United States:  Democrats Attack Bush Nuclear Posture Review

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Senate Democrats at a hearing yesterday criticized the Bush administration’s new nuclear weapon policies for making no new cuts to U.S. delivery vehicles, for planning to keep thousands of nuclear warheads in storage, and for retaining a nuclear triad of aircraft, submarines and missiles to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons.

A danger with the plan, they said, is that Russia would similarly opt against destroying warheads in favor of storing them, making them potentially available to terrorists by theft by or sale.

“By failing to destroy nuclear warheads, the Nuclear Posture Review would increase the threat of proliferation at the very time the al-Qaeda terrorist network is known to be pursuing nuclear weapons,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.), whose panel held the hearing, said.

Defending the plan, Defense Undersecretary for Policy Douglas Feith said it increases U.S. security because it shifts the focus of U.S. nuclear doctrine.  The United States no longer considers Russia to be threat warranting a strategy of mutual assured destruction, Feith said, adding that the new U.S. doctrine was based on maintaining flexibility to deal with new unforeseen threats.

“Now we are not focused on a balance of terror with Russia,” he said.

In questioning, however, he acknowledged that Russia has indicated in negotiations it is not satisfied with the plan to keep warheads in reserve, saying, “I don’t know where we’re going to end up on that issue.”

Republican committee members praised the plan.

“I think this document, the Nuclear Posture Review, is an excellent one by the way.  A very creative approach,” Senator John Warner (R-Va.) said.

No Decision So Far on Cuts

The session was Congress’ first opportunity to query administration officials about the plan, disclosed by the Pentagon last month in a public setting, and it resulted in some intense exchanges.

The Nuclear Posture Review was heralded by the administration as groundbreaking because it would significantly reduce the number of “operationally deployed” U.S. nuclear warheads (see GSN, Jan. 9).  The plan would keep only 1,700-2,200, of the estimated 8,000 warheads in the stockpile, deployed on delivery vehicles.  An unspecified number of the nondeployed warheads would be kept in storage for possible reinsertion into the force later.

Feith said the Pentagon also intends to destroy some of the nondeployed warheads, but Levin said the committee was not briefed that any warheads would be destroyed.

Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.), asked Feith how the policy of mutual assured destruction between the United States and Russia could be considered dead in light of the plan to keep as many nuclear delivery vehicles as planned by the Clinton administration and to retain a triad of strategic weapons — bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles.

“You claim we’ve had a revolutionary change in thinking, but still we have roughly same total number of warheads, and the same basic platforms,” he said.  It seems that it might be dead, but MAD is still ruling us from the grave.”

What is Significant?

Levin criticized the plan for not specifying the destruction of any nuclear warheads or delivery systems beyond the goals in the 1994 posture review, and current warhead levels set by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991.

“It comes up with the same structure, the same number of planes, the same number of ships, the same number of missiles, and the 8,000 [warheads] is the same,” Levin said.

“How is this dramatically different?” Levin asked. “It looks to me to be exactly the same, except you move some thousands of warheads off the delivery systems into a warehouse where they are available for reinsertion into the delivery system should you need them.”

Feith acknowledged no additional cuts to delivery systems were proposed by the review, but he emphasized as significant that nearly two-thirds of the warheads would be taken off active duty.

“The idea that one renders weapons available for immediate use not available for immediate use, that idea, I think, is highly significant and it does constitute a reduction,” he said.

Asked how quickly the stored warheads could be reinserted into the force, Feith said they would not be available in the “near term” and “in some cases it could be years before they are available for use.”  Asked for more detail, Feith said, “it varies from system to system.”

Levin also said the administration’s rejection of the START II agreement, abandons a provision that would have eliminated Russia’s land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

“Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that this approach ‘increases our security.’  I fear the opposite is true: over time, America would be less secure,” he said.

Questions Over Destruction Plans

Feith said the military was planning to destroy some of the downloaded warheads, but said he did not know how many.

“Mr. Chairman, I can’t tell you that now.  The decision has not yet been made.”

Levin said his committee staff was not briefed that any warhead dismantlement would occur and that they could not find any notice of that in materials they were provided in the classified Nuclear Posture Review.

“That’s very different from the briefing we got from the Pentagon, which says that the downloaded warheads will be preserved for the responsive force,” he said.

Feith responded: “My understanding is that we are going to reserving some of the warheads, but that they will not be available for near-term use, but some of the warheads that will be reduced from the arsenal will be destroyed.”

Proliferation Concerns

Levin expressed concern Russia would likewise decide against destroying all of its downloaded warheads, perhaps making them more susceptible to acquisition by terrorists.

“If we store our nuclear weapons, Russia is likely to follow suit.  And if there are more warheads retained by Russia, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons will increase,” he said.

President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in November jointly announced planned warhead reductions (see GSN, Nov. 16, 2001).  An unclassified U.S. intelligence report released in January said “unless Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by 2015 — with or without arms control” (see GSN, Jan. 10).

Feith said the U.S. warheads that would be held in reserve would not be intended for Russia and that he believes there are some officials in Russia “very open to the idea of a completely new concept of strategic stability and a completely new relationship between the United States and Russia.

Levin questioned whether the administration was “making assumptions” as to how the Russians would respond.

What Are The Threats?

Senate Democrats questioned whether any threats are foreseen that justified the force numbers set out in the Nuclear Posture Review, in light of the new relationship with Russia.

Feith said the Pentagon had moved away from basing nuclear planning on “threats-based” analysis toward what it calls “capabilities-based analysis,” saying:

“We are focused on the capabilities that we might need to deal with the kinds of threats that can emerge in the future,” he said.

Asked to specify the threats, Feith said, “for many years, we focused on specific threats, based on the reasonable assumption that we had an idea what the threats were and what the threats were going to be going into the future.”

For the Nuclear Posture Review, he said, “when we looked at what we need to maintain as a nuclear force, on the offensive side and the defensive side, we listed the kinds of missions that we need to accomplish, we looked at the kinds of capabilities we may face, the kinds of capabilities we would need to counter the threats.”

“This seems to be a very sort of ambiguous, imprecise and notional view of strategy,” said Reid.

“You seem to have this big disconnect between specific threats to the United States, and there are and there are many of them, and the specific threats that you are proposing.  You’re prepared for any capability … at some point you have to narrow the issues down to credible, believable threats.  That’s not coming out of your discussion.”

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U.S. Testing I:  No Live Testing Needed For Now, U.S. Official Testifies

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A senior Bush administration official yesterday reiterated the Energy Department’s conclusion that there is no need for explosive nuclear weapons testing for safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile in the near future.

Energy Undersecretary for Nuclear Security John Gordon told the Senate Armed Services Committee he sees “no near-term need for nuclear testing.”  Gordon heads the National Nuclear Security Administration, responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile.

“Today, our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and reliable,” he said.

Gordon said the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which maintains the weapons, has been addressing problems related to the aging of the weapons, but he said, “they do not affect the safety of the systems.”

He also said, however, he would like to see the Energy Department increase its readiness for resuming testing in the event it is needed (see GSN, Jan. 8).

The United States has had a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing, as have most other nuclear states, since the early 1990s.  Gordon said in prepared testimony that President George W. Bush “supports a continued moratorium on underground nuclear testing.”

Possible Scenario

A 1993 presidential directive requires Gordon’s agency to be able to conduct an underground nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a presidential decision to do so.

“My judgment is that our current posture is a bit too relaxed,” he said.

That view was reflected in information released by the Defense Department describing the results of its new nuclear weapons plans, though officials have not said how much they want to crop the readiness time.

Gordon, in prepared testimony, gave a scenario in which nuclear testing might be desired, and quickly:

“If we believed that a defect uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program, or through new insight gained in [research and development] efforts, had degraded our confidence in the safety and/or reliability of the W-76 warhead  — the warhead deployed on Trident submarines and comprising the most substantial part of our strategic deterrent — the ability to conduct a test more quickly might be critically important.”

The Bush administration’s fiscal 2003 budget requests $15 million to increase testing readiness.

Maybe in a Decade

Asked by Senator John Warner (R-Va.) at what point the U.S. stockpile maintenance program might develop the technological capabilities to provide a sufficient substitute for actual testing, Gordon said it would take about a decade.

The United States is on “seven- to 10-year cycle,” he said, referring to computing, simulation and other testing replacement technologies now under development.

Gordon said, however, he could not express with absolute certainty that testing would never be necessary again, “I cannot tell you for certain whether or not we will need to test, I can’t do that for certain.”

Warner said that at previous hearings national nuclear laboratory directors testified that the United States is not moving as quickly as it should to develop a substitute system for replacing actual nuclear weapons testing.

Time-frame projections varied from several years to a decade or more, he said.

“They showed the world how our inventory was aging and the scientists determined at what point they may be perceived as not maintaining credible weapons.  We’re going to cross that point,” Warner said.

Gordon expressed confidence in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

“I want to report that I am fundamentally satisfied with the progress we are making with Stockpile Stewardship, improved surveillance, tools, finding problems, knowing how to fix them,” he said.

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U.S. Testing II:  U.S. and U.K. Conduct Joint Subcritical Nuclear Test

U.S. and British government scientists yesterday conducted a successful subcritical nuclear test yesterday at the U.S. Nevada Test Site.  It was the first time the countries have worked together to conduct such a test, said La Tomya Glass, spokeswoman for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration.

The test was designed to check the safety and reliability of the two countries’ nuclear arsenals without conducting full nuclear explosions (see related GSN story, today).

Unlike critical nuclear tests, which lead to a nuclear chain reaction, subcritical tests are allowed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).  Both the United States and the United Kingdom have signed the CTBT, but the United Kingdom has ratified it and the United States has not (CTBT Organization, Feb. 15).

Yesterday’s test, named Vito, was the 16^th U.S. subcritical nuclear test since 1997, when the program began (see GSN, Dec. 18, 2001).  The last subcritical test, Oboe 7, was conducted Dec. 13, 2001 (Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 15).

Criticism

Although the test did not violate the CTBT, some analysts and officials expressed concern about the U.S. subcritical test program.  Critics said the United States could use the data from the tests not only to test the safety of its nuclear weapons but also to develop new nuclear warhead designs (see GSN, Feb. 11).

The United Kingdom is trying to choose a replacement for its Trident system by the end of the decade and may also be interested in new warhead designs, according to the British American Security Information Council.

“Britain now appears to be increasing its involvement in Washington’s controversial subcritical nuclear testing program while turning a blind eye to ... the Bush administration’s efforts to destroy the CTBT,” said BASIC Director Ian Davis.  “While the safety and reliability of the U.K. nuclear arsenal is of paramount importance, this should not conflict with Britain’s disarmament commitments, nor block the government from raising objections to U.S. policy” (BASIC release, Feb. 14).

Japan is tolerating the test, said Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, adding he is concerned that U.S. testing could encourage other states with nuclear arsenals to conduct their own tests, the Jiji news agency reported, according to Channel NewsAsia (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).

ExperiencedTechnicians Waning

Meanwhile, the aging of employees at the Nevada Test Site and national laboratories presents an obstacle to the Bush administration’s plan to decrease the time needed to conduct nuclear tests, said John Gordon, administrator for the National Nuclear Security Agency, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The average age of employees with essential skills for the U.S. nuclear weapons program is 48 — much older than for the general high-tech industry, he said.  Only 400 of 1,407 employees at the Nevada Test Site have underground nuclear testing experience, said test site spokesman Darwin Morgan.

The last underground nuclear explosion at the site was on Sept. 23, 1992.

“We are always concerned, as years go by and people retire, about maintaining the knowledge base that we have and how we can pass that on to young people,” Morgan said, adding that the test site has videos of interviews with scientists who were involved with former nuclear tests.

Much of the aging of the employees is due to low hiring rates in the early and mid-1990s due to budget decreases, Gordon said.  “Recruiting rates have gone up modestly but are still much lower than required to support planned programs.”

Scientists would need 30 to 36 months to prepare for another nuclear test, Gordon said (Tony Batt, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Feb. 15).

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India:  We Will Not Test Nuclear Weapons, Official Assures EU

Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told several European Union officials that India will adhere to its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, despite Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s suggestion Tuesday that India might have conducted a nuclear test or might be planning to do so (see GSN, Feb. 13).

During a meeting in Madrid this week, Singh told EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, Spanish Foreign Minister Josep Pique and others that India will not test nuclear weapons (see GSN, Feb. 11).

“I think this canard about India undertaking another nuclear test is really simply that, a canard,” Singh said (see GSN, Feb. 13).  “We have publicly stated … that there is a voluntary moratorium that is in force.  It shall remain in force, and it is not time bound.”

India still hopes to hold talks with Pakistan, but India’s belief that Pakistan continues to support terrorism is a serious obstacle, Singh said (Channel NewsAsia, Feb. 15).

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Russia I:  Military Builds Four Ballistic Missile Silos

Russia has constructed four silos for Topol-M ballistic missiles at an army base in the southern Saratov region, a Russian military official said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 30).

Along with the four silos already constructed, two more “are in order” at the Tatishchevo army base, said Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Kosovan.  He added that if Russia purchases six Topol-M missiles, a total of eight silos would be constructed.

“We will reach the objective — fully and ahead of schedule — to put on combat duty the manufactured missiles,” Kosovan said (Xinhuanet.com, Feb. 15).

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Russia II:  Moscow Will Recover Fuel From Russian-Built Reactors

Russia will reclaim spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants it constructs in Iran, China and India, said Russian officials yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 13).

The plants will use Russian nuclear fuel, which Russia is obligated to reclaim under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said Valeriy Lebedev, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy.

Russia is expected to complete construction of a nuclear plant in Iran by early 2005, Lebedev said (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001).  He added that nuclear fuel assemblies are to be shipped to the Iranian nuclear plant upon its completion (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring/Financial Times, Feb. 14).

Russia remains committed to the Bushehr nuclear project with Iran, despite U.S. objections, and will fulfill its side of the contract, Lebedev said.

The United States has claimed that the reactor could be used to help Iran develop nuclear weapons, according to the Associated Press.  Russia, however, has said the reactor can only be used for civilian purposes and will have international oversight (Associated Press, Feb. 14).

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Latin America:  Nuclear-Free Zone in Effect for 35 Years

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Latin American countries yesterday marked the 35^th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlateloloco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in the region.

The treaty, which was the first to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the world, bans construction, storage and testing of nuclear weapons throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean.  It includes two protocols calling on nuclear weapon states to recognize the nuclear-free zone and calling on countries with colonies in the region to adhere to the zone.

Out of 33 member states, 32 have signed and ratified the treaty.  Cuba signed but did not ratify the treaty in 1995.  In 1992, the country dropped its demands for the United States to leave the Guantanamo Bay naval base as a precondition for signing the treaty.

Discussions on the Tlateloloco treaty began in 1963 and 15 Latin American states signed a draft of the treaty in 1967.  The treaty entered into force in 1968.

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North Korea I:  U.S. Congressmen Call for Canceling Agreed Framework

President George W. Bush should halt plans to build two nuclear power reactors in North Korea, three members of Congress said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 7).

“Now that President Bush has refocused the world’s attention on the importance of keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of unstable and hostile regimes, we must work with Russia, Europe and our allies in Asia to impose a multilateral and total ban on the export of nuclear technology,” said Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.).

“A good place to start is by canceling the transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea,” he said.

Markey and Representatives Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) and Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) outlined their opposition to the reactor transfer plan in a letter to Bush last week, according to Deutsche Presse-Agentur.  The reactor transfer is part of the 1994 Agreed Framework treaty, under which North Korea agreed to stop its nuclear weapon development program in exchange for the reactors.

North Korea will be “in clear violation” of the agreement if it refuses to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to begin inspections of its nuclear weapon facilities by May, Gillman said.  If that occurs, “the United States should reassess whether to continue performing our obligations under the Agreed Framework, at least with regard to nuclear reactor construction,” he said.

The three lawmakers said they had introduced legislation to stop funding for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the international institution responsible for implementing the agreement (see GSN, Jan. 2).

“North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons,” Gillman said.  “A nuclear-armed North Korea would pose a grave threat to our nation and our allies.”

Bush’s scheduled visit to South Korea later this month is “an opportune time for him to announce that he is reconsidering plans to move forward and provide the North Koreans with two light water reactors,” Markey said.  “We believe this program should be canceled” (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 13).

Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday that the United States is committed to the Agreed Framework with North Korea (see GSN, Feb. 8).

“We take note of the fact that the North Koreans have not violated [the] agreement,” Powell said in an interview with the Financial Times (Gerard Baker, Financial Times, Feb. 13).

Even though the United States has not been satisfied with the level of access given by North Korea, the reactor program will still move forward, Powell said yesterday during testimony before the House Appropriations Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs subcommittee.

“We know that there will come a time when the construction will reach the point where they have to provide access under obligations they have under other treaties … at which point we have a failsafe,” Powell said.

If, at that point, North Korea still refuses to allow inspections, “then I think the whole program will come to a stop, and they will be in desperate shape, because they won’t have the energy they are looking for as a result of those light-water reactors,” Powell said (Federal News Service transcript, Feb. 13).

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North Korea II:  United States Ready to Start Dialogue, Powell Says

U.S. President George W. Bush will extend an offer of dialogue to North Korea during his trip to Asia next week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday (see GSN, Feb. 11).

“We are ready for any dialogue, anytime, any place, anywhere,” Powell said.  “With no preconditions.”

“We hope that the North Koreans will take us up on it,” Powell said (Associated Press/USA Today, Feb. 12).

Recently, the Bush administration has toughened its stance toward North Korea, increasing the tone of its rhetoric, such as characterizing North Korea as part of an “axis of evil.” The Bush administration’s approach toward North Korea almost ensures there will be deadlock in any potential negotiations, said former U.S. officials.

“The administration says it is willing to meet anytime and anywhere with the North Koreans,” said Robert Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea.  “But what they mean is that they are prepared to meet to accept North Korea’s surrender on the points at issue.”

Administration officials said that criticism over its tough stance with North Korea is unwarranted.

“If we begin these discussions, there is flexibility built in,” said a senior administration official, adding that the main problem is getting North Korea to agree to a dialogue in the first place.

“There is great utility in entering into a broad-based dialogue with North Korea aimed at transforming the relationship and reducing the North Korean threat across the board,” the official said.

While there is merit to seeking a broad agreement, the United States should be ready to work out a separate deal restricting North Korea’s ballistic missile exports if a wider agreement cannot be reached, some former officials said (see GSN, Feb. 7).

“I think there is a good possibility of concluding a deal that bans the export of missiles and missile-related technology,” said Robert Einhorn, who headed talks with North Korea during the Clinton administration (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Feb. 14).

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United States:  Environmental Groups Sue DOE for Plutonium Shipment Plans

Containers in which the U.S. Energy Department plans to transport weapon-grade plutonium have failed safety tests, according to environmental groups Earthjustice and Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment.  The groups filed a lawsuit yesterday in San Francisco against the Energy Department, according to the California Contra Costa Times.

The suit claims the Energy Department approved using containers to hold plutonium parts during 89 shipments between the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the Rocky Flats former nuclear production site in Colorado even though the DT-22 containers failed to withstand a 1,100-pound steel plate dropped from 30 feet.

The Energy Department regularly moves plutonium between the two sites but usually in smaller containers.  The planned shipment would involve different types of plutonium components that are too big for the smaller containers, the Times reported.

The Energy Department originally decided against moving the material in the DT-22 containers but eventually granted Rocky Flats a “nuclear security exemption” to move the parts, according to the Times.

The shipments could endanger people living along the 1,300-mile route between the laboratory and Rocky Flats, the environmental groups said.  The lawsuit asks the Energy Department to consider alternatives before proceeding.

“The plutonium shipments proposed should not be allowed to [proceed] without a full and public process,” said Trent Orr, a lawyer for Earthjustice (Andrea Widener, Contra Costa Times, Feb. 14).

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India I:  Musharraf Hints at Indian Nuclear Tests

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said yesterday he had information that India might have conducted or might soon conduct a nuclear test explosion.

 “Some information, some news even of maybe a possibility of a nuclear test is most untimely, and may I also say provocative,” Musharraf said in a Washington briefing sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see GSN, Feb. 11).

Musharraf has no conclusive evidence to prove India is considering such a test but has shared his information with U.S. authorities, he said.

When asked whether the two rivals could fight a limited, conventional war without escalating to nuclear conflict, Musharraf said only that even a non-nuclear war would be expensive (see GSN, Jan. 17).  Both countries face poverty and economic development challenges, so neither should initiate a war, he said.

The initiation of a nuclear conflict is unthinkable, he said, adding that both India and Pakistan must act responsibly.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee today denied Musharraf’s statement regarding Indian nuclear testing, saying it was an attempt to mislead the world, the Press Trust of India reported (see related GSN story, today).

India has no intention to test nuclear weapons in the near future and will abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said in an interview in Monday’s Financial Times (see GSN, Feb. 11).  India and Pakistan last conducted nuclear tests in 1998.

Musharraf planned to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush today to discuss a range of issues including economic assistance, military relations, Afghanistan and education, a senior Bush administration official said yesterday.

Mediation Needed

Any attempt to negotiate a lasting peace between the two countries must involve all the issues that they disagree on, including the dispute over Kashmir, Musharraf said.  Practical negotiations could not “sideline” the Kashmir issue.

“We expect sincerity and purposeful negotiations from India,” he said, but added that outside facilitation is necessary to seriously address the ongoing conflict.  “Bilateralism has failed,” he said.  Musharraf thanked U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell for helping ease tensions in the region (see GSN, Jan. 22).

Musharraf said he does not expect a solution to the conflict and Kashmir dispute in the near future.  “One needs to go step by step,” he said.

The first step is dialogue, he said.  Next, the countries must accept that Kashmir is central to India-Pakistan relations, then eliminate whatever either country views as unacceptable and finally reach a solution.

Dealing with Terrorism

Musharraf described his vision for creating a liberal, tolerant, progressive, Islamic — but not theocratic — state in Pakistan.  A major step toward that vision is curbing religious extremism and sectarian violence, he said.

Musharraf said he has already taken several actions to end terrorism, including:

*         Banning several extremist parties (see GSN, Jan. 4);

*         Reforming the madrassas, Islamic religious schools, and

*         Issuing instructions to control the “misuse of mosques for activities other than religious activity.”

The majority of the Pakistani public has welcomed these actions and Musharraf’s condemnation of terrorism in his Jan. 12 speech, he said.

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India II:  Nuclear Testing Claims Disputed

Indian officials today rejected Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s recent statement in Washington that he has information indicating that India has recently conducted or plans to conduct a nuclear test (see related GSN story, today).

“These accusations are totally without basis,” said Indian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Nirupama Rao.  India continues to abide by a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, she said (see GSN, Feb. 11).

India and Pakistan last conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 13).

Musharraf’s statement was an attempt to mislead the international community, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said, adding India has no plans to conduct another nuclear test.

“Washington has told him that [U.S. officials] know that [Indians] are not doing it,” Vajpayee added (Press Trust of India/Times of India, Feb. 13).

“Some information, some news even, of maybe a possibility of a nuclear test, is most untimely, and may I also say provocative,” Musharraf said yesterday, although he added he had no conclusive evidence (Reuters/Yahoo.com, Feb. 12).

U.S. Officials Say Musharraf’s Statement Baseless

A U.S. official said Musharraf’s indication of an Indian nuclear test is “baseless.”

“We don’t have any information that would suggest anything like that having occurred,” the official said.

“I would like to think that if that had happened, there would be some alarm bells ringing in Washington, and I haven’t heard any, so I am skeptical,” said another U.S. official (Reuters/Yahoo.com, Feb. 12).

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India-Russia:  Officials Sign Kudankulam Nuclear Project Contract

Indian and Russian officials yesterday signed a $500 million contract to provide equipment and materials for the Kudankulam nuclear power plant under construction in southern India (see GSN, Jan. 7).

“This is the biggest-ever deal signed by [the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited] with any country,” said NPCIL chairman V.K. Chaturvedi in Moscow.

The contract “provides for the supply of two most advanced VVER-1000 reactors with 2,000 megawatts total capacity and other equipment with long production cycle like steam turbines and generators,” Chaturvedi said.

Indian agencies will commission and build the equipment with Russian technical assistance, Chaturvedi said (Press Trust of India, Feb. 12).  He added that India and Russia are expected to sign a contract next month on sustained shipments of Russian nuclear fuel to the Kudankulam plants.

In November of last year, India and Russia signed a memorandum to begin cooperation on the Kudankulam project, according to the Press Trust of India (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2001).  Russia is expected to provide more than $1.5 billion in assistance and equipment for the two Indian nuclear power plants.  India has also placed orders totaling more than $220 million with Ukraine and other Commonwealth of Independent States countries (Press Trust of India/BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Feb. 13).

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Threat Assessment:  Small Nuclear Bomb Would Devastate New York, Say Scientists

Using an official U.S. modeling program, three scientists concluded recently that a Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapon exploding in New York City would kill hundreds of thousands of people.

The consequences of such an attack are so great that nuclear weapons must be abolished to eliminate the risk, wrote Ira Helfand, Lachlan Forrow and Jaya Tiwari, last week in the British Medical Journal.

All members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the three conducted a simulation involving a 12.5-kiloton nuclear explosion in the port area of New York City.  Their simulator was the Consequences Assessment Tool Set software developed by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

The simulated blast killed 52,000 people immediately, and 10,000 people died later of direct radiation exposure.  Another 34,000 people had nonfatal radiation sickness from direct exposure.  Radioactive fallout killed another 200,000 people and created several hundred thousand cases of radiation sickness.

The ability to aid survivors was limited in the simulation because the blast destroyed 1,000 hospital beds and contaminated other facilities.  Other medical facilities were overwhelmed (see GSN, Feb. 5).

A terrorist attack with a “dirty bomb” — a conventional explosive that spreads radioactive material — could also be very lethal (see GSN, Feb. 7).  If terrorists were to disperse a cask of spent fuel rods in Manhattan in the middle of the day, it would likely kill more than 2,000 people, according to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimate.

Attacks on nuclear installations could also have severe consequences.  An attack on either a nuclear reactor or a spent fuel pool “could equal or exceed the effects of the 1986 Chernoybl disaster, which led to 30 acute deaths from radiation sickness, at least 1,800 excess cases of childhood thyroid cancer” and contamination of large amounts of land, the authors wrote.

Preventing Proliferation

To eliminate this risk, the United States and its allies must work to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear materials, the authors said (see GSN, Feb. 5).  They mentioned several cases of attempted nuclear smuggling, including recent attempts by terrorist groups to break into Russian nuclear storage sites and the arrest of two men in Turkey for trying to sell weapon-grade uranium (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2001).

Russia’s large nuclear stockpile is a potential source of tens of thousands of tactical nuclear bombs and 603 metric tons of weapon-grade nuclear material, the authors wrote.  The United States is spending more than $900 million each year to safeguard the Russian stockpile, but, the authors wrote, that amount is less than a seventh of the U.S. national missile defense budget (see GSN, Jan. 10).  They urged the United States and other countries to increase assistance to Russia to protect its nuclear arsenal.

Only Option is to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

“As long as there are stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains,” the authors wrote.  The only conclusive way to end the threat is to eliminate nuclear weapons and implement “strict international control of all fissile materials” with potential weapons use, the authors wrote (British Medical Journal, Feb. 9).

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China:  Multiple-Warhead Missiles Could Defeat U.S. Missile Defenses, Analysts Say

U.S. defense analysts have said China is close to being able to overwhelm any U.S. ballistic missile defense system, the London Times reported today (see GSN, Jan. 10).

China is working to equip its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles, with ranges up to 8,000 miles, with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, according to the Times (see GSN, Nov. 13, 2001).

“It looks like the Chinese are much further [ahead] than we originally thought,” said one U.S. analyst.

China is believed to have recently increased its MIRV tests, the Times reported.  Early this month, the Japanese media reported a test of a Dongfeng-31 missile, which has a range of more than 5,000 miles (see GSN, Nov. 6, 2001).  The missile completed the first half of its trajectory and released separate warheads before disintegrating.  China is also believed to be testing a naval version of the Dongfeng-31, according to the Times (see GSN, Feb. 1).

China currently has about 20 long-range ICBMs, according to the Times.  The proposed U.S. missile defenses are expected to be able to counter attacks of up to 24 missiles.

If China were to equip its missiles with MIRVs, “it could easily overwhelm the shield,” the U.S. analyst said.  “That would change the balance of power in Asia” (Oliver August, London Times, Feb. 12).

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United States:  DOE Requests Study on Nuclear “Bunker Buster”

By David Ruppe

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — President George W. Bush’s fiscal 2003 Energy Department budget request has called for completing a preliminary study on modifying a nuclear warhead for military “bunker-busting” operations (see GSN, Dec. 20, 2001).

U.S. military officials have said they need better earth-penetrating weapons for striking enemy assets protected in hardened and deeply buried bunkers such as missile silos and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s command bunker.

Arms control advocates are concerned about unintended casualties from their use and that developing, testing and using such weapons could undermine international efforts to curb the global development and spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The request calls for completing program cost and feasibility studies for modifying B-61 nuclear warheads for use on a system called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

The B-61 is “the weapon that everybody has looked at for modifications being possible to develop a so-called mini-nuke,” said Cathy Crandall, the associate director of security programs at Physicians for Social Responsibility.  By “mini-nuke” she means a lower-yield nuclear weapon that might create less collateral damage, making it theoretically more acceptable when used.

The earth-penetrating system appears to be in an early stage of development and other possible warhead options could include developing an entirely new warhead or developing a conventional warhead, experts say.

Arms control analysts are concerned developing new low-yield nuclear weapons for use in combat missions could lessen the stigma of using nuclear weapons by other countries.

“The United States using nuclear weapons in combat lowers the threshold on a worldwide basis,” says David Culp, an analyst at the Friends Committee on National Legislation.  It “makes it more politically acceptable for other countries to use nuclear weapons.”

Resuming Nuclear Tests?

There also is a concern that modifying the B-61 or developing a new warhead would lead to a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, which was suspended in the early 1990s by former President George Bush.

“I think everybody understands that if we resume testing, you see the Russians resume testing.  And, this is no secret, there are hawks in Russia just like there are in the United States, and for many years people in their military and in their weapons laboratories have been arguing that Russia needs to develop a new small tactical nuclear weapon that would be deployed in Eastern Europe primarily along the Belarus-Polish border,” said Culp.

China, India and Pakistan might also feel freer to resume testing, he said.

There is, however, a legal hurdle that might need to be overcome. A 1993 law forbids research and development of nuclear weapons below a five-kiloton yield.

On the other hand, Congress passed language in the fiscal 2001 defense authorization bill requiring a study on “the defeat of hardened and deeply buried targets” (see GSN, Dec. 14, 2001).

Also, the current Bush administration has indicated the president has no intentions of submitting to the Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed by President Bill Clinton, which would ban all further testing.

Not Clear Whether U.S. Testing Needed

Experts say it is unclear whether Energy would need to resume nuclear testing for a new nuclear earth-penetrating weapon.

While developing a new warhead probably would require a resumption of testing, modifying the B-61 probably would not, said Culp.  Fifty B-61s previously were modified essentially by putting them in hardened shells to create a lesser earth-penetration weapon, called the B-61 mod 11, first announced in the mid-1990s.

That modified bomb, with a yield potentially ranging from 10 to 340 kilotons, was not tested in the earth-penetrating delivery system, but the system containing the warhead reportedly had somewhat limited penetrating capability, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

That modified model “obviously doesn’t have the kind of capability they are looking for,” said Culp.

Whether a newly modified B-61 warhead might require testing, he said, could depend on both the extent of the modification and “whether the military that’s buying this weapon has enough confidence in it to deploy it without testing.”

Higher-yield warheads do not need to penetrate the ground as deeply as lower-yield weapons but can be more controversial, because they tend to cause higher collateral damage and fallout, experts say.  Crandall said the modifications would not necessarily involve further modifying the B-61 to create a lower-yield “mini-nuke.”

It might be preferred by the military, though, she said, to minimize radioactive fallout and collateral damage.

“It is generally considered that if there were a U.S. military requirement to use an earth-penetrating weapon — on caves in Afghanistan for example — that there would be some effort to reduce the ‘collateral damage’ by lowering the yield if it were a nuclear weapon,” she said.

Uncertain Intentions

U.S. officials have not said whether they plan to add new nuclear bunker busters to the arsenal.

Results of the Pentagon’s most recent Nuclear Posture Review, a reconsideration of its nuclear strategy, alert status and holdings, released last month, alluded to future nuclear testing and new roles for nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy (see GSN, Jan. 24).

The review called for shortening the time needed to prepare for a nuclear weapons test, citing possibly testing needs for maintaining the current stockpile (see GSN, Jan. 10, 2001).  The Bush budget request allocated $15 million to Energy for making that change.

While citing a need for new earth-penetrating weapons, however, the review did not say whether nuclear weapons should be developed for such a role.

Information prepared for a briefing on the review only said there is a need for developing improved “non-nuclear strike” capabilities for use against “hardened and deeply buried targets.”

Responding to a question, however, the principal briefer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch, seemed to say the administration is considering developing new nuclear weapons that could be used for special battlefield operations like bunker busting (see GSN, Jan. 10, 2002).

“Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives,” he said.  “One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against hard targets and deeply buried targets.  And we're also looking at non-nuclear ways that we might be able to deal with those problems.”

The Energy and Defense departments completed a study last July examining how nuclear weapons could be modified to attack buried, hardened targets, but reportedly they made no conclusions about developing such weapons.

Crouch also said no recommendation was made on that in the Nuclear Posture Review.

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India I:  Officials Fail to Agree with Russia on Weapons Contracts

Indian and Russian ministers did not agree during negotiations last week on a proposal to lease two Russian nuclear submarines and two nuclear-capable TU-22 bombers to India, the Moscow Times reported today (see GSN, Feb. 8).

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes agreed on technical issues but disagreed on some financial concerns, Fernandes said.  The two sides did not even discuss leasing the submarines, Indian Defense Ministry spokesman Pradipto Kumar Bandyopadhyay said.

Klebanov and Fernandes pledged to cooperate to develop military equipment and signed three protocols and one military contract, the Times reported.  The limited progress nevertheless indicates Russia and India will begin a significant new stage in military cooperation, analysts said.

The protocols include cooperation in aviation, warships and land-based army systems.  The contract is for the delivery of Krasnopol precision-guided projectiles, according to the Moscow Times (Lyuba Pronina, Moscow Times, Feb. 11).

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India II:  Foreign Minister Renews Promise to Ban Nuclear Tests

Although India is not a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signatory, it will abide by the agreement by not testing any nuclear explosives, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said in an interview published yesterday in the Financial Times online.  Critics around the world complained last month when India test-fired a nuclear-capable short-range Agni missile (see related GSN story, today).

“I have said so at the United Nations General Assembly, and the prime minister [Atal Bihari Vajpayee] has also said so — that India has announced a voluntary moratorium on any further nuclear-explosive testing,” Singh said.  “This is not time-bound.”

India has maintained full military mobilization along the India-Pakistan border since gunmen attacked outside India’s Parliament on Dec. 13, 2001 (see GSN, Feb. 8).  Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has promised to fight terrorism in Pakistan, but Singh said India has not detected any reduction in terrorist infiltration into India’s Jammu and Kashmir territory (see GSN, Jan. 4).  Bad weather in Kashmir makes it too early to truly judge, he added (Edward Luce, Financial Times, Feb. 11).

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U.S.-Russia:  Some Progress in HEU Deal Dispute, Russia Says

U.S. and Russian negotiators have made some progress in an ongoing dispute over pricing terms in the U.S. purchase of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons, ITAR-Tass reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 28).

“No final result has been achieved so far,” said press officials of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry.  Talks will continue in Moscow this week, they said (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring, Feb. 10).

The U.S. Energy Department and U.S. Enrichment Corp. are negotiating the best way to reduce USEC’s dependence on imported enriched uranium, according to the Washington Times.  USEC is the sole U.S. purchaser of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons under the “Megatons to Megawatts” agreement.

“It’s an energy security question,” said a senior Bush administration official.  “It’s the same principle as not being reliant on all the Middle Eastern companies for our oil.”

“They live off the cheap Russian material,” the senior official said of USEC.  “When it runs out, they’re in trouble.”

USEC’s main problem is its outdated technology for manufacturing nuclear fuel, the senior official said.  USEC, however, has balked at setting a date for any technology upgrades, according to the Times.

“If our technology is going to be competitive, we need to get it to market fast,” the senior official said.  “Otherwise, we’re reliant on overseas technology.”

The Bush administration has told USEC is will lose its role in the megatons to megawatts program if it does not set a date for developing new ways to produce nuclear fuel, the senior official said.

Sources close to the Energy Department-USEC negotiations have said the two sides are close to solving main differences between them.

“We’re progressing nicely,” the official said.  “It will happen” (Carter Dougherty, Washington Times, Feb. 11).

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