United States I:  Pentagon Urges Funding for Nuclear Bunker-Buster Study

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Defense Department, saying the ability to carry out its new nuclear policy is at stake, has urged Congress to fully fund a study of new nuclear weapons designs that can destroy hardened and underground bunkers containing weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, Feb. 11).

As part of a series of memos appealing budget actions taken by the House and Senate Armed Services committees, the Pentagon last week asked lawmakers to approve all of the $15.5 million requested by the Energy Department for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator when they iron out a final fiscal 2003 defense authorization bill.

House legislation supports the Bush administration proposal, but the Senate bill forbids the National Nuclear Security Administration from pursuing the project.  House and Senate conferees plan to negotiate a final bill when they return to Washington next month.

The Pentagon says its recently revised nuclear policy, which raises the profile of nuclear weapons in military planning, depends highly on developing such a weapon design.  Without it, the military’s ability to defeat emerging threats to national security would be limited, the Defense Department said.

“This concept is a critical component of the capability envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review,” the Pentagon’s office of legislative affairs told lawmakers on July 29, “and it is essential that the Congress authorize and fully fund the administration’s $15.5 million request.”

The Bush administration, seeking to strengthen nuclear deterrence, signaled for the first time in the January review that the United States might strike pre-emptively at states or terrorist groups developing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.  The Nuclear Posture Review called for developing a nuclear bunker-buster to attack hidden WMD programs without dispersing contaminants into the atmosphere (see GSN, March 14).

“Cutting the [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator] program would severely hamper the quest to overcome emerging threats including hard and deeply buried targets,” the Pentagon said.

Key lawmakers and arms control advocates, however, believe that the arguments in favor of a nuclear bunker buster are weak.  They fear its development will only harm nonproliferation efforts.

Developing a nuclear warhead to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets would adversely affect both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the British American Security Information Council said in a July report (see GSN, Aug. 5).  The move would raise doubts about Washington’s pledge to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and might require new nuclear testing to prove the utility of new weapons, the group said.

The money, if fully restored in the final bill, would build on efforts already underway at national labs.  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is studying a modified B83 nuclear warhead and Los Alamos National Laboratory is studying the feasibility of modifying the B61, one version of which can already penetrate earth (see GSN, March 26).

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Interview:  Outgoing Pakistani Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi Speaks on Security Issues

Last week, Maleeha Lodhi finished her second tour as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States.  A veteran commentator on international security and foreign affairs, she spoke Aug. 2 with Global Security Newswire’s Greg Webb and National Journal’s Tish Durkin.

Global Security Newswire:  One year ago Pakistan was under U.S. sanctions for its nuclear weapon activities, but soon after the Sept. 11 attacks the Bush administration removed those sanctions (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2001).  Is this a reflection of larger changes in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship since Sept. 11?

Maleeha Lodhi:  There has been so much good will between the two countries that even when we had sharp differences over issues, as for example over the nuclear issue during the 1990s, we still managed to engage with each other and managed to talk to each other, and a considerable reservoir of good will and the cooperation that we have had during the Cold War carried us through, even at periods where relations were dipping.

The most recent transformation in our relationship came about, contrary to popular perception not after Sept. 11, but when the Bush administration came to power.  And it was the Bush administration’s decision — which as a new administration I guess it would do — to undertake a review of its South Asia policy as well as its policy on sanctions across the world, not just sanctions vis-a-vis Pakistan and India, but sanctions as a tool of foreign policy and the extent to which sanctions work or don’t work.

It was part of this review that led to re-engagement between Pakistan and the United States which was, I would say, qualitatively different than the kind of engagement that we had had during the twilight years of the Clinton presidency.

So the Bush administration was already moving in the direction of lifting nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan and India, which had been imposed after the nuclear tests, when Sept. 11 happened.

Indeed, I would argue that had it not been for this re-engagement — which was a process that was underway prior to Sept. 11 — the kind of swift and smooth cooperation that we witnessed between our two countries as we became part of the global coalition to fight international terrorism would not have been possible.  It would have taken perhaps longer, and perhaps it would not have been as smooth a transition to a new status that Pakistan found itself in, which is being once again on the front lines of a global effort.

This time the global effort is to fight terrorism.  The last time we had been a frontline state it was to roll back Soviet expansionism and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Yes, this transformation is there.

We have heard people in this administration also acknowledge that this administration feels that it was a mistake to have walked away from our region when the Cold War ended, and we welcome such an appreciation of past — let’s say — neglect.  And for our part also, we look toward the future relationship as obviously different from the past because the past relationship was essentially a Cold War relationship.  During the 1990s we were trying to craft a new relationship and redefine it and recraft it and we weren’t able to because we were lurching from one crisis after another in the bilateral relationship.

But as we look toward the future it is qualitatively different from the past for two or three reasons.  One, both sides now clearly recognize that we want a relationship in itself and for itself, and not something which is contingent on a third factor or a third country.

Two, the Cold War relationship really had only one anchor, which was a strategic anchor and the other tracks of the relationship remained, shall we say, undeveloped.  This time around, the relationship has been broadened.  There are multiple tracks in this relationship.  You see the strategic part.  You see the defense part.  You see the cooperation as part of the global coalition against terrorism.

But we also see a new economic engagement between the two countries, cooperation on trade and investment issues, on economic assistance to Pakistan, the United States also cooperating with Pakistan on such issues as science and technology.

The third element I would identify as marking off the relationship from the past is the fact that we have institutionalized this relationship.  In other words, we have several joint forums that have been set up which identify areas of cooperation and then we have these institutionalized forums through which we can pursue this cooperation.  Again they range from the Defense Consultative Group which will bring together of course the Pentagon and our equivalent to the joint economic forum which is chaired by the secretary of the treasury on the American side and the finance minister on the Pakistani side.  We also have a joint working group on law enforcement.

GSN:  Does this improved relationship pose domestic political problems for the prime minister and other leaders?

ML:  The notion that has existed for some years now is that the United States is an ally of convenience because there is a historical experience, and that historical experience goes back to the time when the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was rolled back and the public felt that no sooner had the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan than nuclear sanctions went into force.  Those nuclear sanctions came into force for the first time in 1990.

So the public has felt that it was no coincidence and therefore obviously wants greater assurances that the United States is in the region for the long haul; that we have a relationship that goes beyond the joint sort of struggle that we have today against the forces of terrorism, that this is not just a situational or a contextual relationship; that it is a relationship that is there for itself and in itself.

The Bush administration has been very sensitive to that public opinion and therefore we are very pleased that they have publicly reiterated the point that the United States is going to remain engaged, that it is there for the long haul.

GSN:  Can Pakistan control the movement of militants across the Line of Control that separates Indian and Pakistani Kashmir?

ML:  Well I think the important issue here is, who will verify persistent Indian allegations on this account.  We think it’s very important for an impartial, neutral mechanism to be put in place because we can go on like this forever.  One country makes a certain allegation.  The other country says this is absolutely untrue.  Who is to decide?

These two countries happen to have troubled relations and have been on the verge of conflict so many times in the past and have actually gone to war three times in the past.  It is very important for the international community to come forward and to see how is it that we can find a verification mechanism.

Now, we think the only way to go for the long run is to put in place some impartial monitoring mechanism.  It could be expanding the U.N. force, which already operates on the Line of Control; it only operates on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control because India does not permit it to operate on the Indian side of the Line of Control (see GSN, June 7).

Or we could think in terms of any other group of countries that may be interested and involved in this process (see GSN, June 14).  The point that is important to grasp right now is that the two countries have been on the brink for such a long period of time and if international involvement just is based and predicated on the minimalist approach of crisis defusion and not conflict resolution, then we are all waiting for the next crisis to happen.

And that is not the approach that we would advocate. We think it is far too dangerous a situation in the subcontinent

GSN:  There are those who say that the United States’ general approach to foreign policy is one of crisis defusion rather than dealing with longer-term issues.

ML:  I would say that the U.S.-led international community today needs to have a longer-term approach in dealing with many of the hot spots in the world, and it needs to go beyond playing the role of a fire brigade, to be involved in a manner that prevents the fires from starting in the first place (see GSN, July 26).

Therefore, the United States has a certain responsibility because it is the world’s primary power today, and therefore for it [must] engage in both preventive diplomacy as well as conflict resolution and deal with the underlying causes of tensions, rather than just managing tensions.  Tension management is not a viable approach to the problems of South Asia because, as I said, it’s temporary.  It’s a Band Aid approach essentially.

GSN:  The threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials has emerged as a major international concern.  Does Pakistan have adequate control over its nuclear weapons and material?  Would it consider accepting U.S. or other third party assistance to improve its security over these materials (see GSN, March 18)?

ML:  First of all, this is an area where Pakistan has an impeccable record of nuclear safety and security.  There has been no incident of nuclear accident, nuclear leakage, nuclear theft, which has emanated from Pakistan.

In fact, most of the incidents that are reported and registered by the International Atomic Energy Agency relate to theft and smuggling from the former Soviet Union.  So I think we need to be clear about what we are looking at here.

We have a very well-articulated command and control authority with the president as its chairperson.  It’s very clear who does what and we are very confident about the safety of our nuclear material (see GSN, April 11).  To the extent that one can always learn from other examples, certainly [we will], but we feel that we can assure the safety and security of our nuclear material ourselves.

GSN: Can you say whether there were any changes made, any additional measures made this year?

ML:  This is always a work in progress in the sense that we have a process and a system whereby we are constantly improving, because there is always room for improvement everywhere, in every system, not just Pakistan.

GSN:  Would you consider as part of that improvement any U.S. assistance?

ML:  We are quite confident that we can assure safety and security ourselves.  We have an impeccable record.

GSN:  How does India’s interest in buying Israel’s Arrow missile interceptor system affect Pakistan (see GSN, July 30)?

ML:  We have raised this issue with the [Bush] administration.  Pakistan has conveyed that such a sale would dangerously destabilize the region, and therefore Pakistan is opposed to such a sale and we have made our views known to the administration. 

Missile defenses work in different ways in different parts of the world and missile defenses of the kind envisaged if such a sale went through would really undermine, seriously compromise, the operation of deterrence as it exists between Pakistan and India today.

GSN:  Related to that, would you anticipate any chain effects of the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty?  Some analysts have suggested that one consequence of that decision could be that China will increase its nuclear forces and perhaps then India would try to respond, in turn building pressure on Pakistan (see GSN, July 12).  Does the U.S. decision affect Pakistan or is it a totally separate issue?

ML:  I think it’s a separate issue, but we do think that the positions and the approach that the United States takes on these issues should be based on a consensual one and that consensus should be built up among the major powers on the general issue of missile defenses.  That’s the way to go at the global level because at the global level it’s important that countries are consulted and a consensus is built.  Then people know what the United States wishes to do and therefore nothing is left to people’s imaginations.  To that extent, I think that would have a stabilizing impact.  But I would still say that the ABM Treaty doesn’t affect us in the same manner as the Arrow missile does.

GSN:  India’s newly elected president recently reaffirmed India’s policy of promising not to be the first party in a conflict to use nuclear weapons (see GSN, July 22).  Does this statement have any positive effect?

ML:  Well, like NATO and the United States, we believe no-first-use doctrine has only rhetorical value.  So we are in agreement with the U.S. and NATO on this one.

The important issue here is that there should be a no-war pact between Pakistan and India — an agreement between the two countries not to resort to any kind of force (see GSN, July 18).

So my country in fact has gone much further than the Indians.  The Indians only talk about the no-first-use of nuclear.  We talk about the fact that force itself should be prohibited in some kind of an agreement between the two countries, and President [Gen. Pervez] Musharraf has repeatedly offered a no-war pact — a non-use-of-force agreement — to India, but we have not heard anything on that count.  There has been no response to that from the Indian side.

So I think for the Indian President to reiterate this — at a time when it continues to amass close to a million troops on our border — obviously makes us very skeptical about the value of such a statement.

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South Asia:  Expand CTR, Analysts Say

By Kerry Boyd
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States should expand cooperative threat reduction programs to other countries, taking advantage of the post-Sept. 11 focus on terrorism and a decade of experience securing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, says a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace paper released this week (see GSN, March 18).

While the United States and its partners must be careful not to detract from efforts to dismantle and secure weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, there are numerous options for developing cooperative efforts to secure nuclear materials and sites in South Asia and possibly other countries, wrote Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment and Rebecca Longsworth, president of Keen Management Solutions.

Their suggestions come amid debate within the U.S. Congress over whether the United States should expand cooperative threat reduction efforts beyond the former Soviet Union (see GSN, May 7).

The paper, offering guidelines more than a specific proposals, suggests several principles the United States and other potential contributors should follow to apply threat reduction programs to South Asia.  Any proposal to begin such cooperation must address Indian and Pakistani national interests, gain eventual commitment from all parties, set priorities with a focus on what sites might be most attractive or accessible to terrorists, apply specifically to the country receiving assistance and work to enhance the global nonproliferation regime, the paper says.

Cooperative programs should also be implemented within the existing U.S. strategy for relations with India and Pakistan, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote.  Threat reduction efforts are likely to require addressing a much broader agenda that includes “economic, humanitarian and education incentives,” they wrote.

Potential Partners

The majority of cooperative threat reduction programs to date in the former Soviet Union have been government-to-government programs, the authors wrote.  Due to costs and varying relationships with potential recipient countries, however, the United States should consider involving more partners if it expands such programs to other countries, they wrote.

The United States could partner with Russia or China, for example, to help initiate programs in India and Pakistan, the paper says.  Russia and China might be particularly useful partners due to their long relationships with India and Pakistan respectively.  Some experts believe that cooperating with Russia and China might provide an entry to working in South Asia and might improve U.S. relations with the countries, but others have expressed concern that the United States would lose adequate control over cooperative programs, according to the authors.

Any multilateral effort should be well coordinated, the authors wrote, noting the current European Union programs in the former Soviet Union that are separate from U.S. programs but coordinated (see GSN, May 3).

The International Atomic Energy Agency might also be a good partner, strengthening the broader nonproliferation regime and providing a door to increased cooperation with India and Pakistan, the authors wrote.  Neither country is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but Pakistan has been working with the IAEA on ways to increase nuclear power plant safety.  India and Pakistan might not accept activities which they felt the United States or another country was trying impose, but they would be more likely to accept a proposal under the aegis of the agency, according to the authors.

Although the IAEA does not work on projects involving nuclear weapons sites in South Asia, cooperation could begin with civilian nuclear facilities, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote.

“The IAEA, through its established relationships, may be a special and effective ‘accelerator’ of cooperation at civilian facilities,” they wrote.  Working to enhance security at civilian facilities might increase confidence and strengthen bilateral relationships that would open the door to eventual bilateral “joint work in military facilities.”

Other Avenues

There are various options that the United States could pursue for cooperation bilaterally or with other partners in South Asia, according to the authors.  Laboratory-to-laboratory projects worked well in the early years of U.S. efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction after the Soviet Union dissolved, the paper says, adding that such projects build on “natural affinities between and among scientists.”

Former Soviet and U.S. scientists had already established ties before the Soviet Union broke up, but that may not be true in India and Pakistan, the authors wrote.  Russian experts have said that Russia has relationships with the Indian scientific community and might be able to help start a laboratory-to-laboratory program, according to the paper.

Another approach would be to initiate a sister laboratory program to establish a relationship with the civilian nuclear sector in a country that would include cooperation on nonsensitive projects, such as managing radioactive waste, the authors suggested.

Exchanging information on “best practices” in particular areas such as export control and nuclear safety training could provide a route for developing relationships and trust between the United States, Pakistan and India, Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote.  In the early stages of cooperation with Russia, the United States offered briefings on U.S. safety and weapons protection programs but did not suggest what information Russia needed.  That approach allowed Russia to set its own priorities and propose cooperative programs based on the U.S. briefings and its own experience.  The same approach might work well in South Asia, according to the paper.

To build confidence, India and Pakistan also could exchange information with the United States on implementing export controls, the authors suggested.

Successful projects might appeal to the interests of indigenous business leaders and to certain “political players,” Gottemoeller and Longsworth wrote.  Using local companies to produce components for cooperative projects would engage the interests of the business community and also establish a base for maintaining projects.  Establishing projects such as crisis centers and emergency communication networks would demonstrate that certain programs have a high level of sophistication, which might “bolster the political position of those who establish them in addition to enhancing the crisis response capability of the organization there they are established,” the paper says.

Another possibility that might be particularly appealing to Pakistan, which has a large external debt, would be exchanging debt for nonproliferation efforts, according to the authors.  The United States has been pursuing debt swaps for nonproliferation with Russia, and the authors advocated waiting to see if the program with Russia succeeds before offering it to other countries (see GSN, July 26).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

NPT Parties  

U.N. Background on NPT

International Atomic Energy Agency

U.S. Defense Department CTR Site

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation Programs in Russia (May 24, 2002)

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Uzbek Response:  Officials Work to Stop Nuclear Smuggling

Uzbekistan has stepped up efforts to combat trafficking of nuclear materials across a major European-Central Asia transit route, the Christian Science Monitor reported today (see GSN, April 17).

Even though Uzbekistan itself never had a nuclear capability under the former Soviet Union, its cooperation in preventing smuggling of nuclear materials is “extremely” important because of its location, according to a Western diplomat in the Uzbek capital of Tashkent.  Uzbekistan’s role will become more important once a planned highway linking Paris with Shanghai is completed, said Bekhzod Yuldashev, head of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent.

“We have nuclear neighbors Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and India,” Yuldashev said.  “Uzbekistan plays an important role.  Transit (of all goods) is very intensive.”

Prior to the Sept. 11 attacks, Uzbek authorities were among a group of 80 Central Asian border and customs officials who traveled to the United States for a three-week U.S. Customs Service training course, according to the Monitor.  There, they discussed how to detect components of weapons of mass destruction using advanced detection devices.  In Uzbekistan, customs and border officials use similar devices funded by the United States and European countries in an attempt to stop nuclear trafficking.

“Don’t you worry in America, because we deeply understand the danger of radiation and weapons of mass destruction,” said Col. Jalilov Sadridin, an Uzbek customs official.  “This is the first line of our struggle in this region because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan lost control of their nuclear materials.  There are so many sources” (Scott Peterson, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 7).

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North Korea:  U.S. Envoy Calls for Inspections

North Korea must open its nuclear program to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections or jeopardize an international project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in the country, a senior U.S. diplomat said today (see GSN, Aug. 6).

“It makes no sense” for the United States to continue to help build the reactors if North Korea will not admit IAEA inspectors, said Jack Pritchard, U.S. special envoy to North Korea.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea consented to end its nuclear research program in exchange for the reactors.  The multinational Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization runs the construction project at Kumho, an east coast site in South Hamgyong Province.

“(North Korea) must start meaningful cooperation now with the IAEA.  This is essential for the health of the project,” Pritchard said during a concrete-pouring ceremony for the reactors at the site.  “The success of the light-water reactor project and the Agreed Framework ultimately hinges on the choices North Korea makes.”

Today’s ceremony demonstrated that the United States and its allies are upholding their end of the agreement, Pritchard said.  “It is now time for us to see the same kind of tangible progress by (North Korea),” he added (Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Aug. 7).

South Korean officials said they expect that today’s ceremony, which marks the beginning of the construction phase of the reactor project, will aid North Korea’s efforts to improve relations with South Korea, the United States and Japan, according to the Korea Herald.  North and South Korea are expected to begin high-level talks in Seoul next week and a U.S. envoy is expected to travel to Pyongyang in the near future, the Herald reported (see GSN, Aug. 1).

“It’s true that the energy-starved North, even while rejecting the IAEA inspection, has feared that the reactor construction would hit a snag under the hard-line Bush administration,” said a senior South Korean Unification Ministry official.  “This ceremony, however, sent a clear message to the North that the project would remain on course” (Korea Herald, Aug. 7).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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United States II:  South Carolina Loses Plutonium Appeal

A U.S. appeals court ruled yesterday against a request by South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges to block plutonium shipments from the Rocky Flats former nuclear weapons plant in Colorado to the Savannah River Site (see GSN, Aug. 2).

Hodges had said that the U.S. Energy Department did not sufficiently examine the environmental impact of the plutonium shipments as required under federal law, according to the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (see GSN, June 19).  The three-judge panel, however, voted unanimously in favor of the department.

Hodges said he now plans to take his case to the Supreme Court.

“This weapons-grade plutonium is a threat to the health and safety of our state,” he said.  “The Washington bureaucrats have misled us time and time again.  Our final hope lies with the Supreme Court.”

The Bush administration supports the court’s decision, an Energy Department spokesman said yesterday.

“This administration is committed to ensuring America’s national security and the security of the people of South Carolina … by proceeding with a program to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium in a safe and responsible manner,” Energy spokesman Joe Davis said (Eric Sundquist, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Aug. 7).

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Ukraine:  Kiev Arranges to Destroy Bombers, Cruise Missiles

Ukraine plans to dispose of 30 strategic bombers and more than 200 cruise missiles within the next 2 1/2 years, Interfax reported yesterday (see GSN, July 16).

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Ration Technical Service Company signed a contract last month on the disposal project, said Ihor Mityayev, head of the center responsible for implementing arms disposal treaties.  Under the contract, about 30 Tu-22 bombers and more than 200 Kh-22 cruise missiles will be destroyed, he said.

“After the disposal, the hardware will be used as metal scrap and earnings will be [spent] on welfare payments for the military,” Mityayev said (Interfax/BBC Monitoring, Aug. 5).

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United States I:  Energy Whistleblower Reports Transport Flaws

A whistleblower in the U.S. Energy Department has reported several serious security flaws within the transport system for U.S. nuclear weapons and materials, Defense Week reported yesterday (see GSN, June 24).

Officials have passed concerns on to the National Security Council, and House Intelligence Committee staff members have interviewed the informant, said a June 27 letter written by the leaders of the Intelligence committee and sent to the senior members of the House Armed Services Committee, according to Defense Week.  The staff members said they believe the informant’s concerns are valid.

The Intelligence Committee is transferring the matter to the Armed Services Committee, which apparently has jurisdiction over nuclear transportation, the Intelligence Committee said.

While the letter, prepared by Intelligence Chairman Porter Goss (R-Fla.) and ranking member Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), does not outline the whistleblower’s concerns, it says the intelligence panel is “quite concerned” about the “gravity of the information contained in this (whistleblower) notification.”

“We believe that the gravity of information contained in this notification could require legislative changes and budgetary reallocations within the departments of Defense and Energy,” Goss and Pelosi said in the letter (George Lobsenz, Defense Week, Aug. 5).

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United States II:  Sandia Seeks New Supercomputer

The U.S. Sandia National Laboratory is negotiating an agreement with computer manufacturer Cray to build a $90 million supercomputer for use in nuclear weapons research, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, June 25).

The new computer would be at least seven times faster than the laboratory’s current fastest computer, said Bob Thomas, head of supercomputing at Sandia.  It would be the second fastest in the world, behind a Japanese supercomputer, according to the AP.  Out of the 10 fastest computers in the world, four are at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, the AP reported.

Previously, supercomputers were built around clusters of commercially available machines, according to AP.  Sandia’s agreement with Cray, however, indicates the laboratory wants a supercomputer designed solely for scientific research, said Horst Simon, director of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (Associated Press, Aug. 5).

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North Korea I:  KEDO Board Meets, Prepares to Pour Concrete

The international consortium building a nuclear power facility in North Korea plans to hold a ceremony today marking the first pouring of concrete for the facility’s two reactors (see GSN, Aug. 1).

A 100-member delegation — including U.S. envoy Jack Pritchard and other executive board members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization — left South Korea yesterday by ship to attend the ceremony.  The executive board met yesterday in Seoul to discuss the project’s future.

KEDO is building the reactors as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for assistance (Korea Herald, Aug. 6).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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North Korea II:  Reactors Pose Plutonium Threat, Experts Say

Light-water nuclear reactors such as those under construction in North Korea could help engineers develop nuclear weapons, two nuclear policy analysts wrote in an opinion piece in the Washington Post Sunday.

The reactors do not belong “in countries with appetites for nuclear weapons and few other ways to acquire them,” said Victor Gilinsky, a former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.  North Korea’s reactors would pose a serious nuclear proliferation threat, they said (see related GSN story, above).

Previous North Korean nuclear facilities — which officials agreed to freeze in 1994 in exchange for light-water reactors built by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization — were designed to be continually refueled, Gilinsky and Sokolski wrote.  Such facilities would have created “constant opportunities for diverting fuel to weapons programs,” they wrote.

Conversely, U.S. diplomats have said that light-water reactors are “proliferation-resistant” and are therefore a better type to use in North Korea.  Even though light-water reactors have more safeguards, they nevertheless produce weapon-grade plutonium, according to Gilinsky and Sokolski, and the reactors that KEDO is building “can make more than all the home-built reactors they would replace” (see GSN, Jan. 31).

Analysts have long debated whether the “reactor-grade” plutonium that most light-water reactors produce can be used for nuclear weapons, but with the right expertise, reactor-grade plutonium can be used for bombs, the authors said (see GSN, Aug. 5).  Diplomats have often ignored the reactors’ ability to produce a large amount of weapon-grade plutonium, they said, but each standard reactor probably contains “about 300 kilograms of near-weapons-grade material” — enough for dozens of bombs.

In addition, extracting plutonium from spent fuel rods is now much easier than in the past, according to the authors.  North Korea has a reprocessing plant and lacks only a front-end unit to cut up fuel rods.  Cutters were complex and expensive in the past, but cheaper, simpler designs have been created, the authors said, citing a 1977 Oak Ridge National Laboratory internal report.

Another argument made by proponents of light-water reactors in North Korea is that it if engineers used spent fuel it would be fairly obvious, according to Gilinsky and Sokolski.  The threat of detection, however, might not deter would-be bombmakers from “cannibalizing” spent fuel, the two said.

If North Korea — or Iran, for which Russia is building a light-water reactor — possessed illicit reprocessing laboratories, they could begin extracting spent fuel immediately, then they might be able to produce a nuclear bomb within weeks, the authors said.  “Amassing an arsenal of dozens of bombs could take a few months or less,” they added (Gilinsky/Sokolski, Washington Post, Aug. 4).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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U.S.-Russia:  Officials Praise Nuclear Reductions Treaty For Requiring No Cuts

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Though hailed by U.S. President George W. Bush and other senior U.S. officials for “substantially reducing” the U.S. and Russian “nuclear arsenals,” one of the most significant implications of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in May is that, contrary to such praise, it requires absolutely no nuclear weapons cuts, according to U.S. officials and independent experts (see GSN, May 30).

During the past month of hearings preceding a Senate vote on the pact, also called the Moscow Treaty, proponents have lauded the agreement for requiring that all except 1,700 to 2,200 “operationally deployed warheads” to be removed from delivery platforms — bombers, missiles and submarines — by Dec. 31, 2012 (see GSN, May 24).

Both critics and proponents of the treaty, however, have said the treaty is equally if not more important for what it does not do — require the destruction of any warheads or their delivery platforms.

Treaty supporters have championed the “flexibility” U.S. forces would retain to deal with unanticipated challenges of the future.  Critics charge it creates an illusion of arms control at best, while not improving Russian arsenal security, not restricting or regulating strategic holdings, and possibly encouraging Russian strategic forces to remain on hair-trigger alert.

Senior Pentagon officials, meanwhile, have acknowledged that U.S. avoidance of platform cuts under the new treaty is made possible by a unique interpretation U.S. officials place on key language in the atypically short and unspecific treaty text.

Flexibility, Preserved Capabilities Praised

While the previous strategic arms reduction treaties, START I and II, also did not require warheads to be destroyed, the Moscow Treaty has parted from its predecessors by not requiring destruction of any delivery platforms either.  Treaty proponent Senator John Warner (R-Va.) praised this treaty feature at a July 25 hearing, noting that the United States and Russia would be free to deploy their warheads in a manner “consistent with each nation’s security requirements and to adapt to changes in the international security environment” (see GSN, July 26).

The treaty “does not define warhead counting rules, require destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers, or include limits or sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers,” he said.

The focus of the treaty on downloading warheads from their platforms, rather than on platform destruction, lets each country retain and field all of its current nuclear weapons holdings up until the deadline day, and to begin returning them to the field the day after, officials have said.

“The treaty is certainly somewhat unusual.  Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 some 10 years from now, apparently just for one day at that moment, when the treaty then expires,” said Senate Armed Forces Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) at a July 9 hearing.

It furthermore enables the United States to reassign nuclear-capable strategic delivery platforms such as the B-2 and B-52 bombers and Trident submarines to conventional missions, without having them counted toward treaty limits, officials have said.

“As you know, under the Moscow Treaty the United States has the option of storing those warheads not operationally deployed,” said head of U.S. Strategic Command Adm. James Ellis in prepared testimony last Thursday.  “From a military perspective, it is essential that we retain the capability to respond to emerging threats or weapon safety and reliability issues.”

The treaty “allows me the flexibility to take the dual-use platforms, these strategic platforms that have such important tactical applications, and transform them in support of the nation’s security needs in a broader way,” Ellis said.

Critical Backlash

The retention of warheads and delivery systems, however, has provoked concern from arms control-minded legislators and independent experts.

“My concern is not that we’re going to 1,700 or 2,200, but [that] we’ve maintained the capacity to go back to 5,700 to 6,200, and what the rest of the world reads from that and what everyone else thinks their requirements are,” said Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (D-Del.) at a July 9 hearing (see GSN, July 9).

The theory supporting previous strategic arms control treaties, Biden said, “was if you took an American missile out of a silo, took the warhead off of it and crushed the canisters, you could not rapidly reload that on to anything that was out there.”

“Here, we have a situation where you take the warhead off, the launcher stays in place … and you have the launcher here and you have the warhead here.  And the theory is, at least, you could rapidly marry them up again and use them,” Biden said.

Christopher Paine, a senior analyst at the Natural Resources Defense Council, in July 23 testimony argued the treaty’s structure encourages no reduction to the Russian strategic arsenal.

“It’s a stunningly bad tradeoff,” he said.  “The Moscow Treaty imposes no limitation whatsoever on the current or future size of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and warhead stockpiles.”

Requiring no cuts, it “does nothing to move Russia or the United States down the road toward deep verified nuclear force reductions, verified warhead elimination, and eventual nuclear disarmament,” said Paine.

Many treaty supporters, including Biden, have said while the treaty accomplishes little, it is nevertheless worthwhile because it takes U.S.-Russian relations a step in the right direction.

Critics, including Biden, on the other hand, have pointed to one particularly negative consequence — Russian officials have indicated Russia may choose to retain its existing multiple-warhead ICBMs or modify single-warhead systems to carry multiple warheads, in an effort to counteract U.S. capabilities. 

Bush administration officials have said they are no longer concerned about Russian multiple-warhead nuclear weapons, which were historically considered to be Russia’s most destabilizing strategic technology throughout the Cold War because they tend to be kept closest to hair-trigger alert (see GSN, July 10).

Implementation Plans

The Bush administration intends to meet treaty requirements by keeping warheads separate from their strategic bombers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers said July 25.

“We will count as operationally deployed those weapons that are kept on the base with the bombers in the weapon storage areas, because presumably you can upload those in a matter of, let’s say hours,” he said.

ICBM warheads will also be separated, but it could take longer to reload them, he said.

“Those weapons will be stored in the weapons storage area at the base,” Myers said, noting that the moving a warhead from storage facility to an ICBM silo could take as long as a six-hour drive. 

Four Trident submarines, as noted above, will be reconfigured for nonstrategic nuclear missions.  Warheads assigned to bombers and missile submarines in overhaul also will not be counted in Moscow Treaty totals as they are by START.

Under START counting rules, reductions are made only by eliminating the delivery vehicles — by destroying submarine launch tubes, cutting up bombers and blowing up missile silos.

Differing Interpretations of the Treaty

With their country unable to afford to operate a large strategic force, Russian negotiators had sought more stringent START-like counting of reductions throughout the negotiations, and insisting the words “operationally deployed” not be included in the treaty text (see GSN, May 30).

“The Americans seem to have said that the missiles and the warheads must not be destroyed, they must be mothballed and be capable of swift redeployment on the carriers and be rapidly returned to the battle-ready forces,” said First Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky in a May 24 interview with reporters.

“You understand that we could not accept such conditions and we did not accept them.  And today in the treaty neither directly nor between the lines on the pages of the test you will not see the words ‘operationally deployed warheads,’” he said.

Abandonment of START-counting rules for the Moscow treaty was made possible, the U.S. officials said, because of a special interpretation the United States applies to the Moscow Treaty. 

The treaty text calls for reducing and limiting “strategic nuclear warheads” and Bush administration officials have repeatedly said they believe the treaty will require a reduction of the U.S. “strategic arsenal” down to the 1,700 to 2,200-threshold range. 

As Myers indicated in his July 25 testimony, however, the Bush administration devised a special definition to apply specifically to the new treaty, the words “strategic nuclear warheads” would encompass only operationally deployed warheads. 

While the START methodology “counts warheads even if there is not a warhead deployed in the delivery platform,” Myers said, “Under the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. will only count operationally deployed warheads.”

A reduction through the Moscow Treaty would not necessarily count as a START reduction, he said.

“The U.S. may remove a warhead to comply with the Moscow Treaty but a notional warhead may still be counted under the START Treaty as we fulfill our obligations under both treaties,” Myers said.

This definition is key for retaining offloaded strategic capabilities, said Ellis said in his testimony.

“This construct allows the United States to retain, reduce, or restructure critical dual-use weapons delivery platforms — those that also can deploy conventional weapons — so as to meet a broader range of military requirements,” he said.

Most Capabilities Retained

In pursuing the Moscow Treaty, Bush administration officials have said they will not pursue future agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons as counted through START rules.

START II, which was signed but remains unratified by the United States, would have cut strategic nuclear warheads down to 3,000 to 3,500 from the START I ceiling of 6,000 by cutting delivery platforms.  START III negotiations, which stalled during the Clinton administration, were aimed at requiring further cuts to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads and were exploring ways to require the destruction of both warheads and delivery platforms.

Though not required to by the Moscow Treaty, U.S. officials have said they are planning cuts.  They plan to complete Clinton administration initiatives to eliminate 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs carrying 500 warheads total, deploy only one warhead on each of 500 Minuteman III missiles, and convert four of 18 Trident strategic submarines, a total of 768 warheads, to perform conventional operations. 

No further platform cuts are planned, however.  Rather, the Pentagon plans to retain the remaining 14 Trident submarines, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, and 76 B-52s and 21 B-2s, all of them capable of delivering strategic nuclear weapons, according to excerpts of the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review leaked this year.

A rough calculation shows that altogether, those systems could deliver a total of about 5,000 warheads according to START counting rules, down from the 6,000 allowed by START I.

Some of the platforms will be deployed with strategic warheads and some will be involved in conventional missions, according to a Pentagon official in a June briefing.  Additional delivery vehicles will be sent into storage, and some bombers and submarines will be put into overhaul.

“The thought was that retaining the existing platforms, and taking the reductions, essentially by downloading warheads, gave us enormous flexibility in terms of responding to changes in the security environment,” said the Pentagon official.

“But also, it was based on a recognition that at least today, a portion of that force, the bomber force, is also heavily involved or engaged in conventional capabilities,” said the official.

An Energy Department official, meanwhile, testified Thursday the department was expecting to dismantle no warheads under the treaty until at least until 2014 (see GSN, Aug. 1).  U.S. officials otherwise have been contradictory on the fate of downloaded warheads (see GSN, July 26).

Russian Forces Likely Outmatched

As the United States is expected to retain and improve its strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian strategic forces are expected to dwindle to below 2,000 weapons by 2015 for lack of resources, according to the latest published U.S. intelligence estimate (see GSN, Jan. 10).

Russia has few options to match U.S. strategic capabilities other than to leave aging ICBMs “rotting in their holes” a few years longer, and adding additional warheads to other missiles, the U.S. analyst said.

Citing an improving U.S.-Russian relationship, U.S. officials have said projected levels of U.S. strategic forces are no longer structured to counter Russian or any other specific country’s forces.

Echoing the Nuclear Posture Review, however, Rumsfeld at the July 17 hearing suggested the 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed range reflects Russian capabilities, as well as Chinese — “they are increasing their defense budget and they are increasing their nuclear capabilities, purposefully” — and those of  “other countries.”

Retaining remaining warhead and delivery platform capabilities, Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials have said, will make available spares to replace faulty warheads and will discourage other countries from “sprinting” to numerical parity.

They also provide the military flexibility to rearm to respond to a radical change in the international strategic environment such as the emergence of an unforeseen peer competitor on the scale of the Soviet Union, the officials have said. 

Arguments Against Deep Cuts

The administration’s desire to avoid further platform reductions also can be explained as a product of institutional resistance from within the Pentagon, bolstered by strategic rationales.

There was a concern with some in the Pentagon, some experts said, that a requirement to eliminate platforms could have possibly eliminated, or at least seriously undercut, one leg of the Pentagon’s nuclear “triad” of long-range bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

“You can’t get down to 2,500 using the START rules unless you cut up lots of bombers, and the Air Force did not want to cut up lots of bombers, because it uses them for conventional missions,” said a U.S. government arms control analyst.

Eliminating additional strategic submarines would have been an “operational nightmare,” said the analyst, because if the Navy operated less than 10 or 12 there would not be enough submarines to justify two ports, on the Atlantic and the Pacific.  That would limit global coverage and make it easier for an enemy to locate and pick off the submarines, the analyst said.

Land-based missiles, meanwhile, also have special advantages, according to the Strategic Command: on continuous alert, they can be quickly targeted and launched.  Eliminating them would not greatly reduce the overall strategic numbers, but could make the Strategic Command a less attractive career for senior Air Force officers, the analyst said.

“There is a constituency there and you’re not going to do that,” the analyst said.  “So it’s both nuclear arguments and conventional politics that prevent you from cutting up any one particular leg of your triad.”

Eliminating one leg of the triad has always been “a bridge too far,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy undersecretary of defense for nonproliferation during the Clinton Administration, now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“There’s been huge resistance over the years from [the Strategic Command], you know the nuclear guys, to moving beyond that, moving beyond the 2,000 barrier, because that’s where in theory we would have to get rid of one leg of the triad.”

Gottemoeller, however, said other areas of the military leadership have seemed less resistant to additional platform cuts.

“It’s my understanding that there is some worry about this among some of the uniform ranks because of the drain that this will bring about on defense budgets, to sustain platforms over time,” she said.

The administration’s decision to avoid additional platform cuts, she said, was driven by a “mania among a rather limited group of people within the [defense secretary’s office] who came in with this administration and have this kind of maniacal emphasis on flexibility.”

At the July 9 hearing, Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested the chosen force levels were driven purely by strategic rationale, arguing cost considerations would have discouraged keeping more weapons than needed.

“As chairman and the succeeding chairmen that followed me, we have every incentive to reduce the number.  These are expensive.  They take away from soldier pay ...  They take away from lots of things.  There is no incentive to keep more than you believe you need for the security of the nation,” Powell said.

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United States:  Report Warns Against New U.S. Nuclear Weapons

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. pursuit of a new “bunker-busting” nuclear bomb would erode several hard-fought arms control treaties and increase tensions with European allies, Russia and China, according to a new report (see GSN, Feb. 11).

Developing a nuclear warhead to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets would adversely affect both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the British American Security Information Council concluded in the July report, Bunker Busters: Washington’s Drive for New Nuclear Weapons.  The move would raise doubts about Washington’s pledge to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and might require new nuclear testing to prove the utility of new weapons, the authors warned.

Meanwhile, European allies are likely to look warily upon any U.S. effort to give nuclear weapons a greater role in defense planning, while Russia and China might take any new nuclear developments as a sign of continued U.S. hostility, according to the report.

The Bush administration is seeking congressional approval to modify current nuclear weapons and to study new warhead designs to strike at deeply buried targets such as underground bunkers suspected of hiding chemical, biological or nuclear weapons (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).  The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives remain split over the issue in divergent versions of the fiscal 2003 defense budget, which they will have to resolve it by the end of next month (see GSN, June 28).

The search for a nuclear bunker-buster has picked up steam in the wake of a re-evaluation of U.S. nuclear policy that led earlier this year to the classified Nuclear Posture Review, which called for developing a nuclear bunker-buster to fulfill a “key unmet capability” (see GSN, March 14).  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is studying a modified B83 nuclear warhead and Los Alamos National Laboratory is studying the feasibility of modifying the B61, which can already penetrate earth (see GSN, March 26).

To enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, the posture review abandoned the deliberate ambiguity surrounding the question of whether the United States is prepared to counter a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons, the report says.  For the first time, the review raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, according to the report.

“Hawkish policy officials believe that the United States should now adopt a more explicit stance in this regard and thereby raise the profile of its nuclear arsenal in its military planning,” the report says.  “The Bush administration has already started down this road by announcing that a pre-emptive strike policy would be incorporated into the National Security Strategy in autumn 2002.”

NPT and CTBT at Risk

Introducing a bunker-busting nuclear warhead, according to BASIC, would have a “far-reaching impact” on the interlocking matrix of global arms control agreements.  In particular, “of all the international treaties that may be adversely affected, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may suffer the greatest blow,” according to the report.

For one, the Bush administration’s plans contradict some of the 13 steps to advance the treaty that were agreed to by signatories in May 2000, according to the report.

“Ongoing attempts to develop new, more usable nuclear weapons, and a refusal to rule out their use against non-nuclear states, raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment to ensure a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies,” the report says.

The threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in particular “runs contrary to the ‘negative security assurances’ issued by the nuclear powers in the context of the NPT regime,” the report says.  Meanwhile, U.S. plans for missile defenses, submarines and bombers signal an “ambition to continue, and possibly increase, the reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. military planning well into the 21st century.”

Another jeopardized arms control regime would be the CTBT, according to the report, which says that renewed testing may be necessary to prove any new weapons.  That would especially be the case if a modified nuclear weapon is unsatisfactory and an entirely new design is required.

“Development of new warheads could necessitate renewed testing,” the report said, “with the administration claiming that the safety and reliability of the new designs cannot be derived from the results of previous testing” (see GSN, March 29).

An entirely new nuclear design may be necessary, according to recent study results.  Tests of the B61 as a bunker-buster have already raised questions about whether a modification would be enough to fulfill the mission, according to the report.  The B61 could only penetrate about 20 feet into dry earth when dropped from 40,000 feet, making it ineffective against deeply buried targets and raising the risk of radioactive fallout in the surrounding area.

European, Russian and Chinese Responses

U.S. pursuit of bunker-busting nuclear weapons will also affect Washington’s relationship with allies and potential adversaries, according to BASIC.

“Allies and adversaries alike have reacted to the new U.S. nuclear posture with trepidation, wariness, and even anger,” the report says.

Europeans, and particularly NATO allies, have had nuclear policies in line with the United States, which therefore has an effective veto over the development of nuclear policy. 

“Washington may seek to include similar language [as the Nuclear Posture Review] in future alliance policy documents to extend the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal, despite concern expressed by NATO allies,” the report says.  “Already strained by questions over its role in a post-Sept. 11 world, NATO will have difficulty withstanding fresh splits over this issue.”

The reaction of European allies, however, may pale in comparison to new regional tensions sparked by U.S. nuclear moves.

In addition, development of new nuclear weapons by the United States might increase Russian military interest in its own arsenal, according to the report.

“With renewed emphasis on nuclear arsenals and technologies in both Russia and the United States, the possibility of meaningful reductions in tactical nuclear weapons will disappear rapidly,” the report says.

At the same time, “the development of low-yield nuclear weapons would appear to Chinese analysts and policymakers as further proof of U.S. hostility,” the report adds.  A possible military confrontation with China over Taiwan is cited in the posture review as a potential nuclear flashpoint and as a result China would be able to justify expanding its own nuclear arsenal without eliciting strong international reaction, the report predicts.

China’s reaction, moreover, “may have serious impact on stability in South Asia as India and Pakistan seek to maintain the regional military balance,” the report says.

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Iran:  Russia Downplays Additional Reactors

In response to U.S. objections, top Russian officials downplayed a plan to expand nuclear cooperation with Iran during talks with U.S. officials that ended Friday (see GSN, Aug. 2).

U.S. officials had raised strong objections to the 10-year plan, which has been signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and would include building five additional nuclear reactors in Iran.

The plan is a blueprint that “covers already existing technical opportunities only,” Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told U.S. officials.  “Their implementation is contingent upon many factors, including political.”

Russia is not helping Iran develop nuclear weapons, Rumyantsev said.

“No cooperation in the nuclear sphere is in place today” other than construction of one civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr, Iran, he said in a statement.

U.S. officials welcomed Rumyantsev’s statement and saw it as an effort to back away from the proposed plan, according to the Washington Post.

“They’re essentially sending the signal that they’re not going to do this, but at some point we’re going to need them to say that,” a senior administration official said.

The U.S. officials said they had threatened to end joint initiatives with Russia if the country continued with plans to build more reactors in Iran.

“We made clear in unmistakable terms that this has to be fixed.  They’re going to lose a lot of stuff,” the administration official said.

The Russian officials who met with the U.S. team, including Rumyantsev and other top officials, expressed surprise about the blueprint, U.S. officials said.  The Russians said they did not know of the plan until it was announced July 26, U.S. officials said.

The issue over Iran dominated talks between Russian officials and U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Undersecretary of State John Bolton last week, the Post reported.  The two countries agreed to cooperate on “advanced fuel cycle” research to find better ways to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, according to the Post (Peter Baker, Washington Post, Aug. 3).

Fuel to Load in 2003

Meanwhile, Russian workers are planning to load fuel into the first unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in December 2003, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Andrey Malyshev has said, according to the Russian Interfax news agency (see GSN, July 15).

“The power plant is due to start working in June 2004,” he said.  The plant is purely for civilian purposes, he added.

“Any double use of the VVER light-water reactor unit of the power plant is out of the question,” Malyshev said.  “Experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency have checked the possibility of using the VVER unit for military purposes and have found none.”

Iran is forming an organization to oversee the nuclear plants, and “IAEA representatives examined the matter in November 2001,” he said.  There are no agreements yet for constructing a second unit at the Bushehr plant, he added (Interfax/BBC Monitoring, Aug. 5).

Russia and Iran plan to hold consultations on WMD nonproliferation during a Moscow meeting between their foreign ministers Aug. 20-22, Interfax reported.  The officials are expected to discuss disarmament, nonproliferation, export controls and strategic stability (Interfax, Aug. 1 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 2).

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