Radiological Weapons I:  New Bill Seeks Better Oversight of Radioactive Materials

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. lawmakers want to expand the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s authority to include monitoring radioactive materials used in a variety of commercial and medical activities, and are now considering legislation to require the agency to regulate materials that could become the source of a terrorist radiological weapon (see GSN, June 26).

The Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002, proposed this week by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) and Representative Ed Markey (D-Mass.) in both houses of Congress, would require the commission to recover lost or stolen radioactive materials, reinstitute a nationwide tracking system that was discontinued in 1984, tighten export controls and levy fines for industrial facilities, hospitals or food irradiation plants that do not properly handle or dispose of such materials.

The bill, which would amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, also calls on the National Academy of Sciences to study whether some industrial and research entities could replace their radioactive materials with nonradioactive materials.

“The danger is clear:  The materials are located in thousands of locations across this country and abroad, and we are not ready,” Markey said yesterday.  “Today, we aren’t ready to detect the radiation in a package being shipped here from abroad.  We aren’t ready to detect radiation in the subways, highways, malls and stadiums of America.  We can’t even figure out which sources are lost because they aren’t tracked using serial numbers.”

The act is one of a flurry of recent proposals seeking to improve the security of tens of thousands of radioactive items worldwide that authorities fear could be stolen by terrorist groups and used along with conventional explosives to contaminate civilian areas, cause mass panic and sow economic instability. Earlier this week the International Atomic Energy Agency announced a new working group including the United States and Russia that will seek to safeguard such materials in the former Soviet Union (see GSN, June 25).

While former Soviet countries are thought to have the largest number of unregulated radioactive materials — such as cobalt-60, strontium-90, cesium-137 and iridium-192 — the United States also has security procedures considered to be inadequate and in recent decades has even loosened some of its controls.

The commission estimates that more than 1,500 radiological items have been lost or stolen in the United States since 1996 and nearly 800 have yet to be located (see GSN, May 6).  The new legislation would require that all sealed sources — radioactive materials requiring shielding — be given a serial number for tracking purposes.  Doing so would reinstate a practice discontinued in 1984 when the threat of a radiological detonation was considered low and the program deemed to be no longer necessary.  “FedEx and Lands End seem to do a better job at tracking clothing purchases than the NRC does at tracking radioactive materials,” Markey said.

To further improve the nationwide monitoring of radiological materials, the new legislation would for the first time institute a national policy governing the regulation of radiological sources. Currently, 34 of the 50 states have agreements with the commission to cooperate on radiological controls.  “There needs to be a national policy,” Clinton said.

To provide incentives to commercial users of radiological materials to institute improved security precautions, the new measure would also levy heavy financial penalties against lax institutions.  Currently, fines are no higher than $3,000. Clinton said a “dramatic increase is called for.”

The task force called for in the bill would also recommend more rigorous controls to ensure radioactive materials exported overseas are not resold or otherwise improperly released to third parties, the legislation states.

Before the commission can begin to implement a more secure and reliable tracking system, officials acknowledge that accounting for materials missing inside the United States must come first.  “We have got to get caught up,” Clinton said.

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Radiological Weapons II:  GAO Advises Agencies to Consolidate Assistance

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States should create a comprehensive plan for assisting other countries to prevent smuggling of nuclear materials, congressional investigators said in a report released yesterday (see GSN, June 26).

The General Accounting Office report says assistance from a range of U.S. agencies often helps combat nuclear smuggling.  Officials from 17 recipient countries said the aid has been useful, sometimes providing the only equipment and training to detect radioactive materials.

The GAO investigators also discovered, however, that because U.S. agencies do not coordinate their assistance efforts, U.S.-provided equipment often sits unused and recipient countries often do not report findings of nuclear material, it is difficult to determine whether programs are effective, they said in the report.

The report notes that the U.S. State Department has placed anti-smuggling advisers in several recipient countries during the last two years, regardless of which agency is carrying out a particular program.  The secretary of state should also work with other U.S. agencies to develop a comprehensive plan to prevent nuclear smuggling, the GAO said.  Officials need to identify a set of common goals and priorities, the report says.

The report also recommends that agencies consolidate efforts within their own organizations.  The Energy Department should move its radiation detection activities into one office, instead of the two that currently conduct such work, and the State Department should consolidate its border security and nuclear smuggling activities into one office, according to the report.

The investigators also called on the secretaries of energy, defense and state to cooperate to fully account for U.S.-provided equipment, and follow up by tracking the uses and effects of the equipment.

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Nuclear Waste:  NRC Fines Nuclear Plant for Losing Fuel Rods

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission fined the owners of a Connecticut nuclear power plant $288,000 this week for failing to account for two missing fuel rods (see GSN, May 6).

Northeast Utilities, the former owners of the plant, told the commission in 2000 that two fuel rods from one of the plant’s reactors could not be accounted for, according to Reuters.

The NRC said there are no signs that the fuel rods were stolen, but the commission decided to levy a fine against the current owners of the plant, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, which has 30 days to respond, according to Reuters.

“Notwithstanding the fact that there was no realistic threat past or present to the public health and safety, the loss of highly radioactive fuel rods is unprecedented and is a very significant violation,” the NRC said in its letter to Dominion (Reuters/Planet Ark, June 27).

Dominion said Tuesday that it does not plan to contest the fine.  Northeast has agreed to reimburse the full amount as part of a 2001 agreement associated with the sale of the plant, known as the Millstone Power Station.

In an investigation in 2000, Northeast concluded that missing fuel rods from the station’s Unit 1 spent fuel pool had been cut into segments in 1979 and shipped with other waste to a low-level radioactive waste facility between 1985 and 1992, according to Dominion.  The NRC, which conducted an independent review, agreed with Northeast’s explanation and determined that Dominion is in control of all the remaining used fuel at Millstone, Dominion said (Dominion release, June 25).

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Radiological Weapons I:  U.S. Efforts Failing to Stop Smugglers

The United States has poorly coordinated and administered its programs to provide detection devices to other countries for preventing smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, congressional investigators said in a report expected to be released today (see GSN, June 25).

“It’s a pretty damning report,” said Senator Pat Roberts (Kan.), ranking Republican on the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.

The report from the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, notes that no U.S. agency coordinates programs to provide assistance to 30 countries — particularly Russia, former Soviet republics and Central and Eastern European countries — to buy detection devices and provide training.  The State and Energy departments run two programs each, and the Customs Service, the FBI and the Coast Guard also have programs.

Without overall coordination, different agencies have duplicated activities and provided equipment of differing quality, the report says.

“The current multiple-agency approach … is not, in our view, the most effective way to deliver this assistance,” the report says, according to the Washington Post.  “We believe the development of a government-wide plan is needed.”

Even within departments, there is sometimes lack of coordination, according to the report.  The two Energy administrators that run the department’s two programs do not communicate with each other, even though they fund the same equipment, the report says.

U.S. agencies also fail to follow through and investigate how countries use assistance, the report says.  The Defense Department said earlier this year that often countries have never used certain U.S. equipment, have used other U.S. equipment only to impress visiting U.S. officials or have stopped using equipment once it needed new batteries or repairs.

Despite the many problems in other countries, U.S. attempts to implement detection and security measures on its borders are sometimes worse, according to the report.  Customs told congressional investigators that it has 4,200 pager-sized radiation detectors for 7,500 inspectors but plans to provide all inspectors with a detector by September 2003 (see GSN, June 13; Guy Gugliotta, Washington Post, June 26).

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Radiological Weapons II:  U.S. Lawmakers to Seek New Task Force

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. legislation soon to be formally proposed will seek to establish a federal task force to recommend steps to secure all radiological sources from being pilfered by terrorists, congressional sources said this morning.

Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) and Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) were scheduled today to call for the establishment of task force with representatives of the Defense Department, intelligence agencies, the proposed homeland security department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The task force would outline a security upgrade program to be overseen and implemented by the NRC, which up to now has had jurisdiction only over fissile materials such as uranium.  The legislation would build on similar security efforts called for in separate legislation proposed by the two lawmakers earlier this year to protect nuclear power plants from terrorist attack (see GSN, March 25).

The new measures are considered urgent in light of recent intelligence reports that the al-Qaeda terrorist network may be planning to explode a conventional device containing highly radioactive materials found in industrial and medical facilities (see GSN, June 13).

The effort would mark the first U.S. attempt to safeguard unregulated radioactive materials used for a variety of everyday purposes.  The legislation comes just a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency announced a new effort with the assistance of the United States and Russia to safeguard radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union (see GSN, June 25).

Among the security measures to be addressed, according to a Markey spokesman, are physical security at facilities that contain radioactive materials and security checks of employees who handle the materials.

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Nuclear Waste:  Lott Urges Action on Yucca Mountain

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) yesterday urged the Senate to take up a resolution to support Yucca Mountain for the site of the first U.S. long-term nuclear waste repository (see GSN, June 11).

The joint resolution would override Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn’s veto of the Yucca Mountain site.  Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, to override the veto both houses of Congress must pass an override resolution by simple majorities within 90 days of the veto.  The House of Representatives passed a resolution in May (see GSN, May 9).

During yesterday’s debate of the fiscal 2003 defense authorization bill Lott made a unanimous consent request that either Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) or Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) bring the joint resolution to the Senate floor for full consideration once work is completed on the authorization bill but before July 9 (see GSN, June 6).  Lott also asked his fellow senators to vote on the motion without debate and to consider it exclusively until a vote is taken on it.

Daschle blocked the request with an objection, saying it was unnecessary and might jeopardize consideration of more important legislation.

The Senate still must finish work on the defense authorization bill and consider an emergency supplemental appropriations bill to provide funds for the war on terrorism, Daschle said.  If the unanimous consent request had been agreed to, it could have forced the Senate to consider the override resolution before these other, more important pieces of legislation, he said.

The request was also unnecessary because, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, any senator can bring the override resolution to the floor, Daschle said (see GSN, March 21).   Daschle has previously said he would not bring the resolution to the Senate for a full vote, said Traci Scott, communications director for Senator John Ensign (R-Nev.).

“I am personally very opposed to the Yucca Mountain legislation as is presented,” Daschle said on the Senate floor yesterday.  “I oppose it and urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.”

Ensign, an opponent of the Yucca Mountain repository plan, is against the idea of a Republican senator bringing the override resolution to the floor over the wishes of the majority leader, Scott said.  Such a move breaks with Senate tradition and could establish a precedent that would reduce the power of the majority leader — a move that could come back to the haunt the Republicans if they are able to regain control of the Senate, she said.

There have been five previous pieces of legislation that had similar language to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and allowed any senator to bring them to the floor, Ensign said.  Out of those five, three were brought by the majority leader and two were not considered because of actions by the majority leader, he said.

“If someone besides the majority leader brings this legislation [the override resolution] to the floor, we are breaking with the traditions of the Senate,” Ensign said.  “I believe we are setting a very dangerous precedent for the majority.”

Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) supported Lott’s request, however, saying urgent action is needed on the resolution before the July 27 deadline.

“I certainly urge the two leaders to proceed and recognize the obligation we have to bring this matter to a vote,” Murkowski said.  “The House has done its work and spoken with an overwhelming vote in support of proceeding with Yucca.  To allow this matter simply to die through inaction is a grave reflection on what was intended to be a balanced procedure.”

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Radiological Weapons:  IAEA to Secure Former Soviet “Dirty Bomb” Materials

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The International Atomic Energy Agency established a working group earlier this month with U.S. and Russian officials designed to better secure unregulated but still highly radioactive materials in the former Soviet Union, the agency announced today.  The effort was initiated to address heightened fears industrial and medical materials could be used to make a “dirty bomb,” the agency said in a release (see GSN, June 21).

The three parties have agreed to cooperate in locating, recovering, securing and recycling radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union that are currently outside the control of nuclear regulators.  Such materials are nevertheless sufficiently radioactive to cause serious illness and contamination if dispersed by a conventional explosive.

“What is needed is cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive sources to protect them against terrorism or theft,” said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.

The tripartite agreement, reached June 12 between the agency, the U.S. Energy Department and Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, marks the first international response to the threat posed by vulnerable radioactive sources, according to the IAEA, which acknowledged that additional work is needed to safeguard similar materials outside of the former Soviet Union.

The announcement comes after the May arrest in Chicago of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen with alleged links to the al-Qaeda terrorist network who authorities maintain was planning to build and detonate a dirty bomb (see GSN, June 17). 

The United States, which has one of the most advanced security systems, has lost track of nearly 1,500 radioactive items since 1996, the agency said (see GSN, June 12).

By setting off a conventional explosive that spews radioactive debris, officials worry a terrorist group might cause relatively few direct deaths, but spread mass panic, cause widespread economic dislocation and contaminate a large area for years.

The new effort to track radioactive materials in the former Soviet Union will focus on those sources of radiation deemed most dangerous.  The IAEA has identified radioactive materials used in industrial radiography, radiotherapy, industrial irradiators and thermoelectric generators as having the largest amounts of radioactive isotopes such as cobalt-60, strontium-90, cesium-137 and iridium-192.

Agency officials said the ability to detect radioactive sources depends on the level and type of radioactivity and the possible presence of shielding materials.  “Fortunately, the most intense and dangerous sources normally are the most susceptible to detection,” according to the IAEA.

A Global Threat

The threat is global.  The agency said that dozens of countries worldwide have little or no security in place to safeguard a variety of radiological materials used for common industrial or medical purposes.

“More than 100 countries may have no minimum infrastructure in place to properly control radiation sources,” the agency said.

Worldwide, the agency estimated there are more than 20,000 operators of radioactive sources, including 10,000 radiotherapy units, 12,000 industrial sources for radiography, and 300 irradiator facilities containing radioactive sources for industrial applications.

The IAEA said it is making progress in working with nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where the control of radiological materials is believed to be most lax.  In March, for example, the agency was called in to secure a powerful cobalt source that had been abandoned in a former Afghanistan hospital (see GSN, April 8).  A week later it helped Uganda secure a radiological source that appeared to have been stolen.

Still, the agency remains particularly concerned about the more than 50 countries that are not members of the 134-nation IAEA and therefore do not benefit from its expertise and assistance.

Despite the global concerns, Russia and the former Soviet states are currently the focus of the agency’s radiological safeguard plans.  According to IAEA figures, “orphaned” radiological materials in the states of the former Soviet Union “are a widespread phenomenon.” 

For example, in February two unshielded and unsecured radioactive strontium-90 power sources were recovered in Georgia.  Since 1997, Georgia and the IAEA have recovered an estimated 280 radioactive sources (see GSN, June 10).

“This is the legacy of one of the most dramatic changes in the security environment in our lifetime:  the dissolution of the Soviet Union,” said Roger Hagengruber of Sandia National Laboratory.  “With U.S. help, Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union can secure and control the management of these sources.  The problem is money.”

Meanwhile, the situation in the former Soviet Union “may just be an indication of the serious safety and security implications that orphaned sources may have elsewhere in the world,” said Abel Gonzalez, IAEA’s director of radiation and waste safety.

“Since Sept. 11, there is a perception that threat [of a dirty bomb] has increased,” Hagengruber added.  “And the problem gets bigger when you go to countries with terrorism ties where there is also sources of radiological material.”

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Uranium:  Egypt Is Mining Sinai Peninsula, Report Says

According to Western intelligence sources, China is helping Egypt mine and process uranium from the Sinai Peninsula, the German daily newspaper Die Welt reported Saturday.  In January Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak signed an agreement with China on the peaceful use of nuclear power, according to the daily.

The arrangement might suggest that Egypt is considering building nuclear weapons, Die Welt reported.  From the Egyptian point of view, according to Die Welt, the most important part of the agreement is cooperation on producing uranium hexafluoride, which can be processed into enriched uranium.

Egyptian officials have denied that the country is seeking nuclear weapons, and the International Atomic Energy Agency also has said it knows nothing about any such developments, Die Welt reported (Jacques Schuster, Die Welt, June 22, Global Security Newswire translation).

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