|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
This weeks Biological Weapons stories for Thursday, June 27, 2002.
Anthrax: Former USAMRIID Scientist Studied Envelope AttackSteven Hatfill, the former biological weapons defense scientist whose apartment the FBI searched this week, commissioned a study in 1999 examining a potential anthrax attack using a spore-filled envelope opened in an office, the Baltimore Sun reported today (see GSN, June 26). The study examined the risks of anthrax spores spreading through the air and the decontamination measures that would be needed after various types of attacks, according to the Sun. William Patrick, a former scientist in the U.S. offensive biological weapons program, prepared the study and submitted it to Hatfill and another researcher at the defense contractor where Hatfill then worked (see GSN, Jan. 25). Investigators have also learned that Hatfill, while attending medical school in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, lived near a school called Greendale School, according to the Sun. The return addresses on some of the letters used in last fall’s anthrax attacks listed a Greendale School at a false address in New Jersey, the Sun reported. During his time in Zimbabwe, Hatfill also witnessed one of the largest outbreaks of anthrax among humans — an estimated 10,000 cases from 1979-1980. FBI agents have searched a public storage facility in Florida that Hatfill rented, the Sun reported. The facility is located in Ocala, Fla., near a farm owned by Hatfill’s parents. Hatfill is one of several scientists that the FBI has investigated, bureau officials said. He consented to the search of his apartment and no incriminating evidence has yet been found, though anthrax tests are still not complete, they said (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, June 27). Hatfill previously worked in the virology division of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., said USAMRIID spokesman Chuck Dasey. The virology division developed defenses against biological weapons for military personnel, he said. Hatfill’s primary work at USAMRIID did not involve him working with anthrax, though he could have had access in laboratories shared with bacteriology scientists, Dasey said (Gretchen Parker, Associated Press, June 27). FBI Motives The FBI might have decided to conduct a highly public search of Hatfill’s apartment as either a move to appease Congress or as an attempt to jump-start the bureau’s “Amerithrax” investigation, a microbiologist said. “The intent was clearly to put his name in the public eye. The only question is why,” the scientist said. “It was either strictly for show — a bone tossed to Congress and the media — or they want to put pressure on him by starting a public investigation to stimulate the stalled nonpublic investigation.” Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.), who was one of the targets of the anthrax-filled letters, said he still has several questions for the FBI on its handling of the investigation. “I have asked for another briefing by the FBI on the anthrax investigation,” Daschle said. “I don’t know if one has actually been set yet. I hope it has, because I have a lot of questions.” The FBI’s reluctance to share information is frustrating, said a source close to Daschle. “In light of yesterday’s news, and in light of everything else that’s going on, we feel we don’t know where things stand,” the source said (Hartford Courant, June 27). For further information, see: CDC Frequently Asked Questions on Anthrax GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)
Smallpox I: U.S. Residents to Be Denied Vaccine if CDC Plan Is AdoptedBy Mike Nartker The CDC and other public health experts have said the agency’s recommendation for a U.S. smallpox vaccine strategy will provide enough protection without individuals attempting to be vaccinated on their own. A critic of the CDC’s approach, however, said individuals had the right to make the decision whether or not to be vaccinated. Public comments received during a recent series of forums held on U.S. vaccine policy indicated that people are supportive of reserving smallpox vaccine for emergencies only, said CDC spokesman Llelwyn Grant (see GSN, June 7). He added that people also seem to feel comfortable with the proposed U.S. “ring vaccination” plan, in which officials would contain an outbreak by vaccinating people in close contact with those infected. A senior defense policy analyst at the CATO Institute, a Washington think tank, however, said U.S. residents should be free to obtain smallpox vaccine from their physicians. “As a taxpayer, you’ve already paid for this,” said Charles Pena. “It belongs to you. After all, you’ve paid for it.” Health and Human Services controls the entire U.S. smallpox vaccine stockpile, blocking individuals’ access to the supply, according to Pena. The choice whether to be vaccinated should be based on whether a person has the perception of being at risk, he said, adding that such decisions should not be dictated to the public. Any person should be able to learn about the potential side effects of the vaccine, be tested for risks and then be allowed to choose whether to be vaccinated, Pena said. If people know they could die or suffer serious side effects from the vaccine, as studies have shown, then demand would probably be low, he said. Public Demand The CDC does not expect a high level of public demand for the vaccine prior to an outbreak, Grant said. Mohammad Akhter, executive director of the American Public Health Association, agreed and said there has not been the same level of demand from the public for the smallpox vaccine as there was for Cipro during last year’s anthrax attacks. “Nobody stepped forward and said we want the vaccine now,” Akhter said. If the vaccine were made available to physicians before an outbreak, however, public fears might increase demand, Akhter said. Currently, there are only 16 to 17 million doses of vaccine available, and they must be kept on hand in the event of an outbreak, he said, adding that he is generally against distributing medicines needlessly. “It’s like taking any other medicine,” Akhter said. “We didn’t tell people to stock up on Cipro.” Pena challenged the CDC’s claims that there is low public demand for the vaccine, citing polls in which 60 percent of those surveyed said they want the vaccine available (see GSN, June 6). The CDC public forums on the vaccine were hastily put together, poorly advertised and lightly attended, hampering the agency’s ability to gauge public opinion, he said. First Responders and Ring Vaccination The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices has decided to recommend that only smallpox response teams — those who would administer the vaccine in the event of an outbreak — be prevaccinated, Grant said (see GSN, May 7). If an outbreak occurred, the CDC would continue to use a ring vaccination strategy, he said. Akhter agreed with the CDC’s decision not to provide the vaccine to physicians, adding that the focus should not be on individuals. “We need to protect our community,” Akhter said. “We need to protect our nation.” Ring vaccination, however, would not be able adequately halt the rapid spread of smallpox once an outbreak began, Pena said. “If you can remember seven people you had contact with in the last few days, I’d be surprised,” he said. The United States could take a preventive measure against smallpox by making the vaccine available to those who want it now, according to Pena. Doing so could help facilitate any future ring vaccination plan and could also serve as a deterrent to terrorists contemplating launching a biological weapons attack using smallpox, he said. U.S. health officials’ view is that they will wait until a smallpox outbreak has occurred before it will react, Pena said. “You just have to look at Sept. 11 to realize government can’t be perfect.”
Anthrax: FBI Searches Home of Former USAMRIID ScientistFBI agents searched the apartment of a former U.S. scientist yesterday as part of the bureau’s “Amerithrax” investigation into last fall’s anthrax attacks (see GSN, June 24). The scientist, Steven Hatfill, agreed to the search in an attempt to remove himself from a list of possible suspects, a law enforcement official said. Hatfill has not been charged with any crime, nor has he been identified as a suspect, according to the Baltimore Sun. Hatfill worked at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Md., for about two years during the late 1990s (Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, June 26). “This was a consensual search for which the only qualification was potential access to anthrax,” a law enforcement official said (Gretchen Parker, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, June 26). The FBI found no evidence that connected Hatfill to last fall’s attacks, according to law enforcement officials. Hatfill said he feels he is the target of a witch-hunt by authorities. “I’ve got a letter from the FBI that says I’m not a suspect and never was,” he said. “I just got caught up in the normal screening they were doing, because of the nature of my job” (David Johnston, New York Times, June 26). The FBI search occurred a week after Hatfill’s name was discussed during a meeting between Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a biologist at the State University of New York who has closely followed the investigation, and members of the staffs of Senators Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), according to the Hartford Courant (see GSN, May 21). FBI agents also attended the meeting, sources said. Rosenberg has tried to prompt the FBI to investigate Hatfill for several reasons, the Courant reported. Five biological weapons experts previously gave the FBI Hatfill’s name, according to Rosenberg. Hatfill also has access to a cabin in Maryland and the knowledge needed to produce weapon-grade anthrax, according to the Courant. Hatfill also lost his position at USAMRIID under questionable circumstances and lost a later job at a defense contractor because he had his security clearance revoked, the Courant reported. FBI agents previously searched Hatfill’s apartment and his car late last year, the Courant reported, but no traces of anthrax were discovered (Altimari/Dolan, Hartford Courant, June 26). For further information, see: CDC Frequently Asked Questions on Anthrax GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)
Smallpox II: Scientists Try New Tactic to Infect MonkeysU.S. scientists have begun a new attempt to infect monkeys with the human smallpox virus in an effort to create an animal model that would allow development of smallpox vaccines and treatments, the Wall Street Journal reported today. A previous monkey infection effort killed the animals too quickly (see GSN, Jan. 29). Scientists cannot test smallpox drugs and vaccine in humans due to its high death rate, so Peter Jahrling and his team of scientists are trying to design an animal model. Last year, the researchers gave macaque monkeys — which do not fall victim to smallpox naturally — an aerosol and intravenous dose of a highly virulent smallpox strain. The team successfully infected the monkeys, but they died within four days, which prompted some scientists to say the monkeys probably died of blood poisoning rather than smallpox. On June 18, Jahrling began trying a different tactic. In an attempt to slow infection rates to something closer to the human smallpox course of 10 to 14 days, he gave the monkeys only an IV infusion — dropping the aerosol attempt — and used a less virulent strain called Harper. Jahrling continued to use a high dosage that would probably almost always be lethal, unlike the 30 percent death rate that occurs in human populations. Creating a model to mirror a human mortality rate would require 60 monkeys, and the scientists can only use 12 at a time. A death rate of 100 percent would allow the researchers to uses fewer animals, he said. Jahrling and his team are now monitoring the progress of the disease in the test subjects, according to today’s Wall Street Journal. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention has supported the experiments, but some experts have criticized Jahrling. The work is “an abhorrent experiment by government idiots,” said Alfred Sommer, dean of the public health school at Johns Hopkins University. Sommer has advocated destroying the two known remaining caches of smallpox in the United States and Russia. Doctors are unlikely to ever find a drug to treat smallpox after its major symptoms appear, and countries should focus resources on finding a drug to treat potentially severe side effects of smallpox vaccine, said D.A. Henderson, former leader of the World Health Organization’s campaign to eradicate smallpox and current adviser to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson (Marilyn Chase, Wall Street Journal, June 26). For further information, see: Journal of the American Medical Association Background
U.S. Response: New Security Department Could Disrupt Public Health Programs, GAO SaysBy Mike Nartker The proposed homeland security department has the potential to improve the coordination of public health preparedness and response programs among federal, state and local officials, Janet Heinrich, the accounting office’s director of public health issues, said in testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The Bush administration’s proposal would transfer some emergency preparedness and response programs and some Health and Human Services Department public health assistance programs over to the new department, Heinrich said. There has previously been a lack of coordination among federal agencies responsible for emergency preparedness and response programs that would be transferred to the new department, Heinrich said. The Bush administration’s plan for a homeland security department would place several federal public health response programs under the control of one person — an undersecretary for emergency preparedness and response — which would provide a central contact point for state and local officials, she said. “We believe that the proposed reorganization has the potential to repair the fragmentation we have noted in the coordination of public health preparedness programs at the federal, state and local levels,” Heinrich said. Heinrich also told the subcommittee, however, that there would still need to be increased coordination between departments for some of the programs that would be transferred to the new homeland security department. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Veterans Affairs Department and Health and Human Services all have responsibilities for the Strategic National Stockpile, Heinrich said (see GSN, May 23). Only the CDC’s responsibilities for the stockpile, however, would be transferred to the new department, she said. Disruptive Effect One potential problem with the Bush administration’s plan to transfer Health and Human Services programs with dual homeland security and public health functions to the new department is that it could disrupt the public health side of the programs, Heinrich said. “We are concerned that transferring control over these programs ... to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities,” she said. “We do not believe that the president’s proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and the public health objectives would be accomplished.” While some of the Health and Human Services programs that would be transferred to the new department have homeland security functions, they are also vital for identifying and reacting to natural outbreaks of infectious diseases, Heinrich said. The new homeland security secretary would have control over programs that would actually be conducted by another department, she said. There are concerns that such an approach would lead to a breakdown in synergy in dual-function programs and could also lead to difficulties in setting priorities for such programs, Heinrich said. “Although the HHS programs are important for homeland security, they are just as important to the day-to-day needs of public health agencies and hospitals,” she said. “The current proposal does not clearly provide a structure that ensures that both the goals of homeland security and public health will be met.”
U.S. Response: Plum Island Facility Considering Controversial UpgradeBy David Ruppe The decision could pit the department’s desire for constructing such a facility, which it currently lacks, against safety concerns of local residents on or near some of the nation’s most expensive real estate. The decision could be ultimately bumped up to the White House. Previous attempts to fund an upgrade by Congress and the Clinton administration were resisted by New York legislators responding to local pressure and there are signs the Bush administration would face similar pressures. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center currently has a Biosafety Level 3 standard, enabling the laboratory to research and diagnose some of the most dangerous animal diseases in the world, such as foot-and-mouth disease, Rinderpest, and African swine fever. A Biosafety Level 4 facility would enable the department to work with diseases posing the highest risk to humans such as anthrax, screwworm, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as “mad cow disease.” Jesse Garcia, chief of staff for Republican Representative Felix Grucci, who has Plum Island in his district, said the White House has assured his boss the center “will not be upgraded to a Biosafety 4 facility. That has been advised to us. Its mission will stay the same.” “The White House has been very receptive throughout the past 18 months about his concerns for that facility,” he said, noting that the Bush administration called for no changes to Plum Island in its recent proposal for creating a homeland security department. The administration has made assurances “that no matter what appropriations level or what department Plum Island facilities will finally end up in, Agriculture or homeland defense, it will stay as a Biosafety 3 facility,” he said. David Huxsoll, interim director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, however, said in a phone interview Friday the upgrade remains a consideration. “As you probably know, that’s something that has been discussed. At this point in time, no decision has been made. That’s about all I can say at this point in time,” Huxsoll said. “We don’t have authority at that point in time to pursue that.” Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman alluded to the possibility during April Senate testimony, saying the department was prepared to spend $23 million for Plum Island “pending the outcome of a broad independent review of the needs and options for this work, including the needs for Biosecurity Level 4 facilities.” The department has contracted with Science Applications International Corp. for a report, which will address whether the department needs such a facility, for which a panel of experts from around the country met last week for two days. The consensus was that one is needed, according to a participant. The panel did not address whether Plum Island is the most suitable location, the person said. The department has otherwise refused to comment on the matter, including on whether it is considering upgrading the facility, or has ruled that out. “These all are questions that are in reference to security matters and we can’t give you any comment at this time,” an Agriculture representative on homeland security matters said. Previous Resistance During the Clinton administration, the department had sought to obtain $24 million in funding specifically to begin upgrading the facility from Biosafety Level 3 to Level 4, the highest security classification. The Plum Island facility is two miles offshore and the only U.S. facility designated to study certain highly infectious foreign animal diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease. The Clinton administration abandoned the idea in 2000, however, responding to protests from New York legislators. Local residents had expressed concern about possible terrorist attacks and road accidents while hazardous materials are transported to the laboratory on the main highway along the north side of the island. After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, New York Democratic Senators Charles Schumer and Hillary Rodham Clinton reportedly beat back another attempt to approve money for a biosafety upgrade, contained in legislation proposed by Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) and Representative Earl Pomeroy (D-N.C.), by successfully encouraging Roberts to remove the language. In addition, Schumer and Clinton last November called for a full and immediate security review of the island. “When you have a facility just off the coast of Long Island that handles lethal and rare animal diseases, you just can’t take chances,” Schumer said. This month, President George W. Bush signed a major bioterrorism defense bill past by Congress in May that provides $100 million, reportedly added by Clinton, specifically for “renovation, updating, and expansion of the Biosafety Level 3” Plum Island facility (see GSN, June 12). Senator Clinton applauded the measure, saying it would “keep Plum Island, off the coast of New York, at its current biosecurity level and to modernize and improve the security of the facilities.” The $23 million referred to by Veneman was approved this year as part of the Defense Department Appropriations Act for 2002 for “planning and design” at Plum Island. A Quieter Approach Since Sept. 11, the department has been undergoing a nationwide lab security review intended to produce recommendations on improving security at the country’s five Biosafety Level 3 laboratories. At Plum Island’s current Level 3 facility, lab workers can be exposed to animals being studied, but must strip down and shower before returning to street clothes. Air leaving the lab is filtered and all materials and sewage leaving the lab are decontaminated to remove any viruses. For a Level 4 facility, employees entering special areas must wear one-piece, pressurized suits ventilated with life-support systems to avoid exposure to potentially fatal diseases. In addition, specially engineered, sealed facilities and elaborate safety equipment are required to prevent dangerous germs from escaping the facility. There are now only four Level 4 labs in the country, located at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Md., a small facility at Georgia State University in Atlanta and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md. In a series of meetings with local communities 1999, Agriculture officials encountered some anger and skepticism as they sought to assure residents about the security precautions associated with the upgrade. The Clinton administration’s approach to considering an upgrade “just didn’t happen right, didn’t move down the pike the way it was supposed to have,” a department source said.
Anthrax: “Modern” Spores Used in Attacks, Officials SaySenior U.S. officials have said the anthrax used in last fall’s attacks was fresh and made within the last two years, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, June 13). The FBI was able to determine the age of the spores through the use of a type of radiocarbon dating, officials said. Federal investigators believe the recent production date of the anthrax used in the attacks means that the person responsible prepared the spores alone and could produce more for further attacks, according to the Times. “It’s modern,” an official said. “It was grown, and therefore it can be grown again and again.” The dating has added evidence to a theory in the “Amerithrax” investigation that the person responsible for the attacks has a direct connection to a microbiology laboratory and might have used relatively new equipment to prepare the spores, the Times reported. “We’re still looking for someone who fits the criteria of training, knowledge, education, experience and skill,” an official said. Investigators have said they think the person responsible, if caught, would fit into the profile created by the FBI (see GSN, June 4). Bureau scientists have said the person responsible for the attacks is a solitary male with scientific knowledge who has a grudge against society, according to the Times. According to the profile, the person responsible also probably feels comfortable in the Trenton, N.J. area, where the letters sent with the spores were postmarked, the Times reported. Investigators still do not know whether the person is from the United States or abroad. Officials have said, however, that there is still no distinct suspect in the investigation. Investigators have created a list of about 50 potential suspects that changes periodically as new suspects are either added or removed, according to the Times. Investigators have also examined the biopesticide industry, which has created a list of about 80 people that are still under investigation, the Times reported. An investigation into the biopharmaceutical industry has created a list of about 200 possible subjects, while research facilities with anthrax stocks account for another list of about 50 people under question. “It’s astounding that they haven’t been able to narrow the field,” said Henry Kelly, president of the Federation of American Scientists. “There aren’t that many people that could have been involved” (Johnston/Broad, New York Times, June 23). Members of Congress Weigh In Some members of Congress have become frustrated at the lack of progress in the investigation (see GSN, June 5). “The anthrax killer is out there,” Senator Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) said yesterday. “We need to nab this person.” Officials need to spend more effort on finding the person responsible for the anthrax attacks and on capturing al-Qaeda operatives rather than on reorganizing themselves, Boxer said (see GSN, June 21). “These are things we must do,” she said. “I have to say we just need a renewed effort to keep our eye on both of these things.” Other members of Congress have expressed more support for the investigation, saying that because it involves factors such as complex science, fast results should not be expected. “Eventually we will know these things,” said House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas). “But we must be diligent, thorough, persistent and patient” (Associated Press/New York Times, June 23). For further information, see: CDC Frequently Asked Questions on Anthrax Journal of the American Medical Association Background GSN Anthrax Attack Chronology (Dec. 12, 2001)
About Newswire | Contact National Journal | Re-Use Guidelines
HOME | CONTACT US | GET INVOLVED | SITE MAP |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Back to top