Iraq:  Yugoslavia Admits Military Sales as U.S. Alleges Further Violations

Yugoslavia yesterday formally acknowledged it sold military equipment and services to Iraq in violation of the U.N. arms embargo (see GSN, Oct. 31).

“These violations concerned the repair and return of Iraqi jet engines for MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter jets and providing certain services in military-technical cooperation,” a government statement said.  Yugoslavia has promised to prevent further arms sales violations.

Meanwhile, the United States has also alleged Yugoslav companies and experts have been aiding Iraqi and Libyan missile development programs, according to the Washington Post.

U.S. and Croatian officials have said cargo from the Boka Star, seized in Croatian waters last week en route to Iraq from Yugoslavia, contained solid rocket fuel, the Post reported.  The cargo had been labeled “active charcoal.”

Some observers suspect Yugoslavia sold Libya military technology ultimately destined for Iraq, according to the Post.  The technology was intended to help convert training aircraft into guided cruise missiles (see GSN, Oct. 31).

The United States has also accused Djordje Blagojevic, a University of Belgrade professor, of helping Iraq develop Scud missiles and helping Libya perfect missile guidance systems, according to the Post.  Blagojevic has denied the charges, saying, “Only studies are in question here”  (Williams/Wood, Washington Post, Nov. 1).

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Yugoslavia:  Belgrade University Denies Libyan Missile Support

While a dean at Yugoslavia’s Belgrade University vehemently denied that the School of Mechanical Engineering was involved in missile proliferation, another school official said that 33 Libyan students are involved in military, chemical and aeronautic engineering there (see GSN, Oct. 31).

“There are currently 33 Libyan students at the School of Mechanical Engineering.  They are working on their Ph.D.s,” said Zoran Stefanovic, chief of the foreign language lecturing program.  “Libyan students attend not only military mechanical engineering and aero-engineering, but also some of our other departments.”

The Dean of the School of Mechanical Engineering said recent allegations that the institution is assisting Libya and Iraq with cruise missile technology are “pure fabrications.”

“Professors at the Belgrade University’s School of Mechanical Engineering have not been working on developing turbo jet rocket motors, particularly not for cruise missiles,” Milos Nedeljkovic said.  “If the biggest university in this country were designing and making the most modern long-range projectiles, our country would be using them and perhaps NATO would never have launched air strikes against us” (N. Krsmanovic, Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, Oct. 30).

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International Response:  MTCR Changes Address Cruise Missile Proliferation

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Revised definitions of “range” and “payload” in the Missile Technology Control Regime will help reduce the proliferation of cruise missiles, a U.S. expert told Global Security Newswire Friday (see GSN, Nov. 9).

The new definitions close a major loophole that “never should have been a loophole,” said Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official who helped negotiate the regime.  They are “a great, great improvement.”

The regime seeks to restrict the export of critical missile technologies by establishing common export controls among leading industrial nations.

At a meeting last month in Warsaw, MTCR members agreed that range, as related to cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, would be the distance capable when flying at “range-maximizing” capability (see GSN, Oct. 2).  This more explicit wording will help prevent cruise missile exporters from circumventing the MTCR by expressing a missile’s range as the distance capable when flying at sea level for stealth purposes, Speier said.

Under the MTCR, the export of missile systems with a range greater than 300 kilometers and capable of carrying a payload greater than 500 kilograms is subject to a strong presumption of denial.  In the late 1990s, controversy arose over a decision by the United Kingdom and France to sell Black Shaheen cruise missiles, which have a maximum range of 500 kilometers, to the United Arab Emirates.  The two countries, both MTCR members, argued that the sale did not violate the regime because the missile’s range when flying at sea level was below 300 kilometers.

Cruise missiles, however, do not have to continuously fly at sea level to avoid detection, according to Speier.  Instead, the missile can fly at its range-maximizing altitude, extending its distance by a factor of three, until it approaches the target, Speier said.  The new MTCR range definition will “make it doubly clear” which cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle exports will be covered by the regime, he said.

During the Warsaw meeting, the MTCR members also agreed to a more explicitly worded definition of payload, which expands the term to cover support structures and countermeasures, as well as the warhead itself.  This new definition addresses earlier ambiguity as to whether the 500-kilogram limit applied only to the warhead, Speier said.

Some Regime Improvements Still Needed

The changes to the MTCR control list did not address a small number of remaining technical issues, Speier said.  For example, a better exploration of range-payload tradeoffs allowed under the MTCR is still needed, especially in relation to UAVs and cruise missiles, since these systems can be easily modified to lighten the warhead and add fuel, thereby increasing range, he said. 

For further information, see:

Missile Technology Control Regime (U.S. State Department)

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