Threat Assessment:  Small Nuclear Bomb Would Devastate New York, Say Scientists

Using an official U.S. modeling program, three scientists concluded recently that a Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon exploding in New York City would kill hundreds of thousands of people.

The consequences of such an attack are so great that nuclear weapons must be abolished to eliminate the risk, wrote Ira Helfand, Lachlan Forrow and Jaya Tiwari, last week in the British Medical Journal.

All members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the three conducted a simulation involving a 12.5-kiloton nuclear explosion in the port area of New York City.  Their simulator was the Consequences Assessment Tool Set software developed by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

The simulated blast killed 52,000 people immediately, and 10,000 people died later of direct radiation exposure.  Another 34,000 people had nonfatal radiation sickness from direct exposure.  Radioactive fallout killed another 200,000 people and created several hundred thousand cases of radiation sickness.

The ability to aid survivors was limited in the simulation because the blast destroyed 1,000 hospital beds and contaminated other facilities.  Other medical facilities were overwhelmed (see GSN, Feb. 5).

A terrorist attack with a “dirty bomb” — a conventional explosive that spreads radioactive material — could also be very lethal (see GSN, Feb. 7).  If terrorists were to disperse a cask of spent fuel rods in Manhattan in the middle of the day, it would likely kill more than 2,000 people, according to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimate.

Attacks on nuclear installations could also have severe consequences.  An attack on either a nuclear reactor or a spent fuel pool “could equal or exceed the effects of the 1986 Chernoybl disaster, which led to 30 acute deaths from radiation sickness, at least 1,800 excess cases of childhood thyroid cancer” and contamination of large amounts of land, the authors wrote.

Preventing Proliferation

To eliminate this risk, the United States and its allies must work to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials, the authors said (see GSN, Feb. 5).  They mentioned several cases of attempted nuclear smuggling, including recent attempts by terrorist groups to break into Russian nuclear storage sites and the arrest of two men in Turkey for trying to sell weapon-grade uranium (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2001).

Russia’s large nuclear stockpile is a potential source of tens of thousands of tactical nuclear bombs and 603 metric tons of weapon-grade nuclear material, the authors wrote.  The United States is spending more than $900 million each year to safeguard the Russian stockpile, but, the authors wrote, that amount is less than a seventh of the U.S. national missile defense budget (see GSN, Jan. 10).  They urged the United States and other countries to increase assistance to Russia to protect its nuclear arsenal.

Only Option is to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

“As long as there are stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains,” the authors wrote.  The only conclusive way to end the threat is to eliminate nuclear weapons and implement “strict international control of all fissile materials” with potential weapons use, the authors wrote (British Medical Journal, Feb. 9).

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China:  Multiple-Warhead Missiles Could Defeat U.S. Missile Defenses, Analysts Say

U.S. defense analysts have said China is close to being able to overwhelm any U.S. ballistic missile defense system, the London Times reported today (see GSN, Jan. 10).

China is working to equip its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles, with ranges up to 8,000 miles, with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, according to the Times (see GSN, Nov. 13, 2001).

“It looks like the Chinese are much further [ahead] than we originally thought,” said one U.S. analyst.

China is believed to have recently increased its MIRV tests, the Times reported.  Early this month, the Japanese media reported a test of a Dongfeng-31 missile, which has a range of more than 5,000 miles (see GSN, Nov. 6, 2001).  The missile completed the first half of its trajectory and released separate warheads before disintegrating.  China is also believed to be testing a naval version of the Dongfeng-31, according to the Times (see GSN, Feb. 1).

China currently has about 20 long-range ICBMs, according to the Times.  The proposed U.S. missile defenses are expected to be able to counter attacks of up to 24 missiles.

If China were to equip its missiles with MIRVs, “it could easily overwhelm the shield,” the U.S. analyst said.  “That would change the balance of power in Asia” (Oliver August, London Times, Feb. 12).

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United States:  DOE Requests Study on Nuclear “Bunker Buster”

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — President George W. Bush’s fiscal 2003 Energy Department budget request has called for completing a preliminary study on modifying a nuclear warhead for military “bunker-busting” operations (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001).

U.S. military officials have said they need better earth-penetrating weapons for striking enemy assets protected in hardened and deeply buried bunkers such as missile silos and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s command bunker.

Arms control advocates are concerned about unintended casualties from their use and that developing, testing and using such weapons could undermine international efforts to curb the global development and spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The request calls for completing program cost and feasibility studies for modifying B-61 nuclear warheads for use on a system called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

The B-61 is “the weapon that everybody has looked at for modifications being possible to develop a so-called mini-nuke,” said Cathy Crandall, the associate director of security programs at Physicians for Social Responsibility.  By “mini-nuke” she means a lower-yield nuclear weapon that might create less collateral damage, making it theoretically more acceptable when used.

The earth-penetrating system appears to be in an early stage of development and other possible warhead options could include developing an entirely new warhead or developing a conventional warhead, experts say.

Arms control analysts are concerned developing new low-yield nuclear weapons for use in combat missions could lessen the stigma of using nuclear weapons by other countries.

“The United States using nuclear weapons in combat lowers the threshold on a worldwide basis,” says David Culp, an analyst at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.  It “makes it more politically acceptable for other countries to use nuclear weapons.”

Resuming Nuclear Tests?

There also is a concern that modifying the B-61 or developing a new warhead would lead to a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, which was suspended in the early 1990s by former President George Bush.

“I think everybody understands that if we resume testing, you see the Russians resume testing.  And, this is no secret, there are hawks in Russia just like there are in the United States, and for many years people in their military and in their weapons laboratories have been arguing that Russia needs to develop a new small tactical nuclear weapon that would be deployed in Eastern Europe primarily along the Belarus-Polish border,” said Culp.

China, India and Pakistan might also feel freer to resume testing, he said.

There is, however, a legal hurdle that might need to be overcome. A 1993 law forbids research and development of nuclear weapons below a five-kiloton yield.

On the other hand, Congress passed language in the fiscal 2001 defense authorization bill requiring a study on “the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets” (see GSN, Dec. 14, 2001).

Also, the current Bush administration has indicated the president has no intentions of submitting to the Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed by President Bill Clinton, which would ban all further testing.

Not Clear Whether U.S. Testing Needed

Experts say it is unclear whether Energy would need to resume nuclear testing for a new nuclear earth-penetrating weapon.

While developing a new warhead probably would require a resumption of testing, modifying the B-61 probably would not, said Culp.  Fifty B-61s previously were modified essentially by putting them in hardened shells to create a lesser earth-penetration weapon, called the B-61 mod 11, first announced in the mid-1990s.

That modified bomb, with a yield potentially ranging from 10 to 340 kilotons, was not tested in the earth-penetrating delivery system, but the system containing the warhead reportedly had somewhat limited penetrating capability, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

That modified model “obviously doesn’t have the kind of capability they are looking for,” said Culp.

Whether a newly modified B-61 warhead might require testing, he said, could depend on both the extent of the modification and “whether the military that’s buying this weapon has enough confidence in it to deploy it without testing.”

Higher-yield warheads do not need to penetrate the ground as deeply as lower-yield weapons but can be more controversial, because they tend to cause higher collateral damage and fallout, experts say.  Crandall said the modifications would not necessarily involve further modifying the B-61 to create a lower-yield “mini-nuke.”

It might be preferred by the military, though, she said, to minimize radioactive fallout and collateral damage.

“It is generally considered that if there were a U.S. military requirement to use an earth-penetrating weapon — on caves in Afghanistan for example — that there would be some effort to reduce the ‘collateral damage’ by lowering the yield if it were a nuclear weapon,” she said.

Uncertain Intentions

U.S. officials have not said whether they plan to add new nuclear bunker busters to the arsenal.

Results of the Pentagon’s most recent Nuclear Posture Review, a reconsideration of its nuclear strategy, alert status and holdings, released last month, alluded to future nuclear testing and new roles for nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy (see GSN, Jan. 24).

The review called for shortening the time needed to prepare for a nuclear weapons test, citing possibly testing needs for maintaining the current stockpile (see GSN, Jan. 10, 2001).  The Bush budget request allocated $15 million to Energy for making that change.

While citing a need for new earth-penetrating weapons, however, the review did not say whether nuclear weapons should be developed for such a role.

Information prepared for a briefing on the review only said there is a need for developing improved “non-nuclear strike” capabilities for use against “hardened and deeply buried targets.”

Responding to a question, however, the principal briefer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch, seemed to say the administration is considering developing new nuclear weapons that could be used for special battlefield operations like bunker busting (see GSN, Jan. 10, 2002).

“Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives,” he said.  “One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against hard targets and deeply buried targets.  And we're also looking at non-nuclear ways that we might be able to deal with those problems.”

The Energy and Defense departments completed a study last July examining how nuclear weapons could be modified to attack buried, hardened targets, but reportedly they made no conclusions about developing such weapons.

Crouch also said no recommendation was made on that in the Nuclear Posture Review.

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India I:  Officials Fail to Agree with Russia on Weapons Contracts

Indian and Russian ministers did not agree during negotiations last week on a proposal to lease two Russian nuclear submarines and two nuclear-capable TU-22 bombers to India, the Moscow Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 8).

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes agreed on technical issues but disagreed on some financial concerns, Fernandes said.  The two sides did not even discuss leasing the submarines, Indian Defense Ministry spokesman Pradipto Kumar Bandyopadhyay said.

Klebanov and Fernandes pledged to cooperate to develop military equipment and signed three protocols and one military contract, the Times reported.  The limited progress nevertheless indicates Russia and India will begin a significant new stage in military cooperation, analysts said.

The protocols include cooperation in aviation, warships and land-based army systems.  The contract is for the delivery of Krasnopol precision-guided projectiles, according to the Moscow Times (Lyuba Pronina, Moscow Times, Feb. 11).

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India II:  Foreign Minister Renews Promise to Ban Nuclear Tests

Although India is not a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signatory, it will abide by the agreement by not testing any nuclear explosives, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said in an interview published yesterday in the Financial Times online.  Critics around the world complained last month when India test-fired a nuclear-capable short-range Agni missile (see related GSN story, today).

“I have said so at the United Nations General Assembly, and the prime minister [Atal Bihari Vajpayee] has also said so — that India has announced a voluntary moratorium on any further nuclear-explosive testing,” Singh said.  “This is not time-bound.”

India has maintained full military mobilization along the India-Pakistan border since gunmen attacked outside India’s Parliament on Dec. 13, 2001 (see GSN, Feb. 8).  Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has promised to fight terrorism in Pakistan, but Singh said India has not detected any reduction in terrorist infiltration into India’s Jammu and Kashmir territory (see GSN, Jan. 4).  Bad weather in Kashmir makes it too early to truly judge, he added (Edward Luce, Financial Times, Feb. 11).

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U.S.-Russia:  Some Progress in HEU Deal Dispute, Russia Says

U.S. and Russian negotiators have made some progress in an ongoing dispute over pricing terms in the U.S. purchase of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 28).

“No final result has been achieved so far,” said press officials of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.  Talks will continue in Moscow this week, they said (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring, Feb. 10).

The U.S. Energy Department and U.S. Enrichment Corp. are negotiating the best way to reduce USEC’s dependence on imported enriched uranium, according to the Washington Times.  USEC is the sole U.S. purchaser of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons under the “Megatons to Megawatts” agreement.

“It’s an energy security question,” said a senior Bush administration official.  “It’s the same principle as not being reliant on all the Middle Eastern companies for our oil.”

“They live off the cheap Russian material,” the senior official said of USEC.  “When it runs out, they’re in trouble.”

USEC’s main problem is its outdated technology for manufacturing nuclear fuel, the senior official said.  USEC, however, has balked at setting a date for any technology upgrades, according to the Times.

“If our technology is going to be competitive, we need to get it to market fast,” the senior official said.  “Otherwise, we’re reliant on overseas technology.”

The Bush administration has told USEC is will lose its role in the megatons to megawatts program if it does not set a date for developing new ways to produce nuclear fuel, the senior official said.

Sources close to the Energy Department-USEC negotiations have said the two sides are close to solving main differences between them.

“We’re progressing nicely,” the official said.  “It will happen” (Carter Dougherty, Washington Times, Feb. 11).

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