Russia:  Moscow Emergency Teams Were Prepared, But Not For Gas

A senior Russian health official has disputed accounts that emergency medical services were unprepared to address the casualties from a fentanyl-based aerosol used to subdue Chechen extremists in an early morning raid Saturday, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Oct. 31).

Crews from 450 emergency teams at the scene carried the antidote — Naloxone — but more was needed, said Igor Elkis, chief doctor of Moscow’s ambulance service.

“At the theater we were prepared to help people suffering from terrorists’ hands … we expected victims of explosion, gunfire,” Elkis said.  “When we learned that the gas was used, we sent more Naloxone to the site” (Steven Myers, New York Times, Nov.1).

On Thursday, the city’s hospitals still held 184 freed hostages, of whom eight were in serious condition (Moscow Times, Nov. 1).

Another health official said that confusion about the security situation might have led to a limited medical response.  Russian authorities had been listening to the Chechens’ phone conversations and believed a second attack might have been imminent.  Medical officials did not want to commit all their resources if another wave of patients was on the way, according to Irina Nazarova, head of the Russian Emergency Medicine Center.

“At any point they could blow up another building, and nobody knew how many victims there would be,” Nazarova said.  She also said the medical system acquitted itself well in the situation (Mark Mackinnon, Globe and Mail, Nov. 1).

Reports have continued to surface, however, of the secrecy that surrounded the use of the gas in the early morning raid last Saturday.  Rescue workers did not know how much of the antidote to administer, the Times reported today.  In interviews with a Russian newspaper, some said they used 5 cubic millimeters while others used 10.

The commandos who pumped the gas into the theater’s ventilation system and stormed the theater did not know what gas they were using, the Times reported.

A doctor who did not want to be named agreed that there was confusion in the medical response and said that hospitals expected gunshots, not gas.  Hostages also lacked key first aid assistance in the immediate aftermath of the raid, the doctor said.  The alleged confusion, however, was not intentional.

“It wasn’t an evil plot,” the doctor said.  “It was just a Soviet mess” (Myers, New York Times).

Back to top

United States:  Deseret Worker Altered Air Quality Tests, Authorities Charge

U.S. authorities have accused an employee at the Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah with tampering with important safety records, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Oct. 11).

David James Yarbrough has been charged in U.S. District Court with one count of making false statements to a government agency, according to AP.  He could face up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted.

Officials have accused Yarbrough of falsifying data in work from June 29 to Aug. 16 at the Oquirrh Mountain Facility, where researchers test disposal methods for chemical agents.  According to authorities, he knew that systems were operating below approved levels but indicated that air monitoring units were performing at passing levels during baseline tests, AP reported.

Officials indicted Yarbrough after a routine data review indicated inconsistencies, depot spokeswoman Alaine Southworth said.  Neither the depot nor its surrounding residents were ever in danger and all air monitoring equipment has worked properly, Southworth said.

Yarbrough yesterday denied the allegations.  “I am innocent of the charges,” he said (Associated Press, Nov. 1).

Back to top

Russia I:  Officials Deny Fentanyl Usage Violates Treaty

While the civilian death toll from Saturday’s Moscow theater raid rose again, Russian officials yesterday refuted reports that the fentanyl-based aerosol used to incapacitate Chechen separatists might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (see GSN, Oct. 30).

“I officially declare that chemical substances of the kind banned under international conventions on chemical weapons were not used in the course of the special operations,” Russian Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko said (see GSN, Oct. 30).

Two more hospitalized former hostages have died, but Russian officials denied that the secrecy that initially surrounded the use of the aerosol caused any unnecessary deaths (Michael Wines, New York Times, Oct. 31).

Russia’s Foreign Ministry supported Shevchenko’s stance that the gas does not violate international agreements, spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said (Judith Ingram, Associated Press/Moscow Times, Oct. 31).

Shevchenko’s comments on the international chemical weapons treaties followed a request for information on the gas from Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Director General Rogelio Pfirter (BBC Online, Oct. 30).

Criticism of Russia’s performance in the aftermath of the theater raid mounted from Russian and international sources, including the liberal Yabloko Russian opposition party.

“The (lack of) organization of medical assistance to the victims … verges on the criminal,” a Yabloko statement read.

“Increasing evidence suggests that many hostages died because they were not given basic medical care immediately after their rescue,” a Human Rights Watch statement said (Bernard Besserglik, Agence France-Presse, Oct. 31).

Shevchenko also denied that any lack of medical care contributed to hostages’ deaths.  He told reporters that 1,000 antidotes for the gas were ready for use by emergency personnel at the theater.

“Specialists, in particular myself, had been warned, even though the operation had to be carried out on short notice,” Shevchenko said.

He said the gas was not deadly, but civilians succumbed to it because they were exhausted, hungry and stressed.  A Russian chemical weapons expert disagreed, saying that fentanyl is deadly if it is not closely monitored.

“With fentanyl, as specialists say, the threshold of an admissible and inadmissible dose for a human organism is very close,” said Lev Fedorov, president of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety.  “Any mistake may be fatal” (Glasser, Baker, Washington Post, Oct. 31).

Meanwhile, a toxicology professor at Munich University Clinic in Germany said that the gas used in the raid also contained halothane — an anesthetic — and possibly other substances.  Thomas Zilker analyzed blood and urine samples from two Germans who had been held hostage in the theater (Ingram, Moscow Times).

Back to top

Russia II:  Finland to Provide Aid for Weapons Disposal Program

Finland signed an agreement Friday to help destroy Russia’s chemical weapons arsenal (see GSN, Oct. 15).

Under the agreement, Finland plans to deliver special-use equipment to the Gorny chemical weapons disposal facility in the Saratov region, which is currently under construction (see GSN, Aug. 22).  The facility is set to begin operation in the first half of next year, said Rene Nyberg, Finland’s ambassador to Russia.  Finland has already provided similar equipment to a Russian chemical weapons storage facility located in Kambarka in the Udmurtia republic, said Zinovy Pak, director of the Russian Ammunitions Agency (see GSN, May 3).

Finland has provided more than $980,000 in assistance to Russia’s chemical weapons disposal efforts, according to Interfax.  Of that, more than $410,000 has been given to the Kambarka storage facility, while more than $570,000 is set to be spent on the Gorny site (Interfax, Oct. 25).

Back to top

CWC:  Experts Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue Violated Treaty

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Sharp differences have emerged among international arms control experts over whether Russia has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention by using an incapacitating substance during a hostage-freeing raid Saturday (see related GSN story, today).

A top Russian health official said today that the chemical substance delivered included the opioid fentanyl, which is used widely in medicine as an anesthetic.  A German health official said analyses in Munich suggest that the substance also included another anesthetic called halothane.

Russian authorities stormed a Moscow theater Saturday shortly after the incapacitating agent was used and shot the Chechen hostage-takers, who had killed prisoners and had threatened to blow up the building.  Authorities said 118 hostages died as a result of exposure to the agent but more than 600 survived (see GSN, Oct. 29).

“The Russians were in my mind not in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” said Jean Pascal Zanders, leader of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Project of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Others are not as sure.  “I think it is a potential violation because … we know it had persistent effects,” said Jonathan Tucker, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The differences of view can be traced to interpretations of the language in the 1993 treaty.  Some experts, including Tucker, contend that a violation occurred, arguing that the substance was used as a riot control agent with results more damaging than allowed by the treaty.

They cite a treaty provision titled “Purposes Not Prohibited Under This Convention,” which allows the use of only certain riot control agents for law enforcement purposes.  The treaty defines a riot control agent as one that rapidly produces sensory irritation or disabling physical effects “which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.”  In addition, the treaty’s Schedule 1 chemicals are banned from legal riot control use.  Such chemicals, listed in a treaty annex, are considered to pose the highest risk for use in chemical weapons.

“If it persists for several hours or days, that is an incapacitating agent, which is banned by the convention,” Tucker said.  In his view, the effects of the agent should last no longer than an hour.

“The only agents which are permissible for law enforcement use are those that fit the definition of a riot control agent in the Chemical Weapons Convention,” said Edward Hammond, co-director of the Sunshine Project, a nongovernmental organization that has alleged that the United States is violating the chemical and biological weapons conventions by researching and developing certain nonlethal agents (see related GSN story, today).

In a recent interview for the Washington Post, Elisa Harris, a chemical weapons expert at the University of Maryland and former staff member at the National Security Council, also raised the possibility of a violation if Russian authorities “used something other than tear gases in this scenario.”

Another Interpretation

Other experts interpret the same treaty provision differently.  They say the Russian operation most certainly was law enforcement, though not riot control, and that the provision allows for chemicals to be used for law enforcement purposes other than riot control, without specifying what those purposes or chemicals might be used.

They cite the treaty language, “Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes,” and say the word “including” implies there are law enforcement purposes allowed other than riot control.  A classic example of such a purpose cited is executions for capital crimes, for which some U.S. authorities use a lethal gas.

“While it remains to be seen whether the Moscow theater use of gas was allowable for ‘riot control purposes,’ it could be allowable as ‘law enforcement,’ wrote Harvard professor Matthew Meselson, a co-director of the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation, in an e-mail Sunday.

Zanders agrees.

“The restrictions on the nature of the agent in terms the duration of the effects, or whether they are listed in the schedules or not, do not apply to law enforcement situations, with the exception of Schedule 1 chemicals,” he said.

Still, there appears to be some question about whether that interpretation is widely accepted in the international community.

According to Daniel Feakes, a researcher with the Harvard Sussex program at the University of Sussex, the British government in written comments to Parliament in 1992 on the treaty interpreted the criteria for using riot control agents to apply to apply to all law enforcement uses.

Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg wrote states parties “will be entitled to use toxic chemicals for law enforcement, including domestic riot control purposes, provided that such chemicals are limited to those not listed in the schedules to the convention and which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.”

“The way I read the answer is that the UK government (in 1992) interprets the CWC criteria for chemicals for riot control purposes as ALSO applying to the broader category of chemicals for law enforcement purposes,” Feakes wrote in an e-mail to colleagues posted on the Internet.

Hogg’s interpretation, Feakes said, implies the use of hydrogen cyanide for capital crime executions would not meet the treaty’s criteria since that agent is listed on one of the treaties schedules, or lists of chemicals for which varying restrictions apply.

Feakes’ research so far has turned up no additional comments by the British government further clarifying that view, or similar comments by other governments, and he said there could be a possibility the government was not precise in its language.

“To my mind there hasn’t been much discussion of that since 1993 or since the treaty came into force,” he said.  “You’ve always got to think that it wasn’t considered as carefully as it would be,” he said.

Was the Material Declared?

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, responsible for implementing the treaty, along with the United States and other countries, were pressing Russia for information in the chemical or chemicals used.

German, British and possibly other authorities had separately been analyzing chemical traces collected from their citizens who were rescued by Russian authorities.  U.S. officials reportedly said Tuesday they believed fentanyl was used.

A German medical expert in Munich told reporters today traces of halothane, an anesthetic agent often used in combination with opioids, were found on one victim.  He said it was likely used in combination with some other substance.

Even if the treaty did not ban the agent or agents used, Russian authorities may yet have committed a violation if the material was not declared to be in their stocks for such purposes, said Amy Smithson, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.

“If they used an incapacitating agent that they had not declared to the international inspection agency as having on hand for these types of purposes, then they might run afoul of the international community,” she said.

“The first question to ask according to the treaty is did Russia declare this is one of the incapacitating agents it had on hand,” she said.

It does not appear that fentanyl was declared by Russia, at least not as of last year.  An annex to the 2001 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons annual report provides a list of the chemicals declared by members for riot control purposes and fentanyl was not included.

If Russian authorities grabbed the agent or agents off the shelf of a medical facility that would also have been a violation, she said.

Feakes said, however, that Russian authorities were not required to pre-declare the agent used, because while the treaty requires declarations for riot control agents, “nowhere in the CWC are states parties required to declare for law enforcement purposes.”

“Russia could have fentanyl for law enforcement purposes other than riot control, if in types and quantities consistent with this purpose, and not have to declare it to the OPCW,” he said.

Possible Implications

While Zanders believes the Russian operation, if it turns out they did not include use of any forbidden chemical, was not a violation, he also says the incident points out a potential problem with the convention as currently written.

The absence of a definition of law enforcement agents used for purposes other than riot control, he said, “leaves a potential loophole in the convention.”

“I think it’s of great concern because the Russian action is just one more illustration of what I would call a new series of contingencies — conflict situations that have emerged in which so called nonlethal technologies might be considered for use by police and military forces — and among them I see anti-terrorism operations but also peacekeeping operations, where peacekeeping troops might be responsible for civil order,” he said.

“We are also approaching a very fuzzy borderline between such operations and actual warfare operations,” he said.

Zanders hopes treaty parties will use the pact’s first review conference next spring to clarify the understanding of the phrase law enforcement and how toxic chemicals might be restricted with respect to peacekeeping, anti-terrorism and rescue of foreign nationals abroad.

For further information, see:

CWC Text

OPCW Main Page

CWC States Parties

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

Back to top

Russia:  Theater Gas Was Fentanyl, Hostage Death Toll Rises

Russia used a chemical compound that included the anesthetic fentanyl to incapacitate Chechen extremists — and their hostages — in a Moscow theater Saturday, Russian Health Minister Yuri Shevchenko said today (see GSN, Oct. 29).

The compound would not have killed the hostages if they were not exhausted, dehydrated, hungry, unable to move and severely stressed, Shevchenko said.  After much international speculation, this is the first Russian admission of the use of fentanyl in the raid that freed several hundred hostages (Judith Ingram, Associated Press, Oct. 30).

Two hospitalized former hostages died yesterday, bringing the civilian death toll from the three-day siege to 119, Moscow’s chief medical officer Andrei Seltsovsky said.  At least 116 of those died as a result of the chemical (News24.com, Oct. 30).

Russian authorities pumped the chemical compound through the ventilation system before storming the theater; U.S. officials have said they believe the gas was an opiate, possibly fentanyl.  Soldiers also killed 50 Chechen hostage-takers in the assault, Russian officials said.

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow today criticized Russian officials’ refusal to tell doctors what chemical had affected the hostages.

“We regret that the lack of information simply contributed to the confusion after the immediate operation to free the hostages was over,” Vershbow said.  “It’s clear that perhaps with a little more information at least a few more of the hostages would have survived.”

A Russian doctor who has been treating the freed hostages agreed that the lack of information has cost lives.

The opiate is mostly harmless if used properly, but emergency responders at the scene “weren’t prepared for detoxification,” the doctor said.

“If people were intubated and helped to breathe with artificial ventilation while still in the vehicles, almost everyone would have survived,” the doctor said.  “Everyone brought to my hospital alive is still alive” (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 30).

Back to top

Russia:  U.S. Believes Russian Gas Was an Opiate

U.S. officials believe Russian authorities used an aerosol version of a fast-acting opiate called fentanyl in Saturday morning’s raid on a Moscow theater held by Chechen extremists, the New York Times reported today.  Opinion remains divided on whether the gas represents a violation of the treaty banning chemical weapons (see GSN, Oct. 28).

The gas used in the assault killed 117 hostages; the Chechens killed one hostage during the raid.  The United States has acknowledged, however, that its findings are inconclusive, as Russia has not provided details about the gas (Miller/Broad, New York Times, Oct. 29).

A number of reports surfaced yesterday supporting the theory that the gas was an opiate of some sort.  According to Western doctors who examined survivors and information recently released by Russia, the gas was not a nerve agent but rather a morphine-related opiate.  A key indication came from reports that Russian doctors successfully used naloxone to treat gas victims; the drug is used to treat heroin and morphine overdose victims (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 29).

German doctors who treated two survivors in a clinic in Munich also concluded that fentanyl was used in the raid (Daniel McGrory, London Times, Oct. 29).

Doctors reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to treat the victims with atropine — an antidote to nerve agents — but were instead successful with Narcan, a brand of naloxone also designed to address the effect of opiates (Matt Kelly, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 29).

The gas used in the raid might also have been an aerosol form of the morphine-based etorphine hydrochloride, the Washington Times reported.  A surgical anesthetic, aflentanyl, could also have been used (Gertz, Scarborough, Washington Times, Oct. 29).

U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the gas was fentanyl “or a derivative that has a narcotic effect,” according to a senior U.S. official.  If that is the case, Bush administration officials do not believe the gas would be a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Times reported (Miller/Broad, New York Times).

The Chemical Weapons Convention does not outlaw anesthetics such as fentanyl, according to Andy Oppenheimer, a weapons expert with Jane’s Defense Weekly.

“There are gray areas in the way these gases can be used and the Russians may be exploiting this to be able to develop chemical weapons without contravening international law,” he said (McGrory, London Times).

Some experts disagreed, saying the gas was a clear violation of the 1997 treaty and could encourage other countries to develop similar agents.

“It’s very troubling for the chemical arms control regime if the Russians get away with this,” said Jonathan Tucker, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Other experts were impressed with the effectiveness of the gas.

“Somebody has actually found something that can turn off the body in seconds,” said Julian Robinson, a biological and chemical weapons expert at the University of Sussex in the United Kingdom (Financial Times, Oct. 29).

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has not commented on the raid since the hostage fatalities became public, Russian officials yesterday defended the use of the gas.

“Our special forces did everything possible,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko said.  “Huge casualties were avoided.  It is hard to say what might have happened and how many casualties there might have been if the building had been blown up” (Baker/Glasser, Washington Post).

A Russian official told the Financial Times yesterday that the gas was a “medical gas of the type used in anesthesiology, which in normal conditions would not lead to lethal results.”

Russia may want to use the gas in the future, however, and will not release its name, the official said.  Russian officials had tested the gas recently, but in the hostage situation the gas proved particularly lethal because of the theater’s poor ventilation and the stress and fatigue of the victims (Financial Times).

For further information, see:

CWC Text

OPCW Main Page

CWC States Parties

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

Back to top

Russia:  Moscow Refuses to Identify Deadly Theater Gas

All but two of the hostages killed in a Moscow theater died from the gas that was used to incapacitate the Chechen separatists who had taken the building, a senior Russian health official said yesterday.  Russian officials would not identify the gas; some experts are saying it might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention.

More than 115 hostages died “from the effects of the gas exposure,” said Andrei Seltsovsky, head of the Moscow health department.  About 650 former hostages remained hospitalized yesterday, 45 of whom were in critical condition.

The gas was described as an incapacitating agent, used as an anesthesia, by Yevgeny Yevdokimov, chief anesthetist in Moscow (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

Seltovsky said he did not know the name of the gas.

Russian authorities have been criticized for not releasing information on the gas, which was pumped in through the theater’s ventilation system early Saturday morning.  Russian officials turned away a request for information on the gas from the U.S. Embassy.

Chemical Speculation

Lev Fedorov, president of the Russian Union for Chemical Safety, said the chemical agent used in the raid was apparently a Valium-based military gas, developed during the Soviet era.

Vil Mirzayanov, a former colleague of Fedorov at the State Scientific and Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, said the Soviet Union had altered the molecular structure of the incapacitating agent BZ, and it proved effective as an anesthetic.  Mirzayanov suggested the gas used in the raid was an anesthetic.

The gas used in Saturday’s assault might violate the Chemical Weapons Convention but conflict with the treaty is unclear, some experts said.  The treaty bans the use of all lethal gasses.  It allows incapacitating gasses for domestic law enforcement, but the effects must diminish quickly.

Because the gas was pumped into the theater, without regard to dosage for children, the sick or the elderly, the move violates the intent of the convention, Mirzayanov said.

Fedorov disagreed, saying that other countries research similar agents (Steven Myers, New York Times, Oct. 28).

The gas might have been a version of sleeping gas Adamsite, and the refusal to identify it could be because undeclared stocks of the gas would be in violation of the convention, the Financial Times reported (Andrew Jack, Oct. 28, Financial Times).

Treaty Implications

Amy Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at the Henry L. Stimson arms research organization in Washington, said there many questions remained regarding Russia’s compliance with the chemical treaty.

“This is kind of like pornography, you know it when you see it,” Smithson said.  “There are going to be people on both sides who will argue that the treaty does not prohibit it.  But how it was used, I think, is going to make it a huge debate.”

Federov said Russian officials would probably never disclose the nature of the chemical.

“We are never going to know exactly what chemical it was because in this country the state is more important than the people,” he said (Glasser/Baker, Washington Post).

The fact that the hostages had been weakened by stress and hunger made the gas much more deadly, health officials said.  Fedorov agreed with this assessment.

“This weapon was developed to be used on healthy men who serve in the army,” he said.  “It was used here on some of the so-called risk groups — women, children, people with liver and kidney problems” (Myers, New York Times).

Russia Will Not Disclose Gas

Officials have come under criticism as well for not disclosing the agent to doctors who treated the hostages.  The doctors were themselves confused, according to a hospitalized former hostage.

“Some of the doctors were telling us it was nerve gas, some were saying it was tear gas,” said a freed hostage identified only as Natasha (Susan Glasser, Washington Post, Oct. 28).

None of the victims suffered symptoms associated with lethal — and therefore prohibited — chemical weapons.

Yevdokimov described the gas a “psychotropic.”

“It is safe if used as a general anesthetic, but large doses can affect basic functions of the organism, causing unconsciousness, respiratory and blood circulation problems,” he said.

A British doctor said the effect of anesthesia varies based on the subject.

“The range of human reaction to any anesthetic is very great,” said David Scott, an anesthesiologist at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary.  “If, for example, 50 percent of the people in the auditorium were put to sleep, you would expect another 40 percent to be unaffected and 10 percent would die” (McGrory/Hartley, London Times, Oct. 28).

Russian authorities, meanwhile, are investigating a link between the Chechen militants and the al-Qaeda terrorist group.

“There were definitely Arab terrorists in the building with links to al-Qaeda,” a senior Western diplomat said.  “The Russians will now want to know how much help the Chechens received from [Osama] bin Laden’s organization” (Lab/Aris, London Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 27).

For further information, see:

CWC Text

OPCW Main Page

CWC States Parties

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

OPCW List of Other Chemical Conventions

Federation of American Scientists List of Chemical Weapon Agents

Back to top

CWC:  Budget Problems Have Thwarted Treaty Inspections

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in recent years was unable to conduct some inspections of chemical facilities for illicit chemical weapons production because of budget troubles, the U.S. General Accounting Office said last week (see GSN, Oct. 25).

Problems cited by the GAO included failures by some states to pay their annual dues and by certain states to reimburse the organization for monitoring the destruction of their declared chemical weapons. The organization also underestimated personnel expenses for the last three years, the report said.

States owe nearly $1 million in unpaid dues and, as of June, owed more than $2 million in reimbursements.

The OPCW was $2.8 million in deficit in 2000 and has a potential deficit of $5.2 million in 2002, the report said.

The GAO concluded, “Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization’s ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention,” noting it had to reduce the number of planned inspections for 2001 and 2002.

A U.S. State Department response included in the report said the GAO analysis does not take into account OPCW changes underway in recent months.  The GAO report was based largely on an audit of documents collected from the OPCW in May.

Changes Underway

The organization’s budgeting difficulties have been well known for some time.  The Bush administration until earlier this year had withheld some of its dues while publicly criticizing and pressing for removal of the previous OPCW director general, Jose Bustani (see GSN, April 12). 

There have been recent signs, however, of a turnaround.  A U.S. campaign to remove the official was successful last April.  A new director general, Rogelio Pfirter, took charge in July and is beginning a management review this week.  Washington has resumed payments, as have other key contributors, and has donated an additional $2 million to the organization for 2002. 

Treaty parties also voted this month to increase the organization’s $54 million 2003 budget by 10 percent and to allow OPCW to use its 2001 cash surplus and its working capital fund.

Pfirter in an interview last week with Global Security Newswire said the additional money would put the organization back on its feet for the near term and would provide for a substantial number of additional inspections, approved by the member states, in the coming year.

The GAO report did specify several changes made by OPCW under Pfirter, including creation of a more accurate and timely invoicing process for inspection reimbursements and exclusion of the dues assessments of states in arrears.  The State Department had hired a budgeting consultant to aid the organization, it said.

The GAO further noted Pfirter’s stated commitment to address the organization’s financial difficulties by ensuring that adequate funding be available for the 2003 budget.

Additional Changes Recommended

The report, however, concluded that some changes are still needed and recommended developing a comprehensive plan for dealing with the budgeting issues. 

“Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent budgeting weaknesses,” it said. 

The GAO assigned the overall blame for the budgeting shortfalls to the OPCW, as opposed to states.

“Unless the organization improves its planning, budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections,” the report said.

“The organization’s budgets (like those of other international organizations) are based on the presumption that all member states will pay their assessments in full,” it said.

Pfirter, last week, said the organization would be able to conduct the additional inspections voted for by member states for 2002 as long as members paid their dues in full.

“The member states worked out a compromise formulation whereas in which 60 DOCs [inspections of discrete organic chemical facilities] are anticipated and we will have the financing for that, if member states again comply with their assessed contributions,” he said.

The State Department said the GAO’s observation that “there is no coherent plan to address these problems, while accurately portraying the situation for the first part of 2002, does not reflect the current situation.”

It suggested a comprehensive plan was not needed, as the organization currently was addressing its budgeting issues in a comprehensive way, including by discounting expected income by one-sixth, based on historical experience, as opposed to already discounted expectations.

Back to top

About Newswire  |  Contact National Journal  |  Re-Use Guidelines

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  GET INVOLVED  |  SITE MAP