Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Iraq I:  Inspectors Visit Crucial Nuclear, Biological and Chemical SitesFull Story
Iraq II:  Summary of InspectionsFull Story
Iraq I:  Inspectors Discover Equipment Missing From Missile SiteFull Story
Iraq II:  Summary of InspectionsFull Story
U.S. Response I:  Bush Signs Defense Authorization ActFull Story
U.S. Response II:  Air Force Plans New Design For Penetrating BombFull Story
Iraq:  Baghdad Admits Sanctions Violation; Cooperates With Inspectors So FarFull Story
U.S. Response:  Army Plans to Double WMD Escort UnitFull Story
U.S.-Russia:  Proliferation Threat Worsens, Experts SayFull Story
U.S. Response:  Pentagon Distributes Modeling Software for WMD AttacksFull Story
Iraq:  U.N. Officials Conduct First Inspection in Four YearsFull Story
Israeli Response:  Germany Tentatively Offers WMD Detection EquipmentFull Story
Iraq:  Blix Reports Progress; Council Reconsiders Oil-For-Food DealFull Story
U.S. Response:  Congressional Gas Masks May Be FaultyFull Story


Recent Stories: WMD

From December 4, 2002 issue.

Iraq I:  Inspectors Visit Crucial Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Sites

International inspectors today visited two sites believed to have been crucial in Iraq’s attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction — the main site for the country’s nuclear weapons program and the former center of its biological and chemical weapons efforts (see GSN, Dec. 3).

International Atomic Energy Agency experts visited the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad (see GSN, Oct. 9).  The agency has monitored the center, considered to be Iraq’s main nuclear facility, for the past 10 years, according to Reuters (see GSN, Jan. 31).  The facility once operated several research reactors and conducted research into plutonium separation, waste processing and uranium enrichment.  Several metric tons of uranium have been stored at Tuwaitha under IAEA seal since 1998.

Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission visited the al-Muthanna State Establishment, located 45 miles north of the Iraqi capital (Haddadin/Giacomo, Reuters, Dec. 4).  When U.N. inspectors had discovered in the 1990s that the facility played a crucial role in Iraq’s attempts to develop biological and chemical weapons, they destroyed the chemical and biological equipment and materials at the site.  Inspectors visited the site today to ensure that no one has restarted arms production there (Charles Hanley, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 4).

Missing Equipment

Iraqi officials yesterday provided more information on equipment believed to be missing from the al-Karama General Company, a key Iraqi missile development site.  U.N. inspectors had tagged the equipment in 1998, and inspectors who visited the site Monday discovered it was missing.

Iraqi officials said they had acknowledged moving the equipment and indicated its new location in an Oct. 1 declaration in Vienna, according to the New York Times (see GSN, Oct. 1).  The location of the missing tagged equipment will also be included in the full declaration of WMD programs that Iraq is required to provide by Sunday, the officials said.

U.N. experts are examining the Vienna declaration, U.N. spokesman Hiro Ueki said (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 4).

Declaration Deadline

Meanwhile, Baghdad said yesterday that it plans to provide the full declaration of its WMD programs required under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 one day before of the Dec. 8 deadline.

“We are going to deliver this declaration in the proper time, on the 7th of this month,” said Hossam Mohammed Amin, head of the Iraqi National Monitoring directorate.  “The declaration will have new elements but ... will not ... necessarily include a declaration of weapons of mass destruction,” Amin added.

The declaration might consist of a list of Iraq’s dual-use equipment — equipment that has both civilian and WMD applications — according to the Financial Times.  It might also include information on weapons of mass destruction for which officials have failed to account during past U.N. inspections.  Iraq might send an initial list including the most important items and might then ask for additional time to prepare a more detailed list of controlled dual-use items, diplomats in Baghdad said.

Iraq must provide its declaration to the IAEA and UNMOVIC, which both have offices in Baghdad, and to the U.N. Security Council.  Mohammed al-Douri, Iraq’s U.N. ambassador, might not be able to hand over all of the information making up the declaration to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan until Sunday, diplomats said.

The United States plans to carefully study and assess Iraq’s declaration, regardless of its possible length, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said yesterday.

“We don’t know how many pages they’ll provide,” Fleischer said.  “It could be hundreds, it could be thousands of pages ... but depending on how long it is, we’ll take the appropriate time to review it, assess it, study it,” he added (Ghattas/Hoyos, Financial Times, Dec. 4).

The United States is preparing to conduct an extensive analysis of Iraq’s WMD declaration and plans to publicly counter any Iraqi claim that it lacks weapons of mass destruction, officials said.

“The U.S. government will put a lot of effort into analyzing it,” a senior State Department official said.  “A lot of people will be working the moment it arrives.”

“We know what they’re doing,” the official said, referring to the Iraqis.  “We don’t know what we’re going to get.”

A false declaration by itself, however, would not be enough justification for military action, according to Security Council diplomats and senior U.S. officials.

If Iraq were to provide the United Nations with a false declaration, however, it might be among the first steps toward military action, especially if the United States could show that Iraq intentionally provided false information, according to the Baltimore Sun.

“If Iraqis continue to maintain in their declaration that they do not have weapons of mass destruction, we are certainly prepared to show the international community this is not the case,” a Bush administration official said.

The possible Iraqi responses range from an outright denial to a partial admission that some of its WMD arsenal remained and would be surrendered, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday.

Iraq might decide to acknowledge part of its WMD efforts to satisfy the Security Council, a move akin to a animal caught in a trap that “chews off one leg to survive,” said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Mark Matthews, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 4).

Annan Challenges Bush’s View of Inspections

Annan yesterday countered the Bush administration’s pessimistic view of the U.N. inspections so far, saying that Iraqi cooperation “seems to be good.”

It is too early to determine Iraq’s willingness to disarm itself, Annan said, adding that he is pleased that inspectors have had easy access to all the sites they have visited, including one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces.  Annan called on Baghdad to maintain its cooperation with inspectors.

“It’s only been a week and obviously the cooperation seems to be good, but this is not a one-week wonder,” Annan said.  “They have to sustain the cooperation and the effort and perform,” he added (Lynch/Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 4).

Oil-for-Food

Meanwhile, the United States is expected to increase its efforts to strengthen U.N. sanctions against Iraq over the next two weeks, despite opposition from France, Russia and other members of the Security Council, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Dec. 2).

The United States is refusing to renew the U.N. oil-for-food program with Iraq for the customary six-month period without first amending the Goods Review List, which details what items Iraq is barred from importing without Security Council approval.  The U.S. Defense Department has called for several additions to the list, including the antibiotic Cipro, geopositioning systems and atropine injectors, an antidote to nerve gas, the Times reported.

The U.S. move has angered several Security Council members, who do not want to hold up the oil-for-food program, according to the Times.  Instead, they are more willing to reduce the number of items on the list, saying that this would help increase trade with Iraq.

Diplomats have said they expect the Pentagon’s list of amendments to the Goods Review List to be reduced over the next two weeks.  The Pentagon’s call for reopening negotiations over the list, however, has hurt the atmosphere in the council, they said.

“It has renewed worries among some members about how seriously the whole U.S. system is committed to the peaceful option (of disarming Iraq),” a Western diplomat said (Carola Hoyos, Financial Times, Dec. 4).

Turkish Support

Turkey yesterday appeared to waffle on its support of potential U.S. military action in Iraq, first saying it would allow the use of its airbases and then later saying that its commitment was not firm, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Nov. 18).

Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis first said that in the event of military action, Turkey planned to open its airspace and allow U.S. troops to utilze facilities within the country.  Several hours later, however, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying Yakis was speaking of “possibilities” and was not making promises.

“The fact that he has referred to these possibilities does not mean a commitment on the part of Turkey,” the ministry said (Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 4).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team

U.N. Resolution 1441


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From December 4, 2002 issue.

Iraq II:  Summary of Inspections

Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have visited more than a dozen sites near Baghdad in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse.  The following chart summarizes their activities.

 

Date Site Activity
Dec. 4 Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, located south of Baghdad The IAEA has monitored the center, considered to be Iraq’s main nuclear facility, for the past 10 years, according to Reuters (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Al-Muthanna State Establishment, located 45 miles north of Baghdad Inspectors visited the site to check for resumed chemical and biological weapons activity after equipment and materials were destroyed in the 1990s (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Dec. 3 Al-Sajoud palace Inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press.
Dec. 2 Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site) IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3).
Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad Several pieces of equipment tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3).  Iraqi officials said they revealed the new locations of the equipment in a declaration in October (see GSN, Dec. 4).
Dec. 1 Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” according to a U.N. spokesman.  Onsite for five hours, the inspectors took samples from tanks and downloaded files from the base director’s computer (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Taji complex that houses the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile production facilities “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein said (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 30 Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where troops train to defend against WMD attacks Inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and operating handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Um al-Maarik dual-use equipment production facility, a machine tool factory Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Meelad dual-use equipment production facility, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges have been developed Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 28 Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational for any purposes (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Nasr industrial complex where uranium enrichment centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made A newly constructed building identified by U.S. intelligence as suspicious appeared to be inactive, according to IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 27 Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center Seven IAEA representatives spent three hours speaking with workers, examining documents and removing an air sampler installed by inspectors in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Rafah graphite production facility Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Rafah missile test stand UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating range of missiles tested here (see GSN, Dec. 2).

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From December 3, 2002 issue.

Iraq I:  Inspectors Discover Equipment Missing From Missile Site

At a key Iraqi ballistic missile site, several pieces of equipment that inspectors had tagged in 1998 are now missing, U.N. weapons inspectors learned yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2).

A team from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission discovered the discrepancy during an inspection of the Waziriyah site of the al-Karama General Company, located outside Baghdad.  In 1998, the site contained several pieces of equipment tagged by U.N. inspectors.

Iraqi officials said that U.S. and British bombing destroyed some of the missing equipment in 1998 and some has been transferred to other sites, according to a press statement from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is responsible for tracking Iraq’s nuclear weapons efforts (International Atomic Energy Agency release, Dec. 2).

A similar situation occurred last week, according to the New York Times.  On Thursday, the second day of the new round of inspections, inspectors discovered that a fermenter was missing from an animal vaccine laboratory south of Baghdad that had once been involved in developing biological weapons, according to the Times.  During that visit, however, Iraqi officials said the missing fermenter had been moved and took inspectors to a veterinary site north of Baghdad to examine it (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 3).

The Waziriyah site is believed to have been involved in Iraq’s development of the al-Samoud missile, according to the IAEA statement (IAEA release, Dec. 2).  The al-Samoud, a scaled-down version of the Scud ballistic missile, is permitted under U.N. restrictions because it has a declared range of less than 150 kilometers, according to CIA documents.  Some versions of the missile, however, are believed to have a range of almost 950 kilometers, according to the New York Times.

Experts have been concerned about Iraq’s intensive development of the al-Samoud, which has included several flight tests since the Waziriyah site was repaired in 1999, the Times reported.  The missile is believed to be part of efforts to develop a multistage long-range missile, according to experts.  The CIA has said, however, that there are still flaws in the al-Samoud, including a shaky guidance system (Burns, New York Times).

More Details Emerge on Distillery Inspections

IAEA nuclear inspectors yesterday visited three distilleries outside of Baghdad, the Washington Post reported today.  The inspectors did not say why they chose to visit the distilleries or what, if anything, they found.

“All sites with industrial/technical capability are of interest to us and need to be assessed to determine relevance or not to a nuclear program,” an IAEA spokesman said.  “Any site with industrial/technical capability can be used to conceal illicit activity,” he added.

One reason that inspectors targeted the distilleries might have been to test Iraq’s willingness to allow inspectors to visit any site they choose and to confuse Iraqi officials, according to the Post.

“Sometimes we don’t know what we’re going to find,” a U.N. official said.  “We’ve got to be able to surprise them.  We wouldn’t be very good inspectors if we only visited places that are logical,” the official added.

U.N. officials indicated that the inspectors were acting on a tip that nuclear-related equipment was being stored at a distillery.  Nothing appeared to have been found, the Post reported.

“We’ve got to follow up on a lot of leads,” the U.N. official said.  “Not all of them lead to something productive,” the official added.

U.N. inspectors had previously visited one of the distilleries, the Awali Co., during the 1990s, but that visit had centered on biological and chemical weapons, U.N. officials said (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Dec. 3).

First Palace Inspection

U.N. inspectors today visited one of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s palaces and were quickly admitted.  The inspectors appeared to have found nothing at the al-Sajoud palace, the Associated Press reported.

“The Iraqi side was cooperative,” said Gen. Hossam Mohammed Amin, chief Iraqi liaison officer.  “The inspectors were happy,” Amin added.

During the 1990s, inspectors had only been allowed to visit Hussein’s presidential palaces after U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated an agreement with Hussein saying inspectors could visit with diplomatic escorts and advance notice.  The new U.N. resolution on Iraq, however, calls for unrestricted access (Charles Hanley, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 3).

IAEA to Begin Analyzing Samples

Meanwhile, the IAEA plans to begin analyzing environmental samples collected by inspectors within two weeks, the agency said today.  IAEA officials hope to have results ready by Jan. 27, when the agency is supposed to report to the U.N. Security Council, agency spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said.

The samples that inspectors are collecting are to be shipped to an IAEA laboratory southeast of Vienna, according to the Associated Press.  If needed, some samples will then be sent to other laboratories for further confirmation, Gwozdecky said.

“It’s a painstaking process, and they’ll be really pushed to have results before Jan. 27,” Gwozdecky said (William Kole, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 3).

“Signs Not Encouraging,” Bush Says

U.S. President George W. Bush said yesterday that the initial signs of Hussein’s compliance with inspections are “not encouraging.”

“In the inspections process, the United States will be making one judgment:  Has Saddam Hussein changed his behavior of the last 11 years?  Has he decided to cooperate willingly and comply completely, or has he not?” Bush said.  “A regime that fires upon American and British pilots is not taking the path of compliance.  A regime that sends letters filled with protests and falsehoods is not taking the path of compliance.”

It is Hussein’s responsibility, and not that of inspectors, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, Bush said.  Instead, the inspectors’ mission is to simply confirm Iraq’s disarmament, he said.

“Any act of delay, deception, or defiance will prove that Saddam Hussein has not adopted the path of compliance and has rejected the path of peace,” Bush said (U.S. State Department transcript, Dec. 2).

A Day in The Life

New York Times correspondent John Burns, in an interview yesterday with PBS’s NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, described how inspectors worked to maintain secrecy about which sites they have chosen to visit.

Each day, inspectors begin their trip to a suspect Iraqi site in a way “somewhat reminiscent of that Gene Hackman car chase in the French Connection,” Burns said.  Inspectors drive quickly and erratically in attempt to throw off Iraqi officials, he said.  Such methods are not very effective though, he said, because the inspectors soon settle on a course to the site they have chosen and Iraqi officials radio ahead to all established weapons sites — those identified during inspections in the 1990s — along that course, Burns said.

“In consequence ... the Iraqis are ready for them, they’re well prepared, the gates are opened promptly, there’s great courtesy, there’s quite a considerable amount of geniality and smiling and the inspectors have told us they don’t actually seriously expect to find major breaches of the past resolutions or Resolution 1441 [the new U.N. resolution on Iraq],” Burns said (Gwen Ifill, PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Dec. 2).

The inspectors themselves have indicated they often feel pulled in opposite directions by the United States and Iraq, each with different objectives, according to the New York Times.

“Do the Americans want us to succeed?  How would I know?” a senior inspections official said.  As for the Iraqis, “they sit across the table from us and tell us ‘We have zero, zero, zero.’  And of course, zero, zero, zero is a red flag to our bull,” the official added (John Burns, New York Times, Dec. 2).

Cost of War

The cost of a U.S. war on Iraq and a postwar occupation could range from $100 billion to $200 billion, according to estimates prepared by congressional staff members and independent analysts.  A protracted war, however, which could include Hussein destroying Iraqi oil fields, could lead to greater indirect costs to the U.S. economy, according to economists.

In contrast, the U.S. costs for the 1991 Gulf War totaled $7 billion.  The United States was able to escape with paying such a small amount because of aid from U.S. allies, which absorbed most of the cost, according to the Washington Post.  Estimates are higher for a new war with Iraq, in part, because allies are believed to be reluctant to help fund new military action.

Some Democrats in Congress have criticized the White House for refusing to engage in a public debate over the possible costs of a war with Iraq.

“If we can plan a war, we should also be planning a way to pay for the war,” said Representative John Spratt (D-S.C.).

It is too soon, however, to begin discussing the possible costs of a war with Iraq because Bush has not yet decided to use military force, a White House official said.  In addition, the costs of war have to be balanced with the “potentially incalculable” costs of allowing Hussein to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction, the White House official said (Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, Dec. 1).

For further information, see:

UNMOVIC

IAEA Iraq Action Team


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From December 3, 2002 issue.

Iraq II:  Summary of Inspections

Inspectors from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have visited more than a dozen sites near Baghdad in the round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Nov. 27 after a four-year lapse.  The following chart summarizes their activities.

Date Site Activity
Dec. 3 Al-Sajoud palace Inspectors were quickly admitted but appeared to have found nothing, according to the Associated Press.
Dec. 2 Three distilleries near Bakuba, north of Baghdad (first previously unvisited site) IAEA inspectors did not explain why they visited the distilleries, but possibly searched for hidden nuclear equipment (see GSN, Dec. 3).
Waziriyah ballistic missile development site at the al-Karama General Company, outside of Baghdad Several pieces of equipment tagged in 1998 are now missing, according to the IAEA (see GSN, Dec. 3).
Dec. 1 Khan Beni-Saad cropdusting facility, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad Satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” according to a U.N. spokesman.  Onsite for five hours, the inspectors took samples from tanks and downloaded files from the base director’s computer (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Taji complex that houses the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile production facilities “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” said bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 30 Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, 90 kilometers north of Baghdad, where troops trains troop to defend against WMD attacks The inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and using handheld sensors (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Um al-Maarik dual-use equipment production facility, a machine tool factory Iraqi officials said the facility only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Meelad dual-use equipment production facility, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuges were developed Recent satellite imagery has indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 28 Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory, about 15 kilometers south of Baghdad Following four hours of inspection, U.N. experts concluded that the plant is no longer operational for any purposes (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Nasr industrial complex where uranium enrichment centrifuge rotors and missile engine parts were once made A newly constructed building identified by U.S. intelligence as suspicious appeared to be inactive, according to IAEA team leader Jacques Baute (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Nov. 27 Al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center, 12 miles northeast of Baghdad Seven IAEA representatives spent three hours at al-Tahidi speaking with workers, examining documents and removing an air sampler installed by IAEA inspectors in 1998 (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Rafah graphite production facility about 15 miles southwest of Baghdad Graphite can be used in missile components (see GSN, Dec. 2).
Al-Rafah missile test stand UNMOVIC inspectors looked for information indicating range of missiles tested here (see GSN, Dec. 2).

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From December 3, 2002 issue.

U.S. Response I:  Bush Signs Defense Authorization Act

U.S. President George W. Bush signed the 2003 Defense Authorization Act yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).  The bill, which authorizes hundreds of billions of dollars in defense spending, is aimed at strengthening anti-terrorism efforts at home and abroad and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Nov. 20).

“It [the bill] sets priorities of our Defense Department in a critical, critical period for our country,” Bush said.  “Our country has unprecedented challenges, and we’re facing them with unmatched technology, careful planning and the finest traditions of valor” (White House release, Dec. 2).


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From December 3, 2002 issue.

U.S. Response II:  Air Force Plans New Design For Penetrating Bomb

The U.S. Air Force wants to redesign its 5,000-pound Guided Bomb Unit 28 penetrator bomb to increase effectiveness in strikes against hard and deeply buried targets, Aviation Week reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 14).

Air Force representatives said they want to increase the weapon’s penetration, durability and effectiveness by 30 percent.  The service plans to begin developing the new weapons this fiscal year to produce about 350 bombs, starting in 2005.

The decision comes in response to U.S. adversaries strengthening their bunkers and weapon storage sites, according to Aviation Week.

The Air Force Research Laboratory has already been working on an improved bomb design.  The service might use new steels, a new design for the missile, and powerful explosive fillings for the warhead to enhance penetration, Aviation Week reported.  Explosive fillings have been developed extensively since the GBU-28 was first designed, said Maj. Steve Pearce, a program manager with the Air Armaments Center at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.

Air Force officials have also proposed a shift in operations.  Dropping two guided penetrators in quick succession might destroy previously unreachable targets, according to Aviation Week (Robert Wall, Aviation Week, Dec. 2).


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From December 2, 2002 issue.

Iraq:  Baghdad Admits Sanctions Violation; Cooperates With Inspectors So Far

Iraq has conceded to U.N. weapons inspectors that it tried to bypass a U.N. embargo to purchase special materials for a conventional rocket program, CNN reported today.  Iraqi officials told the United Nations in a Nov. 19 meeting that it attempted to smuggle special aluminum tubing into the country about a half dozen times, but never successfully, according to a high-ranking official close to the U.N. inspectors (see GSN, Sept. 9).

The Iraqi officials reported the diameter and thickness of the tubing they tried to procure and said that those dimensions precluded the tubes from being used to develop nuclear weapons.  Arms experts agreed that if the dimensions provided by Iraq are accurate, the tubing could not be used in uranium enrichment centrifuges, CNN reported (see GSN, Sept. 19).

“They’re saying that they violated the sanctions, which is a much lesser offense than if they had been trying to build nuclear weapons or long-range missiles,” former CIA analyst Kenneth Pollack told CNN.  “What they are trying to do is to basically plead guilty to the lesser charge in hopes that that will make it much harder for the United States to use that to build international support for a war,” Pollack said.

U.N. inspectors are looking for a more complete accounting of Iraqi weapons efforts by Dec. 8, the deadline for Iraq to submit a full accounting of its weapons activities (CNN.com, Dec. 2).

Inspections Continue

Meanwhile, inspectors conducted their fifth day of inspections in Iraq today, including the first site never visited by previous inspectors.  Officials reported that Iraq has so far cooperated fully with inspectors by providing immediate access to installations, employees and records (BBC Online, Dec. 2). 

According to various reports, experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have visited about 15 sites near Baghdad in this round of post-Gulf War inspections that resumed Wednesday after a four-year lapse.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday that inspections have gone smoothly and have found nothing suspicious.  “What we have seen so far is that the facilities are not used for weapons programs,” he said (CNN.com, Dec. 2).

Inspectors inspected a former Scud missile component factory in Baghdad today and a distillery near Bakuba, north of Baghdad.  The inspectors did not explain why they visited the distillery, but alcohol is a common ingredient in chemical weapons, according to experts.

U.N. and IAEA teams have visited about 15 facilities since Wednesday, including sites that played past roles in Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs as well as Iraq’s ballistic missile development and production effort.  All but one of the sites, the distillery, had been inspected and monitored by previous inspectors before they withdrew from Iraq in 1998 citing Iraqi obstructions (BBC Online).

Wednesday

International experts visited three sites Wednesday, including an industrial engineering facility, a graphite production plant and a missile test site.

The al-Tahidi Scientific Research Center, 12 miles northeast of Baghdad, assembles electric motors for cement factories and oil refineries, Iraqi officials said, but U.S. officials believe the site was historically associated with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, according to the Washington Post.

Former senior U.N. Special Commission on Iraq official Charles Duelfer told a U.S. Senate committee in February that al-Tahidi was one of the “key facilities where (nuclear weapons) congregated.”

“These centers have legitimate rationales for their ongoing work, but the presence of teams of alumni from the nuclear weapons programs is a key tip-off,” Duelfer said.

Seven IAEA representatives spent three hours at al-Tahidi speaking with workers, examining documents and removing an air sampler installed by IAEA inspectors in 1998.

Elsewhere, UNMOVIC inspectors visited al-Rafah a complex containing a graphite production facility and a missile test stand about 15 miles southwest of Baghdad.  They hoped the missile test facility would offer clues as to whether Iraq is developing ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding the 150-kilometer limit established by the U.N. Security Council (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Nov. 28).

The CIA accused Iraq in October of erecting a test stand that would only be necessary to test larger, prohibited missiles, according to the Los Angeles Times.

Dimitri Perricos, a senior UNMOVIC official, said the graphite plant visit was needed because graphite could be used not only to make pencils, but also missile batteries and re-entry vehicle nose cones (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 28).

Thursday

Fourteen UNMOVIC inspectors traveled Thursday to the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Laboratory, about 15 kilometers south of Baghdad to investigate the site where Iraq produced botulinum toxin before the 1991 Gulf War.  Officials were interested in the site because Iraq has never accounted for all the toxin it produced there and a British intelligence assessment released this year said there were suspicions of recent activity at the site (see GSN, Sept. 24).

Following four hours of inspection, however, the U.N. experts concluded that the plant was no longer operational, for any purposes, according to the New York Times.  It had apparently been abandoned in 1996 after U.N. officials dismantled the facility’s fermenters, containers, pressurized tubing and other equipment, the Times reported.

Also on Thursday, IAEA experts inspected an industrial complex at al-Nasr, were uranium enrichment centrifuge rotors were once manufactured as well as missile engine parts.   The facility had been heavily bombed after U.N. inspectors withdrew from Iraq in 1998 and has since been partially restored.  IAEA team leader Jacques Baute, however, said a newly constructed building identified by U.S. intelligence as suspicious appeared to be inactive.  “As far as we observed today, it seemed to be very empty,” Baute said (John Burns, New York Times, Nov. 29).

Parts of the plant that remain working are used to produce light ammunition and heavy civilian machinery, Iraqi officials said (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Nov. 29.

Saturday

After remaining inactive Friday, inspectors set out again Saturday, visiting three sites.  UNMOVIC experts drove 90 kilometers north of Baghdad to the Balad Chemical Defense Battalion, where the Iraqi Defense Ministry trains troops to defend against WMD attacks.

UNMOVIC spokesman Hiro Ueki said the inspectors wanted to “see if any evidence of chemical weapons agents biological weapons agents were present and to see if there was any new equipment.”

The site had been inspected in the 1990s, but it was considered to be a “sensitive” site, requiring advance notification of U.N. inspections.

The inspectors spent five hours examining storage sheds, opening ordnance crates and using handheld sensors.

Meanwhile, eight IAEA experts visited two dual-use equipment production facilities, the first at Um al-Maarik, a machine tool factory which Iraqi officials said only produces parts for light machinery and vehicles.

The experts also inspected the facility at al-Meelad, formerly known as al-Furat, where centrifuge were developed.  Recent satellite imagery indicated that construction has taken place at the site since 1998 (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Dec. 1).

Sunday

Acting on satellite imagery analysis, UNMOVIC inspectors visited a cropdusting facility Sunday at Khan Beni-Saad, 35 kilometers north of Baghdad, where pesticide-spraying helicopters are based.  The satellite information “called for a specific investigation of modified aircraft fuel tanks,” according to a U.N. spokesman (Agence France-Presse, Yahoo.com, Dec. 2). 

Onsite for five hours, the inspectors examined aircraft hangars, chemical tanks and spray nozzles at the facility.  They took samples from the tanks and downloaded files from the base director’s computer (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Dec. 2)

A second team of UNMOVIC experts inspected the large al-Taji complex that houses the bin Firnas and al-Quds missile production facilities.  “We gave the inspectors every assistance and answered all their questions,” said bin Firnas director Brahim Hussein (Agence France-Presse, Yahoo.com).


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From December 2, 2002 issue.

U.S. Response:  Army Plans to Double WMD Escort Unit

U.S. Army officials have decided to double the size of the service’s Technical Escort Unit, which specializes in dealing with chemical and biological materials, New Technology Week reported today (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Officials would not comment on the exact size of the unit, but “several hundred” soldiers are in the command, TEU battalion commander Lt. Col. George Lecakes said.

The group is designed to support other units — military or civilian — by detecting, disabling, transporting or disposing of chemical and biological agents, according to New Technology Week.  The unit has provided assistance in “the mailrooms of the Pentagon to the office suites in the Russell and Hart (Senate office) buildings to the White House,” Lecakes said.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is establishing a similar unit and several other countries are interested in the concept, Lecakes said.

The unit works with various protective suits in which soldiers train in high temperatures to prepare for field work, according to New Technology Week (Ann Roosevelt, New Technology Week, Dec. 2).


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From December 2, 2002 issue.

U.S.-Russia:  Proliferation Threat Worsens, Experts Say

Despite broad political support for international programs to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, many experts believe that the threat of proliferation is worsening, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, Nov. 13).

Some Russian bureaucrats and U.S. conservatives have stifled programs to secure and destroy the weapons at various sites, according to the Times (see GSN, Nov. 15).

For example, midlevel Russian officials have obstructed access to shipyards where Japanese officials have agreed to fund dismantling Russian nuclear submarines, according to the Times.

One large storage facility for Russian chemical weapons in Shchuchye, near the Kazakhstan border, is a prime target for nonproliferation efforts, according to the Times.  It holds 800 chemical-filled warheads for Scud missiles and 1.9 million shells of sarin and VX gas small enough to stash in a briefcase.  This year the U.S. Congress again restricted funds for building a weapons destruction plant at Shchuchye — granting money only until next September, the Times reported.

Legislators also killed a budget item that would have funded efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction stored outside the borders of the former Soviet Union — the province of decade-old threat reduction programs, according to the Times.

Although U.S. President George W. Bush has voiced support for nonproliferation goals, U.S. Representatives Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) and Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) and some other members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee have repeatedly impaired such efforts, according to sources.  U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who has worked for more than a decade to dismantle former Soviet weapons, voiced his frustration at an October Senate hearing (see GSN, Nov. 15).

“The president was under the impression, when Senator [Joseph] Biden [D-Del.] and I met with him in July, that things are on track,” Lugar said.  “But they are not on track,” he added (Sonni Efron, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 2).

Renewing Focus

Meanwhile, Lugar has indicated that he hopes to renew focus on U.S. nonproliferation programs when he becomes chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, the Chicago Tribune reported yesterday.

“The greatest crisis is terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction,” Lugar said.  “We ought to identify which countries have weapons of mass destruction, and as an international community, we ought to make sure that these countries have the means to make this material secure,” he added (Stephen Hedges, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 1).


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From November 27, 2002 issue.

U.S. Response:  Pentagon Distributes Modeling Software for WMD Attacks

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Defense Department has licensed to a few select nongovernmental organizations previously unavailable software that can model the effects of releases of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons and materials.

The Heritage Foundation, Natural Resources Defense Council, Stanford University and other institutions have recently gained access to the computer modeling programs (see GSN, June 5).  The goal is to educate political leaders and the public about the potential consequences of weapons of mass destruction whether they are used by terrorists or by a state in conflict with the United States.  Furthermore, defense officials have said that they benefit from the independent analysis by nongovernmental organizations.

The modeling programs — the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) and the Consequences Assessment Tool Set (CATS) — are both capable of calculating the outcome of thousands of possible scenarios involving a variety of weapons and materials.  The models can determine the human medical effects, toxicity levels, contaminated areas, population exposure, hazard areas and casualties should WMD materials be unleashed in an attack or dispersed in a military strike or by accident (see GSN, Feb. 12)

Both programs were developed under the auspices of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency after the 1991 Gulf War, in which “predictions of the collateral effects of potential weapons of mass destruction use were inefficient and untimely,” according to the agency.

HPAC and CATS can predict the dispersal and effects of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological hazards.  The sophistication of the predictions is derived in part from the software’s ability to consider different levels of purity for a variety of deadly materials.  For example, a WMD agent can be modeled as having 0.001 percent purity up to 100 percent purity — for materials ranging from VX nerve gas to anthrax.

HPAC “provides the means to accurately predict the effects of hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and its impact on civilian and military populations,” according to DTRA.  “It models nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological and high explosive collateral effects resulting from the conventional weapon strikes against enemy weapons of mass destruction production and storage facilities.”

“The HPAC system also predicts downwind hazard areas resulting from a nuclear weapon strike or reactor accident and has the capability to model nuclear, chemical and biological weapon strikes or accidental releases,” the agency states in a project summary.  HPAC can also predict missile intercepts and the consequences for the people and environment near the interception point.

The simulations rely on historical weather data, forecast weather, current observations and particle transport predictions, according to a recent briefing by Navy Cmdr. Julia Spinelli, HPAC meteorologist at DTRA.  She cautioned, however, that “prediction uncertainty” remains no matter how accurate the data used by the software.

CATS, meanwhile, is tailored for scenarios in North America.  It “assesses the consequences of technological and natural disasters to population, resources and infrastructure,” according to Science Applications International Corp., which designed the system for DTRA.

Officials who know about the software have said CATS more commonly predicts domestic terror threats such as environmental damage from WMD materials released near U.S. borders or a chemical or nuclear plant attacked by terrorists.

An Educational Tool

As the military has distributed the programs to military bases around the world as well as to local and state law enforcement, emergency response, environmental and other relevant agencies, it has decided that the academic community would also benefit.

“HPAC is available by license from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to the U.S. government, government contractors and educational institutions for noncommercial research,” according to DTRA’s Web site.  “Approval will be granted on a case by case basis,” the site says.

Officials said a government sponsor is required for an organization to receive the software models — the U.S. Senate sponsored Heritage — which include not only the software, but also a computer link into the DTRA network, which provides much of the modeling data.

“I ask ‘what are you going to do with this, why do you need this and we go from there,” Lt. Col. Todd Hann, HPAC program manager at DTRA, told Global Security Newswire.  “We scrutinize it,” he said, adding that the government is selective about releasing the software because of its sensitivity and the government’s desire to benefit from the academic institution’s work.

A primary rationale for releasing it to academic institutions is for educational purposes, by expanding the public policy debate over the threat of weapons of mass destruction through the introduction of more science — while also demystifying the subject for some.

“Education is a big part of it,” said Dexter Ingram, threat assessment specialist at the Heritage Foundation and a former naval flight officer who prepared nuclear contingency plans.  “It is easy for people to be scared and not want to go to populated events.  We want to make the sure the terrorists aren’t winning and people are educated about the threat.”

One example, Ingram said, of where the modeling tools have proven helpful is to infuse realism into the debate over radiological dispersal devices, or dirty bombs.  Heritage has briefed lawmakers and others on the dirty bomb threat, concluding that in most scenarios the damage inflicted would be minimal, he said.

“So it’s not all doom and gloom,” Ingram said.  “We’re not looking to scare people,” but to provide them with more of the facts, he added.

The HPAC code is “used for doing independent study of incidents in which a decision maker will need to know some information to make an educated decision,” Hann said.

At the same time, he added that “we usually we get something back from [releasing it].  We benefit from some of the analysis.”

Some Scenarios

The software has its roots in the Gulf War, where the threat of chemical and biological weapons — as well as the environmental hazard posed by oil fires — were much on the minds of U.S. military planners.  According to DTRA, “Operation Desert Storm illustrated the need for an automated hazard prediction tool.”

The HPAC software has been widely used by the military in the subsequent decade, at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the 2001 presidential inauguration, the 1997 Group of Eight Summit and in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

It is currently being used to model a possible war with Iraq and the likely dire consequences if weapons of mass destruction were used in the region. 

Matthew McKinzie, a physicist with the Natural Resources Defense Council, has used HPAC to model the effects of chemical-filled Iraqi artillery shells being fired on advancing U.S. troops. 

In the course of a U.S. bombardment of suspected Iraqi biological weapons facilities, he has simulated the release of biological agents into the atmosphere.  Depending on the location of the facility and the weather pattern, such a release could lead to numerous civilian casualties, he found.

Meanwhile, he concluded that there is a looming risk that Israel could retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraq with a weapon of mass destruction.

Ingram has used HPAC to predict that if a 450-kilogram missile tipped with VX nerve gas were launched by Iraq at Tel Aviv under normal conditions, it would kill 43,000 people and injure 38,000.  He also found that if an Iraqi al-Hussein missile was intercepted by Israel it would probably fall on the territory of Jordan.

As for other scenarios, Ingram said HPAC has been used to model the potential consequences of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.  Most of the fallout comes back over India.


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From November 27, 2002 issue.

Iraq:  U.N. Officials Conduct First Inspection in Four Years

U.N. inspectors examined two Iraqi factories yesterday, marking the beginning of a new round of searches for weapons of mass destruction, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, Nov. 26).

Inspectors left Baghdad offices early today in nine vehicles.  Six went to a military graphite factory and three headed for a factory run by the Iraqi Ministry of Industry.  Both facilities are within 25 miles of Baghdad and the inspectors are expected to focus at first on sites that had been inspected years ago.

Shortly after 10 a.m., the larger group of vehicles reached the military-run Graphite Rod Factory.  Graphite can be used in nuclear power reactors — which Iraq is allowed to have — and in missiles, the Associated Press reported.

The U.N. inspectors who traveled to the Industry Ministry factory in al-Tahadi remained inside for three hours.  Journalists were not allowed to accompany the inspectors into either factory and were not told the results of the searches.

Iraqi officials again cast doubt on their willingness to allow unrestricted inspections, as the U.N. Security Council unanimously mandated (see GSN, Nov. 8).

“Iraq is not afraid of the inspectors’ work because it has nothing to hide, but Iraq fears that some of the inspectors will misuse their authority and make trouble that the United States will use to strike Iraq.  Iraq will not give them such an opportunity,” said Mohamed al-Douri, Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations (Charles Hanley, Associated Press, Nov. 27).

Shortly after the inspections began, authorities sounded an air raid siren in response to hostile aircraft, according to Iraqi officials.  The United States and the United Kingdom both denied that their airplanes had flown over Baghdad.

The inspections have begun with “a fairly good start,” said U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Inspectors are expected to move farther through the country and search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction such as mobile and underground laboratories.  It will take inspectors about a year to complete their search (BBC Online, Nov. 27).

The U.N. inspectors who arrived on Monday numbered 17, while the total is expected to climb eventually to 100 (Hanley, Associated Press, Nov. 27).


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From November 27, 2002 issue.

Israeli Response:  Germany Tentatively Offers WMD Detection Equipment

Germany has “no reservations in principle” against providing Israel with armored units to detect chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said today (see GSN, Nov. 26).

Israel requested the units two days ago, and Germany is considering the appeal, Agence France-Presse reported.  There has been no discussion of how many units would be needed and what the arrangement would be for the transfer.

“We have no reservations in principle against the supply of such a purely defensive system used for civilian protection,” Schroeder said during a press conference.

Germany is ready to supply two Patriot missile systems to Israel as well, German Defense Minister Peter Struck said at the same press conference.  Earlier this week Schroeder said it is Germany’s “historic and moral duty” to supply the Patriot units (Agence France-Presse, Nov. 27).


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From November 26, 2002 issue.

Iraq:  Blix Reports Progress; Council Reconsiders Oil-For-Food Deal

By Jim Wurst
Global Security Newswire

UNITED NATIONS — Two contentious U.N. activities in Iraq — the search for weapons of mass destruction and the humanitarian aid program called “oil-for-food” — were discussed yesterday in a series of Security Council meetings in which the chief U.N. weapons inspector reported progress on restarting inspections and the humanitarian program was extended only nine days owing to new disagreements between the United States and other council members (see GSN, Nov. 22).

Reporting on his recent trip to Iraq, Hans Blix, executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, said he told Iraq that “the most important thing [it needed to do] was that whatever there existed by way of weapons programs and proscribed items should be fully declared.”  Blix said that “the Iraqi side assured us that Iraq intended to provide full cooperation with us.”

Speaking to reporters after the briefing, Blix said, “We are going in in good faith and … the Iraqis are saying to us that they want to cooperate.”

On the delicate question of inspection of presidential sites, Blix said, “We will inspect all sites on an equal basis, as the Security Council has said very explicitly.  The Iraqis said that they intend to cooperate in all respects under the resolution.  They did remark, however, that ministerial buildings and ministries and presidential sites are not the same thing as factories.  And that is undeniable.”

“The essential physical infrastructure is now in place to start inspections,” he said, adding, “Any indications of where we might be going or what types of places we’ll go to are speculations, and that we are not going to tell.  The council authorizes us to go anywhere, any time, and we intend to do so.”

After the briefing, Chinese Ambassador Wang Yingfan, the current president of the council, said, “I think that the general view is that the work of Dr. Blix and his team in Iraq during their brief visit is so far, so good.”

The first inspections begin tomorrow.

A few hours later, the council found itself deadlocked on the extension of the U.N.-administered oil-for-food program, under which proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil are used for meeting the humanitarian needs of Iraqis, as well as paying for weapons inspections.  An integral part of the program is the Goods Review List, a lengthy list of items that Iraq may import without conditions and items that may have military applications and whose import is subject to council approval.

The United States said it wants new items added to the list before agreeing to a full extension of the program.  As a result, the council unanimously approved Resolution 1443, which grants an extension only until next Wednesday in order to give the council time to work out its differences.  Normally, the program is extended for six-month periods.

U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said Washington was concerned that “some items” Iraq wants to import “did not necessarily have a benign or purely civilian or humanitarian purpose.”  The United States wanted “a prompt review to tighten it up to ensure that it is not exploited … by the government of Iraq to import items for military purpose under civilian guise.”  Negroponte identified some of those items as jammers for global positioning equipment, atropine — a drug that can be used as an antidote to nerve gas exposure — and atropine injectors.  Although atropine has civilian uses, the quantities sought by Iraq “have no legitimate civilian purpose,” he said (see GSN, Nov. 13).

“We have nothing against the humanitarian program, and once we have reached agreement on a modified Goods Review List, we would be prepared to [approve the program extension] on a normal basis,” said Negroponte.

Letter Rebuts Resolution 1441

The United Nations yesterday reissued Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri’s letter, originally released Saturday in Baghdad, criticizing Resolution 1441.  The letter is a point-by-point rebuttal of nearly every paragraph in the resolution, which Baghdad says has “no legal basis,” “distorts the facts” and raises “imaginary threats.”

The resolution “makes it perfectly clear that the intent is to find pretexts for distorting Iraq’s position and justify military action against that country,” Sabri wrote.

In a polemic-filled letter on Nov. 13 accepting Resolution 1441 but strongly criticizing the United States and United Kingdom, Sabri said Iraq would send another letter “stating our comments on the procedures and measures [in 1441] that are inconsistent with international law.”  The Nov. 23 letter is that response.

Negroponte said the letter “questioned or challenged, in one way or another, virtually every single paragraph of [Resolution 1441].  That kind of letter … does not inspire much confidence that they are really motivated to comply with the resolution.”

For example, Sabri said the resolution’s finding that Iraq is in “material breach” of previous resolutions “dismisses out of hand the cooperation Iraq displayed over eight years to secure the implementation of the council’s resolution.”  The idea that “omissions” in reporting would be a further breach “means that Iraq has already been selected as a target,” he wrote. The resolution’s requirement that Iraq provide by Dec. 8 “an accurate, full and complete declaration” of its weapons programs “is based on the entirely unrealistic assumption that programs for the development of weapons of mass destruction exist in Iraq,” according to the letter.

The preambular paragraphs “focus on the imaginary threats to regional and international peace and security allegedly posed by Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction,” Sabri wrote.  In particular, the letter says the assumption that Resolution 678, the 1990 resolution that authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, is still in force is “fallacious,” since Iraq no longer occupies Kuwait.  “It follows that there is no legal basis that can be invoked as authorizing the use of force against Iraq after the formal cease-fire that was declared by the council [in 1991] and in the absence of any new authorization,” wrote Sabri.  Before the passage of Resolution 1441, the United States said Resolution 678 and others already gave the United States authority to use force against Iraq.

For further information, see:

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441

U.N. Security Council Resolution 678


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From November 26, 2002 issue.

U.S. Response:  Congressional Gas Masks May Be Faulty

Congressional workers may be equipped with thousands of faulty gas masks, says a report released yesterday by the Congressional Office of Compliance, the office responsible for workplace codes in Congress (see GSN, June 27).

The protective hoods — 25,000 of which were distributed this year — are designed to protect workers and visitors if another chemical or biological terrorist attack hits Capitol Hill.  They fail, however, to meet National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health standards, and they might fail to protect users in an emergency, according to the report.

The Capitol and its related buildings also have inadequate emergency plans, the report says.  Specifically, Capitol police leaders endangered officers last year when they did not have a plan to deal with the anthrax attack (Carl Hulse, New York Times, Nov. 26).

“We concluded that the actions of the Capitol Police during these incidents were the predictable result of the lack of an appropriate emergency response plan, governing training, equipment and procedures,” the report says.

Police officials disputed the findings but refused to disclose why the report is inaccurate or what their current emergency response plan is, citing security issues.

While the report says that officials have taken some steps toward better safety since Sept. 11, it also indicates many shortcomings, including inadequate emergency radios and insufficiently audible alarms (Larry Margasak, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Nov. 26).


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