Iraq I:  IAEA Chief Will Look for “Pattern” of Obstruction by Iraq

Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The international official responsible for dismantling Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program said yesterday that he would look for a “pattern” of obstruction before reporting Baghdad’s noncompliance with the new inspections regime.

“If there is a pattern of lack of cooperation, then we have to report to the Security Council and the Security Council will decide if that is a material breach,” Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  If, however, “there is minor omission and this is clearly not intentional, we are not running to the Security Council to say that it’s a material breach.”

His comments — just four days before he is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in advance of the inspection teams along with Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. team responsible for locating and destroying chemical and biological weapons — mark the first clear indication of what will be considered a breach of Iraq’s pledge to cooperate fully.

ElBaradei’s views appear, however, to be at odds with the Bush administration.  The White House has said that any indication of Iraqi intransigence will be considered a breach of its obligations.

U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that a policy of “zero tolerance” would be followed regarding Iraqi noncompliance.  “We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period,” Bush said before meeting with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Washington.

Bush has pledged to lead a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein, in the event that Baghdad does not comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council last week, warning of “serious consequences” if the regime once again fails to live up to its international agreements and does not provide irrefutable evidence that it is free of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 8).

ElBaradei, meanwhile, outlined five “interrelated prerequisites” that he believes are necessary for the new round of inspections to work.  They include:

*         immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority provided for in the U.N. resolution;

*         ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information from U.N. members;

*         unified and unequivocal support from the U.N. Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in the case of noncompliance;

*         active cooperation from Iraq, including demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and allow inspectors to fulfill their mission without conditions; and

*         the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspections teams, free from outside influence.

In an apparent caution to the Bush administration, ElBaradei said, “Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone credibility.”

The IAEA head also ruled out making any requested adjustments to the makeup of the agency’s inspection team.  The Arab League has proposed that Arab countries be better represented.  “Diversity is necessary,” ElBaradei said, but “the key is competence and impartiality.”

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Threat Assessment: U.S., Europe Hold Divergent Views of WMD Threat

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States and its European allies have different perceptions of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, but have begun to bridge a conceptual divide that has hampered trans-Atlantic cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, a panel of European experts said yesterday.

The United States, particularly in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter spree, tends to exaggerate the threat from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, they said.  Meanwhile, European governments — which disagree even among themselves about the extent of the threat — tend to underestimate the potential that terrorists or rogue states will acquire and use these weapons against Western targets, according to the experts. 

Still, they agreed Europe has been slow to come to terms with the full extent of proliferation dangers and if European nations compile a collective assessment, they would likely find themselves more in line with the U.S. view that the threat is substantial, growing and requires immediate and cooperative threat reduction measures.

The government and private experts presented their analysis in opening a two-day conference on nonproliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

They cited a variety of reasons why European governments have not reflected the same level of urgency as the United States in addressing the proliferation threat, including the fact that continental Europe has not suffered a major terrorist attack; the anachronistic view in some European capitals that the key to security remains having good neighbors; a less globally focused foreign policy than Washington; a more multilateral approach and greater faith in international consensus; and perhaps even a “fatigue” with security issues given Europe’s history of a war.

Yet they also cited recent examples they believe demonstrate that European views, however divided they may be, are maturing and that the differences in perception with the United States are narrowing.

The European Versus American Perspective

“There is a gap” between the United States and Europe on the assessment of the WMD threat, said Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. 

He noted that the divergent views are not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to the end of the Cold War a decade ago, when the United States began addressing the proliferation threat posed by former Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems — a decade in which Europe took relatively little action on the proliferation front.

Last year’s terrorist attacks in the United States make it appear that the trans-Atlantic differences are more pronounced, several experts said.  In other words, the killing of 3,000 people on U.S. soil led directly to U.S. urgency about the WMD threat, while no comparable event has taken place in Europe.

Until recent terror alerts in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy about the potential for an impending attack by al-Qaeda operatives or associates, European countries have not been as vigilant as the United States, which has lived with terrorist alerts on a regular basis since the events of Sept.11, and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks.

“We have not been receiving high threats,” said Therese Delpech of the French Atomic Energy Commission.  The lack of a Sept. 11-type attack in Europe, added Tomas Ries of the Finnish National Defense College, “makes all the difference.”

He said Europe remains largely in a “state of delusion” when it comes to the threat of catastrophic terrorism.  While numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years, the European public still lacks the attentiveness to large-scale terrorist threats that the United States has exhibited since Sept. 11, he said.

At the same time, European governments are sometimes accused of adhering to an outdated definition of national security, according to Delpech.  Europeans “still don’t understand that … borders are irrelevant,” she said. European countries, perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom, also have a historically “provincial view of security,” focused primarily on the immediate geographic area.

“The United States has a global security view,” said Dieter Dettke of Germany’s Freidrich Ebert Foundation. 

He also believes that a major difference between the U.S. and European approaches lies in divergent views of when a coalition is required to address collective threats.  Washington ascribes to the tenet that the mission should determine the coalition — and has been criticized at times for being unilateralist — while “for Europe it’s the other way around.”

Europeans are also more concerned than the United States with matching military and other security efforts to thwart terrorist attacks with “soft” approaches that include reliance on humanitarian aid, political reform, nation-building and other activities likely to have a longer-term effect on reducing the ranks of militant terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the experts said.

The international effort to disarm Iraq illustrates the trans-Atlantic foreign policy divide, Dettke added.  Germany believes Iraq can be contained and that continuing the current approach is “less risky” than forcing it to dismantle its weapons programs, which could interfere with the overall war on terrorism and even if successful, breed future terrorists.

Where U.S. and European views on the WMD threat intersect most is in London, officials said.  The United Kingdom, the most vocal supporter of U.S. security policies, recently outlined weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat it faces.

WMD “is not under terrorism, it is on top of it” as perceived threats, said Simon Fraser of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 

He said, however, that a common European assessment of the threat, what he called a “shared perception,” is sorely required.  “European thinking is … behind the United States.”  Such an assessment is “desperately needed,” Ries added, blaming its absence on the lack of a recognizable European leader to lead the way.

“The Americans may hype the threat, but the truth is the Europeans overlook it,” Delpech said.

A Meeting of the Minds

While WMD threat assessments in Washington and European capitals tend to differ, the experts underlined several reasons to believe that the two sides are coming closer together.

For one, “our strategic vacation is over,” said Delpech.  She cited the terrorist alerts spreading across Europe, while others highlighted recent attacks — in Indonesia, Tunisia, against a French oil tanker — to demonstrate a heightened awareness about the potential for mass casualty attacks in the future.

Meanwhile, European governments and their publics have begun in recent years to extend their security view outward, Dettke said.  Germany now has more than 10,000 troops stationed overseas — in Afghanistan, patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa for terrorist fugitives and elsewhere — a dramatic change from its largely passive military history of the past half a century.

According to Delpech, another sign of this is the European Union’s commitment to set up a rapid reaction force by next year to respond quickly to crises, including outside of Europe.

A major test of European seriousness in addressing the WMD threat, however, will be whether European countries live up to their pledge earlier this year to help the Group of Eight economic powers contribute $20 billion during the next decade to secure former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and radiological materials, numerous conference participants said.

Delpech expressed confidence that France, set to become the rotating head of the G-8 next year, will get countries to provide precise figures for their contributions to the global partnership.

“Closer cooperation over the Atlantic is an absolute necessity,” she said.  Europe must “put parochial differences aside.”

But even if there is a meeting of U.S. and European minds about the seriousness of the proliferation threats, Fraser warned that the next hurdle is for both sides to agree on what to do about each of them.

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Chinese Response:  Beijing Committed to Nonproliferation, Official Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — China’s top arms control official yesterday reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, and outlined a number of domestic and international steps China has taken to reduce proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 4).

“China has been firm, consistent and clear-cut in its policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” Liu Jieyi, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Arms Control and Disarmament Department, said in a speech before a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “We have all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... We have steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating, encouraging or assisting any other country in developing weapons of mass destruction,” Liu added.

China has worked internally, through the promulgation of export control regulations, and internationally, by signing a number of multilateral agreements, to combat WMD proliferation, Liu said.  China has also attempted to improve cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation issues, he said.

Domestic Measures

To stem WMD proliferation on a national level, China has created export control regulations and control lists to cover sensitive nuclear, biological, chemical and missile technology exports, Liu said (see GSN, Oct. 21).  China’s export control systems are similar to those of other countries, including an end-use and end-user guarantee system, an export licensing system and “catch-all” principles — which prohibit the export of sensitive items that could be used for weapons purposes even if they are not included on an export control list, he said.

China’s export control lists are virtually identical to those enshrined in other multilateral international export control regimes, such as the Zaanger Committee and Australia Group, Liu said.  China’s missile control list, the promulgation of which has been praised by experts, is “by and large identical” with the annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime in regard to scope and parameters, he said (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“In a nutshell, China’s export controls ... are basically the same as those of the United States, EU and other countries in both scope and enforcement,” Liu said.

International Measures  

China believes that its long-term development goals will become more and more dependant on a peaceful world, Liu said.  For that reason, and to improve global security as a whole, China is committed to improving international nonproliferation efforts, he said.

“In the final analysis, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is conducive to regional and global peace and development and serves the common interest of all countries, certainly China’s fundamental interest,” Liu said.

China has joined almost every international WMD nonproliferation agreement, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Liu said.  China has also placed its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and is the first of the declared nuclear states to sign the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, he said (see GSN, May 10).

While Beijing supports the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it has been stalled in the Chinese People’s Assembly, Liu said.  The issue is not linked to other international Chinese concerns and Beijing supports the treaty’s early entry into force, he said.

China has also apparently rejected an international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 14).  While China agrees with the code’s nonproliferation and cooperation elements, Beijing opposes the code’s transparency and confidence-building measures, Liu said, Beijing believed that the measures should have been made voluntary, he added.

United States

The reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations is important for progress in international nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  He noted that the declared weapons states have a “special and unshirkable responsibility in this respect” (see GSN, Nov. 14).

In his comments, Liu made a veiled attack on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  “It does not make sense, morally or legally,” to maintain large nuclear weapons arsenals, to develop new weapons, to assert the right to conduct nuclear tests and to target other countries with nuclear weapons when “global efforts for nonproliferation are advocated,” Liu said.  

There is room, however, for the United States and China to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  One step that has already been taken is the establishment of a U.S.-Chinese joint consultative group on strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation issues, he said.

“It is true that differences do exist.  The key is how to address them, “ Liu said.  “China believes that differences should and can be settled in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual trust. ... I am convinced that through joint efforts, nonproliferation will be a positive factor in the healthy development of the Sino-U.S. relations,” he added.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

CWC Text

CTBT Text

NPT Text

Australia Group Web Site

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

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U.S. Response:  Abraham Outlines 10 Principles for Nuclear, Radiological Security

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday recommitted the Bush administration to plans by the Group of Eight economic powers to allocate at least $20 billion to cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union during the next decade and outlined “10 principles” to enhance the protection of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide (see GSN, Oct. 11).

“The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it,” Abraham said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

“Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all civilized nations of the world, and certainly [U.S.] President [George] Bush’s leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us,” he said.  “It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy,” Abraham said.

His remarks came as nonproliferation experts in attendance and others raise questions about the seriousness of the pledge and contend that progress has been minimal.  While the United States has said it will provide $10 billion and the United Kingdom and Germany have also promised resources, the ultimate commitment of the G-8 countries remains uncertain nearly six months after the original proposal. The other participants, France, Russia, Japan and Canada, have not announced any formal financial commitments.

Bush administration officials expressed hope last month that G-8 projects could get underway by the early next year, but so far little groundwork has been laid and experts predict little progress is likely before the next G-8 summit scheduled for June.

Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the conference in a later speech that “by then, we should expect to see them turn principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation.”

Even in Washington, the largest donor, G-8 related efforts have been slow moving. For example, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently told Global Security Newswire that his agency — which is responsible for overseeing much of the U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union and is expected to help other donor nations navigate through the Russian bureaucracy — has yet to be asked to play a role in coordinating the G-8 effort.

“The policy community hasn’t figured that out yet,” Younger said Oct. 31.

Abraham assured the audience, however, that “the United States is already working with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the global partnership has established.”

“But it should concern us that this announcement [back in June] received almost no attention, Nunn added.  “We must hold them to their words and their declaration … We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction … It’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed.  We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.”

10 Principles

Meanwhile, Abraham outlined “10 Principles” he says must underpin U.S. and international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon materials and technology as well as radiological sources that could be used to build a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb. 

“Addressing the nonproliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as energy secretary,” Abraham said.  “In nearly two years in office, I’ve organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security.”  They include:

*         The threat continues to evolve.  During the past decade the proliferation threat has focused primarily on rogue states, while the international community must now address the threats posed by terrorists “with the unblinking commitment” to cause mass casualties.

*         The margin of error is small. “Even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact,” Abraham said.  “Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends.  Based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device.  And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, the amount can be even less, depending on the material used.”

*         The problem demands a broad array of responses.  Given that securing nuclear and radiological materials is a multifaceted problem, nonproliferation mechanisms need to run the gamut, including improving physical security, consolidating material into fewer storage locations, down-blending HEU or burning plutonium, and halting the production of excess nuclear material. 

*         There are good reasons to focus on Russia.  U.S. nonproliferation efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, and rightly so, according to Abraham.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union left 40,000 nuclear weapons and over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear materials.  “We’ve paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is,” he said.

*         This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions.  “The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary,” according to Abraham (see GSN, Aug. 23).  He said that there are 17 other facilities like Vinca that need to be addressed.  Other examples of international cooperation include recent efforts to remove radiological material from the Republic of Georgia and security improvements made at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in Ukraine (see GSN, Oct. 23).

*         The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. “This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such,” he said.  Abraham and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced plans Wednesday, along with Russia, to sponsor an international conference in March in Vienna to specifically address radiological threats (see GSN, Nov. 14).

*         The IAEA’s contribution is invaluable.  “But the IAEA needs resources to do its job,” Abraham stressed.  “The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise.  I urge all others to do the same” (see GSN, Sept. 25).

*         Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility.  While international cooperation is critical, Abraham said that nations with nuclear or radiological materials on their territory must take a leading role in securing them.  “One point that I cannot stress too much is that responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community.”

*         This is a long-term effort.  The effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers does not lend itself to any quick fixes.  In fact, solutions must “stand the test of time” for “however long it takes to achieve success,” Abraham said.

*         Success is possible.  “Working together we can make the world safer,” he said.  “We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less.”  He concluded, “I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner.  But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable.”

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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U.S.-Russia:  Nunn Calls for Naming Threat Reduction Czars

By Bryan Bender                                                                       
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The presidents of Russia and the United States should each appoint a single person to oversee efforts to secure nuclear, chemical and biological materials to raise the profile of the “the greatest danger in the world today,” according to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative.

“The first step is to put our own houses in order — identifying, accounting for, and securing the weapons and materials in Russia and the United States,” Nunn said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “Each president should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the president, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone.”

He added, “Both presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise.”

Nunn, an original co-sponsor of the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the decade-old U.S. effort to secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials, said that despite dramatic progress in recent years, “I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat.”

“The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorists’ hands,” he said.

In addition to naming a senior official in the U.S., Russian and other governments to coordinate cooperative threat reduction efforts, Nunn recommended that Moscow and Washington:

*         immediately begin outlining adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons — a perfect terrorism weapon that is  not covered by any arms control treaties;

*         devise operational changes in the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation, while expanding the decision time for each president to decide whether to retaliate to a perceived nuclear attack;

*         combine their collective biological defense knowledge, beginning with a joint fight against infectious diseases in Russia; and

*         launch a global partnership against catastrophic terrorism, based on the premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats to all nations and must be solved by all nations.

Moreover, there is no doubt that securing WMD materials at their source will be the most effective way to stave off the terrorist WMD threat, he added.

“Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop.  By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop.  Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they’ve completed the most difficult step — and our nightmare begins.”

Quoting statistics provided by Wall Street investor Warren Buffet, who recently pledged $2.5 million to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn said even a small improvement in security can make a big difference over time.

If the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10 percent, the chance of getting through a 50-year period without a disaster is only .51 percent, Nunn said.  If the chance can be reduced to 1 percent each year, there is a 60.5 percent chance of making it through 50 years safely, according to Nunn.

“We can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next 50 years.  As Warren Buffet would say, that’s real leverage,” Nunn said.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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International Response:  Lawless Regions Pose Proliferation Risks

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Terrorists and international criminal organizations are becoming increasingly able to obtain contraband materials, including weapons of mass destruction, in international “gray zones” — regions with weak governmental control and rule of law, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia Program at the Moscow-based PIR Center, said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 8).

Three of the most critical gray zones are Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union — primarily Central Asia — and the Transnistria region of Moldova, Orlov said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  In Southeast Asia, a lack of government control has led to an increase in terrorist and organized crime activities in Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the “Golden Triangle” — consisting of sections of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, he said.

Continuing instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnya, the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Russian Ingushetiya region, also pose illegal trafficking concerns, Orlov said (see GSN, Oct. 23).    In the Transnistria region of Moldova, there have been reported contacts between Russian and other international nonstate groups, he said.  Representatives from al-Qaeda, Hamas, Iran and Chechnya are also believed to have traveled to the region.

States of concern might also take advantage of the lack of governmental oversight and control in the international gray zones to expand their contacts with terrorist and organized criminal groups, Orlov said.  For example, there have been reports of meetings between Libyan representatives and terrorists in unstable regions of Colombia, he said.  In the mid-1990s, North Korean agents are believed to have attempted to obtain chemical weapons from Russian organized crime groups, Orlov said.

Orlov said he was skeptical of the effectiveness of encouraging the authorities in the so-called gray zones to take a greater role in cracking down on illegal trafficking and possible WMD proliferation.  Instead, an international response should begin to be considered, which could include exchanges of information and threat assessments, he said.

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Indian Response:  India Faces New Export Control Challenges, Expert Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While India has had an export control system in place since the late 1940s, a gradual process of economic liberalization has raised new concerns over its continued effectiveness, Seema Gahlaut, director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

India, which seriously began developing nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, has historically chosen to restrain its nuclear exports, Gahlaut said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  India’s export control system has also been overseen by a conservative bureaucracy, inclined to restrict such exports heavily, she added.  The economic liberalization program, however, has both expanded the scope of India’s economy and reduced the public sector’s role in its oversight, Gahlaut said, noting, for example that dual-use exports are likely to increase (see GSN, Sept. 27).

In response, India has begun to adapt its export control policies to the changing national economic situation, according to Gahlaut.  For example, India has begun to harmonize its dual-use classification standards with those of the European Union.  New Delhi has also worked to devise a more detailed control list and to develop end-use certification measures, Gahlaut said.  She added that India has enacted prelicensing site-visit requirements for chemical exporters. 

The main remaining weaknesses in India’s export control policy center on enforcement, she said, adding that information on export control violations and imposed penalties is not widely available.

While India has made some progress in addressing the new export control concerns caused by its expanding economy, there are still issues of concern, according to Gahlaut.  India still needs to develop “catch-all” provisions, which prohibit the export of sensitive technologies even if they are not included on a control list, and controls on intangible technology transfers, she said.  India also needs to focus on transit and re-export issues and work to harmonize its export control systems with multilateral regimes.

International Efforts

Some of India’s export control concerns might be resolved through increased dialogue with the United States, Gahlaut said.  India has expressed interest in obtaining on-line software designed to streamline export licensing procedures, increased customs training and information on improving public-private sector export control cooperation from the United States, she said.

The international community as a whole also has a role to play in aiding India’s efforts, according to Gahlaut.  India’s policy of export restraint should continue to be encouraged and the export of sensitive technologies to India should be monitored, instead of outright denied, she said (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2001). 

India and Pakistan also need to be seen as two distinct entities, Gahlaut said, calling for a  “nonhyphenated” paradigm for South Asia.  While the two countries do share some concerns, there are also several important differences between them, she said.  For example, India’s nuclear program is under civilian control and has large civilian uses.  Pakistan’s nuclear program, however, is almost entirely intended for the military and is run by the military, Gahlaut said.

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Iraq II:  U.N. Resolution Might Restrict Access to Scientists

A provision in the new U.N. resolution on Iraq that authorizes inspectors to remove Iraqi scientists from the country to interview them could have the unintended consequence of reducing access, a senior U.N. official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

The provision was meant to improve interviews with Iraqi scientists because they are expected to be more forthcoming once they are away from Iraqi oversight, according to the New York Times.  The flaw in the provision, however, is that Iraq might now be more concerned about possible defections and less forthcoming on the identities of its scientists who are involved in weapons programs, the official said.

It is important for inspectors to learn the identities of Iraqi scientists who joined weapons programs since inspections ended in 1998, the U.N. official said.  Such scientists are now mainly unknown, and it will take an unusual level of Iraqi cooperation for inspectors to learn more about them, the official said.

The identification of new Iraqi WMD scientists for interview purposes is likely to become one of the hardest aspects of the U.N. inspectors’ work, the official said.  “The authority to take them out will make things more difficult,” the official added (William Broad, New York Times, Nov. 15).

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Iraq I:  Baghdad’s Acceptance Generally Welcomed, but Doubted by U.S.

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Security Council members welcomed yesterday’s letter from Iraq accepting Resolution 1441, saying it paves the way for the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.  The initial reaction from the United States was one of skepticism.

Before meeting with Annan yesterday, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “There’s no negotiations with Mr. Saddam Hussein.  Those days are long gone.  And so are the days of deceit and denial.  And now it’s up to him.  And I want to remind you all that inspectors are there to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein is willing to disarm.  It’s his choice to make.  And should he choose not to disarm, we will disarm him.”

After meeting with Bush, Annan said, “We all have to be a bit patient.  The inspectors will be there in a few days ... and we are going to test [Iraq’s commitment].”

Iraq delivered the letter yesterday to the United Nations saying, “We hereby inform you that we will deal with Resolution 1441, despite its iniquitous contents, even though it is to be implemented against the background of the intentions harbored by those of bad faith.”  The nine-page letter, signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, says, “We are ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq.”

The letter is filled with hostile language against the United States and United Kingdom, the two key sponsors of the resolution.  Sabri called the two governments “the gang of evil” spreading a “most wicked slander.”  He wrote, ”Send the inspectors to Iraq. … Everyone will be assured that Iraq has produced no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction, whatever the allegations to the contrary are made by the evil pretenders.  The fabrications of the liars and the deceit of the charlatans in the American and British administrations will be revealed before the world.”

Announcing the delivery of the letter yesterday, Iraqi Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri told reporters his government accepted the resolution “without conditions and without reservations.” That phrase does not appear in the letter, however.  Speaking outside the Security Council chambers after briefing the council on the government’s decision, al-Douri said, “We are always opting for the path of peace ... to protect our country, to protect the region against the threat of war, which is real.”  He added, “We do not have any mass destruction weapons so we are not worried about the inspectors when they come back. … Iraq is clean.”

In the letter, Sabri wrote to Annan, “We request you to inform the Security Council that we are ready to receive the inspectors in accordance with the established dates.”  He continued, “We are eager for them to accomplish their task in accordance with international law as soon as possible. If they do so in a professional and lawful manner, and without previously planned goals, the fabrications of the liars will be revealed to the public and the declared aim of the Security Council will be achieved.  At that point, the Security Council will become legally obligated to lift … the embargo and all the other unjust sanctions from Iraq.”

The initial English translation of the letter was provided by the Iraqi government.  But, as is policy, the United Nations did its own translation of the letter from the Arabic original before issuing it as an official document.  While some of the wording is different in the translations, the tone is the same.

As to the abrasive tone of the letter, Annan said in Washington, “I will wait to see whether it is an indication that they are going to play games, or is a message they are sending to their own people. I really don’t know.  What is important is that the resolution is mandatory.  The resolution went into force the moment it was adopted and the inspectors are going to go there and do their work and they have to comply and we will see what happens when they are on the ground.”

Arriving at U.N. headquarters last night after his trip to Washington, Annan said, “The essential thing is that they did say that the inspectors can come back. ... The rest in the scheme of things is not that important.”

Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, last week said he would have an advance team in Iraq to starting setting up communications, computers, and transportation by Monday, with the first inspectors arriving by Nov. 25.

Government Reactions

Security Council diplomats welcomed the letter.  Irish Ambassador Richard Ryan said this morning, “It’s great, the inspectors are going in.”  He said he was “not worried at all” about the tone of the letter. 

Mexican Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser said, “We are awaiting the return of the inspectors. … We continue to press for the return of inspectors and we expect that Saddam Hussein gives full unrestricted access to them for them to do their job.”  As to the tone of the letter, Zinser said, “It is to be expected, but what we need to see is a commitment expressed in that letter translated into action.”

Officials of the permanent members of the council responded to the letter with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  Britain Foreign Minister Jack Straw welcomed the letter but said, “We must remain vigilant.  Iraq’s intentions are notoriously changeable.”

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said his government “took note of Iraq’s acceptance.”  Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the letter “is opening the way for the situation in Iraq to be settled politically.”

Syrian Deputy Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad yesterday welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of the resolution.  ”We think that the main issue now is how soon the inspectors will be there,” he said. “It is the responsibility of the inspectors to make sure relevant issues of the Security Council are implemented in the correct way.”

Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Aboul Gheit also welcomed the letter.  Regarding Iraq’s claim that it is “clean” of weapons of mass destruction, he said, ”We have to accept it as long as there is no evidence that they harbor any or are hiding anything.”  While not a member of the council, Egypt is a key player in the Arab League.

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Iraq II:  U.N. Personnel to Arrive Next Week to Prepare for Inspections

Preparing for a new round of weapons inspections, 30 U.N. disarmament experts are scheduled to arrive in Iraq Monday to set up communications and inspect a remote system for monitoring dual-use equipment (see related GSN story, today).

After that, an advance team of 12 inspectors is scheduled to arrive Nov. 25 to begin spot inspections, the Washington Post reported today.  A full team of up to 100 U.N. inspectors is expected to begin work in Iraq by the end of December, according to the Post.

With the aid of U.S. and British intelligence and information provided by Iraqi defectors and former U.N. arms experts, inspectors have created a list of more than 1,000 sites suspected of being involved in Iraq’s WMD program.  Over the next two months, the inspectors plan to focus their efforts on 100 sites, including an improved missile launch facility located west of Baghdad at al-Rafah and a former nuclear power plant at al-Furat, south of the Iraqi capital.

U.N. inspectors also plan to travel to at least one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces, which had been previously off-limits, as a test of Iraqi compliance with the new U.N. resolution, officials said (see GSN, Oct. 7).

“We have a plan of action which we cannot obviously lay out in detail,” said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is heading the U.N. nuclear weapons inspection efforts.  “But we will have to go and visit some of the facilities which have been relevant in the past” and conduct “no notice inspections” at previously unknown sites, he said.

“We would not want to work in an expected fashion; we will have to do some surprise visits to facilities that we might not be expected to visit,” ElBaradei said.

Former Iraqi WMD sites are only one component of Iraq’s broader weapons program, ElBaradei added.  Inspectors also plan to install a soil, water and air monitoring system to detect chemical or radioactive traces, according to  ElBaradei and Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for inspecting Iraqi chemical, biological and missile programs.

U.N. inspectors plan to request information from U.N. members on Iraqi attempts to purchase weapon-related equipment, the Post reported.  They also plan to interview hundreds of Iraqi scientists believed to have been involved in Iraq’s former WMD efforts to determine whether they are still participating in prohibited programs, ElBaradei said (see GSN, Oct. 31).

The key to the inspectors’ success, however, is obtaining unimpeded access to any site within Iraq, ElBaradei and other senior U.N. officials said (see GSN, Sept. 25).

“If there is a piece of equipment, it will have to be installed; and if it has been installed and is being used, we will have a chance to bump into it,” said Jacques Baute, head of the IAEA’s Iraq action team (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Nov. 14).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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U.S. Response:  Congress Sends $393 Billion Authorization Bill to Bush

The U.S. Congress has approved the 2003 defense authorization bill to allow $393 billion in Defense Department spending.  The House of Representatives passed the bill Tuesday and the Senate voted for it on Wednesday, sending it to President George W. Bush for final approval (see GSN, June 28; Murray, Rogers, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14).

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Iraq I:  Baghdad Accepts Return of Inspectors “Without Conditions”

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — Iraq this morning accepted Security Council Resolution 1441 on the return of weapons inspectors “without conditions and without reservations.”  Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri said he had delivered the letter accepting the resolution to the office of Secretary General Kofi Annan this morning (see GSN, Nov. 8).

The nine-page letter, signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, says, “We are prepared to receive the inspectors, so that they can carry out their duties, and make sure that Iraq had not developed weapons of mass destruction.”  Calling the U.S. charges that Iraq has such weapons “baseless” and a “most wicked slander,” Sabri wrote, “There are no true, just, or fair reasons behind the adoption of this resolution.”

According to the resolution, the government of Saddam Hussein had until Friday to accept the conditions for a strengthened inspection regime.  Al-Douri said his government accepted the resolution “despite its bad contents.  We are prepared to receive the inspectors within the assigned timetable.  We are eager to see them perform their duties in accordance with international law as soon as possible.”

The Security Council unanimously on Friday adopted Resolution 1441, which grants weapons inspectors new powers and warns Iraq of “serious consequences” if it does not comply.  The resolution gives Iraq until Nov. 15 to accept the conditions and until Dec. 8 to provide a full accounting of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.

Speaking outside the Security Council chambers after briefing the council on the government’s decision, al-Douri said, “We are always opting for the path of peace ... to protect our country, to protect the region against the threat of war, which is real.”  He added, “We do not have any mass destruction weapons so we are not worried about the inspectors when they come back.” 

“Iraq is clean,” said al-Douri.

China’s Deputy Ambassador Zhang Yishan said the Security Council “welcomes this correct decision by the Iraqi government and would like to see 1441 implemented fully and effectively.” 

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U.S.-Russia:  Threat Reduction Lacks Political Will and Coordination, Report Says

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Poor political support, an uncoordinated strategy and inadequate funding are severely hampering U.S. and Russian efforts to secure and eliminate former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, a forthcoming report says.

The lapses threaten to leave vast WMD stockpiles at risk of theft, according to the report, Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction, which is to be released tomorrow by the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The report pulls together the findings of numerous U.S., Russian and European nonproliferation experts, both in and out of government, and identifies a series of common obstacles that they have said are impeding efforts to address perhaps the most serious security threat of the modern age.

“The inability or refusal of these countries to correct these problems threatens to leave vast stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and biological agents vulnerable to acquisition by terrorists, rogue states and black marketeers,” the report concludes.

Click here after Nov.13 to see the report.

Lack of Political Will

For starters, the report’s authors contend that the necessary political support to ensure successful threat reduction efforts is missing from the current global environment.  Sustained support by political leaders and the expenditure of political capital is critical.  “However, truly robust political support for threat reduction is very rarely demonstrated and is often more rhetorical than real,” the report says.

The lack of adequate political support has resulted in funding limitations and restrictions, bureaucratic battles and delayed implementation of particular programs.  The report urges Russia in particular to improve the overall environment for threat reduction by improving in several areas, including financial transparency, facility access and legal protections.

“The technical nature of much of the threat reduction work, the complexity of its implementation, the intangibility of some of its objectives, its cost and intrusiveness, bureaucratic inertia, the stigma that much of threat reduction is still foreign aid and the still unsettled nature of Western-Russian relations all cut into political support,” the report says.

Lack of a Coordinated Strategy

Further hampering U.S.-Russian cooperation on nonproliferation efforts is the need for a comprehensive strategy, according to the report.  As the threat reduction agenda has expanded over the past decade — to include scores of U.S. agencies, other governments and ministries and international and nongovernmental organizations — the growing number of programs have not been integrated in any cohesive strategy, the report says.

“There is a need to develop a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of these efforts and provides some overall direction and prioritization,” the report says.  Such a strategy would go a long way in improving the effectiveness of threat reduction programs and more quickly reduce proliferation risks.

Evidence of the lack of strategy includes the absence of a central coordinator inside the U.S. administration to oversee all threat reduction activities; the need for organized and streamlined congressional oversight over U.S. programs; and the little discussion to date about how these programs can be expanded outside the former Soviet Union to other countries considered proliferation risks.

More Money Needed

One key factor in improving U.S. and Russian nonproliferation efforts will always be money, according to the authors.

“Over $1 billion a year is being made available for international threat reduction programs,” the report says.  “Still, there are a number of efforts that could accelerate progress if additional funding were made available.”

These include redirecting weapon scientists, eliminating additional quantities of highly enriched uranium, implementing plutonium disposition programs, ending production of weapon-grade plutonium, converting research reactors that currently use highly enriched uranium and improving border, export and customs controls, according to the report.

“Additional funding could also allow for expanding the scope of threat reduction,” the report says.  “The paths forward for financing major activities are unclear and largely depend on a higher degree of political support than currently exists,” it says.

The recent pledge of $20 billion over the next decade by the Group of Eight economic powers is one possible solution, as is the proposal to exchange Russian debt to the West for nonproliferation efforts.

Remaining Threats

The report’s authors are quick to highlight the substantial progress that has been made over the past decade to reduce the threat of Russian weapons and technologies.  On the other hand, they also provide a stark reminder of the enormous effort that lies ahead for the world’s governments to fully reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Russia and elsewhere.

“Although significant progress has been made in key areas, more remains to be done in reducing the dangers posed in all of the [Russian] weapons complexes,” the report says.

For example, roughly half of the weapon-grade nuclear material in Russia remains inadequately secured, the painstaking destruction of tens of thousands of chemical weapons has just begun and much remains unknown about past biological weapons activities.

On the nuclear question, as many as 40,000 scientists are looking for work, while only 40 to 50 percent of the work to secure Russian nuclear material is completed, according to the report.

Meanwhile, up to 7,000 scientists in the Russian biological weapons complex are now seeking new employment, according to the report.  “There is a particular concern about the former Soviet biological weapons complex,” it says. “The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related experts, and the future disposition of the … biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat reduction agenda.”

“One significant political problem is that there is no baseline understanding of the old Soviet BW complex and its full range of activities,” the report adds.

Meanwhile, the thousands of chemical weapons in Russia provide their own proliferation challenge.  “The key proliferation dangers in the chemical weapons (CW) complex are the security of the existing weapons, brain drain, and the inability to destroy the existing stockpile,” the report says. 

In addition, the Russian missile complex is also a potential proliferation concern.  Some scientists reportedly have been assisting other countries considered proliferation risks and comparatively little has been done to transition these scientists to other employment, according to the report.

One proposal included in the report for strengthening threat reduction would be to more directly tie such efforts to arms control treaties.  “New agreements such as the Moscow Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty currently have no relation to threat reduction, but threat reduction could be instrumental in facilitating the implementation of these treaties in the future and these linkages should be explored.”

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International Response:  Annan Says Need Never Greater for United Nations

By Steve Hirsch
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan last night cited threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism as indications that the world has rarely needed the United Nations as much as it does now, and cautioned that the underlying causes behind those problems cannot be ignored.

Annan made the comments at a dinner at which he received the United Nations Association of the United States International Visionaries Award.

“The threats and challenges we face require as never before multilateral cooperation if they are to be dealt with successfully — cooperation in areas such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism; cooperation of the kind we have just witnessed in the negotiations leading to the resolution on Iraq adopted last Friday,” he said (see GSN, Nov. 8).

He called Friday a “very good day” for the United Nations, one that “showed what a central role the U.N. can — and must — play in the quest for a world free from weapons of mass destruction.”

“In short,” he said, “the U.N. played its proper role as the only universal instrument of global cooperation.”

He also cited the U.N. role in the broad fight against terrorism.  Annan called terrorism a “global threat with global effects,” and said the United Nations “has an indispensable role to play in providing the necessary legal and organizational framework within which the international campaign against terrorism can unfold.”

While terrorism “must never be excused,” he said, “so must genuine grievances never be ignored.”

“True, it detracts from the justice of a cause when a few wicked men commit murder in its name.  But it does not make it any less urgent that the cause is addressed, the grievance heard, the wrong put right,” he added.  “Otherwise,” he said, “we risk losing that most central of wars — the war for the hearts and minds of much of mankind.”

As the United Nations works against terrorism in coming months and years, he said, “we must act with equal determination to solve the political disputes and longstanding conflicts which generate an atmosphere conducive to support for terrorism.”

“To do so is not to reward terrorism or its perpetrators; it is to deny them the opportunity to find refuge or recruits, in any cause, any country.  Only then can we truly say that the war on terrorism has been won,” he said.

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Iraq II:  U.S. Officials Brief U.N. Inspectors

U.S. officials recently shared intelligence information on Iraq’s suspected WMD programs yesterday with the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in preparation for possible inspections, the Baltimore Sun reported today (see GSN, Nov. 8).  The U.N. Security Council and Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, have requested that countries share any information they have on Iraqi weapons programs (see GSN, Nov. 12).

U.S. officials said they believe they have identified a few sites that would test Iraq’s willingness to allow unfettered access to inspectors.  For example, Iraq’s Special Security Organization — an intelligence agency led by President Saddam Hussein’s son, Qusay Hussein — offers significant opportunities for inspectors, according to the Sun.

“It’s more a matter of a half-dozen [sites] where, if [UNMOVIC chief Hans] Blix is aggressive, he will bring it to a head quickly and expose Iraqi deception,” an official said (see GSN, Oct. 30; Matthews, Bowman, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 13).

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U.S. Response:  Collapse Illustrates Difficulties of WMD Protection

An incident during a Pentagon press briefing yesterday illustrated one of the major concerns in planning for war in Iraq — the effect of the desert heat on U.S. soldiers wearing chemical and biological protective suits (see GSN, July 18).

U.S. Army Sgt. Kerrethel Avery fainted under the heat of television lights while wearing a full protective suit for a media event, United Press International reported.  Moments before Avery fainted, another member of the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, which is trained to identify enemy chemical and biological agents, had explained to the assembled journalists that the unit’s members are accustomed to working in the suits, even under extreme conditions.

“I’ve never felt anything like that light before,” Avery said after the briefing.

After Avery was revived and escorted away from the briefing, officials told the other unit members, who also were perspiring, to unzip their suits and stand at ease, according to UPI.

Unit member Capt. Regan Edens said he had worn the suit in temperatures as hot as 137 degrees Fahrenheit.

“It’s tough but it’s nothing we can’t handle,” he said.

New Army protective suits for chemical and biological weapons are lighter and more durable than previous versions, but still they have some flaws, according to UPI.  For example, Newsday reported last week that the carbon lining in the suits could break down when exposed to sweat.  For that reason, the suits are expected to be replaced every 45 days, according to military officials.

Unit team leader Lt. Col. George Lecakes said, however, that he is confident that the suits provide good protection.

“I can tell you with 100 percent confidence they will protect my life,” he said.  “There’s no doubt whatsoever,” he added (Pamela Hess, United Press International, Nov. 12).

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Threat Assessment:  War Could Forge Iraqi Links With al-Qaeda

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime is not directly linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist network, but an assault to unseat Hussein could prompt secular Iraq to arm al-Qaeda or other Muslim fundamentalist organizations with weapons of mass destruction, two former senior counterterrorism officials said last week.

The experts — Daniel Benjamin, head of counterterrorism for the National Security Council in the Clinton administration, and Stan Bedlington, a senior analyst at the CIA’s Center for Counterterrorism until 1994 — disputed repeated claims by Bush administration officials who say that al-Qaeda is supported by Iraq.  Some of the allegations include reports that a senior Iraqi intelligence official met with a key al-Qaeda operative and that the some al-Qaeda members have found refuge in Iraq.

In a press briefing last week, Benjamin and Bedlington said that Hussein and Osama bin Laden, while sharing some of the same enemies, have little in common and even disdain each other’s approach — Hussein’s Baath political and anti-religious roots and bin Laden’s militant form of Islam.

Prior to or in the immediate aftermath of a military assault, however, the risk would be high that stocks of Iraqi chemical or biological agents now stored in unknown locations would disappear, smuggled out of the country and into the hands of terrorists, the experts said.

Weak Links

To build support for deposing Hussein, the Bush administration has argued that Iraq, with its historic sponsorship of anti-Israeli terrorist groups, will provide al-Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction, Benjamin and Bedlington said.  Experts generally believe, however, that there is still little proof.

“There has been, to my mind, no persuasive evidence that these two entities, Saddam’s Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda, have a record, a substantive record of cooperation or any long term, noteworthy relationship,” said Benjamin, who completed a study on possible links between al-Qaeda, Iraq and Iran for the White House in 1998.

According to Bedlington, U.S. allegations about the linkages between Iraq and al-Qaeda may be an attempt to build political support for a war with Iraq, but rely on a selective use of intelligence information.  Earlier this month, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said,  “In terms of support for terrorism, we have established that Iraq has permitted al-Qaeda to operate within its territory.”

Bolton, however, “didn’t provide any details,” Bedlington said.  “This is where I think the administration’s case falls down.  The best evidence that there is some contact between al-Qaeda and Iraq,” he added, “comes from one or two detainees at Guantanamo Bay [in Cuba], and to the extent that they say that some al-Qaeda members, including those who were of Iraqi descent, fled Afghanistan to Iraq to escape U.S. pressure.”

Repeated statements that a senior al-Qaeda leader has been living in Baghdad, Benjamin said, may be referring to an al-Qaeda member seeking medical care without the Iraqi regime’s knowledge.  That individual “has since been forced from the country,” he added.

Perhaps the biggest allegation of ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda has been disputed reports that Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in the summer of 2001 in Prague (see GSN, Aug. 2).  The Czech president recently reconfirmed the meeting, but even if it did occur, a single meeting does necessarily reflect state sponsorship, the experts said.

“Historically, we’ve never seen any major channeling of funds, material, or men,” Benjamin said.  “Saddam Hussein would give weapons to al-Qaeda, as he knows it, at his own great peril, because it would make them quite happy if he were removed from the scene, because they view him as one of the sort of pharaonic rulers who have brought Islam into a historic catastrophe,” he said.

War Could Force Cooperation

If push comes to shove, however, and the U.S. military is poised to topple Hussein, the Iraqi regime might indeed lock arms with al-Qaeda or other terrorists groups and provide them with weapons of mass destruction to unleash against the United States and its allies, the experts warned.

“What I’m much more worried about is that … faced with an existential threat that he would indeed transfer weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda, which does have an international presence and might be able to use them,” Benjamin said.

In a recent analysis leaked to the media, the CIA outlined that possibility.  The intelligence agency concluded that Hussein, under the status quo, would be unlikely to provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups for fear of the potential consequences.  If the regime were faced with extinction, however, it would have few reasons to hold back (see GSN, Oct. 9).

“Under those circumstances, as I believe the CIA has also said, the possibility that he would hand over powerful weapons, including weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons, to a transnational group such as al-Qaeda, grows considerably,” Benjamin said.

Uncontrolled Weapons

Another growing worry is that even if Saddam did not provide al-Qaeda with the weapons directly, the ensuing chaos in the country after a U.S.-led invasion could allow hidden WMD stocks to be smuggled out and sold on the black market.

“There are mobile BW labs traversing Iraq,” said Benjamin.  “I’ve taken to thinking of these as the Winnebagos of death.  And there’s absolutely nothing to prevent any one of them from pulling off by the side of the road and having the most lethal pathogens loaded into, you know, a cooler, a rucksack, or something like that, and disappearing,” he said.

The challenge facing U.S. and allied military forces in securing the weapons is enormous, according to other experts.

“I think that would have to be one of the issues you would be trying to address in the weeks after the dust settled,” said John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org.  “It’s sort of a junior version of the post-Soviet loose nukes concern.  There is no reason to assume Saddam’s entire residual chemical and biological inventory will immediately head for the border, but reassuring yourself that everything is accounted for may take some time,” Pike said.

Added Benjamin, “The U.S. military has never faced a task such as this, where it would have to literally take control of hundreds of different sites all over a country the size of California.”

Some Iraqi forces remaining after an invasion “would have a big incentive to sell these weapons and the technology, and perhaps their own know-how, to people who they know would value it and would pay well for it.  And that would be, at the top of the list, al-Qaeda,” Benjamin said.

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Iraq:  Parliament Urges Hussein to Reject U.N. Resolution

The Iraqi Parliament unanimously encouraged President Saddam Hussein to reject the new U.N. resolution that demands Iraq’s disarmament, Parliamentary speaker Saadoun Hammadi said today (see GSN, Nov. 11).

After criticizing the resolution in two days of debate, members of parliament approved a motion that urges Hussein to keep inspectors out.

“Parliament recommendations are to reject the U.N. resolution in accordance with the opinion of our people, who put their confidence in us, and authorize the political leadership to take the appropriate decision to defend Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and dignity,” the resolution says.

Hussein must make a decision by Friday or face “serious consequences,” according to the U.N. Security Council (see GSN, Nov. 8).  If he accepts the resolution, inspectors hope to be in Baghdad by Nov. 18, armed with a list of 100 sites that are the most likely to hold illicit weapons, Reuters reported (see GSN, Oct. 23).

“Parliament authorizes President Saddam Hussein to take the appropriate decision and will stand by our leadership in any decision it takes,” the resolution says.  Hussein heads the Revolutionary Command Council, which holds final authority (Hassan Hafidh, Reuters, Nov. 12).

Hussein rarely ignores the recommendations of his parliament, the Washington Post reported today.  Members are all supporters of Hussein’s regime and parliamentary decisions are usually rubber stamps, primarily used to demonstrate that the Iraqi leader is acting in accordance with the will of the people, according to the Post.

The tone of the parliamentary debate, however, surprised many observers in the Arab world.

“We were expecting some criticism, but nothing like this,” an Arab diplomat said.  “It’s difficult to say what Saddam’s strategy is,” the diplomat added.

“You never know what he’s going to do until the very last minute, when he actually makes the decision,” another Arab official said of Hussein (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Nov. 12).

The vote was all the more confusing because Hussein’s son Uday — a member of parliament — urged his colleagues to accept the U.N. resolution.

“What is required from us as a national assembly is to take clear decisions.  We should, as a national assembly, accept the U.N. resolution,” the younger Hussein said in a paper submitted to parliament.

The members were not swayed, however.

“This U.N. resolution looks for a pretext [for war] and not for a comprehensive solution.  It seeks to create crises rather than cooperation and paves the way for aggression rather than peace,” Hammadi said during Monday’s debate (Hafidh, Reuters).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)

U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”)

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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Iraq:  Baghdad Debates U.N. Resolution

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has convened an emergency parliamentary session to consider the recently approved resolution in the United Nations to inspect Iraqi sites with suspected weapons of mass destruction, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Nov. 8).

“The National Assembly is expected to express support for Iraq’s leadership and mandate it to take the decision it deems to be in the interest of the Iraqi people,” a source close to the Iraqi Parliament said.

The Parliament is expected to criticize the new U.N. resolution, echoing official comments that it is “bad and unfair,” as a source said to the official Iraqi News Agency Saturday.  The source also said that Baghdad is “quietly studying” the resolution, indicating that Hussein might agree to it by the Nov. 15 deadline (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Nov. 11).

Arab League Urges Iraqi Support

Arab League foreign ministers meeting in Cairo yesterday said that Iraq would probably comply with the new U.N. resolution.  After a day-long meeting, Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri said “no decision has been taken” on Iraq’s acceptance of the new resolution.  Arab League sources, however, said Sabri had told them that Iraq would probably comply.

In a statement, the participants of yesterday’s meeting urged Hussein to accept the new resolution as part of an effort “to solve all standing issues peacefully in preparation for the lifting of sanctions and the end of the (U.N.) embargo as well as the suffering of the Iraqi people.”

Also in the statement, the Arab League foreign ministers asserted their “absolute rejection” of military action against Iraq.  Several Arab states see the U.N. resolution as a means of avoiding war in the region, according to the Los Angeles Times.

“The U.N. resolution provides the opportunity for a peaceful settlement,” Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said.  “The resolution has pushed the phantom of war into the distance for several weeks or several months.  Our goal is to spare Iraq and the region from a military strike,” he said.

At yesterday’s meeting, Arab leaders indicated to Sabri that they would not support Iraq if it were ignore the resolution, the Times reported.

“We’re telling Iraq the Americans are really serious and this time we’re not with you,” said a senior adviser to one Arab delegation.  “If you reject the resolution, you’re on your own.  You’ve got no choice,” the source said (David Lamb, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11).

Syria Votes Yes

Meanwhile, Syria voted to support the new U.N. resolution on Iraq because of assurances from permanent Security Council members that it would not be used as a pretext for military action, Syrian Deputy U.N. Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad has said.  The resolution also reaffirmed the council’s primary role in dealing with Iraq and preserved Iraq’s sovereignty, he said.

Some experts said that Syria gave its support to the resolution because it feared being on the losing side of the vote.  Syria voted yes because once France, Russia and China — which had each opposed the U.S. draft — gave their support, Syria did not want to be seen as “the odd one out,” said Walid Kazziha, a professor of politics at the American University in Cairo.

“For Syria, the priority is the Israeli-Palestinian issue,” Kazziha said.  “Syria does not want to be in the U.S.’s bad books on this point” (Edith Lederer Associated Press/Jordan Times, Nov. 10).

U.S. View

U.S. officials have begun to urge Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolution, raising the threat of military action if he does not, according to the Los Angeles Times.

“If (Hussein) doesn’t comply this time, we are going to ask the U.N. to give authorization for all necessary means,” U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said on CNN’s Late Edition.  “If the U.N. isn’t willing to do that, the United States, with like-minded nations, will go and disarm him forcefully.”

Under the new resolution, Hussein has until Dec. 8 to declare or surrender all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs and U.N. inspectors have a Feb. 21 deadline to report to the Security Council.  Powell indicated, however, that the United States might not wait until the February report to determine whether Iraq is complying.

“We’re not going to wait until February to see if Iraq is cooperating or not,” Powell said.  U.S. and U.N. officials “will be able to make a judgment as to cooperation very quickly, not sometime in February,” he added.

Hussein “knows if he violates this resolution, military force is coming in to take him and his regime out,” Powell said (Lamb, Los Angeles Times).

U.S. War Plans

Senior U.S. military officials have said that the Bush administration has decided on an invasion plan for Iraq based on capturing most of the country quickly and isolating Baghdad, but the administration is also envisioning that Hussein will be overthrown before U.S. troops attack the city, according to the Washington Post (see GSN, Oct. 29).

The Defense Department is preparing for possible protracted urban combat in and around Baghdad, according to the Post.  White House military planners believe there could be bloody skirmishes in Baghdad and in Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit even if he is overthrown, the senior military officials said.

The U.S. war plan, which is still in development, tries to consider regional sensitivities by seeking to inflict the minimum amount of damage needed to achieve U.S. goals, the Post reported.  To do so, the plan involves a relatively small U.S. force quickly launching focused attacks.  Taking into account the possibility that Iraqi resistance will be higher than expected, however, it includes deployment of enough troops — 150,000 U.S. and allied soldiers — to combat the Iraqi Republican Guard.

“The point is that if things don’t go as we hope, there will be enough forces on hand to deal with it,” said a Pentagon official who was briefed on the plan late last month.

The U.S. plan is also designed to cause Iraqis to revolt against Hussein, according to the Post.  The plans seeks to “create the conditions” needed for the Iraqis to do so, a White House official said.

“I think ultimately this is more of a revolution that’s going to happen, rather than something brought about by U.S. military power,” the official said.

To ferment a revolt, a U.S. attack on Iraq would begin with a campaign of simultaneous air strikes, ground attacks and psychological operations meant to destroy the Iraqi security police and other pro-Hussein institutions, the Post reported.

“You have to shake the regime to its core,” one defense expert said.  “You’ve got to pursue the pillars of the regime across the board,” the expert added.

If Hussein were quickly overthrown, then U.S. troops would not have to assault Baghdad, according to military planners.  “The feeling is, they’ll be successful in the first phase, and then the next phase won’t be necessary, because the regime will fall and a new regime will take over,” one planner said.

The current U.S. plan for an attack on Iraq better resembles planning for the 1989 invasion of Panama than the 1991 Gulf War, some experts have said.