Canadian Response:  WMD Is Top Priority for Intelligence Force

Canadian officials are pressing the country’s Security Intelligence Service to focus on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the Ottawa Citizen reported today (see GSN, July 25).

A Sept. 3 letter from Canada’s solicitor general to Ward Elock, the director of the intelligence service, says that addressing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons is “an even more urgent priority” in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.  The letter directs the service’s efforts for the coming year, according to the Citizen.

Almost every terrorist organization in the world uses Canada to raise money, recruit members, forge documents or plan attacks, the Citizen reported (Jim Bronskill, Ottawa Citizen, Nov. 21).

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Iraq:  U.N. Inspection Chiefs Complete “Constructive” Visit

U.N. weapons inspectors yesterday completed talks with Iraqi officials in Baghdad in advance of a new round of inspections (see GSN, Nov. 19).

The talks with Iraqi officials over the impending inspections were “constructive,” “professional” and “businesslike,” according to U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Iraq has agreed to provide a full declaration of its WMD programs by Dec. 8 as mandated by a new U.N. resolution, and the first weapons inspections are set to begin Nov. 27, Blix and ElBaradei said after returning to Cyprus from Iraq.

The inspections set to begin next week will be “the real test” of Iraq’s willingness to comply with the new U.N. resolution, ElBaradei said.  “We hope their words and commitments will translate on the ground into real, full cooperation,” he added (IAEA Release, Nov. 20).

While in Baghdad, U.N. officials reopened the inspectors’ former headquarters, Blix said.  The site had been closed since 1998, when U.N. inspectors left Iraq because of impending U.S. and British airstrikes (Associated Press/Jerusalem Post, Nov. 20).

U.S. War Plans

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has begun requesting contributions of military personnel and support from U.S. allies to aid U.S. troops in the event of a war with Iraq, White House officials said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 18).

U.S. embassies in 50 countries have been directed to evaluate the willingness of other national leaders to participate in an attack if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is found to have violated the new U.N. resolution, according to the Washington Post.

“Our diplomacy has to be backed by the credible threat of force,” a senior administration official said.  “The best way to keep Saddam focused is to make sure he realizes we’re serious.  If Saddam fails to disarm, we and other members of the U.N. would seek to enforce the resolution.”

Non-U.S. troops would be of little direct assistance in a U.S. war in Iraq because they often lack technology necessary to work with U.S. troops, the Post reported.  U.S. officials believe, however, that non-U.S. troops could play a valuable role in later peacekeeping operations.  In addition, special forces units from several countries were involved in the war in Afghanistan, and the United States would probably welcome similar assistance during a military campaign in Iraq, according to the Post.

The White House has received “a great deal of support” from other countries on the idea of possible military action against Iraq, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday.

“People, countries are coming in,” Rumsfeld said.  “The Department of State has been talking to various countries and there are a growing number of countries that have said that they want to be helpful in the event that it becomes necessary for a coalition of countries to use force in Iraq,” he added.

U.S. President George W. Bush is “not close,” however, to deciding whether to form such a coalition against Iraq, Bush said in an interview with Czech television released yesterday.

“We’re not close to that decision point yet because we’re just beginning the process of allowing Saddam the chance to show the world whether or not he will disarm,” Bush said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Defense Department is ready to call up thousands of reservists to active duty without a standard 30-day notification if the situation requires them quickly, a senior Pentagon official said yesterday.

“If it has to be zero and we call them up and say, ‘Report tomorrow,’ we will do that,” said Thomas Hall, assistant defense secretary for reserve affairs (Loeb/Ricks, Washington Post, Nov. 20).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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Pakistan:  Surgeon Suspected of Aiding Al-Qaeda WMD Freed

Authorities released Pakistani orthopedic surgeon Amir Aziz yesterday after secretly holding him for a month on suspicion of aiding al-Qaeda’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Oct. 22).

Aziz said FBI and CIA agents questioned him about possible involvement in helping al-Qaeda develop nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons.  The accusations were “the most ludicrous thing I have heard in my life,” Aziz said.

Aziz was freed in advance of a deadline set by the Lahore High Court, which had twice ordered his release.  Authorities never told Aziz why he had been detained nor gave him access to a lawyer, he said.

“They didn’t torture me physically, but can you imagine being in one room for a month, being asked questions for eight hours a day?” Aziz said.  “I told them that I was an orthopedic surgeon — what do I know about biological and chemical weapons? — but they were not prepared to listen to this” (Phil Reeves, London Independent, Nov. 20).

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NATO Response:  NATO to Approve New WMD Initiatives; Special Focus on Biodefense

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — NATO members this week plan to agree on steps to improve the alliance’s ability to respond to nuclear, chemical and biological incidents caused by terrorists or rogue states, according to alliance officials and documents.

As NATO heads of state gather in Prague Thursday and Friday to invite seven new members to join their ranks — expanding the Western military alliance further eastward into the territory of the former Soviet Union — summit participants are expected to approve at least five new initiatives.

“Special considerations” are to be given to enhancing biological defenses, considered a key shortfall in NATO planning over the years, which has been more concerned with nuclear and chemical weapons, according to the documents.

Collectively known as the NATO Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense Initiatives, first proposed in June, the new initiatives call for developing an alliancewide disease surveillance system; establishing a nuclear, biological and chemical event response team; creating a mobile nuclear, biological and chemical analytical laboratory; establishing a coordinated NATO stockpile of chemical and biological defense materials; and expanding nuclear, biological and chemical training and education.

“The NBC Defense Initiatives were developed by NATO’s Senior Defense Group on Proliferation and endorsed by defense ministers in June 2002,” according to a NATO briefing.  “They were designed to serve as a first step in addressing the most critical deficiencies in NATO’s NBC defenses.  These initiatives will be developed over the next year and will emphasize multinational participation and the rapid fielding of enhanced capabilities.”

As part of its shift away from defending Western Europe from conventional military attack to preparing for new threats, NATO will also outline a new command structure to better reflect new realities, officials said.

The clearest sign of the new direction may be discussion of a NATO response force of up to 20,000 troops that could quickly deploy in the event of a crisis both inside and beyond the alliance’s historic sphere of influence.

NATO members are expected to extend invitations to the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.  The new NATO-Russia Council, meanwhile, also plans to discuss future cooperation with Moscow.

As the alliance expands eastward, however, NATO officials have said that the threat from weapons of mass destruction — to military forces as well as population centers — is also expanding and that the alliance must take steps to improve its capability to deal with a catastrophic event — particularly a biological attack.

The documents acknowledge that NATO is particularly deficient in biological defense, noting that “NATO capabilities are optimized for chemical defense” rather than biological weapons.  The first step is to establish a disease surveillance system to collect information on unusual disease outbreaks, alert NATO commanders of a biological outbreak and fuse the data with other information sources.

To respond to an attack involving weapons of mass destruction, NATO members plan to establish a prototype nuclear, biological and chemical event response team to assess the effects of a WMD event, advise commanders on mitigating the effects and enable the alliance to “reach back” to national experts for technical advice.

The response team would include an NBC-trained commander, a biological weapons specialist, an NBC specialist, a medical doctor, an NBC explosive ordnance expert, a communications specialist and a public affairs and information operations support officer.  Equipment might include detection devices, communications equipment and NBC assessment tools.

Also needed, according to NATO, is a mobile laboratory that could be quickly and easily transported to investigate and collect samples of a possible nuclear, biological or chemical contamination and conduct highly reliable scientific analysis of samples.

Meanwhile, alliance members will probably agree to pool their resources, establishing a NATO chemical-biological defense stockpile that will help members to identify and share national supply inventories, rapidly move needed materials and improve medical treatment protocols, according to the NATO documents.

Lastly, NATO plans to seek during the next year to enhance the knowledge of senior officials on nuclear, biological and chemical issues through education, while improving understanding of the operational effect of WMD weapons and otherwise strengthening WMD training.

U.S. national security adviser Condoleeza Rice, briefing reporters last Friday on the summit, said that in the future NATO will have to focus new attention on the threat from weapons of mass destruction.

“Iraq is typical or the most important example of the kind of threat that NATO will face in the future,” she said.

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International Response:  Barak Calls for Improving International Readiness

By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire

LAS VEGAS — Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak warned yesterday that another major terrorist attack, one that could possibly involve biological weapons, is “a simple matter” and could prevent a global economic recovery.

An unprecedented level of international cooperation and spending would be needed to prevent such an attack, said Barak, speaking to participants, and later to reporters, at a biological terrorism conference.  Officials need to improve international cooperation in intelligence, law enforcement and immigration, he said, adding that scientists also need dramatically more support to defend against the threat of biological weapons.

In particular, Barak cited the threat posed by shipping containers, noting that 15 million are in use at any one time.

“A major simultaneous attack of a biological nature by terrorist groups,” using shipping containers is plausible risk, Barak said.  “It is frightening how simple an attack could be,” he said.

Barak praised the U.S. Container Security Initiative, a program to inspect and secure cargo at its point of origin (see GSN, Nov. 11).  Nevertheless, he suggested, U.S. efforts to deploy scanners to detect radioactive materials at ports and border crossings are misdirected and narrowly focused (see GSN, Oct. 21).

“There is a need for a globally coordinated effort” to secure shipping containers, Barak said.  Such an effort, he said, would involve creating a real-time tracking system for shipping containers and an improved system of seals to ensure that containers remain closed after they are loaded.  With shipping containers each costing $1,200-$1,500 to purchase, Barak estimated that tracking and sealing equipment could be procured for an additional few thousand dollars per container.

“Once containers are controlled, you reduce exposure dramatically to the risk of terrorist attack,” Barak said.

Critical Training

Adequate preparation is the only way to address terrorist attacks, Barak said, highlighting some of the strategies Israel is pursuing to prevent and respond to possible WMD attacks.  Effective preparation would have two primary results, deterring terrorists from executing attacks and reducing the effects of attacks when they do occur, he said.

In broad terms, proper preparation requires intensive scientific research and development, thorough training of emergency first responders and successful public education campaigns.  Provided with adequate equipment, training and education, Israelis can face WMD attacks with confidence, Barak said.

To address the risk of a biological attack, Israel has vaccinated 10,000 first responders against smallpox, Barak said.  If an attack were to occur, Barak said Israel would then proceed to vaccinate the entire population.  In addition, Barak said he thought Israel should seriously consider making the vaccine available to anyone in Israel who wished to receive it (see related GSN story, today).

To address the risk posed by chemical weapons, Israel has supplied its entire population with chemical protection equipment, primarily gas masks, but the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that training how to use the equipment is critical.

Barak recalled that Iraqi missile attacks during the 1991 Gulf War were responsible for the deaths of 15 Israelis.  One victim was killed by a missile blasting through the open door of his shelter and the rest were killed by responding improperly to the attacks.  Some suffocated in improperly donned gas masks and one or two died after injecting themselves with government-distributed atropine, fearing a chemical attack, Barak said.

Given proper training, however, the confidence supplied by adequate preparation is invaluable, Barak said.  Israeli troops training with chemical protection gear, for example, are put in rooms contaminated with chemical simulants to demonstrate the gear’s effectiveness.  Such training ensures that personnel will be willing to enter an area under chemical attack.

Iraq response

Although preparing to respond to WMD attacks is necessary, the best strategy for addressing WMD threats is to prevent them altogether, Bark said, hinting that if the United States were to take military action against Iraq, Israel would act to protect itself from any counterattack (see GSN, Oct. 18).

Despite the scope of the problem, Barak predicted success in addressing the WMD threat.  “I’m confident that if we focus and converge our efforts, we will prevail,” he said.

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U.S. Response:  Proponents of Export-Control Reform Plan to Revisit Issue

By William New

CongressDaily

WASHINGTON — The U.S. House’s failure to reform the country’s export-control regime before the apparent end of its work in the 107th Congress leaves the technology industry back at the drawing board on the high-priority issue, but a key senator already plans to reintroduce a revised version of the Senate-passed export-control bill in the next Congress, his spokesman said Monday (see GSN, Nov. 4).

The export reform bill remains one of the highest priorities of Senate Banking member Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.), the spokesman said, “and he will continue to work diligently next year to see it passed into law.”  Enzi will work with other parties to the debate to make changes before introducing a revised measure, he said.

The White House and House leadership tried to clear a minimal bill that would have renewed the 1979 Export Administration Act and ended a standard that restricts computer exports based on the millions of theoretical operations per second that computers perform.  EAA governs exports of commercial products with potential military uses.

But Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) blocked the effort, sources said.  Hunter is expected to assume chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee in January.  The defeat of the bill forces the tech industry to rethink its strategy.

“While we’re disappointed, we now feel we can get bipartisan House and Senate leadership and the White House on board to get something done next year,” said Ralph Hellmann, senior vice president for government affairs at the Information Technology Industry Council.  “Sadly, there’s an acknowledgement that EAA’s not going to get any easier in the next Congress, and it forces us to find solutions to the MTOPS [issue] that may not be comprehensive.”

Following a White House meeting on EAA last week, officials decided to push for a limited bill, according to an industry source.  They crafted their first compromise plan, for a short-term renewal of the 1979 EAA and a repeal of the MTOPS, last Tuesday (see GSN, Aug. 6).  When it became clear that Hunter would block it, officials proposed a straight renewal of the EAA until next year, but Hunter blocked that as well.

Edmund Rice, president of the Coalition for Employment Through Exports, outlined “key decision points” for the issue in the next Congress.  He said it must remain a priority for the Bush administration.  The position of incoming Senate Banking Chairman Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), who has opposed export-control reform in the past, and the House Armed Services Committee also are key, Rice said.

“We’ll continue to work with Congress on this when they return,” White House spokeswoman Claire Buchan said Monday. “There are a number of items of unfinished business” to be taken up when lawmakers return, she said.

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Iraq:  U.N. Inspectors Meet with Baghdad Officials

An advance team of U.N. weapons inspectors met with Iraqi officials last night in what a U.N. spokesman said was a useful round of discussions on preparations for weapons inspections (see GSN, Nov. 18).

The meetings yesterday focused on a timeline for U.N. Resolution 1441, which outlines a new inspections regime for Iraq, said Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix.  Inspection teams will probably not reach their full complement for several weeks because some inspectors are not able to join immediately, Buchanan said today.

“There are people who we trained but they’ve gone back to their normal jobs and now some of them are getting leave of absence so that they can come down here to Baghdad and get on with inspection process,” Buchanan said (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo! News, Nov. 19).

Most of the inspections will be carried out on a “no-notice” basis “and therefore we will not say in advance where the inspections are going to take place,” Buchanan said today.  For the inspections to be credible, Iraq must provide access to suspected WMD sites on an “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted basis,” as mandated by the new resolution, he added.

Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, met last night with Iraqi Brig. Gen. Hossam Amin and Gen. Amer al-Saadi, a presidential adviser who had negotiated some terms of inspections with Blix in Vienna last month.

“I think we are making progress,” Blix said after last night’s meeting, which lasted about two hours (Agence France-Presse, Nov. 19).

Swiss Aid

Three Swiss technicians are scheduled to arrive in Baghdad tomorrow to help prepare the U.N. inspectors’ headquarters, according to swissinfo.  Additionally, 10 more technicians such as plumbers, electricians and engineers plan to arrive soon to renovate the site to make it ready for inspectors (swissinfo, Nov. 18).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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Iraq I:  Advance U.N. Inspectors Arrive

The first U.N. weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq today to begin preparations for a new round of weapons inspections as mandated under a new U.N. resolution (see GSN, Nov. 15).

“A new chapter of inspection” has begun, Ewen Buchanan, chief spokesman for the inspection team, said before the team left Cyprus for Iraq.

The team is prepared to meet the challenge of making sure Iraq complies with the new resolution, said Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).  He added that he hoped Iraq would not try to hide anything.

Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said yesterday that there was agreement on the need for “intrusive verifications — that means we would go everywhere, we will use every means at our disposal to make sure that Iraq does not have weapons of mass destruction.”

Inspectors plan to interview certain Iraqis in locations out of the country for their own safety if they might know vital information on WMD programs, ElBaradei said (see GSN, Nov. 15).  He added, however, “if people do not want to talk, we obviously will not be able to force them to talk” (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Nov. 18).

Schedule

The next step in the inspections process is scheduled for Nov. 20, when IAEA technicians are to travel to Baghdad to being preparing for nuclear inspections (see GSN, Nov. 14).  IAEA and UNMOVIC inspectors are set to arrive in Baghdad Nov. 25, with limited inspections to begin shortly thereafter.  Iraq has until Dec. 8 to submit a declaration of its WMD programs to the IAEA, UNMOVIC and the U.N. Security Council (IAEA release, Nov. 15).

UNMOVIC and the IAEA must begin operations within Iraq by Dec. 23, which both agencies are expected to meet easily, according to Agence France-Presse.  The two agencies are supposed to update the Security Council on the progress of the inspections by Feb. 21, AFP reported.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA have within 60 days of beginning operations to outline “the key disarmament tasks” that Iraq must undertake.  Such a program would require Security Council approval.  Once inspections are underway and the remote monitoring system is in operation, Blix and ElBaradei are to report to the Security Council every 120 days (Agence France-Presse, Nov. 18).

Effective Inspections

In his last news conference before leaving for Iraq, Blix said Friday that the first inspectors should begin their work on Nov. 27, less than two weeks before Iraq is required to report to the Security Council on its weapons programs.  The 60-day countdown for the inspectors to report to the council will then begin, he said.  If Iraqi officials fail to fully reveal weapons programs by Dec. 8, the council might find Iraq in material breach of Resolution 1441, according to the text of the ruling.

“This is one of the most important moments we foresee,” Blix said.  “We have a great many questions,” Blix said.

Under repeated questioning, Blix refused to give any specifics as to what would constitute a “material breach,” according to the resolution, that could trigger military action against Iraq.

“We do not judge whether something constitutes a material breach,” he said.  “We will report factually on what has happened, and then it is for the Security Council to assess whether it constitutes a material breach … and it is for the council to decide what they will do about it.  One should not run to the conclusion that now there will be armed action,” he added.

“You need to nuance it,” Blix said, illustrating with an example using flat tires.  One flat tire on an Iraqi vehicle accompanying inspectors may mean nothing, but “four flat tires on the way out, delaying us much more, then it may be a different thing,” he said.  “What this points to is that you may have to take into account whether you can read an intention into something,” he added.

In response to Arab League and Iraqi demands that Arabs be included on the inspection teams, Blix said only that Jordanians have applied for posts.

“We have not had nominations,” he said.  UNMOVIC’s roster consists mostly of people from the United States, followed by France and Russia, he said, adding that he expects more Arab applications for the next training course in January (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Nov. 18).

United States vs. United Nations

The United States and the United Nations disagree over how aggressively inspectors should conduct their operations within Iraq, U.N and U.S. officials said.  The Bush administration has called for the strictest possible inspections, while Blix has called for a more measured approach, according to the Washington Post.

U.S. President George W. Bush has said that a “zero-tolerance” approach should be taken in regard to Iraq, meaning that even minor infractions of the new U.N. resolution could lead to potential military action.  Blix, along with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and some Security Council members, have said Iraq will only be held accountable for serious violations of the resolution.

“The U.S. does seem ... to have a lower threshold than others may have” to justify military action, Annan said last week before meeting with Bush.  “I think the discussion in the council made it clear we should be looking for something serious and meaningful, and not for excuses to do something,” he added (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, Nov. 17).

U.S. War Plans

The United States is prepared to wait for Iraq’s response to U.N. inspections before going to the Security Council for a debate on possible military action, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 11).

“It seems to me that what will happen is a pattern of behavior will evolve and then people will make judgments with respect to it,” he said (Mroue, Associated Press).

The White House, however, has begun taking several diplomatic and military steps to prepare for an attack on Iraq, U.S. and allied officials said.  Such steps, which could take up to months to complete, include formalizing the roles of U.S. allies in an attack, discouraging Iraq’s neighbors from conducting their own actions and deciding whether to obtain Security Council approval for a strike, according to the New York Times.

The United States is seeking to accomplish two goals by beginning preparations for an attack, the Times reported.  One is to present a credible threat of force to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, which could cause him to comply with the resolution.  The second is to be ready for military action before the summer heat begins next year.

Some progress has already been made, U.S. officials said.  Several Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including Kuwait and Qatar, have given informal assurances of basing and overflight rights, according to the Times.  Those assurances, however, still need to be formalized.  Rumsfeld is expected to meet with U.S. allies this week during the NATO summit in Prague to discuss how allied troops could be replace U.S. forces stationed in Europe and the United States that would be moved to the Middle East.

The United States has also begun amassing tanks and heavy equipment for more than 30,000 soldiers stationed in several Middle Eastern countries and on nearby ships, the Times reported.  Additional heavy equipment for Army and Marine divisions will probably arrive in the region in three to four weeks.

A portion of a total U.S. force of about 250,000 troops needed to begin an attack on Iraq could be in position within 30 days of a presidential order to do so, senior U.S. military officials said.

“We’re making preparations every day,” U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Friday.  “I don’t want to start saying exactly when we’re at peak readiness, but it would be a terrible mistake for anyone to underestimate our ability to act if needed.”

The United States has also begun convincing key Iraqi neighbors such as Turkey and Iran, of the need for restraint, according to the Times.  In exchange, Turkey has called on the United States to provide assurance that Iraq’s Kurdish population, located predominately in the northern part of the country, will not try to form its own state.  In order to help reduce Turkish concerns, the Pentagon is planning to send U.S. troops to protect oil fields around the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, the Times reported.

Washington has also begun attempting to convince Iran to stay out of any conflict with Iraq because of concerns that Tehran could attempt to incite Iraq’s Shiite majority, which belongs to the same branch of Islam as most Iranians, to capture Baghdad or to form its own country (see GSN, Aug. 9).  In exchange for its cooperation, however, Iran wants the United States to release billions of dollars of assets frozen after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, according to the Times.  Iran also wants assurances of U.S. assistance for Iraqi refugees who might enter Iran in the event of war.

Iran’s attempts to negotiate with the Untied States were evident when Javad Zarif, Iran’s U.N. ambassador, tried to gain permission to meet with members of the U.S. Congress, the Times reported.  The U.S. State Department, which must approve Zarif’s travels beyond New York, refused to grant him permission to stay overnight, and he canceled the trip.

“I think sooner or later we will have better relations with Iran,” U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Friday.  “We stay in touch with people who might be on the same side of this as us, but I don’t want to give the impression there is a great rapprochement about to take place with respect to Iran” (Dao/Schmitt, New York Times, Nov. 18).

Iraqi Mobile Biological Laboratories

In Iraq, U.S. officials are concerned about finding and destroying mobile biological weapons laboratories, the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 14).

U.S. officials have said they are unsure how many such laboratories exist or what they look like, although they have pictures of what appear to be laboratories housed in 18-wheel tractor-trailers, according to the Times.  Iraq might use several different types of vehicles to confuse pursuers, experts said.

“We know they’re there,” a senior U.S. intelligence official said.  “We don’t know 100 percent what’s in them,” the official added (see GSN, Nov. 12).

The official compared the task of searching for the mobile biological weapons laboratories with the search last month for a white truck believed to be used by a sniper in the Washington area.

“Look how many white vans were stopped here in D.C. looking for a sniper,” the official said.  “There are a lot of trucks (in Iraq), a lot of trailers ... I think it’s going to be real hard to find them,” the official added.

If the confusion resulting from a U.S. attack were to enable a group such as al-Qaeda to obtain biological agents, the situation could become “the greatest proliferation disaster in history,” said Daniel Benjamin, a former National Security Council official.

Even if all of the mobile biological facilities are discovered, there is debate about the best way to handle them, according to the Times.  While the laboratories could be destroyed, such a course of action could also result in the dispersal of any freeze-dried biological agents inside, an official said.

“Without knowing what’s in it, you’d be ill-advised to just bomb it,” the official said.  “If you drop a 500-pound bomb on a truck, even if it’s a ‘smart’ bomb, you may be releasing some real bad stuff on a community,” the official added (Richter/Miller, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17).

Improved Detection Equipment

U.N. inspectors now have at their disposal a wide range of WMD detection equipment — ranging from more portable sample-collection devices to ground-penetrating radar systems that can detect electrical equipment up to 100 feet below the ground — that will make them better equipped than they were in 1998, developers said.

Combined with an improved remote monitoring system, the new detection equipment has enabled U.N. inspectors to better detect illicit WMD materials, even if a site has been thoroughly cleaned before they arrive, the London Guardian reported.

“It’s a matter of time and of retaining custody of the sample,” said John Carrico of Smiths Detection.  “These technologies have been improved to get down to very trace levels,” he said.

Inspectors have said, however, that improved detection equipment cannot substitute for “human factors,” such as intelligence and training.

“You guys are putting way too much emphasis on the technology,” said Mark Gwozdecky, IAEA senior spokesman.  “The most important aspect that the inspector has is his human intelligence, and the sixth sense that comes after you’ve developed some experience and judgment” (Oliver Burkeman, London Guardian, Nov. 18).

Iraq Increases Nuclear Efforts

Meanwhile, Iraq has increased its efforts over the last few months to illegally purchase weapon-grade uranium, according to David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq.

“They’ve been on a much more active campaign to buy enough material to build at least one or two bombs,” Kay said.

There have been reports of Iraqi agents traveling to former Soviet states such as Ukraine as well as to other Middle Eastern countries, China and South Africa to attempt to purchase nuclear materials, Kay said.  “They were traveling with bags of money,” he said of the Iraqi agents (Hamilton/Lathem, New York Post, Nov. 18).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

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International Response:  Nonproliferation Regimes Lack Bite, Officials Say

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Although weapons control regimes are central to nonproliferation goals, they must be strengthened to remain significant, a senior U.N. official and a senior U.S. diplomat agreed Friday.

Countries must increase enforcement and funding to keep such regimes healthy, according to the officials, U.N. Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf, who spoke at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

It is striking that the messages from the United States and the United Nations overlap extensively, according to Institute for Defense Analyses researcher and George Washington University professor Brad Roberts, who sat on a conference panel with Wolf and Dhanapala.  Most observers expected the officials’ speeches to be sharply at odds on regime issues, Roberts said.

Enforcement

Poor local enforcement plagues international weapons agreements, Dhanapala said.

“All regimes are weak in the area of enforcement,” he said.  There is a “lack of congruency between treaty obligations and domestic laws and policies.”  He described the problem as one ”that is especially apparent with respect to export controls and nuclear weapons governance,” he added.

The United States supports some nonproliferation efforts, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, but the world often fails to react when countries violate international agreements and nonproliferation controls, Wolf said.

“We see them [regimes] as one, but not the only tool,” he said.  “While strong regimes are necessary, they are hardly sufficient.  Rigorous enforcement is absolutely necessary,” he added.

Regimes will not work if member countries do not respond strongly to violations, according to Wolf.

“What’s missing in today’s international debates is some sense of outrage,” Wolf said.  Instead, nonproliferation dialogue focuses on fine points of the language and structure of agreements, he added.

Funding

A shortage of funding also handicaps nonproliferation regimes, Dhanapala said.

There is a “lack of investment in research and development to support disarmament goals in contrast to the ample funds available for maintaining nuclear stockpiles and undertaking research on new weapons,” he said.

The United States increased its International Atomic Energy Agency funding by $14 million from 1997 to 2002 and the international community must also financially support nonproliferation goals, Wolf said.

“Will countries just pay lip service to IAEA’s mounting responsibilities or will they provide it with muscle to get the job done?” he asked.  “We’ve started a major initiative … starting with a real increase in IAEA’s regular budget for safeguards,” he added.

Nonproliferation regimes will not succeed if they are not supported by a broad spectrum of countries, according to Dhanapala.

“If the treaty-based regimes are to achieve their full potential, they will require stronger support from all nations, from the most powerful — who have the financial [and] political … means — to the smallest,” he said.

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Al-Qaeda:  Terrorists Made Chemical, Biological Agents, U.S. Says

U.S. intelligence officials are “100 percent certain” that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network developed chemical and biological agents and conducted experiments with them prior to U.S. military action in Afghanistan last year, Newsweek magazine reported this week (see GSN, Oct. 22).

Al-Qaeda operatives also acquired a small amount of radiological material that could be intended for use in a “dirty bomb.”  It is not clear, however, whether the terrorist organization had built such a device, according to Newsweek.

Abu Zubaydah, an al-Qaeda leader held by the United States, told intelligence officials that U.S. newspapers provide the group with ideas for terrorist attacks, according to a classified U.S. intelligence report.  A newspaper report provided the inspiration for attempts to build a dirty bomb, he said (Newsweek, Nov. 25).

Meanwhile, an imprisoned Tunisian man told a Belgian radio journalist that he had planned to attack a U.S. Air Force base in eastern Belgium that reportedly stores nuclear warheads.

The interview with Nizar Trabelsi marks the first report of a specific plot to attack a nuclear installation in Europe.  Belgian and NATO officials have not said whether the base holds nuclear weapons, an accusation made by experts and nuclear activists.

Trabelsi said he had intended to drive explosives into a bunker that holds nuclear weapons (Straits Times, Nov. 17).

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Iraq II:  “Dusty” Weapons Powder Proliferates Across Border

Iraq last month imported as much as 25 metric tons of colloidal silicon dioxide, a powder that, according to U.S. intelligence documents, might be used to make “dusty” chemical weapons that can penetrate protective military clothing (see GSN, Nov. 6).

U.N. officials approved the powder — sold under the brand name Aerosil by German chemical company Degussa AG — because it has legitimate commercial uses, the Associated Press reported.  Nevertheless, its grains are small enough — 12 nanometers wide — to fit in microscopic openings in protective suits.

Analysts and experts are concerned by the developments, AP reported.

Iraq produced dusty weapons in the 1980s that could penetrate protective suits, according to a declassified report from the Defense Intelligence Agency, which recommended covering suits with rain ponchos to reduce exposure.  In 1989 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein directed Samarra Drugs Industry — the importer of the Aerosil — to produce chemical and biological weapons, according to Richard Spertzel, a former head U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq.

“Do you know how much (dusty agent) a kilogram of that stuff makes?  A couple cubic feet,” Spertzel said.  “This gives me another thing to worry about,” he added (Associated Press/Boston Globe, Matt Kelly, Nov. 18).

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Iraq I:  IAEA Chief Will Look for “Pattern” of Obstruction by Iraq

Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The international official responsible for dismantling Iraq’s suspected nuclear weapons program said yesterday that he would look for a “pattern” of obstruction before reporting Baghdad’s noncompliance with the new inspections regime.

“If there is a pattern of lack of cooperation, then we have to report to the Security Council and the Security Council will decide if that is a material breach,” Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  If, however, “there is minor omission and this is clearly not intentional, we are not running to the Security Council to say that it’s a material breach.”

His comments — just four days before he is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad in advance of the inspection teams along with Hans Blix, chief of the U.N. team responsible for locating and destroying chemical and biological weapons — mark the first clear indication of what will be considered a breach of Iraq’s pledge to cooperate fully.

ElBaradei’s views appear, however, to be at odds with the Bush administration.  The White House has said that any indication of Iraqi intransigence will be considered a breach of its obligations.

U.S. President George W. Bush said Wednesday that a policy of “zero tolerance” would be followed regarding Iraqi noncompliance.  “We will not tolerate any deception, denial or deceit, period,” Bush said before meeting with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Washington.

Bush has pledged to lead a coalition to forcibly disarm Iraq and overthrow its leader, Saddam Hussein, in the event that Baghdad does not comply with U.N. Resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council last week, warning of “serious consequences” if the regime once again fails to live up to its international agreements and does not provide irrefutable evidence that it is free of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 8).

ElBaradei, meanwhile, outlined five “interrelated prerequisites” that he believes are necessary for the new round of inspections to work.  They include:

*         immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority provided for in the U.N. resolution;

*         ready access to all sources of information — including timely intelligence information from U.N. members;

*         unified and unequivocal support from the U.N. Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in the case of noncompliance;

*         active cooperation from Iraq, including demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and allow inspectors to fulfill their mission without conditions; and

*         the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspections teams, free from outside influence.

In an apparent caution to the Bush administration, ElBaradei said, “Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone credibility.”

The IAEA head also ruled out making any requested adjustments to the makeup of the agency’s inspection team.  The Arab League has proposed that Arab countries be better represented.  “Diversity is necessary,” ElBaradei said, but “the key is competence and impartiality.”

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Threat Assessment: U.S., Europe Hold Divergent Views of WMD Threat

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States and its European allies have different perceptions of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, but have begun to bridge a conceptual divide that has hampered trans-Atlantic cooperation in nonproliferation efforts, a panel of European experts said yesterday.

The United States, particularly in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax letter spree, tends to exaggerate the threat from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, they said.  Meanwhile, European governments — which disagree even among themselves about the extent of the threat — tend to underestimate the potential that terrorists or rogue states will acquire and use these weapons against Western targets, according to the experts. 

Still, they agreed Europe has been slow to come to terms with the full extent of proliferation dangers and if European nations compile a collective assessment, they would likely find themselves more in line with the U.S. view that the threat is substantial, growing and requires immediate and cooperative threat reduction measures.

The government and private experts presented their analysis in opening a two-day conference on nonproliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

They cited a variety of reasons why European governments have not reflected the same level of urgency as the United States in addressing the proliferation threat, including the fact that continental Europe has not suffered a major terrorist attack; the anachronistic view in some European capitals that the key to security remains having good neighbors; a less globally focused foreign policy than Washington; a more multilateral approach and greater faith in international consensus; and perhaps even a “fatigue” with security issues given Europe’s history of a war.

Yet they also cited recent examples they believe demonstrate that European views, however divided they may be, are maturing and that the differences in perception with the United States are narrowing.

The European Versus American Perspective

“There is a gap” between the United States and Europe on the assessment of the WMD threat, said Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. 

He noted that the divergent views are not a new phenomenon, but date back at least to the end of the Cold War a decade ago, when the United States began addressing the proliferation threat posed by former Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems — a decade in which Europe took relatively little action on the proliferation front.

Last year’s terrorist attacks in the United States make it appear that the trans-Atlantic differences are more pronounced, several experts said.  In other words, the killing of 3,000 people on U.S. soil led directly to U.S. urgency about the WMD threat, while no comparable event has taken place in Europe.

Until recent terror alerts in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy about the potential for an impending attack by al-Qaeda operatives or associates, European countries have not been as vigilant as the United States, which has lived with terrorist alerts on a regular basis since the events of Sept.11, and the still-unsolved anthrax attacks.

“We have not been receiving high threats,” said Therese Delpech of the French Atomic Energy Commission.  The lack of a Sept. 11-type attack in Europe, added Tomas Ries of the Finnish National Defense College, “makes all the difference.”

He said Europe remains largely in a “state of delusion” when it comes to the threat of catastrophic terrorism.  While numerous terrorist attacks have been thwarted by European law enforcement and intelligence agencies in recent years, the European public still lacks the attentiveness to large-scale terrorist threats that the United States has exhibited since Sept. 11, he said.

At the same time, European governments are sometimes accused of adhering to an outdated definition of national security, according to Delpech.  Europeans “still don’t understand that … borders are irrelevant,” she said. European countries, perhaps with the exception of the United Kingdom, also have a historically “provincial view of security,” focused primarily on the immediate geographic area.

“The United States has a global security view,” said Dieter Dettke of Germany’s Freidrich Ebert Foundation. 

He also believes that a major difference between the U.S. and European approaches lies in divergent views of when a coalition is required to address collective threats.  Washington ascribes to the tenet that the mission should determine the coalition — and has been criticized at times for being unilateralist — while “for Europe it’s the other way around.”

Europeans are also more concerned than the United States with matching military and other security efforts to thwart terrorist attacks with “soft” approaches that include reliance on humanitarian aid, political reform, nation-building and other activities likely to have a longer-term effect on reducing the ranks of militant terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction, the experts said.

The international effort to disarm Iraq illustrates the trans-Atlantic foreign policy divide, Dettke added.  Germany believes Iraq can be contained and that continuing the current approach is “less risky” than forcing it to dismantle its weapons programs, which could interfere with the overall war on terrorism and even if successful, breed future terrorists.

Where U.S. and European views on the WMD threat intersect most is in London, officials said.  The United Kingdom, the most vocal supporter of U.S. security policies, recently outlined weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat it faces.

WMD “is not under terrorism, it is on top of it” as perceived threats, said Simon Fraser of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 

He said, however, that a common European assessment of the threat, what he called a “shared perception,” is sorely required.  “European thinking is … behind the United States.”  Such an assessment is “desperately needed,” Ries added, blaming its absence on the lack of a recognizable European leader to lead the way.

“The Americans may hype the threat, but the truth is the Europeans overlook it,” Delpech said.

A Meeting of the Minds

While WMD threat assessments in Washington and European capitals tend to differ, the experts underlined several reasons to believe that the two sides are coming closer together.

For one, “our strategic vacation is over,” said Delpech.  She cited the terrorist alerts spreading across Europe, while others highlighted recent attacks — in Indonesia, Tunisia, against a French oil tanker — to demonstrate a heightened awareness about the potential for mass casualty attacks in the future.

Meanwhile, European governments and their publics have begun in recent years to extend their security view outward, Dettke said.  Germany now has more than 10,000 troops stationed overseas — in Afghanistan, patrolling the waters off the Horn of Africa for terrorist fugitives and elsewhere — a dramatic change from its largely passive military history of the past half a century.

According to Delpech, another sign of this is the European Union’s commitment to set up a rapid reaction force by next year to respond quickly to crises, including outside of Europe.

A major test of European seriousness in addressing the WMD threat, however, will be whether European countries live up to their pledge earlier this year to help the Group of Eight economic powers contribute $20 billion during the next decade to secure former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals and radiological materials, numerous conference participants said.

Delpech expressed confidence that France, set to become the rotating head of the G-8 next year, will get countries to provide precise figures for their contributions to the global partnership.

“Closer cooperation over the Atlantic is an absolute necessity,” she said.  Europe must “put parochial differences aside.”

But even if there is a meeting of U.S. and European minds about the seriousness of the proliferation threats, Fraser warned that the next hurdle is for both sides to agree on what to do about each of them.

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Chinese Response:  Beijing Committed to Nonproliferation, Official Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — China’s top arms control official yesterday reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to WMD and ballistic missile nonproliferation, and outlined a number of domestic and international steps China has taken to reduce proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 4).

“China has been firm, consistent and clear-cut in its policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” Liu Jieyi, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Arms Control and Disarmament Department, said in a speech before a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “We have all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... We have steadfastly pursued a policy of not advocating, encouraging or assisting any other country in developing weapons of mass destruction,” Liu added.

China has worked internally, through the promulgation of export control regulations, and internationally, by signing a number of multilateral agreements, to combat WMD proliferation, Liu said.  China has also attempted to improve cooperation with the United States on nonproliferation issues, he said.

Domestic Measures

To stem WMD proliferation on a national level, China has created export control regulations and control lists to cover sensitive nuclear, biological, chemical and missile technology exports, Liu said (see GSN, Oct. 21).  China’s export control systems are similar to those of other countries, including an end-use and end-user guarantee system, an export licensing system and “catch-all” principles — which prohibit the export of sensitive items that could be used for weapons purposes even if they are not included on an export control list, he said.

China’s export control lists are virtually identical to those enshrined in other multilateral international export control regimes, such as the Zaanger Committee and Australia Group, Liu said.  China’s missile control list, the promulgation of which has been praised by experts, is “by and large identical” with the annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime in regard to scope and parameters, he said (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“In a nutshell, China’s export controls ... are basically the same as those of the United States, EU and other countries in both scope and enforcement,” Liu said.

International Measures  

China believes that its long-term development goals will become more and more dependant on a peaceful world, Liu said.  For that reason, and to improve global security as a whole, China is committed to improving international nonproliferation efforts, he said.

“In the final analysis, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is conducive to regional and global peace and development and serves the common interest of all countries, certainly China’s fundamental interest,” Liu said.

China has joined almost every international WMD nonproliferation agreement, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Liu said.  China has also placed its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and is the first of the declared nuclear states to sign the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement, he said (see GSN, May 10).

While Beijing supports the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it has been stalled in the Chinese People’s Assembly, Liu said.  The issue is not linked to other international Chinese concerns and Beijing supports the treaty’s early entry into force, he said.

China has also apparently rejected an international code of conduct to halt ballistic missile proliferation (see GSN, Nov. 14).  While China agrees with the code’s nonproliferation and cooperation elements, Beijing opposes the code’s transparency and confidence-building measures, Liu said, Beijing believed that the measures should have been made voluntary, he added.

United States

The reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations is important for progress in international nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  He noted that the declared weapons states have a “special and unshirkable responsibility in this respect” (see GSN, Nov. 14).

In his comments, Liu made a veiled attack on U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  “It does not make sense, morally or legally,” to maintain large nuclear weapons arsenals, to develop new weapons, to assert the right to conduct nuclear tests and to target other countries with nuclear weapons when “global efforts for nonproliferation are advocated,” Liu said.  

There is room, however, for the United States and China to cooperate on nonproliferation efforts, Liu said.  One step that has already been taken is the establishment of a U.S.-Chinese joint consultative group on strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation issues, he said.

“It is true that differences do exist.  The key is how to address them, “ Liu said.  “China believes that differences should and can be settled in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual trust. ... I am convinced that through joint efforts, nonproliferation will be a positive factor in the healthy development of the Sino-U.S. relations,” he added.

For further information, see:

BWC Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

CWC Text

CTBT Text

NPT Text

Australia Group Web Site

U.S. State Department MTCR Summary

Draft International Code of Conduct (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

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U.S. Response:  Abraham Outlines 10 Principles for Nuclear, Radiological Security

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham yesterday recommitted the Bush administration to plans by the Group of Eight economic powers to allocate at least $20 billion to cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union during the next decade and outlined “10 principles” to enhance the protection of nuclear and radiological materials worldwide (see GSN, Oct. 11).

“The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it,” Abraham said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

“Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all civilized nations of the world, and certainly [U.S.] President [George] Bush’s leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us,” he said.  “It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy,” Abraham said.

His remarks came as nonproliferation experts in attendance and others raise questions about the seriousness of the pledge and contend that progress has been minimal.  While the United States has said it will provide $10 billion and the United Kingdom and Germany have also promised resources, the ultimate commitment of the G-8 countries remains uncertain nearly six months after the original proposal. The other participants, France, Russia, Japan and Canada, have not announced any formal financial commitments.

Bush administration officials expressed hope last month that G-8 projects could get underway by the early next year, but so far little groundwork has been laid and experts predict little progress is likely before the next G-8 summit scheduled for June.

Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative, told the conference in a later speech that “by then, we should expect to see them turn principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation.”

Even in Washington, the largest donor, G-8 related efforts have been slow moving. For example, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, recently told Global Security Newswire that his agency — which is responsible for overseeing much of the U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities in the former Soviet Union and is expected to help other donor nations navigate through the Russian bureaucracy — has yet to be asked to play a role in coordinating the G-8 effort.

“The policy community hasn’t figured that out yet,” Younger said Oct. 31.

Abraham assured the audience, however, that “the United States is already working with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the global partnership has established.”

“But it should concern us that this announcement [back in June] received almost no attention, Nunn added.  “We must hold them to their words and their declaration … We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction … It’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed.  We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.”

10 Principles

Meanwhile, Abraham outlined “10 Principles” he says must underpin U.S. and international efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon materials and technology as well as radiological sources that could be used to build a radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb. 

“Addressing the nonproliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as energy secretary,” Abraham said.  “In nearly two years in office, I’ve organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security.”  They include:

*         The threat continues to evolve.  During the past decade the proliferation threat has focused primarily on rogue states, while the international community must now address the threats posed by terrorists “with the unblinking commitment” to cause mass casualties.

*         The margin of error is small. “Even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact,” Abraham said.  “Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends.  Based on International Atomic Energy Agency calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device.  And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb, the amount can be even less, depending on the material used.”

*         The problem demands a broad array of responses.  Given that securing nuclear and radiological materials is a multifaceted problem, nonproliferation mechanisms need to run the gamut, including improving physical security, consolidating material into fewer storage locations, down-blending HEU or burning plutonium, and halting the production of excess nuclear material. 

*         There are good reasons to focus on Russia.  U.S. nonproliferation efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, and rightly so, according to Abraham.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union left 40,000 nuclear weapons and over 1,000 metric tons of nuclear materials.  “We’ve paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is,” he said.

*         This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions.  “The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary,” according to Abraham (see GSN, Aug. 23).  He said that there are 17 other facilities like Vinca that need to be addressed.  Other examples of international cooperation include recent efforts to remove radiological material from the Republic of Georgia and security improvements made at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez in Ukraine (see GSN, Oct. 23).

*         The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. “This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such,” he said.  Abraham and IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced plans Wednesday, along with Russia, to sponsor an international conference in March in Vienna to specifically address radiological threats (see GSN, Nov. 14).

*         The IAEA’s contribution is invaluable.  “But the IAEA needs resources to do its job,” Abraham stressed.  “The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise.  I urge all others to do the same” (see GSN, Sept. 25).

*         Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility.  While international cooperation is critical, Abraham said that nations with nuclear or radiological materials on their territory must take a leading role in securing them.  “One point that I cannot stress too much is that responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community.”

*         This is a long-term effort.  The effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers does not lend itself to any quick fixes.  In fact, solutions must “stand the test of time” for “however long it takes to achieve success,” Abraham said.

*         Success is possible.  “Working together we can make the world safer,” he said.  “We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less.”  He concluded, “I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner.  But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable.”

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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U.S.-Russia:  Nunn Calls for Naming Threat Reduction Czars

By Bryan Bender                                                                       
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The presidents of Russia and the United States should each appoint a single person to oversee efforts to secure nuclear, chemical and biological materials to raise the profile of the “the greatest danger in the world today,” according to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the private Nuclear Threat Initiative.

“The first step is to put our own houses in order — identifying, accounting for, and securing the weapons and materials in Russia and the United States,” Nunn said in a speech to a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “Each president should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the president, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone.”

He added, “Both presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise.”

Nunn, an original co-sponsor of the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the decade-old U.S. effort to secure former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and related materials, said that despite dramatic progress in recent years, “I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat.”

“The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorists’ hands,” he said.

In addition to naming a senior official in the U.S., Russian and other governments to coordinate cooperative threat reduction efforts, Nunn recommended that Moscow and Washington:

*         immediately begin outlining adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons — a perfect terrorism weapon that is  not covered by any arms control treaties;

*         devise operational changes in the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to reduce the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation, while expanding the decision time for each president to decide whether to retaliate to a perceived nuclear attack;

*         combine their collective biological defense knowledge, beginning with a joint fight against infectious diseases in Russia; and

*         launch a global partnership against catastrophic terrorism, based on the premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats to all nations and must be solved by all nations.

Moreover, there is no doubt that securing WMD materials at their source will be the most effective way to stave off the terrorist WMD threat, he added.

“Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop.  By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop.  Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they’ve completed the most difficult step — and our nightmare begins.”

Quoting statistics provided by Wall Street investor Warren Buffet, who recently pledged $2.5 million to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn said even a small improvement in security can make a big difference over time.

If the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10 percent, the chance of getting through a 50-year period without a disaster is only .51 percent, Nunn said.  If the chance can be reduced to 1 percent each year, there is a 60.5 percent chance of making it through 50 years safely, according to Nunn.

“We can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next 50 years.  As Warren Buffet would say, that’s real leverage,” Nunn said.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Sam Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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International Response:  Lawless Regions Pose Proliferation Risks

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Terrorists and international criminal organizations are becoming increasingly able to obtain contraband materials, including weapons of mass destruction, in international “gray zones” — regions with weak governmental control and rule of law, Vladimir Orlov, director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia Program at the Moscow-based PIR Center, said yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 8).

Three of the most critical gray zones are Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union — primarily Central Asia — and the Transnistria region of Moldova, Orlov said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  In Southeast Asia, a lack of government control has led to an increase in terrorist and organized crime activities in Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the “Golden Triangle” — consisting of sections of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, he said.

Continuing instability in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, as well as in Chechnya, the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Russian Ingushetiya region, also pose illegal trafficking concerns, Orlov said (see GSN, Oct. 23).    In the Transnistria region of Moldova, there have been reported contacts between Russian and other international nonstate groups, he said.  Representatives from al-Qaeda, Hamas, Iran and Chechnya are also believed to have traveled to the region.

States of concern might also take advantage of the lack of governmental oversight and control in the international gray zones to expand their contacts with terrorist and organized criminal groups, Orlov said.  For example, there have been reports of meetings between Libyan representatives and terrorists in unstable regions of Colombia, he said.  In the mid-1990s, North Korean agents are believed to have attempted to obtain chemical weapons from Russian organized crime groups, Orlov said.

Orlov said he was skeptical of the effectiveness of encouraging the authorities in the so-called gray zones to take a greater role in cracking down on illegal trafficking and possible WMD proliferation.  Instead, an international response should begin to be considered, which could include exchanges of information and threat assessments, he said.

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Indian Response:  India Faces New Export Control Challenges, Expert Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While India has had an export control system in place since the late 1940s, a gradual process of economic liberalization has raised new concerns over its continued effectiveness, Seema Gahlaut, director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security, said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

India, which seriously began developing nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, has historically chosen to restrain its nuclear exports, Gahlaut said during a panel discussion at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  India’s export control system has also been overseen by a conservative bureaucracy, inclined to restrict such exports heavily, she added.  The economic liberalization program, however, has both expanded the scope of India’s economy and reduced the public sector’s role in its oversight, Gahlaut said, noting, for example that dual-use exports are likely to increase (see GSN, Sept. 27).

In response, India has begun to adapt its export control policies to the changing national economic situation, according to Gahlaut.  For example, India has begun to harmonize its dual-use classification standards with those of the European Union.  New Delhi has also worked to devise a more detailed control list and to develop end-use certification measures, Gahlaut said.  She added that India has enacted prelicensing site-visit requirements for chemical exporters. 

The main remaining weaknesses in India’s export control policy center on enforcement, she said, adding that information on export control violations and imposed penalties is not widely available.

While India has made some progress in addressing the new export control concerns caused by its expanding economy, there are still issues of concern, according to Gahlaut.  India still needs to develop “catch-all” provisions, which prohibit the export of sensitive technologies even if they are not included on a control list, and controls on intangible technology transfers, she said.  India also needs to focus on transit and re-export issues and work to harmonize its export control systems with multilateral regimes.

International Efforts

Some of India’s export control concerns might be resolved through increased dialogue with the United States, Gahlaut said.  India has expressed interest in obtaining on-line software designed to streamline export licensing procedures, increased customs training and information on improving public-private sector export control cooperation from the United States, she said.

The international community as a whole also has a role to play in aiding India’s efforts, according to Gahlaut.  India’s policy of export restraint should continue to be encouraged and the export of sensitive technologies to India should be monitored, instead of outright denied, she said (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2001). 

India and Pakistan also need to be seen as two distinct entities, Gahlaut said, calling for a  “nonhyphenated” paradigm for South Asia.  While the two countries do share some concerns, there are also several important differences between them, she said.  For example, India’s nuclear program is under civilian control and has large civilian uses.  Pakistan’s nuclear program, however, is almost entirely intended for the military and is run by the military, Gahlaut said.

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Iraq II:  U.N. Resolution Might Restrict Access to Scientists

A provision in the new U.N. resolution on Iraq that authorizes inspectors to remove Iraqi scientists from the country to interview them could have the unintended consequence of reducing access, a senior U.N. official said yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

The provision was meant to improve interviews with Iraqi scientists because they are expected to be more forthcoming once they are away from Iraqi oversight, according to the New York Times.  The flaw in the provision, however, is that Iraq might now be more concerned about possible defections and less forthcoming on the identities of its scientists who are involved in weapons programs, the official said.

It is important for inspectors to learn the identities of Iraqi scientists who joined weapons programs since inspections ended in 1998, the U.N. official said.  Such scientists are now mainly unknown, and it will take an unusual level of Iraqi cooperation for inspectors to learn more about them, the official said.

The identification of new Iraqi WMD scientists for interview purposes is likely to become one of the hardest aspects of the U.N. inspectors’ work, the official said.  “The authority to take them out will make things more difficult,” the official added (William Broad, New York Times, Nov. 15).

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