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U.S. Response: Pentagon Completes Playbooks for WMD ScenariosBy Bryan Bender Stephen Younger, director of the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said yesterday the series of response plans — first ordered during the Clinton administration — have been approved and are being circulated among key government agencies. The playbooks are designed to “identify the hard problems” in dealing with a catastrophic terrorist attack, he told a nuclear, chemical, and biological defense conference sponsored by Aviation Week. Some of these problems include deciding which agency would have the authority to order a quarantine in the event of a biological attack, what happens when conflicting orders are given in the immediate aftermath of an attack, or whether the National Guard, likely to be called in to help restore order, can make law enforcement decisions. Younger, in providing a WMD threat assessment, said the high probability that terrorists will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in future attacks makes adequate preparations essential. “You have to exercise, exercise, exercise,” he said, referring to the need for government agencies, at the federal and local level, to continuously conduct dry runs of a variety of potential terrorist scenarios inside the United States and abroad. A successful WMD attack, he said, would be a “civilization-changing” event. Military and Civilian Threats Differ Younger believes the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is distinctly different for the military and civilian populations. In military terms, nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat, Younger said, because no effective defenses remain once a nuclear bomb is detonated in a city or on the battlefield. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate equalizer for a conventionally weaker adversary such as Iraq or North Korea that is seeking to challenge U.S. military primacy, or for groups such as al-Qaeda seeking to defeat U.S. military power. He expressed his personal belief that in the event of a U.S. military attack, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would unleash his WMD arsenal against invading U.S. troops. “They will” use chemical or biological weapons on the battlefield, he said. Domestically, Younger says he worries more about a chemical or biological attack than a nuclear attack. First, he believes that despite widespread security concerns at former Soviet nuclear weapons and facilities, a nuclear weapon is still extremely difficult to acquire or develop. Moreover, terrorists lack the state infrastructure historically required to build a nuclear weapon, he added. Yet, chemical and biological weapons are much more widely available to potential terrorists seeking to strike U.S. domestic targets, he said. He cited the unsolved anthrax attacks as an example. “This is someone who knows how to make anthrax as well as it can be made,” he said of the sophistication of the spores and the mail delivery system. It took “great skill” to make and deploy it in a form that resulted in an “explosion” of anthrax spores when the tainted envelopes were opened. “It was not made in someone’s basement,” he said. Asked if there might have been a state sponsor of the anthrax attacks, Younger said, “We simply don’t know.” With the proliferation of high-speed desktop computers, developing deadly pathogens will only become easier for nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, Younger said. On the chemical threat, Younger said the transport of chemicals throughout the United States on a daily basis could be an attractive way for terrorists to acquire WMD materials. For example, he noted that the deadly chemical phosgene — used in a variety of industrial activities — is shipped in 100-ton quantities. “I worry about that,” he said. He said he worries the least, however, about a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb, because it would largely cause panic and economic dislocation rather than a large number of casualties. “They are weapons of terror.” A Rising Scale of Violence For the most part, terrorists have not yet unleashed weapons of mass destruction. Younger said some experts believe terrorists have not done so because violent personalities seek the immediate explosive effect of a conventional attack, while others believe they do not want to alienate their constituency. Younger believes, however, they have not been used because groups such as al-Qaeda are mounting attacks on an ascending scale of violence. The organization strives to make each attack more violent and cause more casualties. Weapons of mass destruction are the next step on that scale, he warned. Weapons of mass destruction are “the greatest threat to the national security of the United States,” he said.
From November 1, 2002 issue.Iraq: United States to Revise Draft U.N. ResolutionThe United States is preparing to revise its U.N. draft resolution on Iraq to better reflect the views of France and Russia without compromising on key points, a move that will delay U.N. Security Council action until at least the middle of next week, a senior U.S. official said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 31). It would take the United States about two days to revise its draft resolution, at which point diplomats would consult with their respective governments, the official said. Discussions on the revised resolution would not occur until next week, with a vote delayed until the middle of next week or later, the Associated Press reported (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 1). U.N. Debate Senior British diplomats also have indicated that the Security Council could vote on a new resolution on Iraq within the next two weeks, the Financial Times reported today. Discussions among the U.S., British, French and Russian foreign ministers are believed to have created enough support for a new resolution that requires the United Nations to “consider” what actions to take if Iraq violates the resolution. “Activity has been so intense in recent days that you might have thought the French, British and American foreign ministers were Iraq desk officers,” a British diplomat said. The United States and France, which have often opposed each other during the debate on the resolution, have reduced their differences over its text, according to British officials. French officials, however, said the language was still unacceptable and that France would find it difficult to approve a resolution not also supported by Russia and China. Lingering differences between the United States and France on the language of the resolution have reached a point where there is less urgency in ending the debate, a British Foreign Office official said. “The differences in the Security Council have now been narrowed down to such an extent that [U.S. Secretary of State] Colin Powell and [British Foreign Secretary] Jack Straw do not feel we have to pile the pressure on to get the resolution approved this week,” the official said. “We are prepared to let things run for a bit longer” (Blitz/Hoyos, Financial Times, Nov. 1). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions
From October 31, 2002 issue.Iraq I: Inspectors Should Have Maximum Authority, Bush SaysU.S. President George W. Bush yesterday told two top U.N. inspection officials — chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency — that he wants inspectors to have maximum authority to hunt for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Oct. 30). “The inspectors don’t want to be the cat in the cat-and-mouse game. They don’t want to get run around,” said White House press secretary Ari Fleischer. “They want to be able to go in and do their jobs and disarm [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein. In order to secure the peace, they have to have the ability to do their job.” Observers have said that Bush is becoming increasingly involved in the U.N. debate over a new inspections regime, according to the Washington Times. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Security Council agree with the United States on the need to give weapons inspectors the authority to conduct their mission, Blix said. “There is probably a very strong opinion in the General Assembly and the council that they would not tolerate any cat-and-mouse games,” he said. “And we would also report anything that we would perceive being cat-and-mouse games” (Bill Sammon, Washington Times, Oct. 31). U.N. Debate Meanwhile, none of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council threatened a veto as the full 15-member council completed the first round of negotiations yesterday on the U.S. draft resolution on Iraq. The council members broadly agreed that they want to tell Hussein that must comply with weapons inspections or face military action, diplomats said. “We’re looking for a resolution which would be agreeable to all 15 members — to achieve through inspections the full disarmament of Iraq,” said Richard Ryan, Ireland’s U.N. ambassador (Julia Preston, New York Times, Oct. 31). The United States and France are still negotiating specific provisions of the resolution, with the two countries divided over the method of deciding whether Iraq has violated it, according to the Washington Post. France, which believes the Security Council should decide, has proposed adding the phrase “when established by the Security Council” into the relevant sentence. The United States has proposed language saying, “failure by Iraq to comply with, and cooperate fully with the implementation of this resolution (France would add its phrase here) shall constitute a … material breach” of its international obligations. The United States has not proposed who would determine whether Iraq violated the resolution or how that would be done. The United States and France appear closer to reaching a compromise over another contentious phrase — “material breach” — which has been used in the past to justify U.N. military action, the Post reported. The United States wants to combine past Iraqi material breaches of U.N. resolutions with potential breaches of the new resolution into one paragraph in an attempt to guarantee future punishment, the Post reported. France, Russia and China, however, want any mention of Iraqi breaches limited to past resolutions. In a new proposal, France has suggested that only the Security Council should have the authority to determine whether a material breach has occurred. The council would also have the sole right to determine whether Iraq had made “false statements or omissions” in declarations regarding its WMD program. France has worked most of this week to gain support for its proposal. “The French and the United States are narrowing in on an agreement, but they have not yet bridged the gap,” a Security Council diplomat said. “France wouldn’t want to be in the same camp with the U.S. and Britain if Russia and China are abstaining.” Russian U.N. Ambassador Sergey Lavrov told the Security Council that he does not object to including the material breach language. Russia wants more assurance, however, that the phrase would not be used as a “hidden trigger” for an attack on Iraq. China also still has lingering concerns over the use of the phrase. “We appreciate the French effort, but we didn’t solve all our concerns. The trigger is buried deeper, but it’s still there,” a senior U.N.-based Chinese official said (DeYoung/Lynch, Washington Post, Oct. 31). U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said he expects the Security Council to vote on the U.S. draft possibly by the end of next week. “We are narrowing the differences. I think we are getting much closer,” Powell said. “I think this is all going to happen, certainly by the end of the next week” (Steve Holland, Reuters, Oct. 31). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions
From October 31, 2002 issue.Iraq II: Bill Would Provide Safe U.S. Haven for Iraqi ScientistsA bill introduced this month in the U.S. Senate would grant immigrant visas and permanent residency in the United States to some scientists, engineers and technicians who have worked in Iraqi weapons of mass destructions programs. According to the text of the bill, the proposed Iraqi Scientists Liberation Act, the legislation is designed to encourage “critical aliens” to share information on Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs without fear of reprisal by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (see GSN, April 5; Iraqi Scientists Liberation Act of 2002). “For nearly four years, Iraq has been able to pursue its weapons of mass destruction programs free of international inspections,” said Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who introduced the bill Oct. 8 with Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), in a press release. “Effective renewed inspections must rely on candid interviews with scientists who might have information about what has happened in those four years,” Biden said. “If the scientists are monitored and subjected to pressure by agents of Saddam Hussein’s murderous regime, they will never provide honest answers” (U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee release, Oct. 9). Five prominent arms control experts sent senators a letter this week calling the legislation “vital to ensuring the viability of any strengthened inspection regime.” The bill says that, in addition to strengthening weapons inspections, an exodus of skilled technicians would cripple Hussein’s weapons programs (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2001). “The emigration from Iraq of key scientists, engineers, and technicians could substantially disable Saddam Hussein’s programs to produce weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them,” it says. To qualify, a defector must be “a scientist, engineer, or technician who has worked at any time since Dec. 16, 1998, in an Iraqi program to produce weapons of mass destruction or the means to deliver them,” the bill says. An applicant must also have “critical reliable information” about Iraq’s programs and be willing to share it. The legislation would also apply to immediate families of eligible asylum seekers. The offer would end 36 months after the bill is enacted and would be limited to 500 asylum-seekers, not counting family members. The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee before the current recess (Iraqi Scientists Liberation Act).
From October 31, 2002 issue.China: U.S.-Chinese Company Might Dodge Export ControlsA U.S. business owned by a consortium that includes two Chinese companies might threaten U.S. national security, Insight Magazine reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 1). Chinese entities San Huan New Materials and High-Tech Co., which was started and is still partially owned by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, bought into the U.S. company, Magnequench Inc., in 1995, according to Insight. Magnequench “is little more than a front for the P.R.C. [China],” a senior U.S. analyst said. The Chinese owners are using the company to obtain “state-of-the-art and emerging technology and [to] transfer it to the P.R.C. It’s just another form of espionage,” the analyst said. Magnequench produces rare-earth permanent magnets, which are used in missile guidance systems and in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, according to Insight. Normally, a U.S. company would not be allowed to export technologies and equipment for the magnets to China, but because Magnequench is a U.S. company, there is little control over how its technology is used, according to Insight. The Magnequench technology not only aids China’s nuclear weapons program, it also poses a proliferation risk, the analyst said (see GSN, Oct. 24). “It enables them [China] to produce super-high-quality rare-earth magnets/ring magnets for use in gas centrifuges to produce nuclear-weapons material,” the analyst said. “And in addition to enhancing their own nuclear weapons program, we know that China has already proliferated ring magnets to Pakistan, which played a critical role in developing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.” In February 1996, the Washington Times reported that the CIA had discovered evidence that China was exporting nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan. Congress later confirmed that those exports had included 5,000 ring magnets, according to Insight. Magnequench President and Chief Executive Officer Archibald Cox said he does not think the company’s Chinese partners pose any threat to U.S. security. “There is no story about China stealing technology,” Cox said (Scott Wheeler, Insight Magazine, Oct. 30).
From October 30, 2002 issue.U.S. Response: Task Force Urges Elevation of National Guard Defense RoleBy Bryan Bender A Council on Foreign Relations task force led by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman — both widely credited with warning of the growing threat of domestic terrorism prior to last year’s attacks — provides a stark assessment of U.S. prevention and response capabilities in the face of a WMD attack (see GSN, Oct. 25). “A year after Sept. 11, 2001, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil,” says the report, America Still Unprepared — America Still in Danger. “In all likelihood, the next attack will result in even greater casualties and widespread disruption to American lives and the economy.” The report urges quick and drastic measures to minimize the damage of a large-scale terrorist attack and thereby force terrorist groups to change their strategy. Elevating the Role of the National Guard A key recommendation calls for dramatically expanding the role of the National Guard — now focused on supporting overseas military operations — in defending U.S. territory and responding to terrorist events that state and local authorities are currently ill equipped to address. The prospect that Washington will launch a pre-emptive war against Iraq, to rid it of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, makes it all the more important to take immediate action, according to the report, as those weapons could be used against U.S. targets in retaliation. “The need for immediate action is made more urgent by the prospect of the United States going to war with Iraq and the possibility that [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein might threaten to use weapons of mass destruction in America,” the report says. The report recommends tripling the number of National Guard WMD support teams located around the country from 22 to 66. It also urges new funding to help the National Guard train first responders, and remove Guardsmen from guarding borders and airports, where they are less valuable. “Governors will expect National Guard units in their states to help with detecting chemical and biological agents, treating the victims, managing secondary consequences, and maintaining civil order,” the report says. “The National Guard has highly disciplined manpower spread throughout the nation in 5,475 units. When called up by governors, the National Guard can be used to enforce civil laws — unlike regular forces, which are bound by posse comitatus restricting on performing law enforcement duties.” The National Guard’s medical units, engineer units, military police units, and ground and air transport units will likely prove indispensable in helping manage the consequences of a terrorist attack, the report added. This includes providing critical communications, evacuating, quarantining and protecting residents, utilizing knowledge of chemical, biological and radiological threats and the capacity to supplement local trauma and triage capabilities. New and improved Guard capabilities such as detecting WMD threats in urban areas and greater emphasis on biological warfare are needed, according to the report. “An aggressive approach to revamping the capabilities of National Guard units designated to respond to domestic terrorist attacks can in the short term provide a more robust response capability while states and localities work to bring their individual response mechanisms up to par.” Local Authorities Need Help The report makes a variety of recommendations to beef up public health systems to better identify a biological attack on the food or water supply, train local police, fire and other emergency response personnel, tighten security at border crossings and sea ports and ensure that major cities and counties plan for “truly catastrophic attacks.” “While these scenarios strike many as too horrific to contemplate, imagining and planning for them can potentially make the difference between a 20 percent casualty rate and an 80 percent casualty rate,” the report says. The document outlines a series of significant shortfalls in domestic WMD preparedness. For example, between 1996 and 1999, the federal government was able to provide WMD response training to only 134,000 of the nation’s estimated 9 million first responders. “Furthermore, only 2 percent of these 134,000 responders received hands-on training with live chemical agents.” The Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama, the only facility in the country where first responders can get hands-on experience with chemical agents, can train only 10,000 first responders per year at peak capacity. At the same time, most city and county health agencies lack the resources to operate 24-hour emergency hotlines. The National Association of City and County Health Officials estimate that localities need between 10,000 and 15,000 new employees to work in public health preparedness functions. To deal with chemical and biological outbreaks, local authorities need federal assistance to develop public health surveillance systems and develop and maintain lists of retired doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in an emergency, among many other steps. And without adequate training, local health officials could be at grave risk themselves in the event of a catastrophic attack. “A nuclear, chemical or biological weapon poses a grave danger not only to those who are immediately exposed, but also the entire emergency response and medical care system in the areas where such a weapon might be used,” the report warns. “Heavy losses of seasoned firefighters, emergency technicians, police, and medical personnel can easily compromise a community’s long-term capacity to provide public health and safety.” The report’s authors stress that quick mobilization to prepare for the worst “is an act of prudence, not fatalism.” “U.S. counterterrorism initiatives abroad can be reinforced by making the U.S. homeland a less tempting target,” they conclude. “We can transform the calculations of would-be terrorists by elevating the risk that an attack on the United States will fail, and the disruptive consequences of a successful attack will be minimal.”
From October 30, 2002 issue.Iraq: Chief U.N. Weapons Inspectors to Brief U.S. PresidentThe leaders of the U.N. weapons inspections teams today are expected to brief U.S. President George W. Bush and other senior White House officials on their views of the U.S. draft Security Council resolution on Iraq (see GSN, Oct. 29). Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, are scheduled to brief Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice (Reuters/MSNBC News, Oct. 30). “It’s to consult on a way forward,” a U.S. official said describing Blix and ElBaradei’s visit. “Blix is going to be the guy on the spot. He’s going to be the guy who has to put a team together and take them in.” Blix and ElBaradei’s visit to Washington indicates that the United States is becoming increasingly serious about returning inspectors to Iraq, a U.N. official said. A U.S. official, however, has said the Bush administration has always supported inspections (CNN.com, Oct. 30). U.N. Debate The Security Council began closed-door consultations this morning on the preambular paragraphs of the U.S. draft resolution. Since none of the contentious phrases, such as “material breach,” appear in these 14 introductory paragraphs, council diplomats said most of the discussion is likely to center around the desire of some states to remove from the text any references to issues other than weapons inspections, such as terrorism and the return of Kuwaiti property. One council diplomat said this morning that there is a “positive outlook” about coming to a conclusion, but “that’s not necessarily to say that we think it will all be signed and settled today or even this week.” (Jim Wurst, GSN, Oct. 30). In the background, the United States and France appear to be closer to reaching a compromise on the more substantive issues, according to BBC News. The two countries have discussed a proposal that calls for a single resolution outlining a new inspections regime for Iraq. If Iraq then fails to comply, the United States has agreed to consult the Security Council before taking military action, BBC News reported. The United States still does not support, however, the need for a second U.N. resolution authorizing an attack. While the United States would be involved in the discussions on a second resolution, it would not be bound by it, according to BBC News. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said the compromise has made him optimistic of reaching a final solution on the new resolution. “I know that the progress has been slow, for sure, but it has genuinely been constructive. And I think that the final outcome will be a good one,” Straw said (BBC News, Oct. 30). Debating U.S. Influence Some analysts have said the U.N. debate over a new resolution on Iraq, which has continued for seven weeks, is part of a larger conflict over projection and containment of U.S. power, according to the Washington Post. So far, the U.N. debate has done little to calm international concerns that the Bush administration is only trying to obtain a justification for war, the Post reported. Because the United States has rejected several international agreements since Bush came to office, U.S. allies have become increasingly cynical about U.S. motivations for now going to the United Nations to resolve the Iraq issue, according to U.N. diplomats. “The whole debate is about two issues,” said an envoy from one of the five permanent Security Council members. “One is Iraq. The other is U.S. power in the world. The second issue is the bigger part of the debate.” Within the Security Council, distrust has been growing on both sides of the issue, diplomats said. Many of the proposals made by France and Russia — which also opposes military action against Iraq — have been an attempt to force the United States to seek U.N. approval before attacking Iraq (see GSN, Oct. 25). French President Jacques Chirac has said war can only be used in self-defense or with international support. “In the modern world, the use of force should only be a last, and exceptional, resort,” Chirac said before a recent meeting of French-speaking countries in Beirut, Lebanon. “It should only be allowed in the case of legitimate defense, or by decision of the competent international authorities. Whether we are talking about making Iraq adhere to its obligations, relaunching the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or solving conflicts in Africa, the same logic of legitimacy has to inspire all of us, because only this firmly guards us against temptations of adventure.” U.S. officials have warned that if Iraq fails to comply with the new inspections, there would still be weak international support for military action. To counter this, the Bush administration has sought a resolution that would force other countries to accept a potential military solution, they said. “This is why words are so critical and important now,” said Ivo Daalder, a Brookings Institution fellow who served on the National Security Council staff in the Clinton administration. “It is clear that some of our closest friends, like the French, don’t trust us” (Kessler/Pincus, Washington Post, Oct. 30). Watching the Inspectors Iraq yesterday called for independent media personnel and individuals to accompany U.N. weapons inspectors once they return to Iraq. Without the presence of neutral observers, the United States will use the inspections as justification for war, Iraq said. “We will not allow the inspectors to be the sole source (of information) because we don’t trust them,” Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan said. “We want the inspectors to work clearly under light and I think this won’t annoy anyone but it would rather facilitate their task to look for weapons of mass destruction.” The United States has rejected Iraq’s demand, according to the Beirut Daily Star. “On the Iraqi call for observers for the inspectors, once again Iraq is attaching conditions to something in which they should have no say,” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said. “No matter how meritorious the group of journalists that Iraq might have in mind, the point is Iraq, having said unconditional … inspectors are welcome, is now once again attaching conditions” (Mona Ziade, Beirut Daily Star, Oct. 30). Middle East Command Post Meanwhile, a planned U.S. military exercise involves deploying a new command post in the Middle East that could later be used during an attack on Iraq, according to the Washington Times. The “Internal Look” exercise is scheduled to run for 10 days, and some U.S. military personnel may remain in the region once it is completed, U.S. Army Gen. Tommy Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, said yesterday. The purpose of the exercise is to evaluate Central Command’s abilities to deploy a command-and-control facility at an airbase in Qatar. “Over the last year, Central Command has built a deployable command-and-control capability,” Franks said. “What that actually means is containers of communications gear, very large communications pipes that we’re able to put in the back of an airplane, fly it a long ways, land it on the ground and then set up a command-and-control complex.” Franks said that if the situation in Iraq were to reach a point in which military action became necessary, he believes the United States would receive international support. “My sense is that we have a great many friends, partners and allies who see the situation the same way we do,” he said (Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Oct. 30). Iraqi “Dirty Dozen” The Bush administration has begun developing cases against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other senior Iraqi officials for crimes against humanity if the regime is overthrown, according to U.S. officials (see GSN, Oct. 21). Besides Hussein, other possible Iraqi war criminals include: * Izzat Ibrahim, vice president of the Revolutionary Command Council and deputy supreme commander of the Iraqi military; * Ali Hassan Majid, de facto governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation and known for using chemical weapons against Kurds; * Tariq Aziz, deputy prime minister; * Uday Hussein, the president’s oldest son and commander of the Fedayeen militia; * Qusay Hussein, the president’s second son, head of the Republican Guard and overall commander of the Iraqi security services; * Barzan Ibrahim Tikriti, the president’s half-brother, a presidential adviser and former head of Iraqi intelligence; * Aziz Salih Noman, former governor of occupied Kuwait and former commander of Popular Army in Kuwait; * Watban Ibrahim Hassan, the president’s half-brother, a presidential adviser and former interior minister; * Mohamed Hamza Zubeidi, former deputy prime minister and former head of the Northern Bureau of the Baath Party, Iraq’s ruling political party; * Sabawi Ibrahim Hasan Tikriti, Hussein’s half-brother, former director of Iraqi intelligence and security directorate and * Taha Yassin Ramadan, vice president, commander of the Popular Army and member of the Revolutionary Command Council. Many other Iraqi officials are considered badly tainted by their connections to the Hussein regime and might also face war crimes charges following further investigation, sources said. Two U.S. Defense Department lawyers have been gathering evidence that might be useful to prosecutors, according to U.S. officials. A U.S. State Department-supervised group of about 30 Iraqi exiles and Iraqi-Americans have been developing plans for transitional justice following an overthrow of the Hussein regime, including criminal charges against a larger number of Iraqis. War crimes prosecutions would probably target Hussein and the aforementioned senior Iraqi officials, who have been referred to as the “dirty dozen,” according to the Washington Post. The Bush administration supports trials held in Iraqi courts that would be partially staffed by international judges and lawyers, the Post reported. “We’ll take the lead in setting the tone. From there, it’s hard to say,” said Pierre-Richard Prosper, State’s war crimes ambassador. “We know that Saddam and his dirty dozen are believed to be the leaders responsible for all the atrocities that have occurred there for well over a decade. We know that over 100,000 people have been killed.” There are concerns, however, that by preparing war crimes charges so far in advance, senior Iraqi officials who are facing prosecution will fight harder to remain in power, according to the Post. “You want to get into Iraq the message that you’re not going to kill everybody in the Baath Party,” a U.S. official said (Peter Slevin, Washington Post, Oct. 30). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions
From October 29, 2002 issue.Iraq I: Blix Calls For Tough Inspections RegimeThe U.N.’s chief weapons inspector told the Security Council yesterday the decision of waging war on Iraq would be up to the council, not him. “We’ve seen sometimes stated that we hold peace and war in our hands. We decline that,” Hans Blix said, “Our job is to report and the decision of whether there is war or peace, or reaction, is for the council” (see GSN, Oct. 28). Blix, the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and Director General Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency spoke after presenting their views on the U.S. draft resolution on Iraq’s disarmament. Council members said they wanted to hear what the two thought of the new inspection regime crafted by the United States and United Kingdom. ElBaradei said, “Our role is to establish the facts, it’s for the Security Council to evaluate the facts and determine whether these facts constitute material breach and what is the next step to be taken by the council. This is a council prerogative.” Neither official would go into the specifics of the proposed regime with journalists after briefing the council, but both said it was important that the regime be fully backed by the council. Blix said, “The intention is in the draft resolution … to give very clear signals as to what we can do and to avoid what people have referred to as ‘cat-and-mouse’ play. It is helpful.” British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock said council members “have a better idea now of what precisely the inspectors need ... We will need further time to absorb what we have heard.” He added, “We’re talking about the clarity of what the resolution says … We’re talking about the inspectors and the council being at one about the powers that they have … This is a cooperative process, not a adversarial one.” The United States said the inspectors welcomed the tougher regime outlined in the U.S. draft. Deputy Ambassador James Cunningham said, “I think its clear from their comments that they welcome that authority … that will strengthen their hand and give them the opportunity to do the job the council has asked them to do. We were pleased with that.” Although the French and Russians have circulated their own drafts on inspections, both of which envision less stringent inspection regimes, Blix and ElBaradei limited themselves to comments on the U.S. text since it is the only one of the three formally before the council (Jim Wurst, GSN, Oct. 29) Blix said he was pleased that the U.S. resolution gives inspectors the authority to decide the methods for interviewing Iraqi weapons scientists, but warned that there would be “great practical difficulties” in removing the scientists from Iraq for the interviews, as the U.S. resolution provides. A demand in the U.S. resolution for Iraq to provide a complete declaration of its chemical and biological weapons capabilities 30 days after the resolution is approved, however, would not be practical, Blix said. He and ElBaradei asked the Security Council members to help provide intelligence information on which suspect Iraqi sites inspectors should visit, but also said inspectors would only report to the council (Julia Preston, New York Times, Oct. 29). If the U.N. Security Council cannot agree on a new inspections regime, however, then the inspectors probably will not return to Iraq, Blix said. He indicated that there could be dangers in sending inspectors to Iraq without the full approval of the council. It is “almost inconceivable” to return inspectors to Iraq “while half of the council wants us to be there and the other half of the council does not want us to be there,” Blix said. “Let me stress that from the inspectors’ horizon, council unity is of the greatest importance,” he said. “We have difficulty in acting with full strength if we feel that we do not have the backing” (Allen/Lynch, Washington Post, Oct. 29). U.S-French Compromises Negotiations on the new resolution are still progressing and might continue into next week, Bush administration officials at the United Nations said. The United States and France, which have held differing views so far, have neared a compromise on the language of the new resolution on Iraq, according to the New York Times (see GSN, Oct. 25). U.S. and French officials have agreed that the resolution would contain language in its final paragraphs warning Iraq of “serious consequences” if it failed to disarm — a euphemism for military action, according to the Times (Preston, New York Times). France might also agree to a U.S. demand to also include the phrase “material breach” in the resolution — which the United States believes would create the authority for military action — but only if the Security Council has the authority to determine if Iraq has committed such a breach, according to the Los Angeles Times. France “will accept ‘material breach’ as long as you get the words around them right,” a council diplomat said yesterday. “It’s feasible that we could have an agreement this week.” Much of the debate over the resolution on Iraq has centered on the phrase “material breach,” which means a violation of a resolution, according to the Times. While the Security Council has found Iraq in material breach of a number of previous disarmament resolution, the United States also wants the term to apply to possible future violations as well, the Times reported. “‘Material breach’ is not a subjective term,” said Richard Grenell, spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. “It’s a statement of fact.” The United States views the term as providing a justification for military action, according to the Times. In December 1998, the United States used similar reasoning as the justification for bombing Baghdad in response to Iraq blocking inspectors. U.N. ambassadors said they had been unaware that the United States was going to conduct such an action. “It was a surprise attack,” said a Security Council diplomat. “Not only on them, but on us.” France wants to prevent another such unannounced attack, the Times reported. Since the United States has pushed hard for “material breach” to be included in the resolution, France is concerned that it would also give the United States the ability to determine on its own if such a breach exists (Farley/Wright, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29). United States to Push For Vote U.S. President George W. Bush plans to push for a Security Council vote on a new resolution on Iraq unless a substantial progress on a new inspections regime is made by next week, senior White House officials said yesterday. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is expected to push for the vote before next week, regardless of the level of support for the resolution, officials said. While the United States has not set a formal deadline for a vote on the resolution, Bush is expected to begin building a coalition for military action against Iraq if the Security Council is not close to completing a tough resolution by next week, senior officials said. “We’re not at the point of giving ultimatums,” a senior White House aide said. “The president has made it very clear that we are nearing the end of this process. I predict this will be concluded by the end of next week, but we’re not ruling anything out” (Allen/Lynch, Washington Post). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime) U.N. Resolution 1409 (“Smart Sanctions”) U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Iraqi Sanctions Revisions
From October 29, 2002 issue.Iraq II: Hussein Considers Possible Responses to U.S. AttackBy Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. National Journal In Washington and around the world, the debate rages over what the United States should do about Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein. It’s a safe bet that in the bunkers of Baghdad, Saddam is brainstorming about what he can do to us (see related GSN story, today). True, the might of the U.S. military is overwhelming. But Iraq is not a rock. It will not sit there passively while the U.S. chisels it into a more appealing shape. Analysts can count the troops and tanks, gauge the accuracy of smart bombs, map the bases, and estimate how fast an army can advance over the Mesopotamian terrain. But some critical questions cannot be answered ahead of time: Would Iraq unleash poison gas and other weapons of mass destruction against American invaders? How effective would those weapons be? How hard would it be for U.S. forces to seize Iraqi cities? And above all, which of Saddam’s several security forces would actually stand and fight? U.S. military planners face these and other key questions as they ponder the risks of war with Baghdad. They know that as bad as Saddam’s playing hand appears, he still holds a hole card or two. He certainly made some clever moves during the last Gulf War. He used foreigners and diplomats as human shields to protect key military installations in the run-up to Desert Storm. He let rip a slew of underwater mines that blew up two U.S. Navy ships, he engineered a massive oil spill in the gulf, and he torched most of Kuwait’s oil wells as he retreated north. So, amid much anguished talk about America’s options, especially considering President Bush’s new doctrine of pre-emption, it’s important to remember that Iraq has options of its own. And the first option, experts say, is to strike America first. The Gambler Could Iraq pre-empt the pre-emptors? It may sound improbable. But “probably won’t happen” rings hollow when lives are on the line — as the Kuwaitis discovered when Iraq suddenly overran their country in 1990; and as the Iranians learned when Iraq invaded their country 10 years before; and as former Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul-Karim Qassem found out when a young hothead named Saddam Hussein tried to kill him in 1959. That assassination attempt misfired, but it jump-started Saddam’s rise to the top of the ultranationalist Baath Party. Saddam’s career shows he is a survivor, not a martyrdom-seeker like 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta. But Saddam’s path is hardly a cautious one. Men who make their fortune by taking great risks rarely learn to play it safe, wrote Niccolo Machiavelli five centuries ago in The Prince — not even when changed circumstances would seem to call for caution. So while Saddam keeps a tight lid on his subordinates, the ex-assassin still likes to spring the occasional big surprise himself. Gambles that U.S. analysts dismiss as suicidal might look like good options to Saddam — especially since his advisers are too terrified to tell him otherwise. “You don’t want to be the guy to bring him bad news,” said Raphael Perl, an analyst with the National Academy of Sciences. So even “if he is deterrable,” Perl said of Saddam, “to what degree is he getting the information he needs to make rational decisions?” America’s greatest fear — its declared reason for preparing for war — is that Saddam will lash out at the United States directly one day, maybe even with a weapon of mass destruction (see GSN, Oct. 17). Although most experts agree that Iraq does not have a working nuclear weapon yet, U.N. inspectors in the 1990s found abundant evidence that Saddam had brewed deadly germs, and his forces have already used poison gas. But he may have a problem using these weapons against the United States. The Iraqi dictator’s network of agents around the world has never entirely recovered from the Gulf War. In the early 1990s, “Saddam was very interested in launching terrorist attacks,” said Peter Probst, a former CIA terrorism expert who was working in the Pentagon at the time. But “we wrapped up a considerable number of his operatives before they were able to do it.” Intelligence agents operating under “official cover” out of a number of Iraqi embassies were expelled, and covert agents were arrested. So while Baghdad vigorously smuggles in weapons components from around the world, its capacity to strike abroad has only grown weaker since its failures in the early 1990s. Saddam could turn to independent contractors, but the Arab nationalists he backed in the 1970s have faded from the scene, and Islamic extremists such as al-Qaeda have no love for the secular dictator. Nevertheless, Iraqi agents are repeatedly rumored to have loosed last fall’s anthrax letters on the United States, and to have spread the West Nile virus. Such limited attacks are within Iraq’s capabilities. In the worst conceivable case, a few infected Iraqi secret agents might just be able to spread a contagious bioweapon, such as smallpox, across much of the United States before they died. But as attractive as such revenge might be to Iraqi hard-liners, killing Americans this way would do less than nothing to ensure Saddam’s survival. Potentially far more profitable, and definitely far easier, than hitting the United States itself would be mounting a spoiling biological or chemical attack against U.S. forces and bases in the Persian Gulf. A first strike, especially on the soil of his Muslim neighbors, would cost Saddam the European and Islamic opinion he is counting on to discourage a U.S. attack — but if he sees the American onslaught as inevitable anyway, he just might decide to throw this kind of wild card onto the table. “Our vulnerability is probably greatest during this buildup phase if we have made an announcement that Saddam is toast,” said Dan Christman, a retired Army general who was a key strategic planner for Desert Storm. Christman noted that in 1991, one Scud missile warhead filled with conventional explosives hit the U.S. supply base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 Americans and wounding nearly 100 others — the deadliest single attack on U.S. troops in the war. Next time, an attack with long-lasting “persistent” chemicals against a U.S. base or a Persian Gulf port could contaminate key equipment — and, just as important, scare off the local workforce supporting America’s supply lines. A pre-emptive Iraqi strike could throw the U.S. buildup off schedule and off balance. But how badly? The answer depends on another key unknown: the power of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of Mass Destruction The nightmare scenario about Saddam Hussein is that he sets off an atomic bomb in downtown Washington (see GSN, Oct. 9). But the most alarming possibility is not necessarily the most probable. It would take Saddam at least six months to even attempt such an American Hiroshima, if he got lucky in securing stolen ex-Soviet plutonium and getting helpful terrorists to smuggle in and set off a nuclear bomb. It more likely would take years, if Saddam must rely on Iraq’s own homegrown capabilities to refine the raw material and its remaining agents abroad to deliver the bomb. Either timeline rules out an Iraqi nuke as part of the looming conflict. Biological weapons are a more plausible threat. Iraq has definitely brewed the germs and experimented with how to spread them — with uncertain success. But even the sophisticated U.S. and Soviet biowar programs during the Cold War never produced a truly effective weapon for military purposes (as opposed to terror). “It’s hard to make this work against people like us who have good sanitation,” said Col. Patrick Lang, a retired Army and Defense Department expert on the Middle East. “It’s hard to generate an epidemic in that way, especially against the Army in the field, which is fanatically clean.” By contrast, Iraq has used chemical warfare repeatedly, and effectively, in the past. It is this most limited form of attack, for which Iraq has a track record from its eight-year war with Iran, that Saddam is most likely to use in a new war. In one early experiment in 1983, the Iraqis fired mustard gas uphill at Iranian positions, and learned the hard way that mustard gas is heavier than air; the gas drifted back downhill on the advancing Iraqis. But by the war’s end in 1988, they had mastered the use of chemical weapons. The Iraqis’ choice of targets was telling. The Iranian commanders often sent into battle dense masses of light infantry, slow moving, poorly equipped, and barely trained. But the Iraqis, even when presented with such nearly ideal targets for poison gas, preferred to hit the Iranians as they assembled behind the lines, rather than in the chaotic conditions of battle itself. According to a study drafted by the Army War College in 1990, Iraqi chemical weapons proved most effective against the Iranian support troops in the rear, by disrupting massed artillery, staging areas, supply lines, and command posts. In stark contrast to the Iranians, U.S. ground troops are trained and equipped to survive in toxic zones — and they have the mobility to avoid them entirely. “We didn’t wear our chemical suits,” recalled John Hillen, lieutenant in an armored unit in 1991. “We were going to drive around” any poisoned area. Supplying U.S. forces with all those vehicles and all that defensive gear, however, requires a huge, immobile infrastructure — exactly the kind of target the Iraqis prefer. The Iraqis’ problem, however, is that the U.S. rear is really far to the rear. In the 1980-1988 war against Iran, the Iraqis could mass their artillery to lob chemical shells over the Iranian trenches into their enemy’s rear areas. But even the giant, long-range “superguns” that Saddam is reportedly building from smuggled parts could fire shells 35 miles at most: far enough to hit the most-forward U.S. forces in Kuwait, but not the warehouses, airfields, and ports farther to the rear (see GSN, Oct. 10). As early as the 1980s, the Iraqis experimented with using helicopters and planes to spray poison gas (see GSN, Sept. 5). And recently they have refitted old L-29 training jets, built to train pilots, as remote-controlled drones. But any Iraqi aircraft would have to run a gantlet of U.S. fighters in the no-fly zones as well as missile batteries on the ground. Harder to intercept would be the infamous Scuds, of which any number from six to 60 may have escaped U.N. inspectors. But it takes sophisticated engineering to disperse toxins widely from a missile warhead (explosives burn the chemicals up; a crash drives them into the ground). So Saddam’s chemical weapons with the best reach are literally long shots, while his reliable artillery lacks sufficient range to deliver toxins. As a result, most experts expect what GlobalSecurity.org analyst John Pike calls “a drizzle of death”: a few lucky shots that catch U.S. troops off guard and cause dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of casualties, but don’t derail the invasion. For the Iraqis to stage a truly damaging chemical attack, the Americans would have to come to them — to get within artillery range and stay there. And Iraq would have to keep its chemical batteries hidden from a wide array of U.S. reconnaissance capabilities and from U.S. retaliation. As it happens, Iraq does have one kind of obstacle that could effectively slow down American invading forces and shield Iraqi ambushers. It’s called a city. Urban Warriors U.S. planners did not name the last war on Iraq “Desert Storm” for nothing. The American military’s mobility, high-tech sensors, and long-range weapons proved devastating in the desert, where open sands gave the enemy no shelter. Except for Kuwait City, which the Iraqis gave up almost without a fight, American troops carefully bypassed urban areas. But in a war to topple Saddam’s regime, U.S. forces may not be able to avoid entering his capital; and in a war to liberate the Iraqi people, American troops may have to venture where the people live. A city can suck up soldiers like a sponge, and for much the same reason: There are so many holes to go down. Even a jungle offers fewer ambush sites per acre than an urban area, with its multistory buildings above the street, and sewers (and sometimes subways) below. And a jungle isn’t full of human beings. Even for militaries with no moral inhibitions against shooting anyone in their way, the fact that civilians do get in the way increases the chaos of urban warfare. Thus, when the Russians stormed Grozny in 1995, they needed 60,000 troops and a month to subdue the Chechen capital, and they leveled most of it in the process. In 1993, the more-scrupulous U.S. forces in Somalia still ended up killing scores of civilians in Mogadishu, where America’s last urban battle ended with 18 dead Americans and a humiliating foreign-policy retreat. The close quarters of Somalia’s capital city neutralized the Americans’ high-tech advantages and forced them into a brutal short-range battle, man to man (with women and children in the crossfire). U.S. aircraft overhead tried to give directions to the forces on the ground, only to see troops go astray time and time again in the mazelike streets. Since 1993, the American military has experimented with new gadgets specifically designed for urban combat — miniature robots, sensors that can hear heartbeats through walls — with distinctly mixed results. But while cities can defeat technology, intensive study and drills in urban warfare have highlighted the importance of old-fashioned tactics. In Grozny, for example, Russian armored columns initially drove straight into the city. But as formidable as tanks can be in the open, they can become blind and blundering giants in the tight confines of the city without friendly foot troops to guide them. Of the 120 armored vehicles in that first assault, the Russians lost 105. Conversely, in Mogadishu, the Clinton administration declined to deploy heavy armor. So the U.S. troops fought unprotected — on foot, in lightly armored Humvees, or in Black Hawk helicopters, which proved so vulnerable to Somali militiamen with crude rocket launchers that the definitive book and movie based on the battle are called Black Hawk Down. The solution, called “combined arms,” is one of the oldest in warfare, dating back to the first Mesopotamian warlord who coordinated his spearmen with his archers. Foot troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters have to work together more closely in a city than anywhere else in battle. The infantry goes first, to flush out hidden enemies who may have anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons — and thus forestall a Grozny-style or Black Hawk Down-style ambush. If unprotected foot troops start getting shot to ribbons, as happened in Mogadishu, armored vehicles and attack helicopters are close behind to blast the nests of resistance into powder. And engineers with explosives and bulldozers are there to clear obstacles that could fatally slow the force. Traditionally, “the total of our urban training was basically how to clear rooms, one frontal attack after another,” said Jim Lasswell, a leading urban warfare experimenter at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Va. But with Mogadishu and Grozny in mind, the military is learning how to move through a city without having to level it, and how to focus firepower on a few key objectives without cutting off troops in isolated pockets. The old approach to taking a city was “circle the whole thing, cut it off, and clear it block by block,” said Laswell. In the new urban warfare, “you penetrate a city the way you penetrate into a jungle.” Such a selective approach presumes that the city is not completely infested with enemies. But what if it is? “Every house can have a machine-gun position,” said George Friedman, chairman of Stratfor (Strategic Forecasting). When Hitler made his last stand in Berlin, Friedman said, the remnants of the German army, filled out by “barely armed children and old men,” faced the triumphant, well-equipped veterans of Stalin’s Red Army. The Soviets lost tens of thousands of men. And the city was reduced to rubble. Friedman fears that Saddam’s last stand in Baghdad might turn into a similar bloodbath. More-optimistic experts predict only pockets of resistance in the Iraqi capital: die-hards holed up in a few formidable but easily isolated redoubts that can be picked off one by one, without heavy American losses or Iraqi civilian casualties. “Very few people are going to die in the streets of Baghdad for Saddam Hussein,” predicted retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson, before adding the caveat: “But the road to hell is paved with things that people expected that didn’t happen.” The most important variable in urban warfare, then, is not the geography of the city or the tactics used to attack it, but the resolve of its defenders. The Human Factor A single gunman can sow death and terror, as the Washington area has learned in recent weeks. But waging war takes legions. It is easy to say that “Saddam” will engage in urban or chemical warfare, but obviously the dictator alone can’t defend the streets of Baghdad or turn chemical weapons on U.S. forces. Less obviously, neither can generic “Iraqis” take on the Americans. Although the attitude of the general population will determine the postwar reconstruction (or dissolution) of Iraq, in the initial fury of the fighting, most people will probably just keep their heads down. Defending a city or launching a chemical warhead, however, requires an organized force of some kind. The confusing thing is that Iraq has many kinds. Like most dictators, Saddam insures himself against disloyalty through redundancy: three layers of uniformed soldiers, two rival secret services, and an obscure array of shadowy special groups. It is these legions — not one man, not mobs — that will either fight or fail to. It is the different responses of these different organizations, above all else, that will determine the outcome of the war (see GSN, July 15). Any regime can be depicted as a series of concentric circles around the center of power. For Iraq’s 350,000-strong military, this is literally true. The regular army’s 17 divisions defend the country’s borders; the elite Republican Guard’s seven divisions are held in reserve; and the Special Republican Guard, one handpicked division, defends the city of Baghdad. Even the evolution of the three forces was consecutive. Saddam invaded Iran in 1980 with his regulars, but as the war dragged on, he expanded his Republican Guard from a few palace protectors to an armored counterattack corps. When coup plots and dissent began to fester within the guard, especially after the 1991 Gulf War debacle, Saddam created the Special Republican Guard to be the last-ditch defense force of his regime. The capabilities and loyalties of these three forces vary dramatically. The regular army fought Iran doggedly, if without fervor or tactical flair, only to collapse before America’s Desert Storm. It is unwise to judge all Iraqi regulars by the mass surrenders of 1991: Saddam deliberately exposed his most expendable troops — hastily recalled, half-trained reservists and ill-equipped light infantry — to the U.S. onslaught. Still, a decade of international sanctions against Iraq has starved the mechanized units of spare parts and even usable ammunition, and left them little opportunity to train. Repeated reports say that senior officers in northern Iraq are already making back-channel deals with the Kurdish rebels. For most experts, the debate is not whether Saddam’s regulars will fight effectively, but whether they will fight at all. A bigger unknown is the Republican Guard, whose current strength is estimated at between 60,000 and 100,000 troops. The guard spearheaded Iraq’s counteroffensives against Iran, but its record against Americans is mixed: While other Iraqi forces fled in 1991, the guard’s Tawalkama division stood and fought — and got run over. Since U.S. air strikes and rapid ground thrusts would probably paralyze Iraq’s tightly centralized command system, any future guard resistance would most likely consist of such isolated stands. Nor are the guards political fanatics: Although “elite,” they are picked from the ranks of the regular army, and they include conscripts — many from rebellious Shiite regions in southern Iraq. Yet guard forces brutally suppressed Shiite risings after the Gulf War, saving Saddam’s regime. Their responses to a U.S. invasion would probably depend on their commanders, varying from fierce resistance to paralysis to surrender — or even to outright defection to the Americans. Not even Saddam seems to trust the Republican Guard. He has reportedly banned the guards from entering downtown Baghdad. The capital is garrisoned by the Special Republican Guard, normally about 15,000 strong but able to expand to 20,000 or even 25,000 in a crisis. This force has too few troops to successfully defend Baghdad, a city of nearly 5 million people, but enough to bloody an attacker. Besides these three main uniformed forces, Iraq has a wide range of paramilitaries. No one expects much from the 20,000 part-timers of “Saddam’s Commandos,” the Fedayeen, who occupy themselves with thuggery and rallies. Far more professional are the Mukhabarat, the Baath Party’s secret police, but they are equipped mainly to disappear dissidents, not to battle armies. By contrast, their rivals in Iraqi military intelligence, the Istikhbarat, include expert commandos. The most dangerous, loyal, and secretive organizations in Iraq are those assigned to defend Saddam himself and his prized instruments of power: his weapons of mass destruction. “We certainly were up against some high-quality people [from] the elite security service,” said former U.N. weapons inspector Terence Taylor, who now heads the D.C. office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. And, Taylor added, “they were very quick, if weaknesses were shown, to replace somebody.” The Bush administration has tried to deter Saddam’s subordinates from launching chemical or biological attacks by threatening retaliation immediately and war crimes trials later (see GSN, Sept. 30). But these weapons are tended by the same men who are trusted to guard the dictator himself, men bound to him by blood — not only the blood of Saddam’s clan, but the blood of those they have tortured and killed for him. The Americans might well spare these men if they let Saddam fall. Their fellow Iraqis would not. Knowing that, “they will fight,” said Rahman Aljebouri, an Iraqi schoolteacher who deserted the army and joined up with Shiite rebels before fleeing the country. “They will be scared of revenge from the people. They are criminals themselves. What kind of option will they feel they have?” How large is this hard core, the Iraqis who are so tied to Saddam, so complicit in his crimes, that they will see no other option but to fight for him to the end? Aljebouri estimates this group at more than 50,000. Others guess far fewer: including perhaps 3,000 in the Special Security Organization guarding the weapons of mass destruction, some of the Special Republican Guards, and the senior officials of the secret police. But until the American hammer is obviously about to fall, no one can really know. And that really means no one. Not U.S. analysts. Not Saddam himself. Not even the Iraqi elites who are at this moment quietly agonizing over whether they — and their families — are more likely to survive if they stand by Saddam or if they sell him out. If enough of them defect, it will become impossible for Iraq to wage chemical or urban warfare, and the entire country will fall faster than occupied Kuwait did in 1991. If these leaders hold firm, and if they ruthlessly, effectively exploit Iraqi cities and poison gas as defenses, then the second Gulf War will be far bloodier than the first. In the end, it is up to the nation’s elite. The most crucial battle of the war, the one that shapes the outcome of all the others, will be the one fought inside the minds of these important Iraqis.
From October 29, 2002 issue.International Response: European Union Holds Emergency Response DrillEmergency response teams from Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden took part yesterday in “Euratox 2002” with 800 French security personnel at a French military base (see GSN, June 20). The exercises were designed to test the European Union’s ability to respond to a WMD attack. The EU’s crisis center in Brussels — established after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States — coordinated the response from various member countries in the exercise. The center routinely coordinates access to vaccines and antibiotics, emergency responses and specialized medical treatment. “The events of Sept. 11, Bali and recently the Moscow theater show that these threats are no longer fiction,” said Pia Brucella, head of the European Commission’s Civil Protection Unit (see GSN, Oct. 28). The exercises included a simulated attack on a sports stadium; victims collapsed and had their “symptoms” listed on tags for rescue workers who entered the stadium in biohazard suits. One problem the center is dealing with is a lack of compatibility between equipment from different countries. “Every country works with different material,” said Natale Inzaghi, an Italian firefighter observing the exercises (Kim Housego, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Oct. 29).
From October 28, 2002 issue.Iraq: White House Says the Time Is Now for Vote on ResolutionWith U.N. Security Council talks on Iraq set to resume this week amid continuing disagreement among the council’s permanent members on what a new resolution should look like, U.S. President George W. Bush’s administration today signaled that a vote could be near on a U.S. resolution formally submitted Friday (see GSN, Oct. 25). “The time has come for people to raise their hands and cast their vote,” White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said. “It is coming down to the wire. This is important. The United Nations has debated this now long enough” (Reuters/Yahoo.com, Oct. 28). Fleischer’s remarks followed Bush’s warning over the weekend that Washington “in the name of peace will lead a coalition to disarm” Iraqi President Saddam Hussein if “the United Nations won’t act” and “Saddam Hussein will not act” (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Oct. 27). Permanent council members France, Russia and China have indicated they want language that gives Iraq a greater chance to comply with demands for weapons of mass destruction inspections than would be possible under U.S. proposals (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Oct. 28). As the U.S. resolution was introduced Friday, U.S. diplomats made it clear they could call for a vote at any time on the measure (Julia Preston, New York Times, Oct. 26). The move was met with the submission of informal texts by France and Russia. France also reversed a previous stance by announcing Saturday that it could formally introduce its own resolution, but Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin added that Paris will “try to work with the Americans on the basis of the text they have proposed” (Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, Oct. 27). The United Kingdom, Singapore, Norway, Bulgaria, Colombia and Mauritius are said to be likely to vote with the United States, which would leave Washington short of the nine votes it needs. Along with France, Russia and China, opponents of the U.S. text include Ireland, Mexico, Syria, Guinea and Cameroon, according to the Financial Times (Carola Hoyos, Financial Times, Oct. 26). The New York Times, though, reported that some diplomats said Guinea could support the United States (Preston, New York Times). U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged Saturday that a council vote could go against the United States (Hutcheson/Hayward, Miami Herald, Oct. 27). The council was to hear today from chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s head, Mohamed ElBaradei (see GSN, Oct. 23; Lederer, AP/Yahoo.com).
From October 28, 2002 issue.U.S. Response: Tougher Export Control Regimes NeededBy David McGlinchey Multilateral export control regimes have successfully limited the export of weapons — particularly to “countries of concern” — but a number of shortfalls leave them unable to address some proliferation issues, the report says. The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group have had an impact on weapons proliferation, including by increasing the cost of attaining chemical weapons worldwide and by stunting missile programs in Argentina, Brazil and Egypt. Member nations, however, are not sharing information about export denials and approvals, preventing a complete picture of the regimes’ effectiveness. Countries are also taking harmfully long periods of time to adopt export control changes into their own laws, and once this does occur the regulations are being applied differently worldwide, according to the GAO. “This lapse of time might allow proliferators seeking sensitive items to exploit disparities in regime members’ control lists,” the report says. Export controls are also suffering because countries join the regimes without effective export control systems in place — the United States has identified Argentina, Belarus and Russia as offenders, according to the report. Any effort to reform the regimes, however, would face imposing hurdles, the GAO says. One member can stop a change in a regime, resulting in a “difficult process of making consensus-based decisions,” the report says. The regimes are voluntary, meaning the groups cannot act against blatant violations such as Russia’s sale of nuclear fuel to India (see GSN, April 30). Earlier this year, the Australia Group adopted stricter controls over chemical and biological weapons but there is no penalty for not adhering to them (see GSN, June 21). The report also noted that changing technology makes it difficult to maintain current control lists. “Secondary proliferation,” poses another significant risk to the regimes, as nonmember countries develop the technology to produce weapons of mass destruction. The GAO singled out North Korea for its export of ballistic missile technology. The report recommends the U.S. secretary of state develop a strategy to improve the regimes, report all U.S. denials of export licenses and establish criteria for reviewing the regimes. The secretary should also work with other member nations to toughen the regimes, and as part of that effort the United States should “increase information sharing, improve the consistent adoption and implementation of export controls, and assess ways to overcome organizational obstacles to reaching decision and enforcing members’ compliance with their regime commitments,” the report says. For further information, see: U.S. State Department MTCR Summary Wassenaar Arrangement Web site Wassenaar Participating States Pentagon Executive Summary on Wassenaar
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