Pakistan:  Terrorist Crackdown Rooted in Nuclear Concerns, Analysts Say

By Greg Seigle

Global Security Newswire

Pakistan’s crackdown on radical Islamic groups within its borders is intended not only to prevent war with India, but is also rooted in U.S. demands that Pakistan keep its nuclear secrets out of Islamic fundamentalists’ hands, U.S. analysts told Global Security Newswire today.

During the past week, Pakistan has arrested dozens of members of two Kashmir extremist groups believed responsible for the Dec. 13 machine gun attack on India’s Parliament. The attack, which left nine security guards and all five gunmen dead, prompted the U.S. State Department to add both groups to its list of terrorist groups Dec. 26.

In addition to adding Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to its list, the United States has begun the process of freezing any U.S. financial assets of Umma Tameer-e-Nau, which until recently was an unknown outfit believed headquartered in Pakistan (see GSN, Dec. 21).

Umma Tameer-e-Nau is “an organization that claimed to feed the hungry and needy of Afghanistan but that in fact provided information about nuclear weapons to al-Qaeda,” U.S. President George W. Bush said recently.

The two retired Pakistani nuclear physicists arrested last month for sharing undisclosed amounts of nuclear secrets with al-Qaeda—Sultan Bashiru-din Mehmood and Chaudry Abdul Majid—headed Umma Tameer-e-Nau, U.S. officials have said.

“There’s still a fear that the semiautonomous militant groups might gain a sympathetic ear with [Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency] and might be able to get their hands on fissile material—nuclear material, radiological material [or] anything that can be used to make a ‘dirty’ bomb,” said Chris Gagne, a research associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center. “The fear of insider collaboration [between the ISI and terrorists] is less than it was two or three months ago, but it is still there.”

The threat of war between India and Pakistan, which both tested nuclear weapons in 1998, has sparked high-level actions by U.S. officials. In the past week alone U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has made a flurry of phone calls to both Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Powell has also had several communiques with the foreign ministers of both countries, which have fought three wars in the last half-century, the last being in 1971 over Bangladesh.

Threat of Islamic Fundamentalists

While the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear materials has been a major concern of top U.S. officials the past few years due to the rise of Islamic insurgency in the country and Islamabad’s reluctance to share its safety procedures or allow outside inspections, the concerns have been exacerbated since the two Pakistani nuclear physicists were arrested, analysts said.

“There has been a lot of talk, quietly so, of fears of an Islamic coup in Pakistan and the nukes getting in the hands of radical Islamic groups,” said Cheryl Loeb, a Monterey Institute for International Studies research associate. “One of the major concerns of the United States is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.”

The pressure Washington puts on Islamabad is made all the more sensitive because U.S. troops in Afghanistan are relying on Pakistani troops to bottle up their mountainous border with Afghanistan to keep Taliban or al-Qaeda militants from escaping into Pakistan, analysts noted.

Analysts agree that the United States seeks to avert a war between India and Pakistan, and to help Pakistan shore up control of its nuclear assets (see GSN, Nov. 5). A large part of that concern is to keep any rogue elements within Pakistan from gaining control of the nuclear materials or passing nuclear secrets to terrorists groups such as al-Qaeda, they said.

Fears of losing control of nuclear weapons or secrets are “a secondary concern,” said Selig Harrison, director of the National Security Project at the Center for International Policy, who has written five books on South Asia. “It’s a concern, the spread of these nuclear materials … but it’s motivated by how Pakistan keeps, stores and monitors its nuclear assets.”

“I think the underlying cause is the desire of Musharraf to recenter the politics of Pakistan,” said the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Dennis Kux, author of The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, recently published by Johns Hopkins University. “He had wanted to move things back [before Sept. 11] but he didn’t have the political muscle … to bring Pakistan politics back from the Islamic brink.”

How Serious Is the Crackdown?

In recent weeks India has massed its troops on its 1,800-mile border with Pakistan and is threatening military action unless Musharraf arrests dozens of members of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed and hands them over to New Delhi for trial—the latter of which is an unprecedented and unlikely scenario.

Musharraf has cracked down on the two groups, however, arresting Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, head of Lashkar-e-Tayibba, and placing Maulana Masood Azhar under house arrest. But Indian officials have scoffed at the moves, with two ministers separately terming Azhar’s house arrest “a joke.”

 “Nothing has changed, in fact,” declared Harrison. “The situation is still dicey … On the ground in Kashmir there’s been no sign of a crackdown.”

Indeed, skirmishes along the Kashmir border region between Indian and Pakistani forces this past week have killed at least a dozen soldiers and wounded scores more.

“It’s similar to [Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat and his crackdowns on Hammas,” said Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation. “Just how effective are these crackdowns?”

“They haven’t cracked down yet,” Harrison continued. “The U.S. may be trying to freeze the assets [of Umma Tameer-e-Nau] but we don’t know if they’ve simply shifted from one [bank] account to another.”

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U.S.-Russia:  Arms Agreements Need to be Codified, Moscow Says

Russian officials have said they want to see any new strategic arms agreements with the United States be codified in new treaties, the Christian Science Monitor reported today.

“So far there are just two presidents who have talked pleasantly together, which is a very good thing,” said Oleg Naumov, a member of the foreign commission of the state Duma, the lower house of Russia’s Parliament.  “But presidents come and go.  Treaties last,” Naumov said.  “Today there is a legal vacuum in the world, and it must soon be filled with something reliable.”

Russia hopes to see at least two new treaties this year, according to experts.  One would concern strategic nuclear weapons reductions worked out by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush and would have a set of mutual obligations and a means of verification (see GSN, Nov. 14).  The other would be a replacement for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, with the hope it could be drafted by the time of Bush’s visit to Moscow this year (see GSN, Dec. 13).

“If the old treaties were outdated, then let’s replace them with relevant ones,” Naumov said.  “But we must have firm controls on the number of strategic weapons, and that must be clearly balanced with the development of anti-missile weapons.  You cannot assure global security just on the basis of a handshake” (Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 4).

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United States:  Report Criticizes U.S. Handling of Wen Ho Lee Case

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Department of Justice Oversight released a report late last month that criticizes the federal government’s handling of the espionage case concerning nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee in 1999, according to a summary of the report in the Congressional Record.

The U.S. investigation of Lee was “so inept that despite scrutiny spanning nearly two decades, both the FBI and the Department of Energy missed repeated opportunities to discover and stop his illegal computer activities,” said the summary.

“As a consequence of these numerous failures, magnetic computer tapes containing some of the nation’s most sensitive nuclear secrets are now missing when they could have been recovered as late as December 1998 and possibly even later,” the summary said.

The report concluded that claims that the investigation of Lee was ethnically biased were unfounded.  “The repeated investigations of Dr. Lee resulted from reasonable suspicions raised by Dr. Lee’s own conduct,” the summary said.  The report indicated that the government’s treatment of Lee after his arrest, which included placing him in manacles and solitary confinement, may have been a tactic to coerce a confession.

The report lists several concerns with the way the Energy Department and the FBI handled the investigation, including:

*         The government had “highly credible” information that Lee had helped the Chinese with computer codes and software, but investigators did not examine Lee’s own computer;

*         The FBI focused excessively on the alleged loss of design information on the W-88 nuclear warhead due to the reliance on the Energy Department’s administrative inquiry.

*          The Justice Department should have approved the FBI’s request for electronic surveillance of Lee.

*         The U.S. claim that Lee had to be banned from communication is “severely undercut” by the failure to obtain any kind of surveillance.  “If the government was truly concerned that Dr. Lee could potentially alter the global strategic balance though phrases as innocuous as ‘Uncle Wen says hello,’ or might send a signal to a foreign intelligence service to extract him, it should have sought to monitor his communications, but it did not.”

*         The Energy Department should not have allowed Wackenhut contract polygraph examiners to administer a lie detector test to Lee, which they later incorrectly reported Lee had passed.

*         Some of the controversial steps in the case appeared to be taken to protect agencies’ image rather than out of concern for national security.

“One great tragedy of the Wen Ho Lee case is that the entire truth will likely never be known” the summary said.  “If the information Dr. Lee put at risk did not fall into the wrong hands, it is a matter of mere luck.  When the nation’s most sensitive nuclear secrets are at issue, it is unacceptable that we should have to rely on luck to keep them safe” (Congressional Record, Dec. 20).

Click here to read the report.

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Sudan:  Country Is Nuclear Weapon-Free, Says IAEA Chief

Sudan has no nuclear weapons, said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at the end of a visit to the country Dec. 25, according to a Sudanese release.

“Sudan does not possess nuclear weapons,” ElBaradei said, adding that he was pleased the country “complies with its commitments under nonproliferation arrangements in using nuclear programs only for peaceful purposes.”

Sudanese President Lt. Gen. Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir thanked the director general for IAEA support for research and technology programs in Sudan.  Al-Bashir said he hoped to use nuclear technologies for health care, animal husbandry, agriculture and hydrological research.  ElBaradei said the IAEA would continue to help Sudan improve nuclear technology for medical treatment, plant breeding and electricity plants (U.S. Newswire, Jan. 3).

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India-Pakistan:  Have Nuclear Weapons Stabilized the Crisis?

The nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan could have helped prevent war so far, according to some experts.  “I know it goes against all nonproliferation theory, but I believe the presence of nuclear weapons [in the region] has actually made things better, for now,” said Sumit Ganguly, a South Asia expert at the University of Texas (see related GSN story, today).

Despite recent tensions since a mid-December attack on the Indian Parliament and military deployments at the countries’ border, the two sides have been cautious about escalating the situation into a serious war, apparently in part due to concerns about potential nuclear ramifications, according to the Christian Science Monitor (see GSN, Jan. 3).

“Both sides now show great cognizance that there are nuclear dangers and that they have to be extremely careful,” said George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The consequences of a nuclear war in the region would be disastrous.  One nuclear weapon dropped on Bombay could result in 850,000 casualties, according to a recent study (Peter Grier, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 4).

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India-Pakistan:  India Undeterred by Pakistani Arsenal, Officials Say

Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes yesterday said Indian actions towards Pakistan would be unaffected by Pakistan’s nuclear status.  “I can’t believe they would ever use [nuclear weapons] for the simple reason that they would be inviting a second strike,” Fernandes said.  “That could be devastating given Pakistan’s size” (Celia Dugger, New York Times, Jan. 3).

All military options were available to India, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said yesterday, as tensions escalated following the Islamic militant attack against the Indian Parliament last month.  Vajpayee said no weapon would be spared in self-defense and whatever weapon was available, it would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy.

Vajpayee said it was time to reply to Pakistan.  “Terrorism is the state policy of Pakistan,” he said.  “Whatever steps it had recently taken for curbing terrorism were not enough” (J.P. Shukla, The Hindu, Jan. 3).

The Indian military has been put on alert, the Calcutta Telegraph reported yesterday.  Included in its alert operations is a wargame called “Operation Parakrama,” which prepares Indian troops for nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.  This is the second nuclear exercise the Indian army has conducted, according to the Telegraph.  The last such exercise, “Operation Poorna Vijay,” was conducted early last year (Calcutta Telegraph, Jan. 2, in FBIS-NES, Jan. 2).

Brief Meeting at Summit

Pakistani and Indian officials attended a regional summit in Nepal, which was the first direct contact between the two countries since the conflict began, according the Associated Press (see GSN, Jan. 2).

Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar shook hands and talked for a short time during the summit, according to the AP.  The two officials met during the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, which has been delayed for three years because of border conflicts between India and Pakistan

Recent Islamic militant attacks in the disputed Kashmir region, however, left Singh in “no mood” for an individual meeting with Sattar during the SAARC summit, according to an Indian official.  Neither the two foreign ministers, nor Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee nor Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf would have any bilateral meetings during the summit, India said.

Pakistani spokesman Ashfaq Ahmad Gondal, however, said, “The ice is melting.  The very fact that both countries agreed to come to the summit is a very positive step” (Associated Press/Globe and Mail, Jan. 3).

Militants Arrested

Pakistani authorities arrested about 50 members of the two Islamic militant groups believed to be responsible for the attack on the Indian Parliament, officials of the two groups said yesterday.

Authorities arrested 38 members of Jaish-e-Mohammed and 12 members of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, leaders of the two groups said.  Yahya Mujahid, a spokesman for the non-militant wing of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, said his group did nothing illegal.  “It is unfortunate that those people are being arrested who have given tremendous sacrifices for the country,” Mujahid said.  “Arrest of such people is demoralizing for the struggle in Kashmir.”

The arrests were taken because of domestic pressures for action and not because of India’s calls for such action, said Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan.  Pakistan is watching militants and would act if they break any laws, but there are no plans to ban the two groups, he said (Amir Zia, Associated Press/Miami Herald, Jan. 3).

Pakistan rejected Indian demands to extradite 20 militants, the London Telegraph reported today.  Pakistani spokesman Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi said India has no proof to support its extradition demands.  “The list [of militants] has been received, but there is no evidence or proof provided,” Qureshi said.  “It becomes very difficult to consider any action if there is no proof.”

India would have to “justify” its extradition claims by making a case against each person in its own courts, provide evidence against the accused and then request their extradition under the SAARC anti-terrorism convention, said Pakistani Foreign Minister Sattar.  India and Pakistan do not have a direct extradition treaty.

“It’s absurd for Pakistan to demand more proof,” said Vajpayee.  “The bodies of the dead and the destruction done in terrorist strikes were proof enough” (Rahul Bedi, London Telegraph, Jan. 3).

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United States:  Report Finds Delays in Testing

A report by the U.S. Energy Department’s inspector general has found serious delays in programs to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, the Washington Post reported today.

In the report, sent last month to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, Inspector General Gregory Friedman said his review found delays in laboratory tests for five out of nine types of nuclear warheads and bombs that the United States deploys.  Another review found delays of up to 18 months in correcting flaws found in older weapons systems, according to the Post.

“Without a robust and complete surveillance testing program, the department’s ability to assess the reliability of some nuclear weapons is at risk,” Friedman wrote.

The delays have been caused in part by aging nuclear weapons facilities, which need increased funding for maintenance and replacement, according to Friedman.  The U.S. Congress approved an additional $200 million in funding for such programs, but more is needed, Energy Department officials said.

If testing shows a defect in a nuclear weapon, department procedures require immediate notification of the laboratory that developed the suspect weapon, the Post reported.  Five days after it receives notification, the laboratory is supposed to determine if the defect is significant, and if it is, the laboratory has 45 days to determine if a major investigation should be conducted.

About 10 percent of such significant findings have led to “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile,” according to the inspector general’s report. The inspector general recently found, however, that the 45-day period for determining defects had grown, in some examples, to 300 days, according to the Post.

After the determinations had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” the report said.  There is only a small group of engineers to conduct such investigations, and they are often involved in other projects, a top Defense Department official said.  As of March 2001, 18 out of 24 investigations remained unresolved after 18 months, the inspector general noted.

“If these delays continue, the department may not be in a position to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons stockpile,” Friedman wrote.

Some officials have been discussing the idea of resuming underground nuclear weapons testing (see GSN, Oct. 2), said Senator John Warner (R-Va.).

“If the surveillance program can’t do the job, we will have to resume testing to make sure our [nuclear] weapons work,” Warner said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, Jan. 3).

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Russia:  Verdict Delayed in Trial of Arms Control Expert

A Russian judge refused last week to issue a verdict on a Russian arms control expert and ordered prosecutors to reinvestigate accusations that he gave nuclear secrets to the United States.  Russian prosecutors said Igor Sutyagin, a researcher for the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, transferred secrets about Russian nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons and early warning systems (Sharon LaFraniere, Washington Post, Dec. 28).

The prosecutors sought a 14-year prison term.  Sutyagin pleaded innocent and said he never had access to classified information (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Dec. 27).

Prosecutors said the London-based firm Alternative Futures, for which Sutyagin worked as a part-time consultant, was a cover for the CIA.

The judge said the prosecutors failed to show which state secrets Sutyagin betrayed that damaged Russian security.  According to Sutyagin’s lawyers, the judge did not consider Sutyagin’s claim that all his sources were public information and never read English documents the expert used for his research.

In response, Russia’s Federal Security Service released a videotape to the Russian Interfax news agency showing Sutyagin admitting that he realized his work was placing Russian interests in jeopardy but that he was persuaded to continue.

Sutyagin, who has served two years in prison so far, could spend more time in prison waiting for prosecutors to continue investigations.  One of Sutyagin’s lawyers, Vladimir Vasiltsov, said he would appeal Sutyagin’s continued detention, calling it “outrageous” (LaFraniere, Washington Post, Dec. 28).

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India-Pakistan:  Nuclear Facilities Data Exchanged

India and Pakistan Monday exchanged information on their nuclear facilities, according to the Washington Post.  Meanwhile, tensions loomed over the two countries as they each moved military forces toward their common border, according to reports.

The exchange of nuclear facility data, which includes locations of nuclear installations, has been an annual practice since 1992, the Post reported.  The exchange began under an agreement between the two countries that stipulated they would not attack each other’s nuclear facilities in the event of war.  The recent information swap is seen as an effort to reduce tensions between the two countries since an attack by Islamic militants on the Indian Parliament on Dec. 13 (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Jan. 2).

Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said his country’s list would likely not contain any new installations.  “We have not undertaken construction of any new facilities this year,” Sattar said.  “[India has] to provide a list.  From that we have to see whether or not any additions were made to the old list” (K.J.M. Verma, Rediff.com/Nuclear Control Institute, Dec. 30).

Pakistani Military Moves

Pakistan’s military actions on its border with India included preparations to transport nuclear weapons out of storage sites, the Washington Times reported Monday.

Pakistan was preparing to move its Chinese-made M-11 missiles from a base near Sargodha, Pakistan, according to officials.  The Times reported that Pakistan was also moving the equivalent of two armored brigades near the northern part of the border (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Dec. 31).

“Pakistan does not seek any war, local or general, conventional or nuclear.  Pakistan is for peace and for adherence to the norms of peaceful coexistence,” Sattar said.  “Nuclear weapons are awful weapons and any use of these weapons should be inconceivable for any state” (Hong Kong AFP, Dec. 29, in FBIS-NES, Dec. 29).

Indian Military Moves

India last week deployed ballistic missiles and increased jet fighter patrols along its border with Pakistan, according to the Washington Post. 

Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes confirmed that Indian missiles, including Russian-made medium-range missiles and Indian-made truck-launched missiles, were “in position.”  The missile batteries were deployed due to recent moves by Pakistan, according to other Indian defense officials.

It is unknown whether the missiles along the India-Pakistan border are armed with nuclear weapons, the Post reported.  “It is a very dangerous gray area,” said Uday Bhaskar, deputy director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi.  “The nuclear question mark has drastically raised the stakes of this confrontation.”

Some Indian officials have said that the military buildup on the border is more of an effort to force Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on Islamic militants in Pakistan.  The increased Indian military presence may also be a move to force the United States into pushing Musharraf, according to Indian analysts.

Many Indian officials, however, do not think Musharraf will move against the militants to a great enough extent to please India, according to the Post.  Therefore, the two countries may be heading to a military conflict, some Indian officials and analysts said. 

“If nonmilitary measures do not yield any tangible results, the thinking is clear that [India] will have no other option but to apply military force,” said Brahma Chellaney, of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi.

“If people in the West think this is all just for show, they’re making a grave mistake,” Chellaney said.  “They should not assume that the Indian state does not have the stomach to confront Pakistan and to impose costs on them” (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, Dec. 27).

Indian Defense Minister Fernandes said there would not be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but that Pakistan would be destroyed if such a war occurred.

“Those who deal with [nuclear] weapons are sensible,” Fernandes told the Hindustan Times.  “Pakistan can’t think of using nuclear weapons despite the fact they are not committed to the doctrine of no first use like we are,” he said.  “We could take a [nuclear] strike, survive and then hit back.  Pakistan would be finished” (Frontier Post, Dec. 31).

The Indian Army Medical Corps is ready in the event of war using weapons of mass destruction, according to Indian officials. 

Recent events, including the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the recent anthrax attacks in the United States, gave the unit “the impetus to formulate new strategies to protect and treat the fighting troops from the devastating effects of nuclear, biological and chemical warfare,” said Director General Lt.-Gen. R.K. Jetley. “The training of medical personnel for efficient management of casualties in such a war scenario may require to be reinforced and reoriented” (The Asian Age, Dec. 30, in FBIS-NES, Dec. 30).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Russian-Support Programs Still Experiencing Organizational Difficulties, GAO Says

By Greg Seigle

Global Security Newswire

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been slow to overcome organizational problems and has made limited use of its authority as a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, according to the General Accounting Office.  NNSA officials defended their work and said they were working out the kinks of a new organization.

The two-year-old NNSA, which supports the transition of Russian nuclear facilities and scientists to civilian roles, has made strides, said Gary Jones, GAO’s director of resources and environment.  In its task to correct long-standing problems within the Energy Department, however, the agency has yet to address important issues such as the division of responsibilities among offices within its headquarters and between headquarters and field offices, Jones said in a letter to two congressional representatives released Dec. 27.  Click here to read the GAO correspondence.

NNSA planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation processes are also lagging, said the letter to Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) and Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) of the House Armed Services Committee’s oversight panel on Energy Department reorganization. The processes might not be implemented by the 2004 budget cycle, already a year later than Congress mandated.

“We recognize that NNSA’s implementation … is an evolving process,” the GAO said. “However, other important, fundamental and long-standing issues—such as organizational roles and responsibilities, where we have previously made recommendations—remain un-addressed.

“We believe the best time to address such problems is when the new organization and systems are first being laid out and the momentum for change is at its highest,” the letter continued. “NNSA’s ability to recapture and build momentum in areas such as planning, programming and budgeting will be critical to whether it will be successful in correcting the long-standing management problems inherited from DOE.”

Officials at NNSA acknowledged the problems cited by the GAO but also noted that they encountered numerous hurdles that slowed their momentum, including the Sept. 11 terrorists attacks, a slow budget process for 2002, delayed confirmations of presidential appointments to key positions and significant institutional barriers to coordinating with other federal agencies and with various other offices in the Energy Department and its own administration.

Twice in the past year the GAO has issued reports criticizing NNSA.  Because they are busy with ongoing operations—especially the implementation of the Nuclear Cities Initiative (see GSN, Dec. 21) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, two programs designed to ease the transition of Russia’s nuclear facilities and scientists to civilian work—NNSA officials said they failed “to see the value added by [GAO’s] latest effort.”

“We are consolidating functions where we can,” Steven Black, acting director of NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, told Global Security Newswire during a Dec. 19 interview. “There are a number of things that have been done … We took the GAO’s good advice to find ways to consolidate functions where we could.”

In the recent GAO letter, which is based on findings discovered between November 2000 and last month, the lawmakers cited various areas in which the administration needs improvement:

*         While NNSA announced a new headquarters organization last May, the reorganization did not contain a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of headquarters offices and did not address field office organization at all.  NNSA, GAO noted, is working to solve these shortcomings.

*         NNSA lost some momentum in 2001 as it reevaluated its efforts to create new planning processes. While the agency has decided to use processes modeled after those used by the Defense Department—ones that streamline efforts and work well when offices are fully staffed and funded—it may not have them ready in time for the 2004 budgetary cycle.  Even if these practices are implemented in time, it remains to be seen whether they will effectively handle the agency’s needs.

*         NNSA has firm plans to use only 100 of its 300 excepted service positions authorized by Congress.  The administration does not have the coherent human resources and workforce planning strategies it needs if it is to develop and maintain a well-managed workforce over the long run.

*         NNSA has determined that there is no need for it to have its own procurement regulations and has begun to address long-standing contract management problems through efforts to improve contractor oversight and program evaluation.

“While some would like to see more progress, we cannot and will not compromise the integrity nor the rigor of the procurement process for the appearance of short term change,” wrote Anthony Lane, NNSA’s associate administrator for management and administration, in response to the GAO assertions.

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Threat Assessment:  Few Weapons Needed for Destroying Nations

Destroying the United States would take only 124 nuclear weapons, and destroying Canada would take only 11, according to a new study by the Natural Resources Defense Council, which has developed a computer program to predict the number of nuclear weapons necessary to destroy a country.  The council developed the software to raise questions about the large nuclear stockpiles the United States and Russia possess, according to the Ottawa Citizen. 

The program was based on the concept of mutual assured destruction, known as MAD.  Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara defined MAD as the ability to kill 25 percent of a country’s population and destroy 50 percent of its industry with nuclear weapons.  The theory holds that countries would not strike with nuclear weapons if they knew their opponent could strike back and destroy them.

Using that definition, a large number of nuclear weapons would do little to increase security, said Matthew McKinzie, a physicist who helped develop the computer program.  “The first 11 weapons [used] on Canada kills 25 percent of the population … But 22 weapons would only kill 30 percent of the population,” he said.

Under the Canadian simulation, Canada’s major cities and military installations were attacked with 475-kiloton warheads.  “If you take out Canada’s major centers, what is there left in terms of medical and rescue services, government, industry and other functions?” McKinzie said.  “There is not enough to continue functioning as a country.  For Canada, 11 weapons will do that … Why do we need several thousand deployed nuclear weapons when even a few hundred would assure an overwhelming loss of life?”

The program is similar to the highly secret U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan, which projects the likely consequences of attacks.  Developers of the National Resources Defense Council’s program used declassified U.S. documents, such as radioactive fallout projections and census data, to develop the program.  McKinzie said he planned to eventually distribute the program to the public.

The program predicted it would take 51 weapons to destroy Russia, 368 to destroy China, 300 to destroy all NATO countries and as few as four to destroy small countries, such as Iraq or North Korea (David Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 2).

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U.S.-Russia II:  Bush to Advance Most Nonproliferation Funding

U.S. President George W. Bush announced last week that the United States would continue, and in some cases accelerate, cooperative nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia.  Bush would propose an overall increase in such programs in his next budget, White House officials said, despite earlier Bush administration criticism of the programs (Mike Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 28).

The administration plans to expand the Energy Department’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting program to help safeguard Russian weapon-grade nuclear material and the Energy Department’s Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program (U.S. State Department fact sheet, Dec. 27).  The administration would also expand the International Science and Technology Center—which helps transfer Russian weapons experts to nonmilitary work (see GSN, Nov. 19)—and efforts to help improve nuclear materials detection at Russian border posts (Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 28).

The administration also announced plans to restructure several programs, including transferring a project to support ending Russian production of weapon-grade plutonium from the Defense Department to the Energy Department.  The White House said the Nuclear Cities Initiative would merge with the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (U.S. State Department fact sheet, Dec. 27).  Some administration officials had advocated canceling the Nuclear Cities Initiative, but Bush did not cut the program entirely (see GSN, Dec. 20).

The White House announced that the State and Energy Departments would search for new approaches to disposing of weapon-grade plutonium in Russia (see GSN, Nov. 26), a project with increasingly high costs and disagreements over disposal methods (Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 28).  The Bush administration prefers a cheaper method of using plutonium in reactors as mixed oxide fuel rather than disposing of plutonium by vitrifying it with nuclear waste materials and storing it indefinitely, the New York Times reported (Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times, Dec. 28).

Congress approved $120 million last month for Energy Department nonproliferation programs in Russia as part of a $286 million supplemental appropriations measure for nonproliferation programs, according to the Washington Post (see GSN, Dec. 20).

Experts’ Reaction

Several experts expressed approval of the decision to maintain the cooperative nonproliferation programs.  Lawrence Korb of the Council on Foreign Relations said the Bush administration had previously said it supported cooperative efforts with Russia but proposed cuts in nonproliferation programs.

“Now they realize these are important programs that could keep nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists,” Korb said.  “If these terrorists get hold of nuclear weapons, it will make Sept. 11 look like a day at the beach” (Allen, Washington Post, Dec. 28).

“I think it shows a fairly profound evolution of Bush administration views over the past year,” said Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “They raised huge expectations early in the administration that they were going to slash and burn.  I think they began to see the national security implications, and then after Sept. 11 it became untenable to cut the programs radically” (Bumiller, New York Times, Dec. 28).

U.S. taxpayers should pay for the programs “because the U.S. is at war with terrorism and this is part of the cost of fighting the war,” said John Hughes of the Desert News in an opinion piece in today’s Christian Science Monitor.

Hughes listed several incidents of attempts to smuggle or steal nuclear material from Russia.  Russian authorities reported two recent cases of terrorists attempting to break into nuclear storage sites, and several Russians, including nuclear laboratory employees and sailors, have been arrested trying to sell or steal material.

“Isolated incidents?  No, just a few of dozens documented by an official U.S. government task force,” Hughes said (John Hughes, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 2).

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United States I:  Battle Continues Over New B-2 Production

Senior civilian U.S. Defense Department officials and the U.S. Air Force are fighting over whether to increase funding for new B-2 bombers, the Washington Times reported last week (see GSN, Dec. 11).

Civilian Defense Department officials, led by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, want the air force to restart production of the B-2, according to the Times.  Pentagon officials said the air force’s five-year plan has no funding for long-range bombers, even though U.S. President George W. Bush has called for weapons with global reach.

B-2s have gained more support, due in part to the expanded use of joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs), which allow bombers to conduct the same precision strikes as fighters, according to the Times.  Although JDAMs are not as accurate as laser-guided weapons, they are still accurate within a few yards of a target and are unaffected by poor weather conditions.  A B-2 bomber can carry up to 16 JDAMs, while the air force F-16 fighter can carry only two, the Times reported. 

“Bombers have resurrected themselves,” said an air force source.  The source added that the stealth capabilities of B-2s make it very useful against countries with more advanced air defenses, such as Iraq.

Air Force Secretary James Roche, however, opposes the production of new B-2s, the Times reported. A Pentagon official said Roche becomes “downright emotional” if the idea is mentioned.  As an alternative to new B-2s, Roche has proposed the development of a “supercruise” bomber later in the decade, officials said.

The air force is concerned that any new B-2s would reduce funding for the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, according to the Times.  A plan under discussion among Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s staff is to reduce the F-22 order from 339 to 150, and to use the saved money to build new B-2s.  The air force has some B-2 supporters, but they have said the funding should come from the U.S. Marines’ V-22 Osprey or the U.S. Army’s Commanche helicopter, instead of the F-22, according to the Times. 

Pete Aldridge, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief, voiced his support for both the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter last week.  “When we get the F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, we’ll have, with essentially all-stealth capability … the ability to just dominate the sky over any adversary,” Aldridge said (Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Dec. 26).

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U.S-Russia III:  Date Set for Strategic Weapons Reduction Talks

The first round of U.S-Russian talks to reduce offensive strategic weapons will be held Jan. 14-18 in Washington, the Russian news agency Interfax reported last week (see GSN, Dec. 18).

The U.S. and Russian delegations will agree “on the amount and time of the reduction, and will decide on the control and transparency of the process,” Russian sources said.  The two countries may be able to draft an agreement on reductions before U.S. President George W. Bush’s trip to Moscow later this year, one of the sources said (Interfax, Dec. 27).

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United States II:  Nuclear Trigger Smuggler Pleads Guilty

Richard Kelly Smyth, a former U.S. physicist charged with smuggling potential nuclear weapons components to Israel, last week pleaded guilty to two counts, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Nov. 27).

Smyth pleaded guilty to making false statements or false documents by signing or approving invoices to send the components to Israel and to exporting the components without a license, the AP reported.  In exchange, prosecutors agreed to dismiss 28 other charges against him.  Smyth faces a maximum sentence of seven years in prison and a $110,000 fine.

Smyth was charged in 1985 with exporting the components, called krytrons, to Heli Corp. in Israel.  Krytrons are small glass bulbs with a wide range of uses, including as triggers in nuclear weapons.  Because of this, their export must first gain U.S. State Department approval, according to the AP.  After Smyth’s indictment, Israel returned most of the krytrons and said they were not for use in nuclear weapons (Associated Press/Las Vegas Sun, Dec. 29).

“This is the kind of case that should be settled,” said Smyth’s defense attorney James Riddet.  “My client is not in the greatest health.  He’d like to put this behind him and end the uncertainty that faces him and his family” (David Rosenzweig, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 28).

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North Korea:  Delegation Returns Home After Training

North Korean nuclear energy officials left South Korea Sunday after touring nuclear facilities there for two weeks (see GSN, Dec. 21).  The delegation of 20 North Koreans visited the Kori nuclear power station, nuclear reactors in Ulchin, the Korea Power Engineering Company in Yongin and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety in Taedok Science Town.

The officials visited Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction in Changwon, which is manufacturing parts for two light-water nuclear reactors to be built in North Korea (Seoul Yonhap, Dec. 30 in FBIS-EAS, Dec. 31).  They also stopped at the headquarters of the main contractor for the reactor project, Korea Electric Power (BBC News/Nuclear Control Institute, Dec. 30).

The tour was part of a training agreement signed in October 2000 by North Korea and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international organization that is building the reactors in exchange for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  The two parties agreed that KEDO would train 530 North Korean technicians in North Korea in the first half of 2002, and 290 would also train in South Korea over the next two years, according to Yonhap (Seoul Yonhap, Dec. 28 in FBIS-EAS, Dec. 31). 

Click here to read the training agreement.

Meanwhile, KEDO and the European Community agreed to renew the European Union’s membership in the organization, KEDO reported in December.  The EU also agreed to continue its role on the KEDO executive board and to contribute about $18 million each year from 2001 to 2005 (KEDO release, Dec. 19).

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