Al-Qaeda:  Afghan Scientists Unveil Hidden Radioactive Material

Two Afghan nuclear scientists showed British soldiers last week a cache of radioactive equipment that they had concealed from the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, March 25).

Mohammed Jan Naziri and Jora Mohammed Korbani led a team from the British Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Regiment to the ruins of the Aliabad mental hospital in Kabul and the basement of the Kabul University’s nuclear physics department.  Naziri, Korbani and other scientists moved several radioactive items from the university’s laboratories into the two hiding places when the Taliban entered Kabul in 1996, they said.

The items included a broken radiotheraphy machine containing enough cobalt-60 to kill a person instantly, chemical warfare agents, instruments emitting radiation and containers of solid and liquid radioactive material, some broken or without lids, the Times reported.

“We’ve been finding stuff that’s far more potent and dangerous than even ‘dirty bombs,’” said Capt. James Cameron, head of the British team (see GSN, March 20).  Much of the equipment was from the Soviets “who used far higher doses of radiation than we would,” said Cameron, adding that the Afghan mujahideen had damaged some of the containers in the early 1990s.

Al-Qaeda might have been able to construct several dirty bombs — conventional explosives laced with radioactive material — with the materials in the two caches, he said.

“But al-Qaeda and the Taliban never knew about it.  The atomic scientists tore up their papers and never said a word,” Cameron said.

The scientists hid the equipment and materials in the two locations and stored them between lead sheets without using any protective clothing.  “We didn’t really know how radioactive some of the sources were,” Naziri said.  “We just tried to protect them.”

They also destroyed their research and papers on nuclear physics.

Recruitment Efforts

The Taliban registered the professors’ names but did little else.

“They didn’t understand anything about physics or what we were doing, but we knew they were looking for physics and chemistry experts,” Korbani said.

Later “an Arab who spoke Pashtu and Farsi poorly,” according to Naziri, tried to talk with the scientists, but Naziri refused and said he could not do anything without permission from the Atomic Energy Authority.  The man never returned.

An aid organization called “Chand Groupi,” or “Multi Group,” contacted Korbani and asked him for assistance.  The organization was linked to the Ummah Tameer-e-Nau charity, which was run by Pakistani scientist Sultan Bashiru-din Mehmood, who later came under suspicion for passing nuclear information to al-Qaeda (see GSN, March 4).

“They said to me, ‘We know you’re working for the faculty of nuclear science, and we need you,’” Korbani said.  “They offered me a lot of money and said that they wanted me to find 100 other nuclear scientists and technicians and come to Karachi.”

“They told me, ‘Pakistan has a very powerful atomic bomb, and we are very keen on bringing such a power to Afghanistan,’” Korbani said.  “They kept calling me, but I never returned (the calls).  I knew it was too dangerous” (Julian West, Washington Times, April 11).

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U.S. Export Controls:  Army Researchers Risk Technology Transfer

Unclear guidelines could cause military technology leaks from U.S. Army scientists who work with civilian and non-U.S. partners, a congressional investigator said Monday.

“There is a need for the Army to clarify its guidance on technology transfers,” said Katherine Schinasi — director of acquisition and sourcing management at the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress — in a letter to Claude Bolton, assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology.

From August 2001 through February 2002, GAO investigators reviewed technology control procedures for 25 agreements between nonfederal partners and two Army laboratories — the Army Research Laboratory at Adelphi, Maryland and the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick, Maryland.

According to Schinasi, the investigators could not determine to what extent Army officials had ensured that the agreements comply with U.S. export control regulations.  There is no “documentary evidence” to indicate that officials had reviewed the agreements for such compliance, Schinasi said.

“Each Army laboratory needs to ensure that the results of [export control] reviews are documented,” she said.

Currently laboratories must consult with the U.S. Trade Representative when forming partnerships with nonfederal entities, but the Trade Representative said its expertise in export controls is insufficient, Schinasi said.  The office has referred the laboratories to the State and Commerce departments, “which are the government agencies involved in export control,” she said.

Recommendations

The GAO suggested that the Army, which is already working to revise related regulations, should include procedures for ensuring that technology transfers from Army laboratories comply with U.S. export control regulations.

“At a minimum, those procedures should require that appropriate laboratory officials determine if the Department of State’s international traffic in arms regulations, the Department of Commerce’s export administration regulations, or other appropriate Department of Defense guidance require control of the technology to be transferred,” Schinasi said.

She added that the new regulations should also require laboratory officials to “document the results of such determinations in the official … files” (General Accounting Office release, April 9).

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International Response:  U.N. Disarmament Commission Considers Delay

The U.N. Disarmament Commission plans to meet next week to decide whether the busy U.N. schedule warrants a delay in the commission’s 2002 substantive session, the United Nations said yesterday.

Yesterday the commission debated a proposal to cancel the 2002 session, which would delay consideration of two items on its agenda until next year, including ways to achieve nuclear disarmament, the United Nations said in a press release.

One commission delegate proposed holding the 2002 session in July and the commission is scheduled to meet on April 17 to consider that proposal (U.N. release, April 10).

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U.S. Response:  Russia Questions U.S. Commitment to Disarmament

Russia yesterday criticized the U.S. decision to curtail some cooperative disarmament projects, saying it will endanger cooperation between the two former Cold War rivals (see GSN, April 8).

“Such actions can have the most negative impact on achieving mutual trust and can be reflected in the two countries’ cooperation in liquidating weapons of mass destruction and in the sphere of nonproliferation,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko.

Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, the Bush administration must certify that Russia is complying with the biological and chemical weapons conventions in order to provide funding for programs, including certain military exchanges and U.S. assistance to prevent theft of nuclear materials in Russia.  The administration, however, has said that it cannot provide certification.

Russian officials said their country is following both treaties and called the U.S. decision bewildering (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, April 10).

Russia is gaining the impression that the U.S. decision has been “used primarily in order to deflect attention from the actions of the U.S.A. itself, which is refusing to support the protocol on verification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and is disrupting the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” Yakovenko said (see GSN, April 4).

“What causes particular concern,” he said, “is that the U.S. side has taken this decision without exchanging views with Russia and without identifying the specific facts which it is querying” (ITAR-Tass/BBC Monitoring, April 9).

Russia and other states must comply with the arms control agreements, but it is not in U.S. interests to “stymie efforts to safeguard nuclear stockpiles in Russia,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (Kralev, Washington Times).

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U.S. Response I:  Post-Sept. 11 Relations Helping Nonproliferation, Officials Say

By Kerry Boyd

Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Improved U.S.-Russian relations since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States have helped accelerate and ease cooperative efforts to secure and destroy Russian weapons of mass destruction, U.S. and Russian officials said Friday (see GSN, Feb. 5).

At a workshop sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, U.S. Energy official Linton Brooks, U.S. Defense official Thomas Kuenning and Russian diplomat Oleg Novikov said that warmer relations between the two former Cold War rivals have benefited nonproliferation programs.

The status of U.S. Energy Department programs dedicated to securing Russian nuclear weapon materials “is very good,” Brooks said.

Energy’s nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia, which have been functioning since the early 1990s, also provide a model for a new strategic relationship because the programs have been based on cooperation since their beginning, Brooks said.

Kuenning said he is optimistic about the Pentagon’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, which are similar to Energy Department programs but cover different specific projects and generally focus on dismantling weapons.

Nonproliferation programs have become a cornerstone of U.S.-Russian cooperation, Novikov said.  Russia greatly appreciates U.S. assistance to secure nuclear weapons, dismantle weapons of mass destruction and help former Soviet weapon scientists, he said.

Cooperative Threat Reduction programs will continue, Novikov predicted, because the programs suit the national interests of both the United States and Russia.

The Bush administration, however, has told Russia that the United States is concerned about Russian compliance with treaties addressing chemical and biological weapons, and the United States may reduce funding for some projects, the New York Times reported today (see related GSN story, today).

Strong Relationships

Meanwhile, good relations between U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Atomic Minister Alexander Rumyantsev have been an “unexpected bonus” to the programs, Brooks said.

After November’s Crawford summit between U.S. and Russian Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, Abraham and Rumyantsev agreed to accelerate nonproliferation efforts, and Energy officials now have access to Russian sites that previously were closed, Brooks said.

The Bush administration has been helpful to promoting cooperative efforts, and Congress has provided “extraordinary” support, Brooks said.

Good Progress, but Work Remains

The officials outlined specific areas where nonproliferation experts have improved conditions.  Russia and the United States signed a new agreement earlier this month that should allow more U.S. access to certain sites to begin installing security enhancements, Kuenning said.

Energy officials have been able to enhance security of transportation systems for nuclear material and have consolidated nuclear material in more secure locations, Brooks said.

Russia has increased its budget for destroying chemical weapons several times and has drawn up plans, said Novikov.

More work remains, however, Brooks said.

Russia needs continued international support and U.S. funds for Shchuchye, according to Novikov.  The Pentagon is waiting for the status of fiscal 2002 funds related to the Shchuchye project, Kuenning said (see GSN, April 3).

Meanwhile, the Energy Department plans to start securing devices that could be used to create radiological weapons, something not under consideration before Sept. 11, Brooks said (see GSN, Feb. 12).  Pentagon officials are also helping collect radiological material, Kuenning said.

At Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea, the Defense Department plans to ensure that any remaining anthrax is eliminated (see GSN, Jan. 22).

In the Ukraine, Pentagon nonproliferation experts plan to eliminate SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles — a project that was delayed but is now back on track, Kuenning said (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001).

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U.S. Response II:  Bush Administration Suspends Disarmament Programs

The Bush administration has told Russia that the United States will cut back several disarmament projects due to concern that Russia is not complying with treaties banning chemical and biological weapons, senior administration officials said (see GSN, March 20).

The State Department last week issued a cable saying it could not certify that Russia is committed to complying with the treaties, the New York Times reported.  U.S. law requires such certification, so the Bush administration will be unable to start certain new programs and will reduce funding for some projects.

The decision not to certify Russian compliance does not mean the United States is accusing Russia of violating any treaties, nor does it mean the United States cannot certify compliance in the future.

Refusing to certify Russian commitment, however, sends a message to Moscow that the United States demands more cooperation and honesty related to WMD issues, officials said.

“This is a signal of our seriousness about compliance on arms control and the need to meet all obligations under the chemical and biological weapons conventions,” said a senior administration official.

The decision not to certify will affect several cooperative programs to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction in Russia, according to the Times.  Pentagon Cooperative Threat Reduction programs worth $450 million, and State Department programs worth $70 million will probably be affected, officials said (see related GSN story, today).

Programs likely to be affected include military exchanges and efforts to ensure against theft of nuclear materials.  Authorities have already canceled several planned visits to discuss new projects, officials said.  Several State Department programs will also run out of funds soon.

The law establishing the Cooperative Threat Reduction program does not allow the president to waive the certification requirement.  The Bush administration asked Congress to provide the president with such authority in the emergency supplemental spending bills for the State Department.

Congressional aides said Congress will probably grant the waiver authority but not in time for U.S. President George W. Bush’s May meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (see GSN, March 28).

The Energy Department programs, worth $500 million, do not require certification and will not be affected.

Insufficient Cooperation

The decision not to certify Russian commitment was prompted by U.S. concerns about Russian refusal to provide accurate information and to send a strain of anthrax to U.S. scientists, the Times reported.

According to the Times, the United States has approved plans to help Russian destroy its chemical weapons stockpile, but Russia has not said that the Soviet Union produced “fourth generation” chemical weapons — far more lethal that the most advanced U.S. chemical weapons (see GSN, March 20).

Russia has also said the Soviet Union never developed certain pathogens, including some genetically modified strains capable of resisting vaccines and antibiotics.  Russian defectors previously involved with the biological weapons program, however, have said the Soviet Union did have such pathogens (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2001).  The Russian denials are absurd, said one U.S. official.

U.S. officials also want to be able to visit four biological laboratories under Russian military control where Russia has denied access.  Russia has said the United States also does not allow access to U.S. military laboratories.

Finally, Russia has refused to allow Russian scientists to send the United States a genetically modified strain of anthrax that reportedly can defeat Russia’s anthrax vaccine, although the two countries signed a scientific strain exchange agreement that requires Russia to send a sample.

Russia has said it has not violated the biological or chemical weapons treaties.

National Security

The Bush administration has said that cooperative nonproliferation and disarmament programs suit U.S. national security interests, but the administration also wants Russia to cooperate more.

“What we’re trying to do,” said one senior official, “is send a signal that we require full compliance with the chemical and biological weapons.”

“But we’ve also made clear in the review of our assistance programs to Russia and the record size of our budget requests that these programs are very much in our own national security interests,” the official said.  “We’re trying to find a way to bring these two goals together.”

Several arms control advocates said the decision not to certify and therefore to cut back on some programs is unwise.

“It’s in our country’s interest to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction from leaking out of Russia in any way we can,” said Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “So undercutting these programs is tantamount to shooting yourself in the foot” (Judith Miller, New York Times, April 8).

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Iraq:  Bush and Blair Say All Options Open to Dealing With Iraq

British Prime Minister Tony Blair said yesterday that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein must allow U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq or face consequences (see GSN, April 5).

Hussein “has to let the inspectors back in — anyone, any time, any place the international community demands,” Blair said.  Hussein has blocked U.N. inspections since 1998.

“To allow weapons of mass destruction to be developed by a state like Iraq ... would be grossly to ignore the lessons of Sept. 11, and we will not do it,” Blair said, adding that Hussein's regime is “detestable.”

Blair did not threaten to use military force against Iraq, but speaking of fighting terrorism more generally, he said the international community must take military action “if necessary” to end terrorism.  “If necessary and justified, it should involve regime change,” he added.

Blair made the comments at the end of his weekend meetings with U.S. President George W. Bush (Ron Fournier, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8).

All Options Open

Bush and Blair said they would consider “all options” to end the threat Hussein poses.

“We must be prepared to act where terrorism or weapons of mass destruction threaten us,” Blair said, although he added there would be no “precipitive action” against Iraq (Olivier Knox, Agence France-Presse, April 8).

Hussein has violated U.N. resolutions and refuses to allow inspectors to return to verify Iraq is no longer pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs, Blair said Saturday.

“Doing nothing in those circumstances is not an option, so we consider all options available,” he said.

Will U.S. Attack?

Bush repeatedly refused Friday to articulate any plans to use military force against Iraq.

“I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go,” he said.  “That's about all I'm willing to share with you,” he told a reporter (Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, April 6).

U.S. Postpones Evidence to Security Council

Meanwhile, the United States postponed plans last week to share information with the U.N. Security Council about Iraqi attempts to develop banned missile technology, the Washington Post reported.  The U.S. decision followed an earlier British decision to delay publishing similar information (see GSN, April 2).

U.S. officials had planned to provide information to council members alleging Iraq is developing missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction farther than the 93-mile range allowed under U.N. resolutions (see GSN, April 5).  It would have been the first time for the United States to supply the council with classified intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs since inspectors left Iraq in 1998.

Increased violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Arab criticism of U.S. support for Israel's military offensive, however, led U.S. diplomats to delay meetings to share such intelligence, according to the Post (see GSN, April 4).  Officials plan to present the information in the future, but the date is unclear, the Post reported.

U.S. officials refused to say what type of information they plan to present to the council, but officials said it includes photographs and other information showing Iraqi attempts to build banned missiles.

“We believe that Iraq is taking steps to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction capability, to develop new and longer missiles and to increase its conventional capability,” said a senior U.S. official.

Inspectors Have Photos, Need Access

Hans Blix, head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, the organization responsible for inspections in Iraq, said he has seen satellite photos showing new construction on facilities the United States destroyed in 1998 and has received information from some governments about Iraqi efforts to rebuild weapons of mass destruction programs.  He said he cannot prove Iraq has such programs until UNMOVIC inspectors can conduct inspections in the country.

“We cannot exclude the possibility that they retained something from the past or that they have produced something new,” Blix said.  “But if I had clear-cut evidence of Iraq still possessing or producing weapons, I would go to the Security Council with that evidence” (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, April 7).

Meanwhile, UNMOVIC is preparing to conduct inspections in case Iraq agrees to allow inspectors to return (see GSN, Feb. 21).

Under UNMOVIC's plan, more than 50 inspectors would be based in Baghdad the New York Times reported.  There would be 230 inspectors available to allow inspectors to rotate in and out of Iraq.  Inspectors have already received training, including cultural-sensitivity training.

The inspectors would have unlimited access to suspected weapons sites, and Iraqi officials would be required to provide documents.  Iraqi officials “will have to help by coming up with the evidence,” said Blix.  “They have the archives, the bills of lading and budget documents.”

The first stage of inspections would include establishing what Iraq must do to address concerns about its weapons programs, and the process would last several months.  If Iraq provides full cooperation, UNMOVIC might be able to report progress within a year, Blix said.

“If we have the kind of cooperation the Security Council has requested, we can get a high level of assurance,” he said.  “We would not get certainty.  Nor do I think you can do it with occupation” (Michael Gordon, New York Times, April 7).

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