International Response:  Code of Conduct Ineffective, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The approved draft proposal of an international ballistic missile code of conduct will do little to stop missile proliferation, arms control experts told Global Security Newswire this week, although some said the code is a progressive step (see GSN, Feb. 12).

The code will undermine efforts to stop ballistic missile proliferation and will instead help missiles spread “more rapidly,” said Richard Speier, a former Pentagon official who served on the U.S. negotiating team for the Missile Technology Control Regime.  The MTCR is an export control regime under which most industrial nations have agreed on rules to restrict the export of critical missile technologies.

During a two-day round of talks in Paris last week, more than 80 states approved a draft proposal of a missile code of conduct.  The code is a political agreement that calls on signatories to declare their ballistic missile programs once a year and to alert other signatories before conducting any missile tests.

Critics of the code said the lack of defined incentives for countries to join and a competition between the code and other agreements under negotiation will make the international code of conduct ineffective.  The United States, however, is likely to support final approval of the code, experts said.

Lack of Incentives Could “Doom” Code

The code is an “important first step” and useful because it helps establish world norms on nonproliferation, said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  The lack of concrete incentives in the code, however, could doom it to failure, he said.

Instead, a one-line paragraph in the code gives a state “unknown incentives to get rid of [its] entire ballistic missile program,” said Alex Wagner of the Arms Control Association.  For any state that has devoted many resources toward a ballistic missile program, there is no reason to join the code, Wagner said.

This lack of tangible incentives is what will keep rogue states such as Iran and North Korea from joining, Wagner said.  Instead, Eastern European states such as Slovakia and the Balkans will flock to the code and give up their remaining stockpiles of Soviet-era ballistic missiles to better facilitate entrance into NATO, he said (see GSN, Jan. 18).

“If it doesn’t provide incentives and all you have are sticks, it’s not very effective,” Wolfsthal said.  “First you set a code, then you find bilateral ways to provide incentives.”

Would Rogue States Want to Join?

The Bush administration has so far shown no willingness to offer any incentives to rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Wolfsthal said.  Evidence has shown, however, that North Korea responds favorably to well-packaged and sincere initiatives, he said (see GSN, Feb. 14).

There is no doubt the United States can work with North Korea on the issue of ballistic missiles, since they “need more things than missiles,” said Chris Madison, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

It would be more difficult for the United States to provide similar incentives to Iran due to the distrust and long history between the two nations since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Wolfsthal said.  European countries, however, could have better success at offering incentives because of the built-up contacts and level of trust.  European countries could also better work with reformers within Iran without damaging their credibility, he said.

The international code of conduct could help increase ballistic missile sales, Wagner said.  Sales of ballistic missiles and technology between signatories to the code and certain allies would become more legitimized, he said.

The code “would create almost a [North American Free Trade Agreement] for missiles,” Wagner said.

Missiles vs. Rockets

Wagner said one set of incentives, examined early on in the negotiations for the draft code proposal, would have centered on assistance for space technology programs.  Technical assistance and space launch services could have been offered to deter states from developing ballistic missiles under the guise of space-launch vehicles.

The United States, however, fears that states could use technology gained from assistance with space programs for military purposes, Wagner said.  U.S. officials, therefore, do not want to offer technical proliferation as an incentive.

While space-launch technology assistance has been one of the best incentives for states to join missile agreements such as the code, it was right that it was left out, Speier said.

It would be “like offering peaceful nuclear explosions to countries to refrain from developing nuclear weapons,” Speier said, adding that there is virtually no difference between space-launch and ballistic missile technology.

The code already treats “scientific rockets” more generously than ballistic missiles and establishes a difference in controls with the MTCR, Speier said.  Many countries already use space-launch vehicles to further develop ballistic missiles, which allows countries to feign peaceful development, he said.

Competing Agreements Could Lead to “Venue Shopping”

Another flaw in the proposed international code of conduct is that it creates a direct competitor to the MTCR, according to Speier.  Before the code, the MTCR was the only set of rules governing proliferation of missiles and missile technology.  With the code, however, nations could go “venue shopping” to find the best set of rules that still allows them to achieve their aims, Speier said.

“It would be better if we pursued one set of rules — the MTCR,” he said.

More Treaties Could Weaken Oversight Power

The creation of more than one set of rules regulating missile and missile technology proliferation will also deflect staff work on nonproliferation in governments, Speier said.

“Nonproliferation regimes are only as good as the work put into them,” Speier said.

It takes large amounts of work to adequately track, and if need be, protest missile technology transfers — work that is already being done by tiny staffs in various governments, Speier said.  Many MTCR member states have no more than three people each following missile nonproliferation, and removing even one person to work on the code could lead to damaging efforts as a whole, according to Speier.

Global Control System Lite?

Experts said the code of conduct might also derail two other missile proliferation efforts, led by Russia and the United Nations.

The code is a response by other countries to create an agreement that is a more “benign” alternative than provisions in a Russian proposal called the Global Control System, Speier said.

Russia proposed the GCS in 1999 and included provisions similar to the code of conduct, but with concrete incentives to join, Wagner said.  The United States boycotted a conference on the Global Control System last year, a move seen as a way to focus attention on the international code of conduct, he said.

The countries that created the code of conduct, however, “might have created something as bad,” Speier said, adding that the only way he would have recommended approval of the code “would’ve been over my dead body if I was still in government.”

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said Russia is happy that several delegates to the code conference are still interested in the Global Control System, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry release.

“We note with satisfaction the wishes expressed by the representatives of a number of countries to continue work on the Russian initiative relating to GCS,” Yakovenko said.

U.N. Missile Control

The code also runs against a U.N. working group on missiles sponsored by Iran, Wagner said.  While praising the code of conduct, Iran and China both have suggested that U.N. involvement is needed on the issue.

The United Nations and the countries of the MTCR compete with each other on crafting an agreement, with the United States and France not wanting work on the code to leave the MTCR regime countries, he said.

The U.N. working group on missiles is “not going down the same path as the code of conduct,” Wagner said.

Final Approval Likely

Despite the potential weaknesses of the code, the United States came out in support of it after the Paris talks and is likely to support its final approval.  The U.S. State Department offered tentative support of the approved draft proposal of the code on Monday, after the completion of the Paris talks.

“The United States supports efforts to establish a universal code of conduct against missile proliferation,” said a State Department spokesman.  “The draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is intended to create a widely subscribed international predisposition against ballistic missile proliferation.”

The code of conduct is not going to end ballistic missile programs in countries of concern to the United States, Wolfsthal said.  It does, however, “provide another tool in the arsenal.”

Speier said he hopes the Bush administration will take a “second look” at the code before the meetings on final approval scheduled to be hosted by Spain at the end of the year.  The decision to approve the draft proposal of the code was made early in the administration, and it is not the type of arms control agreement the administration has favored in the past, he said.

“It’s in writing,” Speier said, noting the administration’s aversion to formal arms control agreements.

No Changes Planned

It is likely the draft proposal will now move on to the next round of talks, which will be a “rubber stamp,” Wagner said.  He added he is not optimistic that the code will get any “teeth” before it is signed in a ceremony at The Hague.

At the Paris round of talks, the U.S. position was that there was no room for negotiations on the code at that point, Wagner said.  It was almost “take it or leave it.”

The code “could have been a fantastic vehicle for shoring up missile proliferation,” Wagner said, “but the Bush administration dropped the ball.”

The code is a “good sign and it’s better than building a missile defense,” Madison said.  He added that the code has some use because it is a multilateral approach to ballistic missile nonproliferation rather than a unilateral technical hardware approach.  It was a good thing any time “you get people even thinking about transparency, Madison said, but he cautioned, “It’s not a panacea.”

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India:  Cryogenic Engine Technology Could Help ICBM Program

India’s successful test Saturday of a cryogenic engine could have important implications for plans to construct an intercontinental ballistic missile in the next few years, according the Indian newspaper the Pioneer (see GSN, Feb. 11).

Indian scientists developed the engine indigenously after the United States persuaded Russia in 1993 to stop transferring the technology to India.  The United States said the transfers would violate Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines.

A cryogenic engine could allow India to launch a 2«-ton satellite into orbit 22,000 miles from earth, the Pioneer reported.  Such satellites are currently mostly used for communications purposes and could provide India with commercial opportunities.  The United States, Russia, France, Japan and China are the only other countries with cryogenic engine capability.

Indian scientists expect to continue testing the engine for two years before it will be fully operational, the Pioneer reported (New Delhi Pioneer, Feb. 12 in FBIS-NES, Feb. 13).

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International Response:  United States Supports Code of Conduct

The United States supports the draft proposal of an international code of conduct, approved during a recent conference in Paris, to slow the proliferation of ballistic missiles, U.S. State Department officials said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 11).  The code is meant to supplement, and not replace, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the officials said.

“The draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is intended to create a widely subscribed international predisposition against ballistic missile proliferation,” the officials said in a statement.  “It contains a set of broad principles, general commitments and modest building measures.  It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment, not a treaty, and will be open to all countries” (U.S. State Department release, Feb. 11).

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International Response:  Countries Agree to Missile Code of Conduct

At the conclusion of a two-day round of talks in France Friday, more than 80 countries agreed to a draft agreement of an international code of conduct designed to help stop ballistic missile proliferation (see GSN, Feb. 8).

The talk’s participants “acknowledge that missile proliferation is a problem” and that “a multilateral approach can contribute to resolving this problem,” said a French Foreign Ministry spokesman.

The code of conduct, which would only be a political agreement and lack the force of a treaty, would have each signatory outline its ballistic missile program once a year and notify other signatories of any ballistic missile tests (Washington Times, Feb. 10).

France said it plans to be able to present the code of conduct for final approval at a conference in Spain and to organize a signing ceremony at The Hague near the end of this year.

The U.S. delegation to the talks only monitored the comments made by other delegations and did not take part in the discussions, the French official said (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 8).

The head of the Iranian delegation to the talks said the issue of ballistic missile proliferation should be examined by the United Nations.

“The issue of ballistic missiles and controlling policies to limit missile proliferation requires a professional discussion which we believe should be conducted by representatives from world countries and under supervision of the [United Nations],” said Hamid Eslami-Zad (Iranian Republic News Agency, Feb. 7, in FBIS-NES, Feb. 7).

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India I:  New Agni-I Missile Developed to Target Pakistan

Unlike its other Agni predecessors, the Agni-I missile, which India tested last month for the first time, is strategically designed to target Pakistan, India Today reported today (see GSN, Jan. 30).

The first Agni, tested in 1989, has a range of 1,200 kilometers.  The road-mobile Agni-I has a range of 700 kilometers, is five meters shorter than its earlier cousins and has a single-stage solid-fuel rocket, which gives it a higher acceleration rate.  Accelerating 2.5 kilometers per second, the Agni-I can travel 700 kilometers in 10 minutes.

Earlier longer-range Agni missiles were designed to target China, whose southern cities are 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers from India.  Until the Agni becomes operational, Indian nuclear delivery vehicles consist of its 150-kilometer-range Prithvi missiles and its Mirage 2000 aircraft.  The Prithvi, however, is vulnerable because it is fired from near the border.

India also prepared its Agni-II missile for targeting Pakistan, but its long range and two-stage rocket, which drops its booster in mid-flight, created trajectory problems.  Using the more expensive Agni-II against Pakistan would also not be cost-effective — like “using a jeweled scimitar to cut vegetables,” according to one scientist.

India developed the Agni-I to remedy the Prithvi’s vulnerability and the Agni-II’s complexities.  “There was a gap in our missile capability, and Agni fills this,” said retired Lt. Gen. Vinay Shanker.

Indian scientists built the Agni-I within 15 months, significantly less than the usual five-year development period for missiles, India Today reported (Raj Chengappa, India Today, Feb. 11).

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India II:  India Successfully Tests Cryogenic Engine

In Tamil Nadu Saturday, India successfully test-fired a cryogenic engine to be used for a space launch vehicle, according to Agence France-Presse.  The domestically developed engine will probably require more testing before India can consider it ready for use, officials said.  Indian scientists aborted an earlier test in February 2000 due to technical problems.

The United States, Russia, France, China and Japan have similar cryogenic capabilities (Agence France-Presse/Dawn, Feb. 10).

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