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This weeks Nuclear Weapons stories for Wednesday, March 20, 2002.
International Response: IAEA Board Approves New Security PlanBy David Ruppe Through the effort, the agency will offer expertise in assessing vulnerabilities in nuclear security and assistance in addressing them. Such assistance might include security standards, guidelines and methodologies, training, technical and administrative advice. “National measures for protecting nuclear material and facilities are uneven in their substance and application,” said the agency in a press release, after the plan was approved “in principle” during a closed meeting. “There is wide recognition that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened,” the agency said. The program would specifically help improve protection of nuclear facilities, border controls, detection of malicious activities using nuclear material, state systems for accounting and control of such material, responses to malicious acts or threats, coordination and information management and adherence to international guidelines. A preliminary proposal for the plan was announced in November (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001). In developing the program, there apparently was concern among states about protecting confidentiality and avoiding leaks of information about vulnerabilities. Anita Nilsson, head of the agency’s physical protection and material security office, told Global Security Newswire the program would not provide inspections, but would rather arrange for states on request the opportunity to have a team of experts, or “peers,” perhaps from another country of choice to provide assessments or services. A single report might be prepared after an assessment to be provided to the client, she said. Bypasses Budget Cap The program is to be funded entirely through donations from member states, necessary since the agency has been operating under a zero real growth budget cap for 15 years. The overall agency budget is currently about $300 million. To pay for the program, a number of states during the Board of Governors meeting pledged money for a special fund to support the plan including: $100,000 from Australia, $350,000 from Great Britain, $500,000 from Japan, $221,000 from the Netherlands, $12,000 from Slovenia and $1 million from the United States. The plan is not intended reduce to diminish the responsibilities of states for protection, said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. “In some rare cases,” said Nilsson, the program might provide some small types of equipment if there are some specific needs. She said, however, there were no pledges for providing equipment through the program so far. The pledges would need to be renewed each year, but there is hope the program eventually will be included in the IAEA budget, said Nilsson. The United States lately has been aggressively working to persuade other states to free the agency from the budget caps, officials say. Non-Monetary Assistance Finland, France, Germany, India, Romania and Turkey said they would provide nonfunding assistance, such as training facilities, to support the program, and others said they plan contributions in the near future. The pledges come on top of a $1.2 million pledge last year by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “This modest investment in nuclear security will bring benefits for all states,” ElBaradei said. “All of us are vulnerable, because all of us use nuclear materials and radioactive materials [that] can easily move across borders.” [EDITOR'S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]
North Korea: Bush Will Refuse to Certify Compliance, Officials SayU.S. President George W. Bush will not certify that North Korea is abiding by a 1994 nuclear agreement, but he still intends to permit a $95 million shipment in fuel oil to North Korea under the pact, officials said yesterday (Peter Slevin, Washington Post, March 20). Officials said Bush plans to waive congressionally required certification, allowing the United States to send aid and continue other work under the 1994 Agreed Framework, a deal in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear weapons program in exchange for the construction of two nuclear power reactors (see GSN, March 15). Refusing to certify North Korean compliance acknowledges the possibility that North Korea might still be developing nuclear weapons, as some critics of the agreement say (see GSN, Feb. 14). A senior U.S. official said that though Bush will refuse to certify North Korean compliance, the move does not mean that the United States believes North Korea is violating the agreement. “We’re not walking away from the agreement,” the official said. “We’re continuing to implement it and hoping for progress” (Miller/Sanger, New York Times, March 20). The Bush decision is the first time a U.S. administration will not certify North Korean compliance. The previous Clinton administration told Congress annually that North Korea was fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. Why Bush Will Not Certify The U.S. State Department has recommended against certification, a senior State official said yesterday. A staff member said Bush has not made a formal decision on the certification but has agreed with the State Department’s recommendation. Some officials believe North Korea hid nuclear material from inspectors in the 1990s, said an official involved in discussions regarding North Korean compliance. A major point of convention is North Korea’s refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to several sites (see GSN, Jan. 23). The 1994 agreement requires IAEA inspectors to examine several sites before the two light-water reactors that the United States and other countries are building in North Korea can become operational. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an international organization building the reactors, has started excavation and preliminary work at the site where they are supposed to be built. The organization plans to pour foundations in August (Slevin, Washington Post). The IAEA said last summer it would need 36 to 48 months to complete full inspections in North Korea. The reactors probably will be mostly complete by May 2005, so unless inspections begin very soon, the reactors are unlikely to be brought on line as scheduled (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001). Missile Exports The United States is also displeased with North Korean missile technology exports, although the Agreed Framework does not include any restrictions on such exports. “Exports of missile technology are increasing as fast as they [North Korea] can increase them — to whomever will buy them,” said a Bush administration official (see GSN, Feb. 21). At the end of former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s term, Clinton administration officials said they were close to reaching an agreement with North Korea on missile exports. The Bush administration, which said an agreement was not close, has continued only low-level talks with North Korea. The Bush administration has said North Korea has refused to talk with Bush (see GSN, Feb. 22), and North Korea has said Bush only shows hostility (Miller/Sanger, New York Times). Opposition to Waiver Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) said last week that Bush should certify North Korean compliance with the 1994 agreement unless there is sound proof North Korea is not in compliance. “We have no evidence they are in breach,” said a congressional staffer. “We share the president’s concern about their long-term intentions, but they remain in compliance with all of their central obligations under the Agreed Framework, according to what we have been told.” “As far as we can see, it has been fulfilled,” a KEDO official said. “We challenge anybody who wants to make us believe that the North Koreans didn’t stick to the bargain” (Slevin, Washington Post). Major Military Drills Meanwhile, U.S. and South Korean troops tomorrow will begin the largest military drills simulating conflict with North Korea since the Korean War. The United States says the drills are only defensive exercises, but North Korea says they are provocative. The drills come as South Korea issued warnings that conflict with North Korea is increasing in likelihood. Reasons why a crisis could occur include the end of North Korea’s moratorium on missile test launches in 2003 (see GSN, Jan. 15), North Korean refusal to allow IAEA inspections and disagreements regarding the KEDO reactors, according to Agence France-Presse. “We may face a similar crisis to the one over Pyongyang’s nuclear program in 1994,” Lim Won-Dong, an adviser to South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, said this week. “Progress must be made on these issues within a year or there will be another crisis,” said Lim (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, March 20).
United States: Cracked Stealth Bombers Keep FlyingThe U.S. Air Force has found cracks in 16 B-2 stealth bombers, but the damage is not significant enough to ground the 21-plane fleet, U.S. Defense Department officials said yesterday (see GSN, Jan. 2). B-2 bombers participated in the first week of the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, but have only flown training missions since (see GSN, Oct. 29, 2001). The cracks, ranging up to nine inches long, were discovered on titanium plates behind engine exhausts, according to the New York Times. Air Force officials do not know what caused the cracks, and they have not developed any fixes, the Air Force said. Military officials believe the cracks pose little risk to the safety of the B-2s, and aircrews have continued to fly training missions, an Air Force spokesman said. Now, however, maintenance crews measure the cracks after each flight, the Times reported. Purchased for $2.2 billion apiece, the B-2 is also among the most expensive planes to maintain in the U.S. Air Force, according to the Times. The Air Force spends $150 million per year on depot maintenance and employs 1,000 workers to take care of the 21 B-2s stationed at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. A recent Pentagon assessment found that the average B-2 was available for combat duty only 31 percent of the time in 2001, down from 37 percent in 2000. The Air Force aims to keep its aircraft combat-ready 60 percent of the time. (James Dao, New York Times, March 20).
United States I: Nuclear Response Considered to High-Explosives AttackBy David Ruppe The spokesman, reading from a prepared statement, was commenting to confirm a statement by the top U.S. military official, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Richard Myers, in a television interview earlier this month. Myers, on March 10, said the administration’s nuclear policy preserves all options for the president if the United States or its friends and allies were attacked “with weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, biological, chemical, or for that matter high explosives.” Asked whether Myers’ statement reflected current policy, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Michael Humm said: “We have reiterated the longstanding policy of the United States that we will do whatever is necessary to defend America’s innocent civilian population. If a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States, we will not rule out any specific type of military response.” Policy on Chemical and Biological Weapons Attacks Myers comment appeared to be the first time an official indicated publicly that high explosives could be considered a weapon of mass destruction, and therefore, could warrant a nuclear response. In its so-called “negative security assurances” pledge, the United States first in 1978 said it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state unless such a state teamed up with a nuclear power to attack the United States, its interests, or its allies. The Clinton administration reaffirmed the pledge in 1995, in order to help secure agreement by the world’s non-nuclear countries to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, barring them from developing nuclear weapons. In infrequent comments on the subject, however, Clinton administration officials — such as Defense Secretary William Perry in April 1996 — also said they would not rule out using nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. Reflecting that policy, President Bill Clinton signed a directive in November 1997 believed to include new guidelines permitting U.S. nuclear strikes after enemy attacks using chemical or biological weapons, according to a Washington Post report. During the Gulf War, the senior President George Bush warned Saddam Hussein he and his country would pay “a terrible price” if he ordered such “unconscionable acts” as chemical and biological weapons attacks. Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction Explaining his prepared statement, Humm said high explosives could be considered a weapon of mass destruction (see GSN, Dec. 21, 2001). “High explosives would fit into the category if they were weapons of mass destruction. If you could envision a scenario that could include high explosives as weapons of mass destruction, then you can draw your inferences from what I’ve given you,” he said. Humm said the administration’s policy regarding high explosives is consistent with previous U.S. nuclear use policy. “This is not a change in policy, it reflects the language of the 1995 U.N. Security Resolution that endorsed negative security assurances but reaffirmed the inherent right of self defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, where all states have the right to defend themselves if attacked,” he said in his prepared statement. It also appears consistent with how the U.S. military formulated its nuclear weapons doctrine after the United States produced its 1995 pledge.
CTBT: Progress Mixed on Organization’s Five-Year AnniversaryBy David Ruppe Nevertheless, treaty proponents, and even some of its opponents such as the United States, continue to fund the organization, helping it to build capabilities it could use if the treaty ever takes effect. The Bush administration for fiscal 2002 contributed $16.5 million, the largest contribution of any nation. The CTBTO, with an $84 million budget, continues to build and improve the International Monitoring System, a network of facilities worldwide using various technologies to detect possible nuclear explosions. Just over 100 seismological, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations are already in place, monitoring all regions of the globe for evidence of nuclear explosions underground, underwater or in the atmosphere. Satellite communications are being installed, so far enabling some 80 stations to continuously relay secure data in near real time to Vienna, where it is processed using Sun Microsystems high-performance computers, and forwarded upon request to treaty signatories for scrutiny. Enough computer memory has been created, 125 terabytes so far, to archive up to 10 years’ worth of collected data for ready retrieval. The organization also is gradually buying equipment and training for on-site inspection operations. Annual funding so far has been strong by U.N. standards, usually between 90 and 98 percent of the requested budget, CTBTO Executive Secretary Wolfgang Hoffmann of Austria, told Global Security Newswire yesterday. “Other organizations have to do sometimes with less than 50 percent, and they still survive,” he said. Hoffmann is optimistic that by 2007, 321 sensors at 260 stations will be in place and a full complement of on-site inspectors will be equipped to help implement the treaty, although that will require “rising budgets, year after year.” Peter Basham, coordinator of the monitoring system, said the organization would need a 10 to 15 percent increase to its annual budget for two or three years, and then could gradually decrease back down to around the $84 million level. The system, CTBTO experts say, would enable round-the-clock detection of nuclear explosions with yields as low as one kiloton anyplace in the world. Political Differences Since 1995, 165 states have signed the document, and 89 have ratified it. “I think the CTBT is really enjoying global support,” said Austrian Foreign Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, at a joint press conference with Hoffmann. “I can only hope that the nuclear weapon states will honor these commitments,” she added. While the CTBTO develops the treaty’s monitoring system, certain key political support is lacking for full implementation of the treaty, from the United States in particular. The treaty cannot enter into force until 13 specific nations ratify the pact, the United States among them. Other nations needed to ratify include China, India and Pakistan. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the treaty in 1996, but the U.S. Senate refused to approve ratification and current President George W. Bush has said he has no intention of supporting the treaty. Bush opposed the treaty during the presidential election campaign, saying it was unverifiable and could undermine U.S. nuclear deterrence. Bush has indicated he stands by a U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing implemented by his father, President George H.W. Bush, in 1992, but the administration has also signaled it will not rule out testing in the future. The administration has requested funding to speed up the preparation time for conducting a nuclear test (see GSN, Jan. 8) and has been conducting studies into possibilities for developing new or modified earth-penetrating nuclear weapons (see related GSN story, today). Hoffmann and other national delegates see U.S. leadership as the key to the winning remaining support for the treaty. “There is no question that the United States plays a key role … this treaty would not be here without the Americans,” said Hoffmann, noting that the Clinton administration was a leading proponent of the treaty. “We have to regain U.S. support to get the treaty into force.” Support Verification U.S. substantive support for much of the organization continues, said Hoffmann, because the United States, like most other countries, believes the organization’s International Monitoring System serves its national security interests by monitoring countries that might try to secretly test nuclear weapons. The United States provides key technical support on the monitoring side, a good deal of funding and 37 monitoring stations. The United States has its own monitoring systems, separate from stations it contributes to the treaty, but they do not provide the extent of coverage the CTBTO system would. “We can go places where they can’t,” said Basham. The system, for instance, has monitoring stations in China and Russia. He said the system should have the Indian Ocean completely covered by early next year. Since last August, however, the Bush administration has not participated in the on-site inspection program or committees dealing with it, nor has it contributed money for that program or for efforts to promote treaty ratification (see GSN, Nov. 12, 2001). Without full treaty ratification, Hoffmann said, the CTBTO’s effectiveness will be hampered. It will not be able to perform on-site inspections of incidents, there would be no clarification procedure for reviewing questioned data and there would be no formal meeting of a council of member states. The monitoring system, nevertheless, could still provide unprecedented data for detecting and locating potential nuclear explosions, but also possibly for scientific purposes, such as locating earthquakes and volcanoes, said Basham. “It’s the best environmental monitoring system ever conceived and devised,” he said. It is “seeing all kinds of things around the world and I bet people will take advantage of it.”
United States II: “Bunker-Buster” Development to BeginScientists at U.S. Energy Department laboratories are expected to begin research next month on a “bunker-busting” nuclear weapon, USA Today reported yesterday (see related GSN story, today). The new nuclear weapons development program will start small, said Everet Beckner, National Nuclear Security Administration deputy administrator for defense programs. There will be about a dozen weapon designers each at the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories. The study on the new bunker-busting bomb will probably cost up to $50 million over two to three years, Beckner said. Energy officials will obtain congressional approval before designing any new weapons, he said. The Bush administration also plans to reduce the time needed to restart nuclear weapons testing down to months and increase spending on manufacturing sites for nuclear weapons, according to Energy documents. “The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex,” said the recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review (Jonathan Weisman, USA Today, March 18). It is possible to build a bunker-busting nuclear weapon by modifying an existing bomb, rather than using a new design, said NNSA Administrator John Gordon before a Senate panel yesterday. “There is no defined requirement for a new weapon at this time,” Gordon said. “I don’t see anything happening in the immediate future.” Gordon also told the Senate panel that the current U.S. nuclear arsenal works fine and there is no need to resume testing. “No identified problems … suggest the need to return to nuclear testing any time soon,” he said. “Our nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and reliable. When we find aging problems, we know what to do about them. We know how to fix them, and we go out and do that” (Carolyn Skorneck, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 18).
United States III: New Development Could Reinvigorate Scientists, Experts SayThe Bush administration’s plans to restart designing and producing nuclear weapons could help U.S. laboratories regain an intellectual edge lost by a lack of nuclear weapon research in the last 10 years, USA Today reported yesterday (see GSN, March 15). “Nobody wants to work here,” said Tom Thomson, a senior weapons designer at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. “There’s no sense of mission.” Starting next month, nuclear weapons scientists will begin designing a nuclear weapon that could destroy bunkers buried deep underground, according to USA Today. The administration’s proposed fiscal 2003 budget raises U.S. Energy Department funding for nuclear stockpile work to $1.2 billion, up 18 percent. The Bush administration has also proposed $243 million to rebuild the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex in fiscal 2003. The Bush administration wants nuclear weapon scientists involved in the new projects to “think more broadly” about current threats and “the present stockpile and whether it’s properly configured,” said Everet Beckner, deputy director of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton tried to halt intellectual decline among U.S. weapon scientists through programs that evaluated the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without having to resort to testing, according to USA Today. Those programs included the world’s largest laser at Lawrence Livermore, expensive non-nuclear explosive facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory and supercomputing initiatives to create better 3-D models of nuclear explosions (see GSN, March 11). Such programs, however, only slowed down the departure of weapons scientists from laboratories, administration officials said. “To keep people thinking at the front edge of their intellectual interests, it’s important that they not be constrained to think only in terms of what’s out there, already built,” Beckner said. The Bush administration’s plans to develop new nuclear weapons carries far more risks than are justified by the benefit of providing new work for scientists, according to some critics. “Getting nuclear weapons untangled from old Cold War doctrines and putting them on the shelf for use is a huge departure from the past,” said Robert Alvarez, a former Energy Department official. Developing new weapons also could increase the need for testing, according to USA Today. Building a new weapon and then not testing it is like designing a new car without turning the ignition to determine if it works, Thompson said. Recently leaked excerpts from the Nuclear Posture Review also hint that any new weapons might have to be tested (see GSN, March 14). “While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future,” the document said (Jonathan Weisman, USA Today, March 18).
Russia: New Weapons Needed to Counter U.S. Shield, Official SaysRussia should improve its arsenal of nuclear weapons in response to U.S. plans to build a missile defense system, a top Russian lawmaker said yesterday (see GSN, March 18). “If you build up the shield, we will build up the sword,” said retired Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, head of the Russian parliament’s defense affairs committee. Russian President Vladimir Putin reacted calmly to U.S. plans to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and begin development of a missile defense system, according to the Associated Press. Some Russian military officers and diplomats, however, have said a U.S. missile defense shield would reduce the deterrence value of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Russia must respond to a U.S. missile “umbrella” by “increasing the threat” and creating weapons “capable of penetrating their missile defense,” Nikolayev said (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press/Washington Post, March 18).
Pakistan: Country Will Not Be First to Conduct Nuclear Test, Musharraf SaysPakistan will not be the first South Asian country to conduct another nuclear test, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said Friday in Tokyo (see GSN, March 14). “We will exercise full restraint in this regard,” Musharraf said. “We have offered a no-war pact to India. We believe in demilitarization of South Asia” (see GSN, March 18). Pakistan has not violated the missile control regime, Musharraf added. “We have our own nuclear and missile technology which is completely indigenous,” he said. Countries should avoid viewing the world in terms of adversarial civilizations, Musharraf said. Civilizations are “complementary to each other,” he said. “We should not talk of clash of civilization. We should not compartmentalize civilizations. This is a very dangerous concept,” he said. Musharraf called on the United States, as the world’s only superpower, to play an active role in resolving disputes in the Muslim world, according to the Islamabad News (Islamabad The News, March 16 in FBIS-NES, March 18).
India-Pakistan: Analysts Propose to Safeguard South Asian ArsenalsBy Kerry Boyd U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said earlier this month that he intends to propose legislation to expand U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction programs — established to help former Soviet states dismantle and secure nuclear materials and facilities — to countries including Pakistan and India. “The precise replication of the [CTR] program will not be possible everywhere, but a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, can and must be established in every nation with a WMD program,” Lugar said in a Council on Foreign Relations speech (see GSN, March 5). The United States and other countries with applicable knowledge should offer assistance to Pakistan and India to help them ensure the security of various nuclear assets, said Robert Einhorn, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation. “There’s no reason that any process that has worked in Russia couldn’t work well in any other country,” said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Start Simple Although Pakistan’s command and control system works well, India and Pakistan could learn a lot from the U.S. experience of managing its own nuclear capability and avoiding nuclear war with the Soviet Union, said Brigadier Feroz Khan, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Division of the Pakistani Joint Services Headquarters. “Why must I learn something that was already learned in the 1950s and 60s?” he said. U.S. advisors should help both countries install more sophisticated locks, fool-proof communication systems and other means to prevent unauthorized access to and use of weapons, Khan said (see GSN, Nov. 29, 2001). Any assistance, however, must not be in a context of weakness and must not violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or other legal requirements, Khan said. “No one’s asking for nuclear weapon designs,” he said. Personnel Reliability Khan and Wolfsthal both suggested that the United States could help improve ways to ensure loyalty and reliability of personnel with access to nuclear materials and facilities (see GSN, Oct. 1, 2001). The United States — which uses techniques also used by banks, government and other entities that require a loyal and stable work force — has provided its experience developing a personnel reliability program to Russia, said Wolfsthal. U.S. measures include drug tests, credit history checks and lie-detector tests to ensure that workers with access to sensitive materials are loyal, stable and do not have weaknesses that could allow someone to blackmail or tempt them, said Wolfsthal. Pakistan already has some technology and procedures to ensure proper control, such as identity cards and coded locks, Khan said. He added that the country could, however, benefit by learning more about the U.S. personnel reliability system, as could India and Israel — the other two nuclear powers outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime. Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers The United States can also offer assistance beyond CTR-type efforts. One important measure is to establish crisis prevention centers, Khan said. “South Asia is endemic to crisis” and needs a method to deal with tense situations, he said. Pakistan and India should establish nuclear risk reduction centers in Islamabad and New Delhi similar to the ones in Moscow and Washington, Khan said. Nuclear risk reduction centers are “a good idea,” said Einhorn. “It’s a modest confidence-building measure that can provide a vehicle for exchanging information that could help defuse a crisis.” The United States and former Soviet Union established two Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in 1988 to provide “direct, reliable, high-speed systems for the transmission of notifications and communications at the government-to-government level,” according to a U.S. State Department summary. The two centers exchange information, such as notifications of ballistic missile launches, in accordance with treaties and confidence-building agreements. A South Asian center might include a combination of diplomats, scientists and military officials with regular meetings between Indian and Pakistani officials, Khan said. Potential Problems Concerns exist, however, that threat reduction programs might not work in South Asia due to Pakistani and Indian distrust of U.S. intentions, some analysts said. “I think we should be realistic about what the Pakistanis and Indians are prepared to accept in the way of help from other countries,” said Einhorn. Pakistan and India do not trust each other, and they are unlikely to provide U.S. personnel access to certain nuclear facilities, he said. CTR programs between the United States and Russia followed decades of interactions between U.S. and Soviet, and then Russian, officials that created a level of confidence and comfort allowing some access, Einhorn said. That is not the case in South Asia. Despite those potential difficulties, the United States should still offer assistance, he said. The techniques and approach of the CTR program in the former Soviet Union are applicable to South Asia, but the program may not be politically workable, Wolfsthal said. India and Pakistan are “paranoid about U.S. intentions,” he said. “There’s a lot of skepticism about our intentions.” The principle behind the CTR program — that many unsecure nuclear weapons were left in the former Soviet Union — does not apply to Pakistan, Khan said. The regional context in South Asia and lack of cooperation between India and Pakistan create a very different situation. Khan emphasized that he supports the concept of CTR but is unsure whether it applies to South Asia. Tension to Dialogue In any case, proposals for U.S. assistance and South Asian cooperation face a serious obstacle in the current mobilization of Pakistani and Indian forces after a Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament. Tension reduction measures are most needed but are particularly difficult in such a climate, Einhorn said. The situation might have to calm down before India and Pakistan can begin serious dialogue, but in the meantime, the United States can “float ideas” and let the two countries “mull them over,” he said. India and Pakistan should not expect assistance from the United States until the two form some type of cooperative security agreement to prevent misperceptions and escalation, Khan said (see GSN, Feb. 25). India and Pakistan must promise to restrain their forces — both conventional and nuclear, Khan said. South Asia needs a third party to jumpstart, facilitate and monitor agreements, Khan said. If India and Pakistan reach a restraint agreement, the United States could help provide information on each country’s adherence with an agreement, he said. The United States previously has used information from satellites and other means to prevent crises in South Asia, so why not formalize that role, Khan said.
U.S. Response: New Detectors Could Have Limited Use, Experts SaySome scientists have said that new radiation detecting devices might be of little use in preventing terrorists from detonating a nuclear weapon or “dirty bomb,” the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 6). The key to finding a nuclear device is information — without it, “needle in a haystack” does not describe the challenge, said Steven Fetter, a physicist and professor of public policy at the University of Maryland. “If you tell me there’s a warhead in New York, it’s just hopeless,” Fetter said. “You just hope you never get to the point where you have to track down one of these in a city.” Under ideal conditions, it is possible to detect a nuclear weapon from more than 200 feet away, but a weapon under terrorist control might be more difficult to find, said Frank von Hippel, a physicist and science policy professor at Princeton University. A joint U.S.-Russian study in 1989 “showed that U.S. and Soviet warheads were quite detectable,” von Hippel said. “That might not necessarily be true for a terrorist warhead.” Terrorists could attempt to shield a nuclear device with lead to block emissions that detectors would otherwise pick up, the Times reported. Some of the most dangerous nuclear materials, such as uranium and plutonium necessary for a bomb, emit very little radiation. Natural radiation could also mask a faint signal coming off of a nuclear device, according to the Times. The best way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to make sure terrorists do not have access to nuclear materials, according to some experts. “The moral of the story is you lock up nuclear materials as well as you can lock them up,” Fetter said. “Once you let them get out, the problem is a thousand times harder.” New Sensors Since Sept. 11, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s annual budget for the development of radiation sensors has doubled to $20 million, according to the Times. In addition, federal laboratories are spending up to $18 million on the effort, an NNSA spokeswoman said (James Glanz, New York Times, March 18). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory engineers have developed the Cryo-3, a small, 10-pound detector that uses a high-purity germanium crystal to find a radiation source. Photon, X and gamma rays interact with the germanium to create a corresponding charge. The charge is then processed to determine the type and quantity of radioactive isotope present. The germanium crystal is cooled by the same kind of mechanical cooling device currently used to cool low-noise cell phone antennae. The Cryo-3 can operate for six hours on two camcorder batteries that can be switched while the detector is running, allowing for almost unlimited operational time. “Whatever you can detect with a germanium crystal, you can detect with the portable system,” said Lorenzo Fabris of Berkeley Laboratory’s Engineering Division. “Ideally, we would be able to place one at any customs port” (U.S. State Department release, March 17). Researchers at the U.S. Energy Department’s Brookhaven National Laboratory are working on another type of radiation detector, one that would use semiconductor chips that could detect radioactive isotopes through their individual radiation “fingerprints,” according to United Press International. “You’re after something that’s low-power, battery operated, very compact in size, long-term operation unattended, no maintenance, all those things are going to be required …,” said Ralph James, associated director for energy, environment and national security at Brookhaven. “This (chip) technology really fits the bill.” One major factor is the ability of a radiation detector to be able to differentiate between naturally occurring radiation and that given off by a terrorist nuclear device, James said. “What we need is something that can discern special nuclear materials that might be part of something with nuclear yield,” he said. “These are cases of plutonium-239, uranium-235, the ones people know about. (We have to spot these) materials from a wide range of naturally occurring isotopes.” The new semiconductor chip technology can do just that, James said. “Just as you can tune your radio to find the frequency of your favorite station, you can identify each isotope by tuning into the unique energies associated with the emissions,” he said. “We can spectrally ‘window’ and determine if (a source) is plutonium-239, a great concern for nuclear weapons, or something like americium-241, which is in practically every smoke detector in the United States” (Scott Burnell, United Press International, March 17). Who Will Track Down Nuclear Devices? Any new radiation detectors would be sure to find their way into the hands of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), part of the Energy Department’s Nevada Operations Office, which is in charge of responding to a nuclear terrorism threat (see GSN, March 4). NEST can send about 600 personnel to the site of nuclear terrorism threat, though deployments have so far involved fewer than 45 people, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. NEST personnel come from the Nevada operations office, Energy Department laboratories and three private contractors. There are 17 different types of NEST personnel representing a wide range of abilities, including four types of physicists, chemists, mathematicians and communications specialists. If there is a nuclear terrorist threat, the first step the team takes is to determine its validity. NEST maintains a database on nuclear weapons design information, taken from sources ranging from scientific journals to spy novels, in order to check the technical accuracy of a threat. Psychologists examine the wording and structure of any accompanying communication to determine the mindset of the terrorist and where in the world he or she might have originated. If it is necessary to respond to a threat, NEST has more than 150 tons of equipment at hand, according to the Bulletin. The team has its own air fleet consisting of four helicopters with radiological search systems and three airplanes equipped for remote sensing missions. NEST can also deploy vans equipped to detect radioactive emissions and has its own graphics agency to disguise the vans and blend in with commercial traffic. NEST already has in its arsenal handheld nuclear detectors that can be hidden in objects the size of suitcases or briefcases. These detectors can silently alert a NEST member to the presence of a nuclear device through a signal transmitted to the member’s earphone, the Bulletin reported. NEST also has diagnostic and disablement equipment if a nuclear device is discovered. If it is necessary to disable a nuclear or “dirty” bomb, team members might surround it with explosives and then detonate them or use a 30-millimeter cannon to break the bomb up into tiny pieces. NEST can also build a nylon tent 35 feet high and 50 feet in diameter around a nuclear device, and then pump up to 30,000 cubic feat of foam to limit the spread of radiation (Jeffrey Richelson, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2002).
U.S.-Russia: Russia May Agree to Store Nuclear WeaponsRussia might agree to a bilateral arrangement that allows the United States to store some decommissioned nuclear weapons rather than destroy them, said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov Sunday on NBC’s Meet the Press (see GSN, March 15). “Part of it may be stored. I don’t argue with that principle,” Ivanov said. “But the devil is in details — how much, how long and how quickly it might go back to operational, and, well, jeopardize strategic stability” (Meet the Press, March 17). U.S. insistence on an agreement that cuts the two countries’ operational nuclear arsenals to between 1,500 and 2,200 warheads but allows storing some so they could become operational again has been a major point of contention in the latest U.S.-Russia arms talks. Russia said previously that it wanted each side to agree to destroy the decommissioned warheads (Steve Gutterman, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 17). Ivanov’s comments followed an earlier U.S. concession to agree to a legally binding document formalizing the cuts rather than the informal document the Bush administration originally wanted (see GSN, March 14). Exactly what constitutes a legally binding agreement, however, remains an unresolved issue, Ivan Safranchuk, director of the Center for Defense Information’s Moscow office, wrote in a Moscow Times opinion piece. Russian law states that the Duma must ratify any document dealing with national security and arms reductions, so Russia is pushing for a full treaty that requires Russian and U.S. Senate ratification, according to Safranchuk. The U.S. Bush administration, however, wants to bypass a Senate ratification requirement by forming an executive agreement. “The Russian side is hardly likely to agree to a treaty that it must ratify fully, while the United States is under no such obligation,” Safranchuk wrote. Russian officials have indicated that the United States will concede to the Russian definition of a legally binding document in exchange for Russian acceptance of U.S. plans to store decommissioned warheads, wrote Safranchuk. Russia will likely follow suit and store rather than destroy its warheads. Verification measures would probably be based on START I and START II, according to Safranchuk (Ivan Safranchuk, Moscow Times, March 18). Senate Requests Vote on Agreement U.S. Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), the ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell Friday demanding that any agreement to cut nuclear warheads be sent to the Senate for ratification. An agreement on “significant obligations by the United States regarding deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads” would “constitute a treaty subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,” the letter said. “With the exception of the SALT I agreement, every significant arms control agreement during the past three decades has been transmitted to the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution,” the senators wrote. “Mr. Secretary, we see no reason whatsoever to alter this practice.” Three Ways The U.S. president can formalize a legally binding agreement in three ways, the New York Times reported. One is by executive authority, which does not require congressional consent. The president could also send an agreement to both houses of Congress, and require a majority vote. The third route is to submit a treaty to the Senate, which would need a two-thirds majority to approve it (Thom Shanker, New York Times, March 17).
U.S-India: Talks Could Shift Away From Old Issues, Indian Newspaper SaysIn talks in New Delhi tomorrow, the United States and India might set aside old issues and focus on bilateral cooperation with missile defense systems and ways to deal with the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, according to the Hindu. Officials will probably resume discussions on nuclear weapons issues during a visit today by Christina Rocca, U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs (see GSN, Feb. 25). Even though Rocca will probably discuss old concerns such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, many such issues have lost their importance, the Hindu reported (see GSN, March 14). The United States and India have had more than 10 rounds of talks on nuclear issues since India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the Hindu reported (C. Raja Mohan, Hindu, March 18).
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