North Korea:  Pyongyang Prepares to Restart Nuclear Reactor

In response to a suspension in fuel aid, North Korea announced today that it plans to restart a nuclear reactor that has been inactive since at least 1994 when Pyongyang signed the Agreed Framework with the United States (see GSN, Dec. 4).

The Agreed Framework promises fuel aid in exchange for a freeze on suspected North Korean nuclear activities, but international officials suspended fuel shipments in November after the United States alleged that Pyongyang was working to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons (see GSN, Nov. 15).

“The prevailing situation compelled the D.P.R.K. government to lift its measure for nuclear freeze taken on the premise that 500,000 tons of heavy oil would be annually supplied to the D.P.R.K. under the D.P.R.K.-U.S. Agreed Framework and immediately resume the operation and construction of its nuclear facilities to generate electricity,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry said in a statement released by the Korean Central News Agency.

The move appears to be an effort to draw the United States back to negotiations, analysts said.  Comments from the ministry might support such a theory.

“Whether the D.P.R.K. refreezes its nuclear facilities or not hinges upon the U.S.,” the ministry statement says (Paul Eckert, Reuters, Dec. 12).

North Korea said that its purpose in restarting its Soviet-era nuclear reactor and resuming construction on several other nuclear projects is to generate much needed power.

“Our country faced an immediate problem in electricity generation because the United States has virtually abandoned its obligations,” the ministry said.

Experts said, however, that technicians could also extract plutonium from the fuel in the reactors (Christopher Torchia, Associated Press, Dec. 12).

International Response

After a national security meeting today, South Korean officials expressed “strong regret and concern about the North’s declaration.”  Pyongyang should abide by its treaty obligations, said South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Sok Dong-yon (Xinhua.net, Dec. 12).

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was in Beijing today, said that “China shares the same concern,” as the United States on Pyongyang’s announcement.  Armitage said he is “sure the Chinese will be urging some different behavior” from North Korea, but China has released no official statement (Don Kirk, New York Times, Dec. 12).

Japan urged a restrained response, Reuters reported.

“If you read the North Korean announcement carefully, their consistent stance is to seek a peaceful resolution,” Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said.

North Korea Blames United States

Pyongyang maintained that it is the United States that violated the Agreed Framework first, adding that U.S. Assistant Secretary Of State James Kelly “arbitrarily made up” a report of contentious negotiations between the two countries (see GSN, Oct. 17).

North Korea has “consistently maintained a position to resolve the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner,” and the United States “abandoned the Agreed Framework,” Pyongyang said (Kirk, New York Times).

“The U.S. cannot escape its responsibility for utterly trampling on the terms and spirit of the Agreed Framework by designating us as an ‘axis of evil’ and target of pre-emptive nuclear attacks,” the Foreign Ministry said (Eckert, Reuters).

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U.S.-Russia:  Duma Plans Treaty Discussions Next Week

Committees of the Russian State Duma, the lower house of the country’s Parliament, are set to discuss the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty next week, Nikolai Bezborodov, deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee said Tuesday (see GSN, Dec. 10).

The international affairs and defense committees plan to discuss the treaty’s military and political aspects, Bezborodov said.  The defense, security and industry committees will discuss the treaty’s technical aspects, he added.

“I am sure the treaty will be ratified by the Duma without any special problems,” Bezborodov said (Ivan Novikov, ITAR-Tass, Dec. 10, in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).

International Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitry Rogozin said Tuesday that he and Andrei Nikolayev, chairman of the Defense Committee, have asked the Defense and Foreign ministries as well as the Kremlin to clarify several points in the treaty.  The date of ratification will depend on when the ministries respond to the request, Rogozin said (Interfax, Dec. 10 in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).

Meanwhile, members of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Parliament, have said they believe that the treaty will be easily ratified by all of the Parliament, ITAR-Tass reported.

“The chances that the State Duma and the Federation Council will ratify the treaty are quite big,” said Federation Council speaker Sergei Mironov. 

The Moscow Treaty is an important achievement in Russian diplomacy, said Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Federation Council’s international committee.  “The document confirms the Russian and U.S. obligations as the depository countries of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and enhances the nonproliferation regimes,” he said (Lyudmila Yermakova, ITAR-Tass, Dec. 10 in FBIS-SOV, Dec. 10).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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U.S.-Russia:  Putin Submits Moscow Treaty to State Duma for Ratification

Russian President Vladimir Putin Saturday formally submitted the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty to the lower house of the Russian Parliament for ratification, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Oct. 11).  The Russian State Duma will probably begin discussions on the treaty soon, the Kremlin said yesterday (Associated Press/Moscow Times, Dec. 10).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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Russia:  SS-19 ICBM Tests Successfully

Russia today conducted a successful test launch of an SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile from the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Russian space military officials said (see GSN, Oct. 17; Agence France-Presse/Times of India, Dec. 10).  The ICBM’s prelaunch operations, launch and flight path went according to plan, and the missile’s six mock warheads hit targets on the Kura testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula, said Russian Space Forces spokesman Mikhail Deryagin (Associated Press, Dec. 10).

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India:  United States Should Allow Nuclear Transfers, Expert Says

The United States should offer civilian nuclear power technology to India if it agrees to comply with several conditions, Asia expert Selig Harrison said in a commentary yesterday in the Los Angeles Times (see GSN, Oct. 18).

U.S. law prohibits nuclear technology transfers to countries such as India that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but India now wants to sign the treaty as a nuclear weapon state, Harrison says.  The U.S. position is “legalistic hairsplitting,” said Harrison, a senior scholar from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy.

The United States allows sales of nuclear technology to China, which has sent nuclear and weapon technology to Pakistan and Iran, the commentary says.  Meanwhile, the U.S. refusal to allow India access to nuclear technology that could be used to make civilian reactors safer is a “relic of past decades,” according to Harrison.

To apply the same ban on nuclear technology to both India and Pakistan is misguided, Harrison said.  While Pakistan has sold uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, India has a “consistent record of honoring international nonproliferation norms,” he said.

Two years ago, former IAEA chief Hans Blix suggested that nuclear technology could be transferred to both India and Pakistan if those countries would freeze their stockpiles of fissile material, according to Harrison.  Last month, U.S. officials gave approval for a January meeting between U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Richard Meserve and Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar.  Meserve is allowed to discuss the issue with Kakodkar but may not agree to transfers of nuclear technology, Harrison said.

The United States should allow India into the “nuclear club” if India agrees to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all existing civilian nuclear reactors and make a formal commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, Harrison said (Selig Harrison, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 9).

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North Korea:  Pyongyang Seeks Chinese Weapons Aid, Sources Say

North Korea appears to be approaching Chinese companies in an attempt to purchase a chemical that could be used to help produce weapon-grade nuclear materials, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Dec. 4).

U.S. intelligence has monitored visits by North Korean agents to several Chinese companies that produce tributyl phosphate (TBP), officials familiar with classified intelligence reports said.  While TBP has commercial applications, U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea is trying to purchase the chemical for use in suspected nuclear weapons efforts, the Times reported.  It can be used in purifying uranium and in extracting plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, according to nuclear arms specialists.

“This shows they are moving ahead with their uranium (nuclear weapons) program,” an intelligence official said.  The TBP “will be used to turn spent (nuclear) fuel into weapons-grade uranium,” the official said.

U.S. intelligence agencies have also detected recent activities at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which had been shut down as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, an intelligence official said (see GSN, Nov. 22).  TBP might be used to help produce new plutonium fuel at the site, according to nuclear arms specialists.

Through attempts to obtain TBP, North Korea might be trying to send a signal as “a way for Pyongyang to turn up the heat a little, without going to the brink,” said Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program is expected to be among the topics of discussion during a visit to the South Pacific this week by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, according to the Times (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Dec. 9).

KEDO

Meanwhile, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which oversees the Agreed Framework, has decided to postpone a meeting of its executive board for several weeks (see GSN, Nov. 15).  The board had been scheduled to meet in New York next week to discuss various issues related to the framework, including the future of two light-water nuclear reactors that the organization is building in North Korea in exchange for a freeze on Pyongyang’s suspected nuclear program.

“Due to end-of-the-year scheduling conflicts, board members decided to postpone their meeting until early next year,” U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said.  “They’ll continue to stay in touch with each other and consult with each other on the next steps,” he added.

The United States is indifferent to the timing of the meeting since it will be individual governments, and not KEDO, that decide the future of the light-water reactor project, an official said.

“They don’t want to meet because if there is a discussion of the light-water reactor construction project all indications are they would call the project off.  It’s increasingly clear that [the U.S.] Congress is not going to appropriate any money and highly unlikely that the Japanese Diet will either,” the official said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is expected to travel to China this month, which could give North Korea an opportunity to announce that it will end its suspected uranium-enrichment program, a diplomatic source said (see GSN, Dec. 2).

“The delay gives some time for the D.P.R.K. (North Korea) to make an announcement on dismantling the HEU (highly enriched uranium) project.  The visit to China could be a good opportunity for something along those lines,” the source said (Jonathan Wright, Reuters/Planet Ark, Dec. 9)

KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman said recently that he believes North Korea will ultimately decide to end any suspected nuclear weapons efforts, according to the Asahi Shimbun.

North Korea “seems to understand that the Agreed Framework is now in great jeopardy,” Kartman said.  “They use the phrase, ‘If the Agreed Framework is to be alive, and the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is to find a fundamental solution ...,’ then the United States should do some things.  This is their way of saying that the Agreed Framework is not yet dead.  It is still alive,” he added (Nobuyoshi Sakajiri, Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 29).

IAEA

Nevertheless, the fact that North Korea has not publicly verified the existence of any suspected nuclear weapons program and has not engaged in any dialogue on the issue is a source of concern, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said today.

“It’s a very confusing reporting we’ve got, and that’s why it’s very important that we get direct confirmation from the D.P.R.K. as to what exactly it has been doing,” he said.

Even though IAEA inspectors are in North Korea, they are limited to inspecting sites and activities that North Korea has already declared, ElBaradei said.

“We do not have the full story.  We have asked the D.P.R.K. for clarification.  We never got a confirmation of the reports of an enrichment program.  We never got a response,” he said.  “What worries me now is that there is a lack of dialogue,” ElBaradei added (Agence France-Presse, Dec. 9).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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International Response:  ElBaradei Promotes Protocol in Tokyo

A two-day international conference on strengthening the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to find undeclared nuclear materials began today in Tokyo, China’s Xinhua news agency reported (see GSN, Nov. 22).

The conference is focusing on an agreement known as the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements.  According to Xinhua, 67 countries have signed versions of the protocol and 28 have ratified them (Xinhua.net, Dec. 9).

“The Additional Protocol greatly enhances the IAEA’s verification capability by endowing it with expanded rights of access to information and to sites,” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said at the conference, according to an agency press release.  “The agency is now able to provide credible assurance not only about the diversion of declared nuclear material but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities,” he added.

The agency’s previous weapons inspections in Iraq made it clear that the current “verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and its limited rights of access to information and to other locations, was neither sufficiently robust nor comprehensive,” ElBaradei said.

As the agency gains more experience with tools and technology associated with the protocol, safeguards will become even more effective, he said.

“As countries bring their additional protocols into force — particularly countries with large nuclear programs — the workload will initially increase, but reductions will ensue after the initial conclusions have been drawn and integrated safeguards initiated,” ElBaradei said (IAEA press release, Dec. 10).

For further information, see:

Model Additional Protocol

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Russia I:  Security-Focused Culture Would Protect Fissile Materials, Report Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Instead of using only technical measures to improve the security of Russian fissile materials, officials should focus on the personnel and workplace culture at nuclear sites, says a report released last month by the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security (see GSN, Nov. 15).

The report, The Human Factor and Security Culture:  Challenges to Safeguarding Fissile Materials in Russia, explores several cultural factors at Russian nuclear sites that might pose security concerns, including corruption, inadequate infrastructure, shortcomings of various personnel, and underdeveloped standards and guidelines.

“The lack of nuclear security in Russia ... has more to do with the practices of personnel than with the presence or absence of technology,” the report says.  “The dismal conditions under which nuclear personnel toil, combined with pervasive lax attitudes towards nuclear security, mean that nuclear material in Russia is at much greater risk of diversion than in other nations.  Thus, efforts to enhance nuclear security through new gadgetry alone will fall short,” it adds.

There have been several examples of personnel at Russian nuclear sites misusing security equipment, according to the report.  For instance, a 2001 U.S. General Accounting Office study found several cases where security gates were left open and unattended, guards failed to check identification of personnel entering sensitive areas, and security equipment was uninstalled or inoperable.

Russian nuclear sites often lack the infrastructure needed to support security system upgrades, according to the report.  For example, power outages at nuclear sites occur often, which can deactivate security equipment.  Site security systems also often suffer from a lack of necessary training and funds for repairs.  Almost 30 percent of managers at Russian nuclear sites reported that security equipment was “sometimes” broken, while less than half said they had personnel on site capable of repairing inoperative systems, according to the report.

While many nuclear security experts believe that nuclear sites are most vulnerable to attack or theft by an insider, Russian nuclear personnel still do not fully grasp the threat of such an attack, according to the report.  Studies have shown that many Russian top- and mid-level nuclear site managers see the threat of an attack by an insider as no greater than an attack by a terrorist group, the report says.

Russian Cultural Effects

Overall sociological and economic conditions in Russia also have affected security culture at nuclear sites, the report says.  Because personnel are often underpaid, nuclear materials have been stolen and diverted in several cases.  Rising levels of drug and alcohol use among site personnel also has security implications, the report says.

“The requirements for drug and alcohol tests among nuclear personnel are often ignored, so there is no way of knowing how many people working at nuclear sites are actually intoxicated on the job,” the report says.

The reduced prestige of the Russian nuclear sector further helps to undermine the security culture, according to the report.  During the Soviet era, many top scientists went to work in the civilian and military nuclear sectors out of patriotism — a motivation that has severely waned after the fall of the Soviet Union, the report says.  Now, qualified personnel often choose instead to pursue higher paying jobs in the private sector, it adds.

A lack of security regulations for fissile materials, when combined with a workplace culture that values compliance with superiors over compliance with established rules, also poses a security threat, the report says.  Much of Russia’s fissile material regulatory system is underdeveloped, according to the report, with few national accountability standards and site-level security procedures.

“Some Russian experts characterize the volumes of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOE [U.S. Energy Department] security regulations as excessive, but admit that the dearth of adequate normative and regulatory guidelines that is the norm in Russia is a real problem,” the report says.

What guidelines do exist are often unclear and contain too many generalities, according to the report.  Such vagueness enforces the idea that security is a low priority and gives individuals more freedom to choose courses of action, the report says.  It also frustrates cooperation among agencies because each defines the same guidelines and procedures in different ways, it says.

Recommendations

The center outlined several recommendations for improving Russian nuclear security culture.  Any such improvement efforts must not, however, be undertaken solely by Western countries, the report says.  Western standards and guidelines cannot be imposed onto Russia unaltered, it says

Russia should work to promote a commitment to strong security, starting from the top down, the center recommended.  Senior Russian officials should use their positions to increase public support for strengthening security arrangements, according to the report.  Officials also need to emphasize security when they allocate resources, promoting quality control and additional training, it says.

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry needs to end a Cold War-era policy of placing military and intelligence officials in important positions in material protection, control and accounting programs, the center recommended.  “Most of these people barely understand the technical side of the nuclear sector, especially its technologies and production processes,” the report says.

Moscow also needs to improve its nuclear security regulations and guidelines to make them clearer and easier to use, the report says, noting serious flaws in the Soviet-style of creating instructions.  The new guidelines should be solution-based instead of process-based, laying out step-by-step solutions to various scenarios in clear language.  New instructions should also be computer-based, and manuals should be tailored for various personnel with different levels of training and experience at different sites, according to the report.

Nuclear site personnel recruitment and training practices also need to be improved, the report says.  Reliability tests should be conducted often, including before students enter educational institutions to begin the necessary training for work in the nuclear sector, it says.  Selective tests, including psychological and drug testing, should also be conducted frequently.

One key area is a need to change how Russian nuclear site personnel perceive the level of threat to fissile materials, according to the report.  Concrete examples should be used to illustrate to workers that the threat of an insider-aided attack is higher than an attack conducted by an outside terrorist group, it says.

“Given Russia’s recent experiences with terrorism and the widely publicized cases of military personnel essentially supplying potential terrorists with weaponry and special equipment in exchange for money — an egregious example of an insider job — getting the point across to nuclear managers may not be such a daunting task after all,” the report says.

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Russia II:  U.S. Levies $40,000 Fine for Illegal Computer Exports

The U.S. company Jet Info Systems International has agreed to pay a $40,000 fine to settle charges that it illegally re-exported computers from Germany to a Russian nuclear research facility, acting U.S. Assistant Commerce Secretary Lisa Prager announced Wednesday (see GSN, Nov. 5). 

The Commerce Department’s Bureau Industry and Security has alleged that, on two separate occasions in 1996, Jet Info shipped computers from Germany to the Federal Nuclear Center of the Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics without authorization.  Although the computers were produced abroad, they were subject to U.S. export controls because they incorporated technology that originated in the United States, the department said in a press release.

Commerce also imposed a two-year denial of export privileges on Jet Info, which will be suspended provided the company commits no further violations during that period, the department said.

A Russian national who authorized one of the two shipments has been fined $20,000 and denied export privileges for five years (U.S. Commerce Department release, Dec. 4).

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United States:  Nuclear Facility Must Improve Safety

A U.S. nuclear oversight board last month criticized criticality safety violations at the Energy Department’s Y-12 nuclear weapon facility in Oak Ridge, Tenn., warning that safety conditions at the aging complex “may soon be in a deficient condition,” Energy Daily reported today (see GSN, March 28).

Safety lapses could lead to an accidental chain reaction and release of radiation at the facility, which manages and maintains nuclear materials, evaluates the integrity of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and disposes of retired nuclear weapons, according to the Daily.

Building 9212 at the facility is of particular concern because of its age and a history of safety problems, according to a Nov. 13 letter from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to Everet Beckner, the deputy administrator for defense programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Criticality safeguards — measures to ensure that fissile materials remain stable enough to prevent a chain reaction — are “regressing” at the Y-12 plant, the board said, instructing the nuclear administration to submit a letter within 60 days to explain how the facility’s safety would be improved.

“The recent criticality safety violations in Building 9212 have again given the board cause for concern, and point to a general neglect of criticality controls in the storage and handling of fissile material at Y-12,” the board said.  “The most recent criticality safety violations were self-identified by the contractor, but the recurring nature of these violations clearly indicates that the contractor’s corrective actions to date are inadequate,” it added.

The board recommended conducting safety reviews and standardizing nuclear handling programs and procedures to ensure that workers understand safety requirements at the plant (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, Dec. 6).

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Russia III:  Washington, Moscow Negotiate U.S. Design for MOX Plant

The United States and Russia have reportedly begun “active” discussions to enable Russia to dispose of weapon-grade plutonium using a replica of a U.S. mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel plant, Nuclear Fuel reported last week (see GSN, May 16).

Originally, Russian officials had planned to use a German MOX plant, but earlier this year Germany refused to support exporting the plant, according to Nuclear Fuel.  The United States and Russia are now negotiating using a replica of a plant that U.S. company Duke Cogema Stone & Webster is building at the U.S. Energy Department’s Savannah River Site (see GSN, June 21).

Currently, there are few alternatives to using the DCS design, a U.S. official indicated.

“Right now, the betting is on this horse,” the official said, adding,  “Right now, it’s the only horse in the race.”

Russia has asked several “detailed questions” and is waiting to review the U.S. answers, the official said, adding that a decision might come by the end of the year.  The DCS design would probably have to be “Russianized,” the official said.  That process, however, would probably be done through a partnership of DCS and Russian designers and not by Russia alone, the official said.

Using the DCS design would counteract an important incentive for Russia, which is an expectation that funds for the plutonium disposition program would help support Russian research on fuel-cycle ventures, according to experts.  The advantage of using the DCS design, however, is that it helps to reduce cost and schedule overruns, the U.S. official said.

“That whole idea of ‘Let’s keep a whole lot of R&D going’ runs counter to keeping the lid on costs and schedules,” the official said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has criticized the pace of the Russian plutonium disposition program as a whole, according to Nuclear Fuel.  In a conference report on the recently passed fiscal 2003 defense authorization act, lawmakers indicated that they are frustrated with “the slow pace of the Russian program” and called for “transparent and verifiable steps to enable the United States to have the necessary assurances that the schedule for the disposition of plutonium will be achieved.”

The lawmakers also called, however, for the Energy Department “to conduct research on more speculative, long-term options” for the Russian plutonium disposition plan (Daniel Horner, Nuclear Fuel, Nov. 25).

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United Kingdom:  Costs Rise for British Nuclear Docks

The expense of maintaining the British nuclear submarine fleet are expected to rise dramatically, in part due to rapidly inflating costs for specialized, earthquake-resistant docks used to refit submarines, London’s Guardian reported today (see GSN, Aug. 13).

One reason that costs are almost doubling is a British decision to refit the HMS Vanguard — a Trident missile submarine — by last February “to ensure the effectiveness of the UK’s nuclear deterrent,” according to a report released today from the British national audit office.  Meeting nuclear safety standards has also increased the costs of the docks under construction in Devonport, the report said.

The company contracted to build the docks — DML Services, largely owned by U.S. oil company Halliburton — originally promised to do the work for $907 million.  The estimated final cost has now reached $1.4 billion and it is “uncertain” how much higher it might go, auditors said.

The docks are “probably the largest nuclear construction project in Europe in recent times,” the report says.

The auditors also criticized the government’s selection of DML, which had “no experience of managing a major construction project that was subject to civil nuclear safety standards,” according to the report.

The company will pay $68 million of the overrun costs, and the rest fall on the government’s shoulders, the Guardian reported.

Nevertheless, refitting the Vanguard on time was a “major achievement,” the report said.

“To maintain at least one (Trident missile) submarine at sea, all four submarines must begin their refit on time, as there is very little ‘slack’ over the next eight years,” the report said.

“Crucially the refit of the HMS Vanguard went ahead, and our nuclear deterrent was not compromised,” said the British Defense Procurement Minister, William Bach (Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, Dec. 6).

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