Iraq I:  Advance U.N. Inspectors Arrive

The first U.N. weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq today to begin preparations for a new round of weapons inspections as mandated under a new U.N. resolution (see GSN, Nov. 15).

“A new chapter of inspection” has begun, Ewen Buchanan, chief spokesman for the inspection team, said before the team left Cyprus for Iraq.

The team is prepared to meet the challenge of making sure Iraq complies with the new resolution, said Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).  He added that he hoped Iraq would not try to hide anything.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said yesterday that there was agreement on the need for “intrusive verifications — that means we would go everywhere, we will use every means at our disposal to make sure that Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction.”

Inspectors plan to interview certain Iraqis in locations out of the country for their own safety if they might know vital information on WMD programs, ElBaradei said (see GSN, Nov. 15).  He added, however, “if people do not want to talk, we obviously will not be able to force them to talk” (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Nov. 18).

Schedule

The next step in the inspections process is scheduled for Nov. 20, when IAEA technicians are to travel to Baghdad to being preparing for nuclear inspections (see GSN, Nov. 14).  IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors are set to arrive in Baghdad Nov. 25, with limited inspections to begin shortly thereafter.  Iraq has until Dec. 8 to submit a declaration of its WMD programs to the IAEA, UNMOVIC and the U.N. Security Council (IAEA release, Nov. 15).

UNMOVIC and the IAEA must begin operations within Iraq by Dec. 23, which both agencies are expected to meet easily, according to Agence France-Presse.  The two agencies are supposed to update the Security Council on the progress of the inspections by Feb. 21, AFP reported.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA have within 60 days of beginning operations to outline “the key disarmament tasks” that Iraq must undertake.  Such a program would require Security Council approval.  Once inspections are underway and the remote monitoring system is in operation, Blix and ElBaradei are to report to the Security Council every 120 days (Agence France-Presse, Nov. 18).

Effective Inspections

In his last news conference before leaving for Iraq, Blix said Friday that the first inspectors should begin their work on Nov. 27, less than two weeks before Iraq is required to report to the Security Council on its weapons programs.  The 60-day countdown for the inspectors to report to the council will then begin, he said.  If Iraqi officials fail to fully reveal weapons programs by Dec. 8, the council might find Iraq in material breach of Resolution 1441, according to the text of the ruling.

“This is one of the most important moments we foresee,” Blix said.  “We have a great many questions,” Blix said.

Under repeated questioning, Blix refused to give any specifics as to what would constitute a “material breach,” according to the resolution, that could trigger military action against Iraq.

“We do not judge whether something constitutes a material breach,” he said.  “We will report factually on what has happened, and then it is for the Security Council to assess whether it constitutes a material breach … and it is for the council to decide what they will do about it.  One should not run to the conclusion that now there will be armed action,” he added.

“You need to nuance it,” Blix said, illustrating with an example using flat tires.  One flat tire on an Iraqi vehicle accompanying inspectors may mean nothing, but “four flat tires on the way out, delaying us much more, then it may be a different thing,” he said.  “What this points to is that you may have to take into account whether you can read an intention into something,” he added.

In response to Arab League and Iraqi demands that Arabs be included on the inspection teams, Blix said only that Jordanians have applied for posts.

“We have not had nominations,” he said.  UNMOVIC’s roster consists mostly of people from the United States, followed by France and Russia, he said, adding that he expects more Arab applications for the next training course in January (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Nov. 18).

United States vs. United Nations

The United States and the United Nations disagree over how aggressively inspectors should conduct their operations within Iraq, U.N and U.S. officials said.  The Bush administration has called for the strictest possible inspections, while Blix has called for a more measured approach, according to the Washington Post.

U.S. President George W. Bush has said that a “zero-tolerance” approach should be taken in regard to Iraq, meaning that even minor infractions of the new U.N. resolution could lead to potential military action.  Blix, along with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and some Security Council members, have said Iraq will only be held accountable for serious violations of the resolution.

“The U.S. does seem ... to have a lower threshold than others may have” to justify military action, Annan said last week before meeting with Bush.  “I think the discussion in the council made it clear we should be looking for something serious and meaningful, and not for excuses to do something,” he added (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Nov. 17).

U.S. War Plans

The United States is prepared to wait for Iraq’s response to U.N. inspections before going to the Security Council for a debate on possible military action, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 11).

“It seems to me that what will happen is a pattern of behavior will evolve and then people will make judgments with respect to it,” he said (Mroue, Associated Press).

The White House, however, has begun taking several diplomatic and military steps to prepare for an attack on Iraq, U.S. and allied officials said.  Such steps, which could take up to months to complete, include formalizing the roles of U.S. allies in an attack, discouraging Iraq’s neighbors from conducting their own actions and deciding whether to obtain Security Council approval for a strike, according to the New York Times.

The United States is seeking to accomplish two goals by beginning preparations for an attack, the Times reported.  One is to present a credible threat of force to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, which could cause him to comply with the resolution.  The second is to be ready for military action before the summer heat begins next year.

Some progress has already been made, U.S. officials said.  Several Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including Kuwait and Qatar, have given informal assurances of basing and overflight rights, according to the Times.  Those assurances, however, still need to be formalized.  Rumsfeld is expected to meet with U.S. allies this week during the NATO summit in Prague to discuss how allied troops could be replace U.S. forces stationed in Europe and the United States that would be moved to the Middle East.

The United States has also begun amassing tanks and heavy equipment for more than 30,000 soldiers stationed in several Middle Eastern countries and on nearby ships, the Times reported.  Additional heavy equipment for Army and Marine divisions will probably arrive in the region in three to four weeks.

A portion of a total U.S. force of about 250,000 troops needed to begin an attack on Iraq could be in position within 30 days of a presidential order to do so, senior U.S. military officials said.

“We’re making preparations every day,” U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Friday.  “I don’t want to start saying exactly when we’re at peak readiness, but it would be a terrible mistake for anyone to underestimate our ability to act if needed.”

The United States has also begun convincing key Iraqi neighbors such as Turkey and Iran, of the need for restraint, according to the Times.  In exchange, Turkey has called on the United States to provide assurance that Iraq’s Kurdish population, located predominately in the northern part of the country, will not try to form its own state.  In order to help reduce Turkish concerns, the Pentagon is planning to send U.S. troops to protect oil fields around the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, the Times reported.

Washington has also begun attempting to convince Iran to stay out of any conflict with Iraq because of concerns that Tehran could attempt to incite Iraq’s Shiite majority, which belongs to the same branch of Islam as most Iranians, to capture Baghdad or to form its own country (see GSN, Aug. 9).  In exchange for its cooperation, however, Iran wants the United States to release billions of dollars of assets frozen after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, according to the Times.  Iran also wants assurances of U.S. assistance for Iraqi refugees who might enter Iran in the event of war.

Iran’s attempts to negotiate with the Untied States were evident when Javad Zarif, Iran’s U.N. ambassador, tried to gain permission to meet with members of the U.S. Congress, the Times reported.  The U.S. State Department, which must approve Zarif’s travels beyond New York, refused to grant him permission to stay overnight, and he canceled the trip.

“I think sooner or later we will have better relations with Iran,” U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Friday.  “We stay in touch with people who might be on the same side of this as us, but I don’t want to give the impression there is a great rapprochement about to take place with respect to Iran” (Dao/Schmitt, New York Times, Nov. 18).

Iraqi Mobile Biological Laboratories

In Iraq, U.S. officials are concerned about finding and destroying mobile biological weapons laboratories, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 14).

U.S. officials have said they are unsure how many such laboratories exist or what they look like, although they have pictures of what appear to be laboratories housed in 18-wheel tractor-trailers, according to the Times.  Iraq might use several different types of vehicles to confuse pursuers, experts said.

“We know they’re there,” a senior U.S. intelligence official said.  “We don’t know 100 percent what’s in them,” the official added (see GSN, Nov. 12).

The official compared the task of searching for the mobile biological weapons laboratories with the search last month for a white truck believed to be used by a sniper in the Washington area.

“Look how many white vans were stopped here in D.C. looking for a sniper,” the official said.  “There are a lot of trucks (in Iraq), a lot of trailers ... I think it’s going to be real hard to find them,” the official added.

If the confusion resulting from a U.S. attack were to enable a group such as al-Qaeda to obtain biological agents, the situation could become “the greatest proliferation disaster in history,” said Daniel Benjamin, a former National Security Council official.

Even if all of the mobile biological facilities are discovered, there is debate about the best way to handle them, according to the Times.  While the laboratories could be destroyed, such a course of action could also result in the dispersal of any freeze-dried biological agents inside, an official said.

“Without knowing what’s in it, you’d be ill-advised to just bomb it,” the official said.  “If you drop a 500-pound bomb on a truck, even if it’s a ‘smart’ bomb, you may be releasing some real bad stuff on a community,” the official added (Richter/Miller, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17).

Improved Detection Equipment

U.N. inspectors now have at their disposal a wide range of WMD detection equipment — ranging from more portable sample-collection devices to ground-penetrating radar systems that can detect electrical equipment up to 100 feet below the ground — that will make them better equipped than they were in 1998, developers said.

Combined with an improved remote monitoring system, the new detection equipment has enabled U.N. inspectors to better detect illicit WMD materials, even if a site has been thoroughly cleaned before they arrive, the London Guardian reported.

“It’s a matter of time and of retaining custody of the sample,” said John Carrico of Smiths Detection.  “These technologies have been improved to get down to very trace levels,” he said.

Inspectors have said, however, that improved detection equipment cannot substitute for “human factors,” such as intelligence and training.

“You guys are putting way too much emphasis on the technology,” said Mark Gwozdecky, IAEA senior spokesman.  “The most important aspect that the inspector has is his human intelligence, and the sixth sense that comes after you’ve developed some experience and judgment” (Oliver Burkeman, London Guardian, Nov. 18).

Iraq Increases Nuclear Efforts

Meanwhile, Iraq has increased its efforts over the last few months to illegally purchase weapon-grade uranium, according to David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq.

“They’ve been on a much more active campaign to buy enough material to build at least one or two bombs,” Kay said.

There have been reports of Iraqi agents traveling to former Soviet states such as Ukraine as well as to other Middle Eastern countries, China and South Africa to attempt to purchase nuclear materials, Kay said.  “They were traveling with bags of money,” he said of the Iraqi agents (Hamilton/Lathem, New York Post, Nov. 18).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

Back to top

International Response:  Nonproliferation Regimes Lack Bite, Officials Say

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Although weapons control regimes are central to nonproliferation goals, they must be strengthened to remain significant, a senior U.N. official and a senior U.S. diplomat agreed Friday.

Countries must increase enforcement and funding to keep such regimes healthy, according to the officials, U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf, who spoke at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

It is striking that the messages from the United States and the United Nations overlap extensively, according to Institute for Defense Analyses researcher and George Washington University professor Brad Roberts, who sat on a conference panel with Wolf and Dhanapala.  Most observers expected the officials’ speeches to be sharply at odds on regime issues, Roberts said.

Enforcement

Poor local enforcement plagues international weapons agreements, Dhanapala said.

“All regimes are weak in the area of enforcement,” he said.  There is a “lack of congruency between treaty obligations and domestic laws and policies.”  He described the problem as one ”that is especially apparent with respect to export controls and nuclear weapons governance,” he added.

The United States supports some nonproliferation efforts, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, but the world often fails to react when countries violate international agreements and nonproliferation controls, Wolf said.

“We see them [regimes] as one, but not the only tool,” he said.  “While strong regimes are necessary, they are hardly sufficient.  Rigorous enforcement is absolutely necessary,” he added.

Regimes will not work if member countries do not respond strongly to violations, according to Wolf.

“What’s missing in today’s international debates is some sense of outrage,” Wolf said.  Instead, nonproliferation dialogue focuses on fine points of the language and structure of agreements, he added.

Funding

A shortage of funding also handicaps nonproliferation regimes, Dhanapala said.

There is a “lack of investment in research and development to support disarmament goals in contrast to the ample funds available for maintaining nuclear stockpiles and undertaking research on new weapons,” he said.

The United States increased its International Atomic Energy Agency funding by $14 million from 1997 to 2002 and the international community must also financially support nonproliferation goals, Wolf said.

“Will countries just pay lip service to IAEA’s mounting responsibilities or will they provide it with muscle to get the job done?” he asked.  “We’ve started a major initiative … starting with a real increase in IAEA’s regular budget for safeguards,” he added.

Nonproliferation regimes will not succeed if they are not supported by a broad spectrum of countries, according to Dhanapala.

“If the treaty-based regimes are to achieve their full potential, they will require stronger support from all nations, from the most powerful — who have the financial [and] political … means — to the smallest,” he said.

Back to top

Al-Qaeda:  Terrorists Made Chemical, Biological Agents, U.S. Says

U.S. intelligence officials are “100 percent certain” that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network developed chemical and biological agents and conducted experiments with them prior to U.S. military action in Afghanistan last year, Newsweek magazine reported this week (see GSN, Oct. 22).

Al-Qaeda operatives also acquired a small amount of radiological material that could be intended for use in a “dirty bomb.”  It is not clear, however, whether the terrorist organization had built such a device, according to Newsweek.

Abu Zubaydah, an al-Qaeda leader held by the United States, told intelligence officials that U.S. newspapers provide the group with ideas for terrorist attacks, according to a classified U.S. intelligence report.  A newspaper report provided the inspiration for attempts to build a dirty bomb, he said (Newsweek, Nov. 25).

Meanwhile, an imprisoned Tunisian man told a Belgian radio journalist that he had planned to attack a U.S. Air Force base in eastern Belgium that reportedly stores nuclear warheads.

The interview with Nizar Trabelsi marks the first report of a specific plot to attack a nuclear installation in Europe.  Belgian and NATO officials have not said whether the base holds nuclear weapons, an accusation made by experts and nuclear activists.

Trabelsi said he had intended to drive explosives into a bunker that holds nuclear weapons (Straits Times, Nov. 17).

Back to top

Iraq II:  “Dusty” Weapons Powder Proliferates Across Border

Iraq last month imported as much as 25 metric tons of colloidal silicon dioxide, a powder that, according to U.S. intelligence documents, might be used to make “dusty” chemical weapons that can penetrate protective military clothing (see GSN, Nov. 6).

U.N. officials approved the powder — sold under the brand name Aerosil by German chemical company Degussa AG — because it has legitimate commercial uses, the Associated Press reported.  Nevertheless, its grains are small enough — 12 nanometers wide — to fit in microscopic openings in protective suits.

Analysts and experts are concerned by the developments, AP reported.

Iraq produced dusty weapons in the 1980s that could penetrate protective suits, according to a declassified report from the Defense Intelligence Agency, which recommended covering suits with rain ponchos to reduce exposure.  In 1989 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein directed Samarra Drugs Industry — the importer of the Aerosil — to produce chemical and biological weapons, according to Richard Spertzel, a former head U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq.

“Do you know how much (dusty agent) a kilogram of that stuff makes?  A couple cubic feet,” Spertzel said.  “This gives me another thing to worry about,” he added (Associated Press/Boston Globe, Matt Kelly, Nov. 18).

Back to top

Iraq I:  IAEA Chief Will Look for “Pattern” of Obstruction by Iraq

Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The international official responsible for dismantling Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program said yesterday that he would look for a “pattern” of obstruction before reporting Baghdad’s noncompliance with the new inspections regime.

“If there is a pattern of lack of cooperation, then we have to report to the Security Council and the Security Council will decide if that is a material breach,” Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  If, however, “there is minor omission and this is clearly not intentional, we are not running to the Security Council to say that it’s a material breach.”

His comments — just four days before he is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in advance of the inspection teams along with Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. team responsible for locating and destroying chemical and biological weapons — mark the first clear indication of what will be considered a breach of Iraq’s pledge to cooperate fully.

ElBaradei’s views appear, however, to be at odds with the Bush administration.  The White House has said that any indication of Iraqi intransigence will be considered a breach of its obligations.

U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that a policy of “zero tolerance” would be followed regarding Iraqi noncompliance.  “We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period,” Bush said before meeting with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Washington.

Bush has pledged to lead a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein, in the event that Baghdad does not comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council last week, warning of “serious consequences” if the regime once again fails to live up to its international agreements and does not provide irrefutable evidence that it is free of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 8).

ElBaradei, meanwhile, outlined five “interrelated prerequisites” that he believes are necessary for the new round of inspections to work.  They include:

*         immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority provided for in the U.N. resolution;

*         ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information from U.N. members;

*         unified and unequivocal support from the U.N. Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in the case of noncompliance;

*         active cooperation from Iraq, including demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and allow inspectors to fulfill their mission without conditions; and

*         the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspections teams, free from outside influence.

In an apparent caution to the Bush administration, ElBaradei said, “Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone credibility.”

The IAEA head also ruled out making any requested adjustments to the makeup of the agency’s inspection team.  The Arab League has proposed that Arab countries be better represented.  “Diversity is necessary,” ElBaradei said, but “the key is competence and impartiality.”

Back to top

Threat Assessment: U.S., Europe Hold Divergent Views of WMD Threat

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States and its European allies have different perceptions of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, but have begun to bridge a conceptual divide that has hampered trans-Atlantic cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, a panel of European experts said yesterday.

The United States, particularly in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter spree, tends to exaggerate the threat from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, they said.  Meanwhile, European governments — which disagree even among themselves about the extent of the threat — tend to underestimate the potential that terrorists or rogue states will acquire and use these weapons against Western targets, according to the experts. 

Still, they agreed Europe has been slow to come to terms with the full extent of proliferation dangers and if European nations compile a collective assessment, they would likely find themselves more in line with the U.S. view that the threat is substantial, growing and requires immediate and cooperative threat reduction measures.

The government and private experts presented their analysis in opening a two-day conference on nonproliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

They cited a variety of reasons why European governments have not reflected the same level of urgency as the United States in addressing the proliferation threat, including the fact that continental Europe has not suffered a major terrorist attack; the anachronistic view in some European capitals that the key to security remains having good neighbors; a less globally focused foreign policy than Washington; a more multilateral approach and greater faith in international consensus; and perhaps even a “fatigue” with security issues given Europe’s history of a war.

Yet they also cited recent examples they believe demonstrate that European views, however divided they may be, are maturing and that the differences in perception with the United States are narrowing.

The European Versus American Perspective

“There is a gap” between the United States and Europe on the assessment of the WMD threat, said Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. 

He noted that the divergent views are not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to the end of the Cold War a decade ago, when the United States began addressing the proliferation threat posed by former Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems — a decade in which Europe took relatively little action on the proliferation front.

Last year’s terrorist attacks in the United States make it appear that the trans-Atlantic differences are more pronounced, several experts said.  In other words, the killing of 3,000 people on U.S. soil led directly to U.S. urgency about the WMD threat, while no comparable event has taken place in Europe.

Until recent terror alerts in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy about the potential for an impending attack by al-Qaeda operatives or associates, European countries have not been as vigilant as the United States, which has lived with terrorist alerts on a regular basis since the events of Sept.11, and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks.

“We have not been receiving high threats,” said Therese Delpech of the French Atomic Energy Commission.  The lack of a Sept. 11-type attack in Europe, added Tomas Ries of the Finnish National Defense College, “makes all the difference.”

He said Europe remains largely in a “state of delusion” when it comes to the threat of catastrophic terrorism.  While numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years, the European public still lacks the attentiveness to large-scale terrorist threats that the United States has exhibited since Sept. 11, he said.

At the same time, European governments are sometimes accused of adhering to an outdated definition of national security, according to Delpech.  Europeans “still don’t understand that … borders are irrelevant,” she said. European countries, perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom, also have a historically “provincial view of security,” focused primarily on the immediate geographic area.

“The United States has a global security view,” said Dieter Dettke of Germany’s Freidrich Ebert Foundation. 

He also believes that a major difference between the U.S. and European approaches lies in divergent views of when a coalition is required to address collective threats.  Washington ascribes to the tenet that the mission should determine the coalition — and has been criticized at times for being unilateralist — while “for Europe it’s the other way around.”

Europeans are also more concerned than the United States with matching military and other security efforts to thwart terrorist attacks with “soft” approaches that include reliance on humanitarian aid, political reform, nation-building and other activities likely to have a longer-term effect on reducing the ranks of militant terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the experts said.

The international effort to disarm Iraq illustrates the trans-Atlantic foreign policy divide, Dettke added.  Germany believes Iraq can be contained and that continuing the current approach is “less risky” than forcing it to dismantle its weapons programs, which could interfere with the overall war on terrorism and even if successful, breed future terrorists.

Where U.S. and European views on the WMD threat intersect most is in London, officials said.  The United Kingdom, the most vocal supporter of U.S. security policies, recently outlined weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat it faces.

WMD “is not under terrorism, it is on top of it” as perceived threats, said Simon Fraser of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 

He said, however, that a common European assessment of the threat, what he called a “shared perception,” is sorely required.  “European thinking is … behind the United States.”  Such an assessment is “desperately needed,” Ries added, blaming its absence on the lack of a recognizable European leader to lead the way.

“The Americans may hype the threat, but the truth is the Europeans overlook it,” Delpech said.

A Meeting of the Minds

While WMD threat assessments in Washington and European capitals tend to differ, the experts underlined several reasons to believe that the two sides are coming closer together.

For one, “our strategic vacation is over,” said Delpech.  She cited the terrorist alerts spreading across Europe, while others highlighted recent attacks — in Indonesia, Tunisia, against a French oil tanker — to demonstrate a heightened awareness about the potential for mass casualty attacks in the future.

Meanwhile, European governments and their publics have begun in recent years to extend their security view outward, Dettke said.  Germany now has more than 10,000 troops stationed overseas — in Afghanistan, patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa for terrorist fugitives and elsewhere — a dramatic change from its largely passive military history of the past half a century.

According to Delpech, another sign of this is the European Union’s commitment to set up a rapid reaction force by next year to respond quickly to crises, including outside of Europe.

A major test of European seriousness in addressing the WMD threat, however, will be whether European countries live up to their pledge earlier this year to help the Group of Eight economic powers contribute $20 billion during the next decade to secure former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and radiological materials, numerous conference participants said.

Delpech expressed confidence that France, set to become the rotating head of the G-8 next year, will get countries to provide precise figures for their contributions to the global partnership.

“Closer cooperation over the Atlantic is an absolute necessity,” she said.  Europe must “put parochial differences aside.”

But even if there is a meeting of U.S. and European minds about the seriousness of the proliferation threats, Fraser warned that the next hurdle is for both sides to agree on what to do about each of them.

Back to top

Chinese Response:  Beijing Committed to Nonproliferation, Official Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — China’s top arms control official yesterday reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, and outlined a number of domestic and international steps China has taken to reduce proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 4).

“China has been firm, consistent and clear-cut in its policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” Liu Jieyi, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Arms Control and Disarmament Department, said in a speech before a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “We have all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... We have steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating, encouraging or assisting any other country in developing weapons of mass destruction,” Liu added.

China has worked internally, through the promulgation of export control regulations, and internationally, by signing a number of multilateral agreements, to combat WMD proliferation, Liu said.  China has also attempted to improve cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation issues, he said.

Domestic Measures

To stem WMD proliferation on a national level, China has created export control regulations and control lists to cover sensitive nuclear, biological, chemical and missile technology exports, Liu said (see GSN, Oct. 21).  China’s export control systems are similar to those of other countries, including an end-use and end-user guarantee system, an export licensing system and “catch-all” principles — which prohibit the export of sensitive items that could be used for weapons purposes even if they are not included on an export control list, he said.

China’s export control lists are virtually identical to those enshrined in other multilateral international export control regimes, such as the Zaanger Committee and Australia Group, Liu said.  China’s missile control list, the promulgation of which has been praised by experts, is “by and large identical” with the annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime in regard to scope and parameters, he said (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“In a nutshell, China’s export controls ... are basically the same as those of the United States, EU and other countries in both scope and enforcement,” Liu said.

International Measures  

China believes that its long-term development goals will become more and more dependant on a peaceful world, Liu said.  For that reason, and to improve global security as a whole, China is committed to improving international nonproliferation efforts, he said.

“In the final analysis, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is conducive to regional and global peace and development and serves the common interest of all countries, certainly China’s fundamental interest,” Liu said.

China has joined almost every international WMD nonproliferation agreement, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Liu said.  China has also placed its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and is the first of the declared nuclear states to sign the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, he said (see GSN, May 10).

While Beijing supports the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it has been stalled in the Chinese People’s Assembly, Liu said.  The issue is not linked to other international Chinese concerns and Beijing supports the treaty’s early entry into force, he said.

China has also apparently rejected an international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 14).  While China agrees with the code’s nonproliferation and cooperation elements, Beijing opposes the code’s transparency and confidence-building measures, Liu said, Beijing believed that the measures should have been made voluntary, he added.

United States

The reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations is important for progress in international nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  He noted that the declared weapons states have a “special and unshirkable responsibility in this respect” (see GSN, Nov. 14).

In his comments, Liu made a veiled attack on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  “It does not make sense, morally or legally,” to maintain large nuclear weapons arsenals, to develop new weapons, to assert the right to conduct nuclear tests and to target other countries with nuclear weapons when “global efforts for nonproliferation are advocated,” Liu said.  

There is room, however, for the United States and China to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  One step that has already been taken is the establishment of a U.S.-Chinese joint consultative group on strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation issues, he said.

“It is true that differences do exist.  The key is how to address them, “ Liu said.  “China believes that differences should and can be settled in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual trust. ... I am convinced that through joint efforts, nonproliferation will be a positive factor in the healthy development of the Sino-U.S. relations,” he added.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

CWC Text

CTBT Text

NPT Text

Australia Group Web Site

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

Back to top

U.S. Response:  Abraham Outlines 10 Principles for Nuclear, Radiological Security

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday recommitted the Bush administration to plans by the Group of Eight economic powers to allocate at least $20 billion to cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union during the next decade and outlined “10 principles” to enhance the protection of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide (see GSN, Oct. 11).

“The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it,” Abraham said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

“Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all civilized nations of the world, and certainly [U.S.] President [George] Bush’s leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us,” he said.  “It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy,” Abraham said.

His remarks came as nonproliferation experts in attendance and others raise questions about the seriousness of the pledge and contend that progress has been minimal.  While the United States has said it will provide $10 billion and the United Kingdom and Germany have also promised resources, the ultimate commitment of the G-8 countries remains uncertain nearly six months after the original proposal. The other participants, France, Russia, Japan and Canada, have not announced any formal financial commitments.

Bush administration officials expressed hope last month that G-8 projects could get underway by the early next year, but so far little groundwork has been laid and experts predict little progress is likely before the next G-8 summit scheduled for June.

Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the conference in a later speech that “by then, we should expect to see them turn principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation.”

Even in Washington, the largest donor, G-8 related efforts have been slow moving. For example, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently told Global Security Newswire that his agency — which is responsible for overseeing much of the U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union and is expected to help other donor nations navigate through the Russian bureaucracy — has yet to be asked to play a role in coordinating the G-8 effort.

“The policy community hasn’t figured that out yet,” Younger said Oct. 31.

Abraham assured the audience, however, that “the United States is already working with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the global partnership has established.”

“But it should concern us that this announcement [back in June] received almost no attention, Nunn added.  “We must hold them to their words and their declaration … We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction … It’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed.  We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.”

10 Principles

Meanwhile, Abraham outlined “10 Principles” he says must underpin U.S. and international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon materials and technology as well as radiological sources that could be used to build a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb. 

“Addressing the nonproliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as energy secretary,” Abraham said.  “In nearly two years in office, I’ve organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security.”  They include:

*         The threat continues to evolve.  During the past decade the proliferation threat has focused primarily on rogue states, while the international community must now address the threats posed by terrorists “with the unblinking commitment” to cause mass casualties.

*         The margin of error is small. “Even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact,” Abraham said.  “Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends.  Based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device.  And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, the amount can be even less, depending on the material used.”

*         The problem demands a broad array of responses.  Given that securing nuclear and radiological materials is a multifaceted problem, nonproliferation mechanisms need to run the gamut, including improving physical security, consolidating material into fewer storage locations, down-blending HEU or burning plutonium, and halting the production of excess nuclear material. 

*         There are good reasons to focus on Russia.  U.S. nonproliferation efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, and rightly so, according to Abraham.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union left 40,000 nuclear weapons and over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear materials.  “We’ve paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is,” he said.

*         This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions.  “The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary,” according to Abraham (see GSN, Aug. 23).  He said that there are 17 other facilities like Vinca that need to be addressed.  Other examples of international cooperation include recent efforts to remove radiological material from the Republic of Georgia and security improvements made at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in Ukraine (see GSN, Oct. 23).

*         The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. “This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such,” he said.  Abraham and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced plans Wednesday, along with Russia, to sponsor an international conference in March in Vienna to specifically address radiological threats (see GSN, Nov. 14).

*         The IAEA’s contribution is invaluable.  “But the IAEA needs resources to do its job,” Abraham stressed.  “The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise.  I urge all others to do the same” (see GSN, Sept. 25).

*         Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility.  While international cooperation is critical, Abraham said that nations with nuclear or radiological materials on their territory must take a leading role in securing them.  “One point that I cannot stress too much is that responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community.”

*         This is a long-term effort.  The effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers does not lend itself to any quick fixes.  In fact, solutions must “stand the test of time” for “however long it takes to achieve success,” Abraham said.

*         Success is possible.  “Working together we can make the world safer,” he said.  “We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less.”  He concluded, “I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner.  But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable.”

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

Back to top

U.S.-Russia:  Nunn Calls for Naming Threat Reduction Czars

By Bryan Bender                                                                       
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The presidents of Russia and the United States should each appoint a single person to oversee efforts to secure nuclear, chemical and biological materials to raise the profile of the “the greatest danger in the world today,” according to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative.

“The first step is to put our own houses in order — identifying, accounting for, and securing the weapons and materials in Russia and the United States,” Nunn said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “Each president should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the president, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone.”

He added, “Both presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise.”

Nunn, an original co-sponsor of the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the decade-old U.S. effort to secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials, said that despite dramatic progress in recent years, “I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat.”

“The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorists’ hands,” he said.

In addition to naming a senior official in the U.S., Russian and other governments to coordinate cooperative threat reduction efforts, Nunn recommended that Moscow and Washington:

*         immediately begin outlining adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons — a perfect terrorism weapon that is  not covered by any arms control treaties;

*         devise operational changes in the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation, while expanding the decision time for each president to decide whether to retaliate to a perceived nuclear attack;

*         combine their collective biological defense knowledge, beginning with a joint fight against infectious diseases in Russia; and

*         launch a global partnership against catastrophic terrorism, based on the premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats to all nations and must be solved by all nations.

Moreover, there is no doubt that securing WMD materials at their source will be the most effective way to stave off the terrorist WMD threat, he added.

“Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop.  By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop.  Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they’ve completed the most difficult step — and our nightmare begins.”

Quoting statistics provided by Wall Street investor Warren Buffet, who recently pledged $2.5 million to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn said even a small improvement in security can make a big difference over time.

If the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10 percent, the chance of getting through a 50-year period without a disaster is only .51 percent, Nunn said.  If the chance can be reduced to 1 percent each year, there is a 60.5 percent chance of making it through 50 years safely, according to Nunn.

“We can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next 50 years.  As Warren Buffet would say, that’s real leverage,” Nunn said.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

Back to top

International Response:  Lawless Regions Pose Proliferation Risks

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Terrorists and international criminal organizations are becoming increasingly able to obtain contraband materials, including weapons of mass destruction, in international “gray zones” — regions with weak governmental control and rule of law, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia Program at the Moscow-based PIR Center, said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 8).

Three of the most critical gray zones are Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union — primarily Central Asia — and the Transnistria region of Moldova, Orlov said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  In Southeast Asia, a lack of government control has led to an increase in terrorist and organized crime activities in Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the “Golden Triangle” — consisting of sections of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, he said.

Continuing instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnya, the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Russian Ingushetiya region, also pose illegal trafficking concerns, Orlov said (see GSN, Oct. 23).    In the Transnistria region of Moldova, there have been reported contacts between Russian and other international nonstate groups, he said.  Representatives from al-Qaeda, Hamas, Iran and Chechnya are also believed to have traveled to the region.

States of concern might also take advantage of the lack of governmental oversight and control in the international gray zones to expand their contacts with terrorist and organized criminal groups, Orlov said.  For example, there have been reports of meetings between Libyan representatives and terrorists in unstable regions of Colombia, he said.  In the mid-1990s, North Korean agents are believed to have attempted to obtain chemical weapons from Russian organized crime groups, Orlov said.

Orlov said he was skeptical of the effectiveness of encouraging the authorities in the so-called gray zones to take a greater role in cracking down on illegal trafficking and possible WMD proliferation.  Instead, an international response should begin to be considered, which could include exchanges of information and threat assessments, he said.

Back to top

Indian Response:  India Faces New Export Control Challenges, Expert Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While India has had an export control system in place since the late 1940s, a gradual process of economic liberalization has raised new concerns over its continued effectiveness, Seema Gahlaut, director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

India, which seriously began developing nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, has historically chosen to restrain its nuclear exports, Gahlaut said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  India’s export control system has also been overseen by a conservative bureaucracy, inclined to restrict such exports heavily, she added.  The economic liberalization program, however, has both expanded the scope of India’s economy and reduced the public sector’s role in its oversight, Gahlaut said, noting, for example that dual-use exports are likely to increase (see GSN, Sept. 27).

In response, India has begun to adapt its export control policies to the changing national economic situation, according to Gahlaut.  For example, India has begun to harmonize its dual-use classification standards with those of the European Union.  New Delhi has also worked to devise a more detailed control list and to develop end-use certification measures, Gahlaut said.  She added that India has enacted prelicensing site-visit requirements for chemical exporters. 

The main remaining weaknesses in India’s export control policy center on enforcement, she said, adding that information on export control violations and imposed penalties is not widely available.

While India has made some progress in addressing the new export control concerns caused by its expanding economy, there are still issues of concern, according to Gahlaut.  India still needs to develop “catch-all” provisions, which prohibit the export of sensitive technologies even if they are not included on a control list, and controls on intangible technology transfers, she said.  India also needs to focus on transit and re-export issues and work to harmonize its export control systems with multilateral regimes.

International Efforts

Some of India’s export control concerns might be resolved through increased dialogue with the United States, Gahlaut said.  India has expressed interest in obtaining on-line software designed to streamline export licensing procedures, increased customs training and information on improving public-private sector export control cooperation from the United States, she said.

The international community as a whole also has a role to play in aiding India’s efforts, according to Gahlaut.  India’s policy of export restraint should continue to be encouraged and the export of sensitive technologies to India should be monitored, instead of outright denied, she said (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2001). 

India and Pakistan also need to be seen as two distinct entities, Gahlaut said, calling for a  “nonhyphenated” paradigm for South Asia.  While the two countries do share some concerns, there are also several important differences between them, she said.  For example, India’s nuclear program is under civilian control and has large civilian uses.  Pakistan’s nuclear program, however, is almost entirely intended for the military and is run by the military, Gahlaut said.

Back to top

Iraq II:  U.N. Resolution Might Restrict Access to Scientists

A provision in the new U.N. resolution on Iraq that authorizes inspectors to remove Iraqi scientists from the country to interview them could have the unintended consequence of reducing access, a senior U.N. official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

The provision was meant to improve interviews with Iraqi scientists because they are expected to be more forthcoming once they are away from Iraqi oversight, according to the New York Times.  The flaw in the provision, however, is that Iraq might now be more concerned about possible defections and less forthcoming on the identities of its scientists who are involved in weapons programs, the official said.

It is important for inspectors to learn the identities of Iraqi scientists who joined weapons programs since inspections ended in 1998, the U.N. official said.  Such scientists are now mainly unknown, and it will take an unusual level of Iraqi cooperation for inspectors to learn more about them, the official said.

The identification of new Iraqi WMD scientists for interview purposes is likely to become one of the hardest aspects of the U.N. inspectors’ work, the official said.  “The authority to take them out will make things more difficult,” the official added (William Broad, New York Times, Nov. 15).

Back to top

Iraq I:  Baghdad’s Acceptance Generally Welcomed, but Doubted by U.S.

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Security Council members welcomed yesterday’s letter from Iraq accepting Resolution 1441, saying it paves the way for the return of U.N. weapons inspectors.  The initial reaction from the United States was one of skepticism.

Before meeting with Annan yesterday, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “There’s no negotiations with Mr. Saddam Hussein.  Those days are long gone.  And so are the days of deceit and denial.  And now it’s up to him.  And I want to remind you all that inspectors are there to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein is willing to disarm.  It’s his choice to make.  And should he choose not to disarm, we will disarm him.”

After meeting with Bush, Annan said, “We all have to be a bit patient.  The inspectors will be there in a few days ... and we are going to test [Iraq’s commitment].”

Iraq delivered the letter yesterday to the United Nations saying, “We hereby inform you that we will deal with Resolution 1441, despite its iniquitous contents, even though it is to be implemented against the background of the intentions harbored by those of bad faith.”  The nine-page letter, signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, says, “We are ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq.”

The letter is filled with hostile language against the United States and United Kingdom, the two key sponsors of the resolution.  Sabri called the two governments “the gang of evil” spreading a “most wicked slander.”  He wrote, ”Send the inspectors to Iraq. … Everyone will be assured that Iraq has produced no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction, whatever the allegations to the contrary are made by the evil pretenders.  The fabrications of the liars and the deceit of the charlatans in the American and British administrations will be revealed before the world.”

Announcing the delivery of the letter yesterday, Iraqi Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri told reporters his government accepted the resolution “without conditions and without reservations.” That phrase does not appear in the letter, however.  Speaking outside the Security Council chambers after briefing the council on the government’s decision, al-Douri said, “We are always opting for the path of peace ... to protect our country, to protect the region against the threat of war, which is real.”  He added, “We do not have any mass destruction weapons so we are not worried about the inspectors when they come back. … Iraq is clean.”

In the letter, Sabri wrote to Annan, “We request you to inform the Security Council that we are ready to receive the inspectors in accordance with the established dates.”  He continued, “We are eager for them to accomplish their task in accordance with international law as soon as possible. If they do so in a professional and lawful manner, and without previously planned goals, the fabrications of the liars will be revealed to the public and the declared aim of the Security Council will be achieved.  At that point, the Security Council will become legally obligated to lift … the embargo and all the other unjust sanctions from Iraq.”

The initial English translation of the letter was provided by the Iraqi government.  But, as is policy, the United Nations did its own translation of the letter from the Arabic original before issuing it as an official document.  While some of the wording is different in the translations, the tone is the same.

As to the abrasive tone of the letter, Annan said in Washington, “I will wait to see whether it is an indication that they are going to play games, or is a message they are sending to their own people. I really don’t know.  What is important is that the resolution is mandatory.  The resolution went into force the moment it was adopted and the inspectors are going to go there and do their work and they have to comply and we will see what happens when they are on the ground.”

Arriving at U.N. headquarters last night after his trip to Washington, Annan said, “The essential thing is that they did say that the inspectors can come back. ... The rest in the scheme of things is not that important.”

Hans Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, last week said he would have an advance team in Iraq to starting setting up communications, computers, and transportation by Monday, with the first inspectors arriving by Nov. 25.

Government Reactions

Security Council diplomats welcomed the letter.  Irish Ambassador Richard Ryan said this morning, “It’s great, the inspectors are going in.”  He said he was “not worried at all” about the tone of the letter. 

Mexican Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser said, “We are awaiting the return of the inspectors. … We continue to press for the return of inspectors and we expect that Saddam Hussein gives full unrestricted access to them for them to do their job.”  As to the tone of the letter, Zinser said, “It is to be expected, but what we need to see is a commitment expressed in that letter translated into action.”

Officials of the permanent members of the council responded to the letter with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  Britain Foreign Minister Jack Straw welcomed the letter but said, “We must remain vigilant.  Iraq’s intentions are notoriously changeable.”

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said his government “took note of Iraq’s acceptance.”  Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said the letter “is opening the way for the situation in Iraq to be settled politically.”

Syrian Deputy Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad yesterday welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of the resolution.  ”We think that the main issue now is how soon the inspectors will be there,” he said. “It is the responsibility of the inspectors to make sure relevant issues of the Security Council are implemented in the correct way.”

Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Aboul Gheit also welcomed the letter.  Regarding Iraq’s claim that it is “clean” of weapons of mass destruction, he said, ”We have to accept it as long as there is no evidence that they harbor any or are hiding anything.”  While not a member of the council, Egypt is a key player in the Arab League.

Back to top

Iraq II:  U.N. Personnel to Arrive Next Week to Prepare for Inspections

Preparing for a new round of weapons inspections, 30 U.N. disarmament experts are scheduled to arrive in Iraq Monday to set up communications and inspect a remote system for monitoring dual-use equipment (see related GSN story, today).

After that, an advance team of 12 inspectors is scheduled to arrive Nov. 25 to begin spot inspections, the Washington Post reported today.  A full team of up to 100 U.N. inspectors is expected to begin work in Iraq by the end of December, according to the Post.

With the aid of U.S. and British intelligence and information provided by Iraqi defectors and former U.N. arms experts, inspectors have created a list of more than 1,000 sites suspected of being involved in Iraq’s WMD program.  Over the next two months, the inspectors plan to focus their efforts on 100 sites, including an improved missile launch facility located west of Baghdad at al-Rafah and a former nuclear power plant at al-Furat, south of the Iraqi capital.

U.N. inspectors also plan to travel to at least one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces, which had been previously off-limits, as a test of Iraqi compliance with the new U.N. resolution, officials said (see GSN, Oct. 7).

“We have a plan of action which we cannot obviously lay out in detail,” said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is heading the U.N. nuclear weapons inspection efforts.  “But we will have to go and visit some of the facilities which have been relevant in the past” and conduct “no notice inspections” at previously unknown sites, he said.

“We would not want to work in an expected fashion; we will have to do some surprise visits to facilities that we might not be expected to visit,” ElBaradei said.

Former Iraqi WMD sites are only one component of Iraq’s broader weapons program, ElBaradei added.  Inspectors also plan to install a soil, water and air monitoring system to detect chemical or radioactive traces, according to  ElBaradei and Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, which is responsible for inspecting Iraqi chemical, biological and missile programs.

U.N. inspectors plan to request information from U.N. members on Iraqi attempts to purchase weapon-related equipment, the Post reported.  They also plan to interview hundreds of Iraqi scientists believed to have been involved in Iraq’s former WMD efforts to determine whether they are still participating in prohibited programs, ElBaradei said (see GSN, Oct. 31).

The key to the inspectors’ success, however, is obtaining unimpeded access to any site within Iraq, ElBaradei and other senior U.N. officials said (see GSN, Sept. 25).

“If there is a piece of equipment, it will have to be installed; and if it has been installed and is being used, we will have a chance to bump into it,” said Jacques Baute, head of the IAEA’s Iraq action team (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Nov. 14).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

Back to top

U.S. Response:  Congress Sends $393 Billion Authorization Bill to Bush

The U.S. Congress has approved the 2003 defense authorization bill to allow $393 billion in Defense Department spending.  The House of Representatives passed the bill Tuesday and the Senate voted for it on Wednesday, sending it to President George W. Bush for final approval (see GSN, June 28; Murray, Rogers, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14).

Back to top

Iraq I:  Baghdad Accepts Return of Inspectors “Without Conditions”

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — Iraq this morning accepted Security Council Resolution 1441 on the return of weapons inspectors “without conditions and without reservations.”  Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri said he had delivered the letter accepting the resolution to the office of Secretary General Kofi Annan this morning (see GSN, Nov. 8).

The nine-page letter, signed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, says, “We are prepared to receive the inspectors, so that they can carry out their duties, and make sure that Iraq had not developed weapons of mass destruction.”  Calling the U.S. charges that Iraq has such weapons “baseless” and a “most wicked slander,” Sabri wrote, “There are no true, just, or fair reasons behind the adoption of this resolution.”

According to the resolution, the government of Saddam Hussein had until Friday to accept the conditions for a strengthened inspection regime.  Al-Douri said his government accepted the resolution “despite its bad contents.  We are prepared to receive the inspectors within the assigned timetable.  We are eager to see them perform their duties in accordance with international law as soon as possible.”

The Security Council unanimously on Friday adopted Resolution 1441, which grants weapons inspectors new powers and warns Iraq of “serious consequences” if it does not comply.  The resolution gives Iraq until Nov. 15 to accept the conditions and until Dec. 8 to provide a full accounting of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs.

Speaking outside the Security Council chambers after briefing the council on the government’s decision, al-Douri said, “We are always opting for the path of peace ... to protect our country, to protect the region against the threat of war, which is real.”  He added, “We do not have any mass destruction weapons so we are not worried about the inspectors when they come back.” 

“Iraq is clean,” said al-Douri.

China’s Deputy Ambassador Zhang Yishan said the Security Council “welcomes this correct decision by the Iraqi government and would like to see 1441 implemented fully and effectively.” 

Back to top

U.S.-Russia:  Threat Reduction Lacks Political Will and Coordination, Report Says

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Poor political support, an uncoordinated strategy and inadequate funding are severely hampering U.S. and Russian efforts to secure and eliminate former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, a forthcoming report says.

The lapses threaten to leave vast WMD stockpiles at risk of theft, according to the report, Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction, which is to be released tomorrow by the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The report pulls together the findings of numerous U.S., Russian and European nonproliferation experts, both in and out of government, and identifies a series of common obstacles that they have said are impeding efforts to address perhaps the most serious security threat of the modern age.

“The inability or refusal of these countries to correct these problems threatens to leave vast stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and biological agents vulnerable to acquisition by terrorists, rogue states and black marketeers,” the report concludes.

Click here after Nov.13 to see the report.

Lack of Political Will

For starters, the report’s authors contend that the necessary political support to ensure successful threat reduction efforts is missing from the current global environment.  Sustained support by political leaders and the expenditure of political capital is critical.  “However, truly robust political support for threat reduction is very rarely demonstrated and is often more rhetorical than real,” the report says.

The lack of adequate political support has resulted in funding limitations and restrictions, bureaucratic battles and delayed implementation of particular programs.  The report urges Russia in particular to improve the overall environment for threat reduction by improving in several areas, including financial transparency, facility access and legal protections.

“The technical nature of much of the threat reduction work, the complexity of its implementation, the intangibility of some of its objectives, its cost and intrusiveness, bureaucratic inertia, the stigma that much of threat reduction is still foreign aid and the still unsettled nature of Western-Russian relations all cut into political support,” the report says.

Lack of a Coordinated Strategy

Further hampering U.S.-Russian cooperation on nonproliferation efforts is the need for a comprehensive strategy, according to the report.  As the threat reduction agenda has expanded over the past decade — to include scores of U.S. agencies, other governments and ministries and international and nongovernmental organizations — the growing number of programs have not been integrated in any cohesive strategy, the report says.

“There is a need to develop a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of these efforts and provides some overall direction and prioritization,” the report says.  Such a strategy would go a long way in improving the effectiveness of threat reduction programs and more quickly reduce proliferation risks.

Evidence of the lack of strategy includes the absence of a central coordinator inside the U.S. administration to oversee all threat reduction activities; the need for organized and streamlined congressional oversight over U.S. programs; and the little discussion to date about how these programs can be expanded outside the former Soviet Union to other countries considered proliferation risks.

More Money Needed

One key factor in improving U.S. and Russian nonproliferation efforts will always be money, according to the authors.

“Over $1 billion a year is being made available for international threat reduction programs,” the report says.  “Still, there are a number of efforts that could accelerate progress if additional funding were made available.”

These include redirecting weapon scientists, eliminating additional quantities of highly enriched uranium, implementing plutonium disposition programs, ending production of weapon-grade plutonium, converting research reactors that currently use highly enriched uranium and improving border, export and customs controls, according to the report.

“Additional funding could also allow for expanding the scope of threat reduction,” the report says.  “The paths forward for financing major activities are unclear and largely depend on a higher degree of political support than currently exists,” it says.

The recent pledge of $20 billion over the next decade by the Group of Eight economic powers is one possible solution, as is the proposal to exchange Russian debt to the West for nonproliferation efforts.

Remaining Threats

The report’s authors are quick to highlight the substantial progress that has been made over the past decade to reduce the threat of Russian weapons and technologies.  On the other hand, they also provide a stark reminder of the enormous effort that lies ahead for the world’s governments to fully reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Russia and elsewhere.

“Although significant progress has been made in key areas, more remains to be done in reducing the dangers posed in all of the [Russian] weapons complexes,” the report says.

For example, roughly half of the weapon-grade nuclear material in Russia remains inadequately secured, the painstaking destruction of tens of thousands of chemical weapons has just begun and much remains unknown about past biological weapons activities.

On the nuclear question, as many as 40,000 scientists are looking for work, while only 40 to 50 percent of the work to secure Russian nuclear material is completed, according to the report.

Meanwhile, up to 7,000 scientists in the Russian biological weapons complex are now seeking new employment, according to the report.  “There is a particular concern about the former Soviet biological weapons complex,” it says. “The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current whereabouts of BW and BW-related experts, and the future disposition of the … biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat reduction agenda.”

“One significant political problem is that there is no baseline understanding of the old Soviet BW complex and its full range of activities,” the report adds.

Meanwhile, the thousands of chemical weapons in Russia provide their own proliferation challenge.  “The key proliferation dangers in the chemical weapons (CW) complex are the security of the existing weapons, brain drain, and the inability to destroy the existing stockpile,” the report says. 

In addition, the Russian missile complex is also a potential proliferation concern.  Some scientists reportedly have been assisting other countries considered proliferation risks and comparatively little has been done to transition these scientists to other employment, according to the report.

One proposal included in the report for strengthening threat reduction would be to more directly tie such efforts to arms control treaties.  “New agreements such as the Moscow Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty currently have no relation to threat reduction, but threat reduction could be instrumental in facilitating the implementation of these treaties in the future and these linkages should be explored.”

Back to top

International Response:  Annan Says Need Never Greater for United Nations

By Steve Hirsch
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan last night cited threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism as indications that the world has rarely needed the United Nations as much as it does now, and cautioned that the underlying causes behind those problems cannot be ignored.

Annan made the comments at a dinner at which he received the United Nations Association of the United States International Visionaries Award.

“The threats and challenges we face require as never before multilateral cooperation if they are to be dealt with successfully — cooperation in areas such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism; cooperation of the kind we have just witnessed in the negotiations leading to the resolution on Iraq adopted last Friday,” he said (see GSN, Nov. 8).

He called Friday a “very good day” for the United Nations, one that “showed what a central role the U.N. can — and must — play in the quest for a world free from weapons of mass destruction.”

“In short,” he said, “the U.N. played its proper role as the only universal instrument of global cooperation.”

He also cited the U.N. role in the broad fight against terrorism.  Annan called terrorism a “global threat with global effects,” and said the United Nations “has an indispensable role to play in providing the necessary legal and organizational framework within which the international campaign against terrorism can unfold.”

While terrorism “must never be excused,” he said, “so must genuine grievances never be ignored.”

“True, it detracts from the justice of a cause when a few wicked men commit murder in its name.  But it does not make it any less urgent that the cause is addressed, the grievance heard, the wrong put right,” he added.  “Otherwise,” he said, “we risk losing that most central of wars — the war for the hearts and minds of much of mankind.”

As the United Nations works against terrorism in coming months and years, he said, “we must act with equal determination to solve the political disputes and longstanding conflicts which generate an atmosphere conducive to support for terrorism.”

“To do so is not to reward terrorism or its perpetrators; it is to deny them the opportunity to find refuge or recruits, in any cause, any country.  Only then can we truly say that the war on terrorism has been won,” he said.

Back to top

Iraq II:  U.S. Officials Brief U.N. Inspectors

U.S. officials recently shared intelligence information on Iraq’s suspected WMD programs yesterday with the U.N. Monitoring, Verific