BWC:  Diplomats Expect Conference Agreement Today

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

GENEVA — Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention are expected to approve a final decision of the treaty’s fifth review conference later today.  Delegates said countries that were seeking to change the text of a draft decision proposed by the conference chairman have relented, and the draft will most likely be approved by consensus with no changes (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Chairman Tibor Toth has scheduled a plenary meeting for late today to submit the plan for approval without any of the changes that some states had advocated.  He had offered a draft decision to the conference Monday (see GSN, Nov. 11).

“I cannot hand out last minute goodies because all of those compromises have been built into the draft decision as it stands now,” Toth told Global Security Newswire this morning.

Approving review conference decisions has traditionally required consensus among the parties, but until now consensus has eluded the current conference, which Toth suspended in December 2001 after parties failed to agree on a final declaration.

The inability of parties to agree to any kind of plan for cooperation for more than a year is seen by many diplomats and outside experts as a sign that the international community is unable to address biological weapon proliferation multilaterally.  Many have said they are troubled by such a shortcoming in light of developments in the biotechnology field, the anthrax attacks in the United States and other high-profile terrorist attacks.

“Facing a threat that is ubiquitous means multilateral measures are needed,” said a Western diplomat at the conference.  While the Toth proposal does not create any multilateral measures, it could promote needed international cooperation, the diplomat added.

The Toth plan calls for holding annual meetings until the next review conference in 2006.  Discussion at these meetings would be limited to five subjects primarily addressing ways that individual countries could improve domestic measures to control and penalize biological weapons activities.  Virtually every state is believed to support such meetings in principle.

Without Changes

Toth’s decision to submit his proposal without any changes should be a disappointment to some delegations.  Since the chairman formally proposed the text Monday, some diplomats from a collection of developing states known as the Nonaligned Movement have attempted to expand the scope of the proposed annual meetings.

A collection of developed countries known as the Western Group has opposed broadening the proposal, and the United States reportedly supports that position.  For instance, it has opposed discussions to create a global inspection mechanism for checking compliance with the treaty.  Citing commercial interests and national security, it withdrew from efforts to create such a mechanism last year, disappointing Western Group and NAM members alike.

Toth has said that he opposes allowing changes because parties are unlikely to reach agreement if the text of his draft decision is opened for negotiation.

“I have not promised last-minute compromises because all of the compromises were embedded in the draft decision,” he said.  “I explained to delegations what compromises were required by others and what compromises were required by them,” he said.

Toth also cited precedents for taking a gradual approach to developing a major nonproliferation treaty, he said.

Implied in Toth’s proposal, though not specifically addressed in it, is that an ad hoc group that had been negotiating a treaty protocol would not be abolished or have its mandate terminated.  That protocol, under negotiation for more than seven years, would create verification and monitoring systems for the treaty, which currently has none.  In the past, U.S. officials have sought to end the group’s existence.

Some Optimism

The Western Group diplomat said there is cause for optimism that delegates will accept the proposal.  NAM delegations that had proposed changes said explicitly on Wednesday that they would not veto the proposal, the diplomat said.

“I think that no country wants to stand up and deny the will of all the other states,” the diplomat said.  “Countries will want to join in and support the decision for the common good.”

Toth was slightly more cautious this morning.  “We are very, very close to consensus and we shouldn’t let the process drift in a negative way and turn it into an agonizing exercise.”  He said he is motivated to bring the proposal forward today because a delay might decrease the chances of a successful outcome.

U.S. Support Anticipated

Diplomats have said that the United States has indicated it plans to support the proposal.  U.S. officials appear to have taken a step back from their previous position, stated in September to other developed countries, of opposing any meetings preceding the next review conference in 2006 (see GSN, Sept. 6).

“I think [it was] the vocal, unanimous views expressed in September by all of its allies that their position was unacceptable,” said the Western diplomat.  “I think they heard that and I think they were listening.”

Toth said his proposal is similar to one proposed by U.S. delegates late last year, and that that U.S. proposal was built upon elements already approved in previous review conference final declarations.

“It would be very difficult at this time for the U.S. not to support it,” Toth said.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department)

U.N. Background on BWC

Pentagon Executive Summary of BWC

Fifth Review Conference of BWC

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Smallpox:  Homeland Bill Includes Smallpox Vaccine Liability Protection

Removing a large roadblock to smallpox immunizations, U.S. legislators have included language in the homeland security bill to limit lawsuits against medical workers administering smallpox vaccine (see GSN, Oct. 24).

Senators are expected to vote by next week on the bill, which the House of Representatives passed yesterday.  If the bill passes intact, the U.S. government would pay damages to those who are injured or to the families of those who are killed by the vaccine, but victims would not receive punitive damages, the Associated Press reported.

“Because of risks associated with the smallpox vaccine, many health professionals may be unwilling to give the vaccine without some measure of liability protection,” Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) said.  “The threat of lawsuits mustn’t be a barrier to protecting the American people,” he added (Laura Meckler, Associated Press, Nov. 13).

Meanwhile, scientists in New York are leading a study on residual immunity from old smallpox vaccinations, and how it might affect any new inoculation.  U.S. health officials have said that the existing batch of smallpox vaccine — some doses are more than 40 years old — can be diluted and remain effective.  For people who were vaccinated long ago, existing immunity could be too weak to be effective against smallpox, but such immunity might still resist a diluted dose of vaccine, scientists have said.

If this theory is correct, people with existing immunity would now need full-strength doses of the vaccine.

“It’s likely the body may tamp down the diluted vaccine; we don’t know,” said John Treanor, a medical professor at the University of Rochester who is leading the study.  “The subjects in this study are people who were vaccinated as children, and for some people that may have been 30, 40, 50 years ago,” he added.

Researches plan to use 1,000 volunteers — ranging in age from their early 30s to 75 years old — and to administer either a full dose of the vaccine or a diluted dose (Delthia Ricks, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 14).

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BWC:  States Dispute Plan for Future Meetings

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

GENEVA — Negotiations at the resumed fifth annual review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention continue to hang in the balance, as member states quarrel over a proposal to meet annually for the next three years (see GSN, Nov. 11).

Delegations are disagreeing over recommendations to change language in the plan that might allow members to discuss topics that U.S. officials have said they are opposed to discussing, diplomats and observers said.

The review conference, which meets every five years, serves as a forum for treaty parties to discuss and modify the treaty and other tools to address the proliferation of biological weapons.  Experts and diplomats said they are concerned that this meeting might now end without any common declaration of intentions or plans to prepare for the next conference.

This week’s meetings were scheduled when the review conference could reach no decision last year and conference Chairman Tibor Toth called for reconvening the meeting one year later (see GSN, Dec. 10).  The next full review conference is scheduled for 2006.

Toth, who authored the draft conference decision that is now under consideration, has been shuttling between two groups of countries passing messages and trying to encourage consensus.  One U.N. source described the activity as “pingpong” diplomacy.

If at some point Toth believes he has achieved consensus, a general committee would be convened to consider forwarding the plan to a final plenary meeting.  If no state speaks up in opposition, the plan would then be adopted.

“Western Group” Adamant Against Changes

The Toth plan calls on treaty parties to discuss five subjects involving possible national and international controls for discouraging proliferation and use of biological weapons.  Virtually every state is believed to support such meetings.

Nevertheless, some developing states, part of a group known as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), are pressing for certain changes to the proposal that would allow for a broader range of subjects to be considered. 

A collection of developed states known as the Western Group, on the other hand, continues to push for approving the plan strictly as it is written.  The United States has supported that position, diplomats said, and one Western diplomat said all group members support it.

“It is a view that is shared by all,” the diplomat said.  “We have been unwilling to countenance any change” to the Toth proposal, the diplomat said.

U.S. Concerns

Some NAM members, including Iran, have argued for introducing the language into a key phrase specifying the subjects that might be discussed at the annual meetings, diplomats said.  Such language would open the door to discussing treaty issues not specifically identified in the draft decision.

The U.S. delegation reportedly opposes such a change over concerns that it might allow discussions to create an inspections mechanism for the treaty, which the Bush administration opposes.  U.S. officials declined to discuss their positions until a resolution is achieved.

Some NAM members have also proposed another change that might allow discussion of export control regimes.  That might lead to discussions at the meetings on separate Australia Group restrictions, which limit transfers of certain biological and chemical technologies to developing countries, said Ed Hammond, co-director of the Sunshine Project.

Some NAM members have complained that the United States should not be allowed to dictate the terms of the process or proposal, diplomats said.  Others complained that “the way the topic has been framed is meant to accommodate U.S. sensitivities and nobody else’s,” the U.N. source said.

“It’s not clear whether they [the NAM] have difficulty in accepting the proposal based on substance or on procedural grounds, as it was presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition,” said Alexander Kelle, a research associate at the University of Bradford.

Western diplomats said nonspecific language regarding the topics of discussion could cause the annual meetings to be occupied with debates over the agenda rather than substance.

Time a Possible Factor

There is a general concern among participants that if discussions become protracted the United States may walk out and effectively end the conference.  Toth has been trying to convince member delegations that “his proposal represents one shot,” said the U.N. source, to “keep the United States involved in the process.”

At a September meeting, U.S. officials told Western Group members that they preferred an extremely short meeting at this resumed conference and no further meetings until 2006 (see GSN, Sept. 6).

The fact that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker is involved in these negotiations, observers said, suggests the administration has reconsidered its opposition to holding annual meetings.

A Second Best Alternative

While possibly all treaty parties are believed to support Toth’s proposal in some form, most also see it as a second-best alternative to creating a legally binding protocol that would create an inspections mechanism to investigate treaty compliance.

U.S. officials indicated before the review conference opened last November they were withdrawing U.S. support from just such a protocol that had been negotiated over a seven-year period. 

All non-U.S. Western Group states still favor adopting a protocol to create such a mechanism, but are unwilling to do so without U.S. participation, according to a Western group diplomat.

Oliver Meier, an Arms Control Association analyst following the proceedings here, said states now have maneuvered themselves into positions where they are unable to address substantive issues. 

“The Western Group is holding the line of the Americans and not moving at all. In the nonaligned movement, there are deep divisions about how and whether to address substantive issues and to approve the proposal that is on the table.”

“The real danger is if such empty exercises in diplomatic procedure are continued over the next three years and such mechanisms not used to talk about real issues, this convention runs the danger of becoming more and more irrelevant,” Meier said.

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Anthrax:  Postal Officials Postpone Brentwood Fumigation

The U.S. Postal Service has decided to wait to fully decontaminate the anthrax-tainted Brentwood Road postal facility in Washington because technicians have found cracks in the plastic piping that was to carry the toxic decontaminant, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Oct. 7).

The cracks were found last week among 7,000 feet of piping that was to be used to pump chlorine dioxide gas into the facility, postal officials said.  The cause of the cracks is still unknown, but officials think they occurred during the regular course of manufacturing, delivery or on-site handling, said Postal Service spokeswoman Kristin Krathwohl.

Officials plan to replace the damaged section of the piping, according to Krathwohl.  The remaining sections have been examined and no additional leaks were discovered, she said.

The piping cracks caused postal officials to delay a planned Nov. 9 test of the fumigation procedures and equipment and to postpone the full decontamination of the facility, which Postmaster General John Potter had hoped would begin at the end of the week, the Post reported.  Officials might conduct the test Saturday after replacement piping is installed, postal officials said.  While no new date for the full fumigation has yet been set, officials said they anticipate a delay of approximately one week.

“We are doing constant quality-control assurance testing and reviewing, and we are going to do this safe and right, not fast,” Krathwohl said (Manny Fernandez, Washington Post, Nov. 13).

For further information, see:

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

Journal of the American Medical Association Background on Anthrax

CDC Frequently Asked Questions About Anthrax

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Smallpox:  United States Needs More Vaccine Antidote

U.S. officials are contracting with two companies for thousands of doses of vaccinia immune globulin, the only clinically tested antidote for many reactions to the smallpox vaccine, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Nov. 7).

If U.S. officials were forced to begin mass inoculations against smallpox today, they would not have enough of the globulin, known as VIG, according to the Times.  Regardless of which smallpox immunization plan U.S. President George W. Bush chooses, the United States will need substantial quantities of VIG, which is produced from plasma extracted from the blood of people who have been recently immunized against smallpox (see GSN, Oct. 17).

Health officials have told the Defense Department’s VIG producer to expect one case of severe adverse effects from the vaccine for every 8,000 immunizations (see GSN, Nov. 8).

“Given the uncertainties here, that may not be a bad estimate,” said Raymond Strikas, an epidemiologist at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

In October, the United States had less than 700 doses of VIG, but U.S. health officials hope to have 5,000 doses by the end of the year, enough to treat the complications of 40 million immunized people.  It might take as long as two years to produce enough VIG to protect the entire country safely.  Officials are unsure exactly how much they need because conditions that cause adverse reactions — including suppressed immune systems and a variety of skin rashes — have increased substantially since the last study on side effects in the 1960s (see GSN, Oct. 18).

VIG Production Underway

The United States has ordered VIG from DynPort Vaccine Company in Maryland and Cangene Corporation of Winnipeg, Canada.  Using stored plasma from immunized soldiers, DynPort has produced VIG to treat 660 reactions, according to David Smith, the company’s chief scientist.  DynPort has tested the antidote on volunteers, and no adverse side effects have arisen, even with dramatically increased dosages, Smith said.

The U.S. government has tasked Cangene with producing as many as 100,000 doses over the next five years, the Times reported.  The company plans to immunize 10,000 volunteers — who must be previously immunized and are medically screened — and use their plasma to produce the VIG.  The company has found 1,300 donors to date and has not experienced any adverse reaction to the immunization (McNeil/Altman, New York Times, Nov. 12).

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BWC I:  Review Conference Reconvenes; Toth Introduces Proposal

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

GENEVA — Lacking consensus for negotiating an enforcement protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, a proposal was introduced today for holding annual meetings of experts and diplomats until next treaty review conference in 2006 (see GSN, Nov. 7).

Tibor Toth, president of the treaty’s fifth review conference that reconvened here at the United Nations today, described his proposal as a “rescue operation” for the conference.  The review conference was suspended in December (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001), and now faces the prospect of concluding without an enforcement protocol or final declaration.

Toth has shown “patient and constructive diplomacy” in producing a document “that represents a modest achievement for the review conference,” said U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala, speaking with Toth at a press briefing.

Toth’s proposal is designed in part to appeal to the United States, which scuttled last year’s review conference with its opposition to establishing a new treaty monitoring and verification protocol, the product of seven years of negotiations. 

The core of the proposal — annual meetings to discuss five particular issues — he said, is based on a proposal by the U.S. delegation last year as an alternative to a protocol.

“My feeling is it would be extremely difficult for the United States not to agree to these proposals, Toth said.

Concerned about a re-emergence of protocol discussions, however, U.S. officials told other states in September they would oppose any further meetings of states parties until the 2006 conference (see GSN, Sept. 6). 

Toth said he has not yet heard from the U.S. delegation regarding the proposal. He said he has asked party members to consider the proposal and reconvene tomorrow afternoon to consider whether to vote on it. 

The five items Toth proposes discussing annually include adopting national measures to implement the treaty, including the enactment of penal legislation; creating national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of possible biological weapons attacks or suspicious disease outbreaks; strengthening and broadening national and international efforts for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants; and adopting a code of conduct for scientists.

The proposed annual discussions are intended to promote “understanding and effective action,” according to the draft document Toth circulated to treaty parties.

His proposal does not recommend any discussion of a mechanism for ensuring treaty compliance.  The Bush administration has said it is opposed to any such mechanism, citing commercial and national security concerns.

“Compliance measures are totally missing from this package,” Toth said.

Some developing countries have reportedly criticized the absence of such measures and nonaligned nations are meeting today to discuss Toth’s proposal.

The proposal has received mixed reviews from nongovernmental arms control organizations.

“Compared with the protocol we could have had, the present proposal is obviously much more limited,” said Martin Dando, professor of international security at the University of Bradford.

“It’s better than nothing … we would still have a process going forward and multilateral negotiations to help strengthen the convention, so in that sense, thank goodness for that.”

“If only this decision is adopted, the member states of the BWC will have failed to take the long-sought, stronger actions that are needed to guard against biological weapons proliferation and to ensure compliance with the global ban on biological weapons,” said Oliver Meier, an analyst with the Arms Control Association, in a statement.

Toth said member states indicated last year they were opposed to pursuing a protocol without U.S. support and continued conversations with members indicates that view has not changed.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

BWC State Parties (U.S. State Department)

U.N. Background on BWC

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Anthrax:  Experts Praise New FBI Investigative Tactic

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The FBI’s attempts to recreate the spores used in last year’s anthrax attacks could provide valuable clues and help the bureau focus its investigation, experts told Global Security Newswire last week (see GSN, Nov. 4).

The bureau has been working for months to reconstruct the spores, FBI Director Robert Mueller said Nov. 1, according to the Washington Post.  “We’re replicating the way or ways it might be manufactured, but it is not an easy task,” the Post quoted Mueller as saying.  “We are going into new territory in some areas,” he added.

Several experts agreed that this new tactic in the FBI’s “Amerithrax” investigation could provide information needed to better determine who might be a possible suspect.  By knowing how the spores were produced, the FBI might be able to determine how many people were needed and whether sophisticated materials and equipment were acquired and used, said Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a biologist at State University of New York who has often publicized her views on the anthrax investigation.

With the information learned through the experiments, the FBI will also be able to better educate its field agents, improving their abilities to investigate sites and conduct interviews, said Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax researcher at Louisiana State University.  It is “a very sensible decision,” Hugh-Jones said in a written response to questions from GSN.

Charles Pena, a senior defense policy analyst at the CATO Institute in Washington, agreed that the experiments should enable FBI investigators to learn what kind of technical expertise was needed to produce the spores.

The FBI should be able to determine whether the spores were made by “an individual in their basement” or if the spores were more sophisticated — something “you need more than high school chemistry, high school biology” to produce, Pena said.

The bureau might also be able to learn whether specialized equipment was needed — and what kind — which could then be used to determine where such equipment could be obtained and by whom, Pena said.  “This isn’t the kind of stuff you can go down to K-Mart and get,” he added.

No Solid Leads

The FBI’s decision to attempt to recreate the spores might also be a sign that investigators lack other concrete evidence, Pena said.  The bureau’s decision reflects the fact that it does not have any solid leads in the case, and instead is choosing to go back to fundamentals, he said, suggesting that this is a tactic the FBI should have considered earlier.

Pena also criticized the FBI’s apparent decision to base its investigation on a profile that a lone U.S. scientist is responsible for the attacks (see GSN, Oct. 28).  In a large-scale investigation, officials tend to follow their initial assumptions, Pena said, adding that it is often difficult to shift an investigation away from those initial assumptions.

The FBI might now be asking, “If we start from zero, where would we go?” Pena said.

Research into how the anthrax spores were produced might help dissuade the bureau away from the lone U.S. scientist profile, said Richard Spertzel, chief biological inspector for the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1994 to 1998.

“If it gets them [the FBI] off the kick that it can be easily and cheaply made, it will be helpful,” Spertzel said in a written response to GSN.

The FBI’s acknowledged months of research into recreating the spores should be an indication that they were probably difficult to produce, Spertzel said.  He added that this high level of difficulty should also convince the bureau to shift the focus of its investigation away from Steven Hatfill, the former U.S. Army biologist who has been the public focus of the FBI investigation (see GSN, Oct. 23).

If the FBI were to determine through its research that the spores were coated with a silica compound and created with the use of a spray dryer — expensive and specialized equipment — it might narrow the field of suspects toward a state-run program such as Iraq, Spertzel said.

BWC

While the FBI has not publicly provided technical details of its anthrax-manufacturing research, such as whether it is using or producing live anthrax, experts agreed that the work probably does not violate the Biological Weapons Convention.  The convention prohibits signatories from producing biological weapons agents except in small quantities for defensive purposes.

Attempt to reverse-engineer the spores would not violate the BWC as long as the quantities of anthrax used are small, Spertzel said.

“Such ‘small quantities’ are acceptable for defensive purposes and investigating a crime would certainly fall into that category,” he said in a written response to questions from GSN.

The FBI might not even need to use actual anthrax in its research, Rosenberg said, noting that simulants would probably be as effective.  If the FBI is using live anthrax, however, it should explain the necessity for doing so, she said.

“I don’t see any point in secrecy on this,” Rosenberg said in a written response to GSN.  “It just adds to doubts about [the FBI’s] competence in pursuing this case,” she added.

For further information, see:

FBI Amerithrax Investigation

GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

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BWC II:  Nongovernmental Groups Launch Alternative Treaty Compliance Network

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

GENEVA — Facing no prospect that Biological Weapons Convention states will approve an inspections mechanism for verifying compliance any time soon, a group of organizations here today announced the launch of a nongovernmental network for gathering information and reporting on biotechnological activities worldwide.

The organization was conceived as a way for civil organizations to “step into the breach” created when BWC parties failed to create a treaty enforcement mechanism last year, Chandre Gould, a researcher with the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, told a press conference here.

The press conference coincided with resumption of the treaty’s fifth review conference today (see related GSN story, today).

The Geneva-based Bioweapons Prevention Project is composed of eight prominent arms control groups from Europe, the United States and South Africa. One of its two principal goals is to produce an annual report called the Bioweapons Monitor, describing global offensive biological weapons activities and developments in the biotechnology field that could be used in violation of the treaty.

To help accomplish this, the organization hopes, like the Nobel Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, to build a vast network of groups to gather and report information from countries around the world.

Information will be collected from publicly available documents, such as annual reports BWC members are required to produce detailing compliance with the treaty and other open-source materials.  

Some participating organizations have begun looking for support from the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, according to Malcolm Dando, of the University of Bradford’s Peace Studies Department.

Participating organizations may also use government contacts worldwide to elicit information on programs that may not already be available.

Participants also hope that vast network will help build momentum for global treaty compliance.

The organizations will both “feed into the process of information gathering and analysis and on the other hand strengthen civil society’s understanding about the nature of biological weapons,” said Gould.

It will help “strengthen the norm against using disease as a weapon,” she said.

The project this afternoon received support from U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala.

“This is a very timely and significant initiative,” he said. 

While member states missed an opportunity last year in failing to negotiate a protocol, Dhanapala said, “civil society and nongovernmental organizations are not going to accept any more missed opportunities.”

The founding project members include the British American Security Information Council, the Center for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, the University of Bradford’s Peace Studies Department, the Federation of American Scientists, the Program for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Switzerland, the Sussex Program at the University of Sussex, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility in Germany and the Verification Research, Training and Information Center in the United Kingdom.

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United States:  U.S. Technology Exported to Suspected Bioweapons States

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Commerce Department in recent years licensed biotechnology exports to six countries that are not members of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and six suspected of having offensive biological weapons programs, according to a General Accounting Office report last month (see GSN, Oct. 2).

U.S. officials defended the approvals, saying they were made only after a thorough interagency review to ensure that the recipient governments would not divert the technology for illicit purposes, and that exports of controlled pathogens were in minute quantities intended for public health uses.

Between October 1999 and December 2001, Commerce licensed exports of dual-use pathogens or technology to Egypt, Israel, Kazakhstan, Trinidad and Tobago, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates, “none of which have ratified the BWC,” according to the GAO report.

In addition, Commerce cleared China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Russia to receive exports even though they “are mentioned as possibly violating the BWC and carrying on offensive biological weapons research,” the report says.

U.S. officials have repeatedly criticized Cuba this year for exporting dual-use equipment to Iran and other so-called “rogue nations.”  Iran is a party to the convention but is suspected by the United States of producing biological weapons and supporting terrorism (see GSN, May 22).

“Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states,” Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said in a speech at the Heritage Foundation in May (see GSN, May 7).  “We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.”

Review Process Cited

A State Department official Thursday said the difference between the U.S. approvals and the Cuban exports is “very much apples and oranges.”

“The kinds of things we are going to be exporting are the kinds of things, even though they are classified as dual-use … that won’t contribute to a weapons program, that are going to contribute to legitimate purposes,” the official said.

Without speaking specifically to what was approved, the official said such things generally tend to include “gram quantities of a controlled pathogen” or “regular laboratory equipment.”

“I think the concern about people selling things to Iran is when they’re selling production technology or equipment to manufacture CW or BW.  They are the real significant things, they are not the gram quantities of a controlled substance or material,” the official said.

“So on the face of it, it might seem a little hypocritical, but it’s really not,” the official said.

The report, Arms Control:  Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, was sent in late September to U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), who chairs the National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee, and released to the public late last month.

Reviewing the report before publication, Commerce expressed concern the report suggested it had acted “negligently.”

“The Department of Commerce is concerned that … the report could give the incorrect impression that the United States is negligently authorizing the export of pathogens that could be diverted to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or other illicit uses,” wrote Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Borman.

He wrote it was “important to note” that such licenses to non-Biological Weapons Convention countries and certain countries of concern were authorized after “careful scrutiny” by Commerce, the State Department and the Pentagon, with intelligence community involvement.

The review, Borman wrote, was intended “to ensure the proposed end users are not involved in WMD programs and that the exports are not otherwise likely to be diverted.”

The items approved to nonsignatories were for human health purposes only, he wrote, such as “minute” quantities of aflatoxin for use to establish quality control standards to test food items for contamination.

The State Department official said if the department had a problem with any of the approvals they could have opposed them, bumping the decision up the chain to the president if need be.

“I don’t know of any case that have been escalated that high,” the official said.

“I imagine that a lot of these licenses have to do with gram quantities of a controlled pathogen or something that might be used in test kits, testing food, or water, or that kind of things,” the official said.  “So it’s very legitimate, benign uses, we see a lot of that kind of stuff, and then, regular laboratory equipment as well.”

The GAO report, however, contended that it is difficult to verify compliance with the treaty, because pathogens, knowledge and technology can have both commercial and military applications.

“Many pathogens that can be used to produce biological weapons also have commercial applications in the health and biotechnology spheres,” it says.

Difficult to Prove

The main focus of the report was to analyze various efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.  The report says the absence of a strong verification mechanism is a factor making it difficult to prove suspicions of illicit programs.

The report says it is difficult to find proof by monitoring a country’s imports, because biological items that can be used for commercial research and production purposes also can be used for military purposes.

“The difference between developing a vaccine for humans and developing a biological weapon may be very small.  When developing a vaccine, a large volume of pathogen is created.  The development of the vaccine would require killing the pathogen.  But if the pathogen were to be used as a biological weapon, one would keep it alive,” it said.

The report says the BWC is weak because it lacks a strong verification mechanism.  The Bush administration last year rejected a draft protocol intended to create such a mechanism, saying it would be ineffective and could harm U.S. security interests and commercial interests. 

The GAO report says, though, “With no verification procedures, it is difficult to prove or disprove these allegations within the auspices of the BWC.”

U.S. officials have maintained that strengthening the BWC is not the solution for dealing with biological weapons proliferation and have proposed a list of other measures for international action.  They include criminalizing violations by individuals of prohibited activity and enhancing infectious disease surveillance and response.

U.S. officials are pushing for a quick resolution, without a protocol to the treaty, of the fifth annual BWC review conference scheduled to begin Monday in Geneva (see GSN, Nov. 7).

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

BWC States Parties (U.S. State Department)

U.N. Background on BWC

Fifth Review Conference of BWC

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Smallpox:  Rumsfeld Recommends Smallpox Vaccine Plan For Military

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday recommended a military smallpox immunization plan to President George W. Bush, but many of the president’s concerns were left unanswered, according to a White House official (see GSN, Oct. 15).

The plan would vaccinate up to 500,000 troops, beginning with emergency and medical personnel and moving on to U.S. forces in the Middle East that might see combat soon, the Washington Post reported.

“There’s a lot of issues on both sides,” the official said of Bush’s caution in making a decision on the vaccine.  “He’s concerned not just about whether to do it, but how you do it.  You don’t want to do it if you can’t do it right,” the official added (Allen/Graham, Washington Post, Nov. 8).

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