Europe:  Involvement Will Probably Be Minor, Analyst Says

Recently announced missile defense partnerships between European and U.S. contractors will probably trigger only minor activity, Aerospace Daily reported last week (see GSN, July 23).

U.S. contractor Boeing announced July 23 that it has entered into agreements with the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, Alenia Spazio and BAE Systems to cooperate on missile defense development.  European countries, however, do not perceive an immediate need for a missile defense system and are unlikely to devote large amounts of money to it, said Steven Zaloga, senior missile analyst with the Teal Group.

The European companies probably want to develop some technical expertise on missile defense in case European countries decide to pursue missile defense in the future, Zaloga said.

“It’s the classic case of keeping the technology base warm,” he said.

European officials are spending a “tiny” amount for missile defense research and development, Zaloga said.  For example, France plans to buy some Aster surface-to-air missiles to replace the HAWK missiles that most NATO members use.  Additionally, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have considered buying the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile defense system (see GSN, July 15).

Europe, however, does not consider the missile threat very “ominous,” Zaloga said.  The European perspective might change if Libya were to deploy No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles or if Iran were to develop the Shahab 4 to reach Europe, but both countries are far from being fully capable of striking Europe, he said (see GSN, July 10).

European countries “want to position themselves for the future so that if the situation changes, they do have some missile defense background,” Zaloga said.  “But I think the bottom line is that we’re not going to see the Europeans throw big bucks into missile defense unless the situation changes.”

Even without large European financial contributions, the United States and Boeing could benefit from the involvement of European companies in missile defense, said Larry Dickerson, senior missile analyst with Forecast International/DMS.  One potential benefit would be that the United States might gain a partner country that would agree to host missile defense bases and facilities on its territory.  Business cooperation could also benefit European countries, Dickerson said.

“The Europeans, if they get involved in the U.S. missile defense program, could develop that expertise for their own theater missile defense system,” he said (Nick Jonson, Aerospace Daily, July 25).

For further information, see:

MDA Basics of Missile Defense

MDA Missile Defense System

PAC 3 Fact Sheet

U.S. Missile Defense 2002 Budget

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India:  Washington Considers Allowing Transfer of Arrow Interceptor

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Calling missile defenses an “inherently stabilizing concept,” a senior U.S. defense official yesterday said the United States is considering allowing Israel to sell Arrow missile interceptors to India.

The decision would factor Israeli and Indian needs as well as U.S. obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary set of export control guidelines intended to limit missile proliferation.

The Pentagon view — delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Marshall Billingslea at a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee hearing — appeared at odds with the State Department position expressed at the same hearing and a Washington Post report last week that Secretary of State Colin Powell planned to express his opposition to the deal when he met with Indian officials this past weekend (see GSN, July 23).

State Department officials reportedly were concerned that if India were to obtain the Arrow, it might fuel tensions with Pakistan.  The two nuclear rivals seemed on the brink of war only several weeks ago.

“South Asia is a region of tension, as is obvious by ongoing events.  India is a country that’s pursuing programs of proliferation concern, so by definition, there would be issues that one would have to consider of that nature in deciding whether or not to go ahead with such a sale,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen, testifying alongside Billingslea.

The Arrow missile interceptor is coproduced by Israel and the United States, with Washington providing the bulk of the funding.  The cooperative agreement gives the United States the power to veto any transfer of Arrow technology to a third party.

Although it is a defensive system, the Arrow nevertheless triggers the most restrictive MTCR guidelines because its propulsion system is powerful enough to deliver a 500-kilogram payload over a 300-kilometer range.  Such a missile is considered to be “Category 1” system under the MTCR.

“I think clearly the administration has some decisions to make about how to square its missile defense promotion efforts and its missile nonproliferation goals,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

“The hearing yesterday made abundantly clear that the Defense and State Departments are crossing wires on this one.  And it’s clear that any Arrow sale would have to cross the MTCR threshold.  The MTCR was designed to prevent that kind of transfer.”

What India Needs

Billingslea’s comments addressed an issue raised last week by Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) of how the United States could pursue a national missile defense effort while denying another country the same capability.

“We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an inherently stabilizing concept.  The right to defend yourself against these missiles is something that we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians, with the Pakistanis if they’re interested,” Billingslea said.

“What I would say is, we need to look at it more from the standpoint of, what do the Indians feel they need in terms of defense for the region?” he said.

In a report to Congress earlier this month, the Pentagon said it expected aggressive U.S. national missile defense development to drive China to improve and increase its nuclear warhead delivery platforms (see GSN, July 15).

A Nonbinding Regime

The State Department’s Van Diepen stressed Israel’s commitments to restrict transfers of certain, potentially destabilizing missile technology in accordance with the MTCR.

The Arrow, he said, is an “MTCR Category 1 rocket system.   Israel is a country that unilaterally has pledged its adherence to the MTCR.  So it, just as we, or countries that are members of the MTCR, is committed to apply what’s called a ‘strong presumption of denial’ to exports of any Category I system, including Arrow, to any end user for any purpose.”

Billingslea said the administration has not yet developed a position whether the MTCR restrictions should take precedence in an administration decision, saying that might depend on what the Indians say they need for security.

“The Arrow system, because it’s an MTCR-class missile, does raise certain obligations that we have under the MTCR, and I don’t think the administration has come to a position on that whole complex issue of balancing the MTCR, our defense cooperation with India, so on and so forth.  But it’s a matter under active discussion.  Again, we also need to hear from the Indians in terms of what they want and what they need.”

The MTCR is not a legally binding agreement, but rather, includes a set of guidelines that parties voluntarily agree to follow to discourage proliferation of WMD delivery systems.

The regime does not actually forbid transfer of Arrow, or other Category I systems, but the guidelines state there should be “a strong presumption to deny such transfers.”

“Israel would have to go through the necessary procedures to decide that it could overcome that strong presumption of denial and make that sale.  And that’s by definition not an easy matter,” said Van Diepen.

While “the strong presumption is not an absolute ban,” Van Diepen said, “it can be overcome on so-called ‘rare occasions’ that are extremely well justified in terms of five specific nonproliferation and export control factors in the MTCR guidelines.”

The five factors to be considered when allowing sensitive missile-technology transfers are concerns about weapons of mass destruction proliferation; the capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state; the significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction; the assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states; and the applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.

Overruling the guidelines, the United States in the past sold Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles and conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles to the United Kingdom.

Weakening the Regime

Critics of the potential Arrow transfer to India say it, and other possible exports that could be conceived as violating the spirit of the MTCR, would undermine the regime.  Van Diepen acknowledged such concerns when discussing U.S.-Israeli coproduction plans and the possibility of the United States simply selling fully assembled Arrow systems to Israel.

“In terms of the MTCR guidelines, we would have to be prepared to live with whatever precedents that other countries decided to draw from that sale,” he said.

“If the U.S. said yes to a Category I rocket system export to Israel, it’s going to be hard for us potentially to say no to a Russian export of Category I rocket technology to Iran.”

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U.S. Plans:  Legislators Debate Missile Defense Oversight

U.S. representatives and senators are debating how much the Pentagon should tell Congress about performance and estimated costs for U.S. missile defense programs, Congressional Quarterly Weekly reported last week (see GSN, June 26).

A House-Senate conference committee is considering fiscal 2003 defense authorization legislation, for which the White House has requested $7.8 billion in missile defense spending.  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has insisted that defense officials report fewer details to Congress even as long-range goals and schedules for missile defense programs become more abstract, according to Congressional Quarterly.  If Congress agrees to Rumsfeld’s request, Pentagon officials could shift funding among programs and make other changes without congressional oversight, Congressional Quarterly reported.

Some opponents, however, cite the traditional congressional oversight role.

“What they call ‘flexibility’ means far less congressional oversight than is typical for weapons systems,” said Representative Tom Allen (D-Maine).

House and Senate versions of the defense authorization bill contain different oversight requirements, with the Senate version being the stronger of the two, according to Congressional Quarterly.  White House officials have threatened to veto the bill, however, if it requires overly burdensome missile defense reports, Congressional Quarterly reported.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, has told members of Congress that the agency will provide the information it has available.  Such an approach has satisfied some Republican lawmakers, including Senator John Warner (R-Va.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“We can always have hearings; we can always get witnesses,” Warner said.  “But the cost to the taxpayer of this continually accruing requirement for reports is just incredible.”

Senator John Spratt (D-S.C.) said that it might be a bad idea to give Rumsfeld the reduced oversight he seeks.  Spratt said he was disappointed with a lack of information in a recent Pentagon report on the missile defense program’s goals.

Some members of Congress have said that Rumsfeld’s request for less oversight of the missile defense programs is part of a broader preference to keep Congress less informed, according to Congressional Quarterly.

“We’ve noticed in the last several months an increasing reluctance to volunteer information, and even to provide responsive information to inquiries,” said Senate Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee Chairman Jack Reed (D-R.I.).  “It does seem to be an operating style that says, ‘They don’t need to know a lot.’”

The White House has repeatedly said it is important to conduct an all-out effort to develop a U.S. missile defense system because of the threat posed by rogue states and terrorist groups seeking to obtain advanced ballistic missiles.  Missile defense critics, however, have said the threat is not as high as the Bush administration claims and does not justify getting rid of congressional oversight.

“The administration has overstated the threat from the beginning,” Allen said.  “Al-Qaeda isn’t firing missiles at us, Iraq doesn’t have the capability (and) North Korea has suspended its missile program voluntarily.”

“We can take the time to do this right, with proper congressional oversight,” he said (Pat Towell, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, July 27).

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