “Each threat requires a different type of response.  You’ve heard my strategy on Iraq.  With North Korea we’re taking a different strategy initially.”

North Korea’s Suspected  Nuclear Capabilities

One reason for the slower approach is that very little is known about the North Korean uranium enrichment program, according to U.S. officials, including how advanced it is or where North Korea’s covert facilities are located inside the largely closed society.  

“There is much about the program that we don’t know,” Feith said.  “I cannot answer with precision exactly what they have accomplished with their uranium enrichment program to date.”

Intelligence officials assert that while they lack conclusive evidence, they believe it is unlikely that the uranium enrichment effort has reached a level at which the North Koreans have produced nuclear weapons using the enrichment method.

“It takes a very long time to produce a weapon based on that system,” said a U.S. intelligence official.  “And there would be more fingerprints.”

U.S. intelligence, which has long suspected North Korea of secretly developing nuclear weapons, discovered in August of this year that North Korea was attempting to acquire large quantities of high-strength aluminum, which could be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium.  Meanwhile, construction activity appearing to be related to a uranium enrichment facility was also detected by U.S. intelligence agencies, officials said.

“The fact that the North Koreans are seeking a production-scale capability to produce weapons-grade uranium is a cause of grave concern to us, to the states of the region, and to the world as a whole,” Undersecretary of State John Bolton said last week.

The new intelligence, combined with Kelly’s report that Pyongyang surprisingly admitted to seeking to develop nuclear weapons, pointed to a clear violation — in spirit if not in letter — of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to forgo its plutonium production capability in return for two modern light-water nuclear power reactors.

Under the agreement, North Korea is storing spent nuclear reactor fuel rods containing enough plutonium to make up to five nuclear bombs.  Those fuel rods have been monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the 1994 agreement.  This material is in addition to a plutonium stockpile North Korea had previously separated from spent fuel.

“North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons,” Bolton said, not including the material now in storage.  Others, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have said that North Korea already has manufactured two nuclear bombs with the material not covered by the 1994 agreement.

“Ours is very much keeping with the Rumsfeld view,” said a U.S. intelligence official.  In other words, Pyongyang is believed to already have at least two plutonium-based nuclear weapons.  Moreover, without a diplomatic solution to the current standoff, it could build more with the additional material it has, while also proceeding with its uranium enrichment program, the official said.

Data Collection Intensifying

Meanwhile, the new revelations about uranium enrichment have spurred U.S. intelligence agencies and others to increase efforts to collect information about North Korea’s efforts and intentions.

An estimated 200 U.S. reconnaissance flights were flown over North Korea last month, 20 more than in September, according to North Korea’s government-run news services.  A variety of aircraft are being utilized, including U-2s, RC-135s, E-3s and the RC-12, the reports said.

Other information has also contributed to the U.S. monitoring of the North’s activities.  For example, satellite images taken by the private firm Space Imaging in October of 2000, released this week, shows a sprawling group of buildings surrounding the entrance to a large underground facility in the Myohyang Mountains. 

South Korea’s Atomic Energy Institute has concluded the complex houses an underground nuclear reactor, a reprocessing facility, a storage facility and a high explosive test site, according to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  U.S. officials, however, doubt that assessment, according to a Nov. 1 report by InsideDefense.com.

Nuclear Negotiation

Despite the covert nature of the program, many North Korea watchers believe Pyongyang’s reported admission was an attempt to bring the United States — which has labeled it a member of the “axis of evil” — and its regional allies to the bargaining table for one last effort to resolve their long-standing differences.

“I think they would like the U.S. to give them some assurances that we do not intend to blow them out of the water,” said Donald Gregg, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.  Gregg returned this week from North Korea, where he met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok.

“The danger has increased but the opportunity is still there if we are willing and able to take it,” Gregg added.  “Talking and discussion is the only way out of what is a very delicate situation at the moment.”

Others say those negotiations should build on the 1994 agreement.  “I think the main point is that we were able to freeze the operation of the plutonium-producing reactor and put the fuel rods in storage and they have been under inspection,” said Selig Harrison, a North Korea expert at the Center for International Policy.  “They have enough to make five more bombs.  These fuel rods are its card.”

Preventing North Korea from using those fuel rods should be paramount, Harrison believes.  “What is important that they don’t feel pushed into in a corner and will use those fuel rods,” he added. “Japan and South Korea are saying ‘don’t let the agreement lapse,’” Harrison said.

The Bush administration, however, has so far ruled out negotiations until North Korea opens the uranium enrichment program to international scrutiny and dismantles it.

“We’re happy to undertake the negotiations, but first North Korea has to dismantle, and do so rather promptly, this program that they have, which is in clear violation of the previous agreements we’ve had in some three other international agreements,” Kelly said this week.  “This is not an unsolvable problem but it is clearly one that there’s really nothing to negotiate, at least at this time.”

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has all but declared the 1994 agreement dead.  “It’s going to be something that’s going to be very difficult for us to continue,” Kelly said. 

Nuclear Isolation

Other experts agree with the Bush administration and say that the 1994 agreement is a failure and warn against any further concessions to Pyongyang.

“First, our continued payment of nuclear blackmail has got to stop,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. 

“Our diplomats have all but turned North Korea’s nuclear cheating into a recreational diplomatic drug,” he said.  “Breaking the habit won’t be easy, but continuing it is a one-way ticket to nuclear chaos.  It will not only increase proliferators’ contempt for U.S. and allied pleas for restraint, it will teach the world that a tyrannical state that succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons will then get its way,” he said.

Sokolski is calling for a complete withdrawal by the United States from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which, along with South Korea, Japan and the European Union, oversees the 1994 agreement.

“At a minimum, the United States and its allies have to end their transfer of nuclear technology and fuel oil to Pyongyang,” Sokolski said.  “We must also figure out some way to penalize Kim Jong Il’s regime for violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Certainly, North Korea is not going to self-disarm,” he added.

The U.S. negotiators of the 1994 agreement partially agree.  “We should, first, persuade out allies to suspend economic and political engagement with the North, except for vital food aid,” wrote Anthony Lake, former national security adviser, and Robert Gallucci, former ambassador-at-large, in Wednesday’s Washington Post.

“Second, we should suspend our own performance under the Agreed Framework until the North shows us the destruction of its uranium enrichment facilities,” they said.

Unlike Sokolski, however, they believe the 1994 agreement, which in part successfully addressed North Korea’s plutonium, should be salvaged.  “Some changes to the agreement are needed in light of the North’s clandestine activities:  immediate initiation of full-scope inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency; prompt removal of the stored spent fuel out of North Korea; and agreement by the North to accept any future requests from the IAEA for special inspections.”

The threat of force is also necessary, they said.  “A powerful military reaction to any North Korean provocation should be on the table, too, as was the case in 1994, while also reserving the possibility of a pre-emptive strike.”  However,  “an ideological disdain for negotiating with our adversaries seldom serves our interests, and in this case could be highly dangerous,” Lake and Gallucci said.

Harrison agreed, saying, “It is critically important for the United States to pursue a dialogue with Pyongyang to keep the key provisions of the 1994 agreement in force, while renegotiating the rest of the accord to settle the nuclear issue once and for all.”

Biding Time

Whatever diplomatic or military approach Washington ultimately chooses, the Bush administration will likely bide its time, according to knowledgeable sources.

“There are lots of good reasons to resolve this,” said Joshua Handler, a Princeton University nuclear expert.  “But you have to appreciate the conservatives in each country, the United States and North Korea, have little incentive to change things.”

“The White House wants some sort of punitive approach,” Harrison added.  “At the moment, the Bush administration will be stalling until January, hoping to get a more conservative government in South Korea.  And they don’t want North Korea to take away from Iraq.”

Handler added: “My impression is that the Pentagon and the national security community never thought the Korean standoff was going to end.  If we have a breakthrough it will have significant implications,” for missile defense, for U.S. military force structure and a variety of other strategic factors, he said.  The lack of urgency in resolving the crisis, he said, is understandable in such a context.

Events to closely watch, experts say, include the KEDO meeting next week, at which board members will decide whether to continue shipments of fuel oil to North Korea, as called for by the 1994 agreement.  A new shipment left Singapore Tuesday, headed to North Korea and takes an estimated 10 to 12 days to arrive (see GSN, Nov. 5).

“There’s a board meeting next Monday that’s going to decide whether that one goes ahead,” Kelly said.  Feith, in Japan today, discussed cutting off the shipments and halting construction of the two U.S.-built nuclear power plants, as a way to pressure Pyongyang.

At the same time, North Korea this week warned that if relations are not normalized with Japan soon, it may lift its moratorium on live missile tests. Should Pyongyang make such a move, the region would find itself in further turmoil, experts said (see GSN, Nov. 5).

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United States I:  Four B-2 Shelters to Diego Garcia, One to England

The United States plans to build four B-2 stealth bomber shelters on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia and one at Fairford, England to move the long-range aircraft closer to Iraq, the Los Angeles Times reported today.  Each shelter can hold two bombers (see GSN, Oct. 31).

If the United States were to attack Iraq, the bombers would be used to counter Iraq’s intricate air defense system, which has been built with Russian, Yugoslav and French technology, the Times reported.  Iraq has built defense facilities, rebuilt damaged equipment and added radar to its systems.  President Saddam Hussein has also installed redundant fiber-optic communications systems in Iraq’s missile defense systems.

The U.S. Defense Department, which has long planned to deploy the bombers in England and Diego Garcia, also plans to station some in Guam to provide better access to Asia (see GSN, Sept. 16; John Hendren, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7).

Meanwhile, workers are still repairing a B-2 that suffered $2.5 million worth of damage when it collapsed on, and injured, five members of a maintenance crew six months ago, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, July 25).

The airplane’s “left main landing gear actuator rod, the left weapons bay and main gear doors, the left wing and its control surfaces” were damaged, according to the accident report.

The incident, which took place during maintenance requested by the air crew, was classified as the first B-2 “Class A” accident — an accident that costs more than $1 million or results in death.

“It was an error made by the maintenance crew,” U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command spokesman Maj. Roger Lawson said.  “It was kind of a strange thing” (Rich Tuttle, Aerospace Daily, Nov. 7).

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United States II:  Retired ICBMs Still Useful, U.S. Air Force Official Says

A senior U.S. Air Force official has said that retired intercontinental ballistic missiles have several uses, including satellite launches and the development of the U.S. missile defense system, Space & Missile reported today (see GSN, Oct. 4).

The Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center’s Rocket Systems Launch Program manages the retired ICBMs, which are refurbished for use as space launch vehicles and target launch vehicles, said Col. James Neumeister, head of Detachment 12 of the center, which oversees the program.  To ensure that the retired missiles are available for use, the program stores them in environmentally controlled conditions, monitors them and performs X-ray tests and firing tests on their motors, he said.

The program currently manages stocks of retired Minuteman and Minuteman 2 ICBMs, Neumeister said, adding that it is also expected to oversee stocks of retired Peacekeeper ICBMs.  The Peacekeepers present new opportunities for U.S. defense contractors, he said.

“We are in the process of source selection for our follow-on orbital/suborbital program contract,” Neumeister said.  “This is to pick a couple of contractors who will have responsibility for working with us to take those Minuteman assets — and now Peacekeeper assets, because we are prepared for Peacekeeper deactivation — and build those up into both target launch vehicles as well as space launch vehicles to meet the needs of our customers” (Ray Nelson, Space & Missile, Nov. 7).

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