U.S. Response:  Experts Call for Revitalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — To expand critically important nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the United States and its allies must take immediate steps to remove unnecessary hurdles and coordinate new public and private initiatives to secure nuclear weapons materials across the globe, experts told the U.S. Congress this week.

In frank assessments of the current state of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, two nuclear experts testified Sept. 24 that while progress has been made in preventing nuclear and radiological material from reaching terrorists, overall efforts in this regard remain wholly inadequate in light of the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism.

Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, urged nations to increase financial support for these programs, chided the United States and other countries for placing unnecessary restrictions on nuclear nonproliferation aid and criticized remaining opposition in some quarters to nuclear security cooperation.

In testimony to the House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, they proposed a series of new measures to expand what they currently consider to be a paucity of investment in countering the threat of nuclear terrorism.

“We cannot take the chance that the next terrorists attacking the United States could make use of nuclear material that escaped through a hole in a Russian facility fence that would have been repaired” if nonproliferation programs were better implemented, Gottemoeller said.  “The burden of such an outcome would be difficult to bear for all in our policy and government communities.”

One weak link is financing.  “The threat reduction budget for the whole year is what the Defense Department spends in a single day,” Bunn said.

“While a number of key officials in the Bush administration have worked hard in the last year to accelerate efforts to secure stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients around the world, the reality is that the president’s program does not yet match his rhetoric.”

Nevertheless, the United States, which spends an estimated $1 billion a year on nuclear and related nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, has been far more committed to these programs than Washington’s allies, Gottemoeller said.  “Frankly, I wish other countries would do more.”

The Group of Eight economic powers have pledged $10 billion over the next decade to match an equal investment by the United States, but how that money will be raised, managed and spent remains unclear, lawmakers were told (see GSN, Sept. 18).

Overcoming Hurdles

Holding back U.S. and allied nuclear nonproliferation efforts are a series of bureaucratic hurdles and an overall lack of vision, the experts said.

“It remains true that bureaucratic wrangling, lack of coordination, failure to conceive and pursue new approaches, unimaginative program execution, limited planning, and low priority are slowing many of these programs and limiting their success,” Bunn said.

For example, some in Congress remain hesitant to approve a permanent waiver to an annual certification that says Russia is abiding by all arms control agreements. Washington’s has been unable to make such a certification and as a result nonproliferation aid has been delayed (see GSN, Aug. 9). 

At the same time, U.S. nonproliferation aid is currently limited to only the former Soviet Union, although legislative attempts are underway to change that (see GSN, March 20).

Meanwhile, U.S.-Russian disputes continue to delay progress on nuclear security cooperation.  “Because of disputes between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense over exactly how much access U.S. experts would be given to sensitive sites, there is today urgently needed security upgrade equipment that was purchased five years ago that is still sitting in warehouses, uninstalled, while the vulnerabilities it was intended to fix go unaddressed,” Bunn said.

In addition, the United States lacks some key ingredients in its nuclear nonproliferation efforts, according to Bunn.

“To do an important job, you need three things:  someone in charge, a plan and the resources to get it done,” he said.  “Unfortunately, for this mission, few of these essential ingredients are in place.”

Another major barrier is U.S. unwillingness — and legal prohibition — to participate in nuclear nonproliferation efforts with nations that have not signed certain arms control treaties, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Gottemoeller suggested that the United States review this policy, which is hindering much-needed progress.  One venue for cooperating with such countries is the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“The agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service offers, even [to] those not cooperating in other aspects of the regime, the opportunity for consultations on improving the security of their civilian nuclear facilities,” she said.

Meanwhile, if Washington engaged such nuclear proliferation concerns as India and Pakistan, it would go along way in advancing nonproliferation as a whole.

“If the United States worked separately with India and Pakistan to share information on protection and control of nuclear assets, the United States would be taking the first step toward transformation of these countries from adversaries to partners in the nonproliferation arena,” she said (see GSN, March 18).

Greater International Cooperation, New Ideas

Gottemoeller and Bunn agreed that, building on the G-8 pledge for new resources, the United States and others must work to build an international coalition against nuclear terrorism, including identifying new sources of financing and international cooperation.

 “Now it is important to engage other countries in new regions, with the primary goal of ensuring the protection of nuclear and radiological assets from terrorists.  This goal is in the national interest of every country,” Gottemoeller testified.

“In the current era, with burgeoning concerns about a larger, more widespread threat, especially involving radiological materials, international efforts to set priorities, divide labor, and establish partnerships will be critical.”  The G-8 pledge, she said, is the perfect means for establishing this enhanced coordination.

She said “Russia should be called upon to play a responsible role, both in facilitating the initiative and contributing resources.”

The two experts outlined a series of new initiatives that could propel nuclear security efforts significantly forward in the coming years.

One novel idea, according to Bunn, would be to relieve Russian debt in exchange for arms control expenditures.  This “debt for nonproliferation swap,” he said, would be modeled after past debt for environment swaps, in which a portion of Russian debts would be canceled in return for Russian financing of agreed arms reduction and nonproliferation projects (see GSN, July 26).

Gottemoeller suggested that new partnerships be established as a way of getting around restrictions to U.S. nonproliferation aid.  For example, if the United States cannot directly provide nuclear security assistance to Pakistan because of sanctions, neighboring Kazakhstan could be enlisted to help dispose of spent nuclear fuel.

“If Pakistan is interested in assistance to improve the secure storage of its spent and fresh fuel at civilian reactors, it might benefit from partnership with a regional player,” she said.  Kazakhstan has particular expertise in this area.

There is a major need to identify more finances for nuclear nonproliferation efforts, she said.  One way is to tap into private financial sources.

“Commercial means should be sought to finance new projects,” she said.  “The goal should be to discover public-private partnerships that lessen the burden of these projects on national budgets …  Such partnerships, in my view, will be an important piece of the resource base necessary to tackle the expanded nuclear terrorism threat.”

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Congo:  Kinshasa Seeks U.S. Removal of Uranium

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been negotiating with the United States for a year to remove uranium from two sites — a reactor in Kinshasa and a uranium mine in the southern part of the country, a senior Congolese official said yesterday.

Officials have not yet made any decisions on requests for the United States to remove uranium from the reactor, but they are continuing negotiations, said Victor Mpoyo, a Congolese minister of state and a close adviser to former President Laurent Kabila.

There has been speculation that the D.R.C. paid North Korea for military aid by granting it mining concessions around the Shinkolobwe uranium mine, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Sept. 25).  The North Korean interest in the mine has increased concerns that that area might become a haven for illicit trafficking, the Times reported.  Zimbabwean military forces loyal to D.R.C. President Joseph Kabila currently control the area around the mine.

“Anyone who expresses an interest in Shinkolobwe, or tries to get there, has a habit of disappearing,” a mining industry source familiar with the area said yesterday (Mark Huband, Financial Times, Sept. 26).

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U.S. Testing:  NNSA Plans Rocco Subcritical Test Today

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is conducting a subcritical nuclear experiment today at the Nevada Test Site, the office said in a press release (see GSN, Sept. 3).

The test, named “Rocco,” is designed to examine what happens to plutonium when chemical high explosives shock it.  Researchers believe the test will help “maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,” according to the press release (NNSA release, Sept. 24).

Today’s experiment is the 19^th subcritical test the United States has conducted and the sixth under President George W. Bush (Kyodo News Service, Sept. 24).

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Russia:  Nuclear Weapons Losses Are Reporting Errors, Former Official Says

Reports of suitcase-sized nuclear devices lost by Russia are more likely the result of faulty accounting than the actual disappearance of weapons, a former Russian diplomat has said (see GSN, Dec. 19, 2001).

Nikolai Sokov, now a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in the United States, wrote in a Los Angeles Times commentary that there has never been “credible information about the loss of even a single nuclear weapon.”

Additionally, small Russian nuclear devices require frequent servicing and if they have been lost, they would be useless by now, Sokov said.  He suggested that resources spent searching for these devices might be used more productively against other threats (Nikolai Sokov, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 26).

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China:  New Report Details Chinese Missile Defense Countermeasures

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Although the development of Chinese missile defense countermeasures is not likely to keep pace with U.S. technologies, the United States should still monitor China’s efforts, says a report released this week by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (see GSN, July 23).

Building on years of research, China has created a broad program to develop countermeasures to defeat a U.S. missile defense system, according to a chapter in the report, China’s Growing Military Power:  Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities.  The chapter was prepared by Mark Stokes, country director for China and Taiwan in the U.S. defense secretary’s office, in an unofficial capacity.

Countermeasures developers have focused on two main avenues, countersurveillance and counterintercept, the report says.

Countersurveillance

The countersurveillance strategy is designed to prevent U.S. sensors from detecting ballistic missiles and their warheads, the report says.   To this end, China has worked to develop passive electronic countermeasures such as chaff to confuse X-Band radar systems and active electronic countermeasures such as radar jammers.  Analysts at the Chinese National University of Defense Technology have researched electronic countermeasures to sensors on the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and the Sea-Based Midcourse interceptors, which have been proposed for use in the U.S. missile defense system, according to the report.

China is also examining ways to reduce sensors’ ability to detect ballistic missiles during their midcourse and terminal flight phases, the report says.  Engineers have experimented with altering the shape of reentry vehicles to reduce their radar signatures, the report says.  They also are working to reduce infrared signatures.  Researchers have conducted experiments on “cold screen technology,” in which a warhead is encased in an aluminum alloy and liquid nitrogen is placed between the warhead and the shell, the report says.  In some experiments, infrared sensors normally capable of detecting an unshrouded reentry vehicle 3,000 kilometers away were unable to detect a cold-screen-protected warhead at more than three meters, the report says.

Chinese engineers have worked to develop two kinds of decoy measures — saturation and deception.  Saturation measures such as balloons have been praised for their relative ease of technology and low costs, the report says.  Researchers are also working on electronic decoys that emit a radar return similar to an actual reentry vehicle.

To counter U.S. anti-missile lasers, Chinese engineers have worked on fast-burn boosters, the report says, adding that concerns have been raised over possible quality control problems related to stage separation and accuracy (see GSN, July 15).  The report also says that some observers have reported research efforts into boost-phase maneuvering systems, but there is so far no hard evidence as to any actual development.

Counterintercept

China has worked on several measures to block interceptors from engaging targets.  One method that has been examined is the use of multiple warheads, the report says, adding that China has researched multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology since the 1970s (see GSN, Feb. 12).  The report cites Chinese missile designers who have said that real and decoy warheads could be combined through the use of MIRV technology.

Researchers are also working to develop maneuverable reentry vehicles to complicate missile defense tracking, according to the report.  Efforts have focused on programming a reentry vehicle to maneuver during its terminal flight phase — about 20 to 30 seconds before engaging a target, the report says.

To counter U.S. boost-phase intercept systems such as the Airborne Laser, China is researching missile spinning and hardening, the report says.  Missile spinning, designed to reduce the concentration of a laser on a single spot, and hardening might not render a missile immune to boost phase defenses, but they probably would lower the number of laser shots available per mission, the report says.

Other Measures

China also has several other missile defense countermeasures under consideration, including non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-satellite measures and anti-radiation missiles, according to the report.  Chinese engineers have experimented with the use of EMP weapons, such as a high-powered microwave warhead, to knock out space-based and ground-based missile defense sensors, the report says.

“PLA [People’s Liberation Army] writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a relatively high priority,” the report says.

China has also conducted research on anti-satellite measures since the 1960s, according to the report.  To counter a missile defense system, ASAT measures would be directed against satellite systems in low-Earth orbit — for example, the Space Based Infrared System-Low system — or in highly elliptical orbits — for example, SBIRS-High (see GSN, Sept. 4).  China has also increased efforts to distinguish actual satellites from decoys, the report says.

To destroy radar installations within a missile defense system, China is attempting to acquire or develop anti-radiation missiles such as the Russian Kh-31P, according to the report.

“There are persistent rumors of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement on the Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note was specifically developed to counter the Patriot’s MPQ-53 radar and Aegis SPY-1D phased array radar,” the report says (see GSN, June 19).

China’s countermeasure research program is apparently well advanced, but could also overwhelm China’s entire ballistic missile program, the report says (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“Chinese research and development of missile defense countermeasures is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated.  However, countermeasures introduce an added element of complexity into an already complex system,” the report says.  “Despite significant investment, P.R.C. [People’s Republic of China] countermeasures on longer-range ballistic missiles are unlikely to keep pace with U.S. technologies. ... Nevertheless, the U.S. should hedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in P.R.C. countermeasure technology.”

For further information, see:

MDA Basics of Missile Defense

MDA Missile Defense System

MDA Boost Defense Segment

MDA Midcourse Defense Segment

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

PAC 3 Fact Sheet

Sea-Based Midcourse

Airborne Laser Fact Sheet

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Africa:  Region Could Be Source of Uranium for Rogue States

Uranium-producing countries in Africa such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Africa could be a source of fissile material for rogue states, including Iraq, attempting to develop nuclear weapons, the London Guardian reported today.

A dossier released by the United Kingdom yesterday accuses Iraq of attempting to obtain uranium from Africa (see GSN, Sept. 24).  While the dossier did not identify which countries might have been involved, analysts said the two most likely countries were the D.R.C. and South Africa.

Leaders of the Mayi-Mayi, a militia group involved in the D.R.C. civil war, traveled to Baghdad twice to offer gold and diamonds, according to documents.  While uranium was not specifically mentioned, the Mayi-Mayi would have been able to obtain the mineral in areas under its control, a western intelligence officer said.

Other rogue states and groups have attempted to obtain uranium from the D.R.C., according to reports.  In 1998, North Korea provided the D.R.C. with military trainers under an agreement with former President Laurent Kabila, the Guardian reported.  The trainers were withdrawn under U.S. pressure after allegations that they had reopened a uranium mine, the Guardian reported.

In addition, French radio reported last year that supporters of Mobutu Sese Seko, the former leader of then-Zaire, shipped 22 pounds of uranium bars to Libya (see GSN, Dec. 5, 2001; Astill/Carroll, London Guardian, Sept. 25).

In 1998, Italian police arrested a group of men who attempted to sell a uranium fuel rod to the Mafia, according to the Financial Times (see GSN, Nov. 9, 2001).  The rod had been stolen from a nuclear reactor in Kinshasa.  A second fuel rod missing from the reactor has still yet to be found, nuclear industry sources said yesterday.  Experts consider the reactor, which was damaged during civil war, to be highly insecure, the Times reported (Financial Times, Sept. 25).

South Africa

It is highly unlikely that Iraq was able to obtain uranium from South Africa, which had a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, said Jakkie Cillers, head of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa.

“As a past nuclear power we are an obvious suspect but it is unlikely because the program was dismantled under the observation of the ... International Atomic Energy Agency,” Cillers said.

South Africa ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991 and signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Cillers said, however, that former South African officials or military officers might have had contacts with Iraq since then (Astill/Carroll, London Guardian).

Other Producers

In other African countries with uranium, production is strictly monitored and sales are made under exclusive contracts, the Financial Times reported.  It is unlikely that any uranium could have been smuggled out to rogue states, experts said.

In Niger and Gabon, two of the continent’s main uranium producers, the French company Cogema controls the production operation, according to the Times.  In Namibia, another chief source, production is controlled by the international mining company Rio Tinto and primarily sold to the French electricity company EdF under a long-term agreement (Financial Times).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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IAEA:  Agency Completes a Year of Expanding Its Mission

By Bryan Bender
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, has capped a year of dramatic expansion in which it initiated new efforts to stop the spread of nuclear-related materials and to more fully address threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism (see GSN, Sept. 12).

At an annual meeting in Vienna that ended last week, the agency reported on preparations for returning IAEA monitors to Iraq and attempted to break a logjam over on-site inspections in North Korea.

Meanwhile, representatives from the agency’s 134 members reviewed a variety of new measures designed to step up nuclear power plant security, track radioactive sources worldwide and dispose of at-risk materials.  The members pledged to expand their efforts further as international cooperation and investment in nuclear and radioactive safeguards continues to expand.

A year into the global war on terrorism, the IAEA has emerged as a key component of international efforts to enhance defenses against the prospect of catastrophic terrorism.

“The IAEA continues to play a central role … through its long-standing work to verify compliance with nonproliferation obligations,” U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan told conference attendees. 

Noting the growing and critical need to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist hands, Annan urged the agency to continue programs aimed at safeguarding nuclear material, securing nuclear facilities and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.

IAEA Reacts to Sept. 11

Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the security of the world’s nuclear power plants and nuclear-related industrial material and waste has been a rising concern, particularly in light of new information about al-Qaeda terrorist plans.

The IAEA reviewed its efforts to prevent acts of terrorism involving nuclear or radiological materials, resulting in a $12 million per year effort to enhance security in eight areas, including protecting nuclear material and facilities and securing radioactive sources.

“In just over five months, a plan of enhanced and new activities to upgrade nuclear security worldwide was developed,” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the general conference.

He reported that, to date, 12 member states and one nongovernmental organization — the Nuclear Threat Initiative — have pledged a total of $8 million to implement the new measures in the first year.  More pledges are expected, he said.

Nuclear Power Plants

One IAEA focus has been nuclear power plant safety and security.  Information gained after the Sept. 11 attacks indicates that the al-Qaeda terrorist network has considered attacking nuclear power plants.  New IAEA security guidelines adopted over the past year are the “highest caliber,” according to ElBaradei.

“It is satisfying to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide,” he said.  However, “more work needs to be done, and public demands are widely voiced in many countries for greater transparency and accountability on safety issues.  The need for a more effective and transparent international safety regime, therefore, continues to be a high priority.”

Tracking Radioactive Sources

In June, the IAEA established a working group with the United States and Russia on “securing and managing radioactive sources.”  The group plans to develop a strategy “to locate, recover, secure and recycle orphan sources throughout the former Soviet Union,” according to the IAEA.  A month earlier the two countries had agreed to cooperate in this area and Washington had pledged $1 million for security upgrades at Russia’s largest radiological repository.  It is the first international effort to safeguard materials necessary to build a “dirty bomb.”

Radioactive materials in industrial and medical facilities around the world have become a new proliferation concern because terrorists could make a so-called dirty bomb by mating the materials with conventional explosives.

“Plans found in al-Qaeda bunkers revealed in detail the interest of al-Qaeda in radiological dispersal devices,” according to the U.S. Energy Department.  “The discovery of these plans demonstrates the importance of incorporating radiological dispersal devices into the world’s nonproliferation and counterterrorism strategy.”

At the Vienna conference, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham proposed expanding U.S. and Russian cooperative efforts and called for an international conference to address the threat posed by the misuse of radioactive materials to make radiological weapons (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“Although these dirty bombs are not comparable to nuclear weapons in destructiveness, they are far easier to assemble and employ,” Abraham said.

At-Risk Nuclear Material

Meanwhile, a scenario in which terrorists would acquire nuclear weapons is considered a nightmare, prompting the IAEA to increase efforts to secure at-risk fissile material around the world.

One such security effort occurred in August when the agency and the United States — with funds from the Nuclear Threat Initiative — removed 100 pounds of bomb-grade nuclear material from a scientific academy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (see GSN, Aug. 23).

IAEA officials have said they are planning additional missions in the coming months at as many as two dozen facilities around the globe (see GSN, Sept. 3).

Proliferating Countries

IAEA officials have also reported on agency efforts to monitor the activities of countries considered to be some of the world’s most immediate proliferation concerns (see GSN, Sept. 16).

On Iraq’s nuclear efforts, IAEA has “no additional information that can be directly linked without inspection to Iraq’s nuclear activities,” ElBaradei said Sept. 16.  “Resumption of inspections is therefore a crucial step towards providing assurance to the international community that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has been neutralized and is not being revived.”

“We do have access to commercial satellite images of specific facilities in Iraq,” he added, “and some of those images show changes.  But we have not been physically present in Iraq since 1998, and without the return of inspectors we cannot verify anything.”

Another proliferation concern, North Korea, has continued to delay agency inspections called for under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

“The agency continues to be unable to verify … that the D.P.R.K. has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to the agency safeguards measures under its NPT safeguards agreement,” ElBaradei said.  Further inaction could lead to a “substantial delay” in the construction of the light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea called for under the 1994 international agreement in which Pyongyang exchanged its nuclear programs for two nuclear power reactors.

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]

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U.S. Testing:  Los Alamos Tries Cheaper Linux-Based Simulations

Los Alamos National Laboratory is buying a relatively inexpensive $6 million dollar Linux supercomputer for nuclear weapons simulations, CNET News.com reported Monday (see GSN, June 25).

The laboratory has traditionally run nuclear simulations on systems that can cost $215 million from computer manufactures Silicon Graphics and Hewlett-Packard.  Los Alamos has seen success using less expensive components and the Linux operating system to build supercomputers but has not used them for nuclear simulations, according to News.com.  The shift requires that software be reworked to run on the less expensive machine.

The new system, known as Science Appliance, will be able to complete 10 trillion calculations per second and is due by the end of 2002 (Stephen Shankland, CNET News.com, Sept. 23).

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United States:  Commercial Plant Wins Approval to Make Tritium

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Monday approved a plan to make tritium at the Watts Bar commercial nuclear power plant near Spring City, Tenn. (see GSN, June 28).

The United States stopped producing tritium, an isotope of hydrogen used in nuclear weapons, in 1989, but it has sought to resume production to replace losses caused by natural radioactive decay.

The use of a commercial plant has raised concerns.

“It crosses the imaginary line that separates the civilian nuclear industry and military production in the U.S.,” said Bob Schaeffer of the Alliance For Nuclear Accountability.  “This is the first time that the U.S. is using a civilian power reactor to make nuclear weapons” (Associated Press, Sept. 25).

Irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods are to be taken from the Watts Bar facility in Tennessee to Savannah River, S.C., where Energy Department technicians will extract the tritium.

“Producing tritium is a key element in the U.S. national security strategy to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent,” said Linton Brooks, acting administrator of the department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (Energy Department release, Sept. 24).

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U.S.-Russia I:  Budget Issues Delay Russian Ratification of Moscow Treaty

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov has said the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty will be sent to the lower house of the Russian Parliament sometime in the near future, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye reported last week (see GSN, Sept. 13).

“The procedure of budget forming,” however, has delayed sending the treaty to the Duma for ratification, Mamedov said.  In a June 14 resolution, the Duma criticized the treaty and offered several measures in an attempt to improve upon it.

A hearing on the treaty is expected in October, according to the newspaper.  Mamedov indicated that the Russian Parliament might confirm the treaty by the end of this year (see GSN, June 13; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Sept. 20).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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U.S.-Russia II:  Moscow Proposes Talks on Reductions, Missile Defense

Russia has proposed convening just-established working groups with the United States this fall to discuss missile defense issues and the U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty on nuclear weapons, the Russian Foreign Ministry said today (see GSN, Sept. 19).

The groups could meet in “late October or early November of this year in Moscow,” according to the statement.  Officials established the groups during a recent meeting of the U.S.-Russian Consultative Group on Strategic Security in Washington (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 25).

For further information, see:

U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)

Bush Announces Moscow Treaty

U.S. State Department Fact Sheet on Moscow Treaty

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NPT:  Mali, Chile, South Africa Sign Additional Protocols to Treaty

Mali, Chile and South Africa this month signed additional protocols to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency said yesterday.  The agreements expand the agency’s authority to detect undeclared nuclear materials or activities.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei last week urged members of the organization to sign additional protocols so the agency can continue to provide assurances about nuclear materials (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“The number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force remains well below expectations,” ElBaradei said at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna.  “I urge all States who have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date.”

This week the IAEA’s Board of Governors also approved an additional protocol with El Salvador, the agency said in a press release (IAEA release, Sept. 24).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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CTBT:  Monitoring System Expanding, Treaty Organization Says

Six years after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature, great progress has been made in creating the global verification regime called for under the treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 18).  The treaty was opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996.

Out of the 337 International Monitoring Station facilities called for in the treaty, site surveys have been completed for 280 stations, the organization said in a release.  So far, 135 stations have been built and an additional 104 are currently under construction (see GSN, April 15).  About 70 stations are contributing data to the organization’s International Data Center in Vienna, according to the release.

On the treaty’s anniversary this year, 166 countries had signed the treaty and 94 had ratified it, including 31 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force (see GSN, Sept. 18).

“Today, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is recognized as a cornerstone in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament,” the organization said.  “States which sign and ratify the Treaty join a global community committed to ensuring that the world is a safer and more secure place” (CTBT Organization release, Sept. 24).

For further information, see:

CTBT Text

States Parties to the CTBT (Federation of American Scientists)

CTBT Organization

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Pakistan:  U.S.-Pakistani Defense Officials Hold First Meeting Since 1998

The U.S.-Pakistani Defense Consultative Group today began its first meeting since 1998, when the United States imposed sanctions after Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests (see GSN, Aug. 8).

The four-day meeting is expected to focus on the release of weapons and military equipment sold to Pakistan by the United States, but withheld due to the sanctions, according to a Pakistani defense official.  U.S. and Pakistani officials are also expected to discuss the purchase of new weapons and resumption of joint military exercises, the official said.

“The revival of the Defense Consultative Group is a very significant development,” Pakistani presidential spokesman Gen. Rashid Qureshi said.  “Such meetings will definitely help enhance defense cooperation between Pakistan and United States.”

A 40-member U.S. team arrived in Pakistan today to begin preliminary discussions, according to the Associated Press.  Led by Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith, the U.S. delegation and a Pakistani delegation led by Defense Secretary Gen. Hamid Nawaz are expected to meet Thursday for formal talks.  Feith is also expected to meet with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and other Pakistani defense officials to discuss Pakistan’s military needs, according to a Pakistani Defense Ministry statement (Munir Ahmad, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Sept. 24).

For further information, see:

Pakistani Government

Pakistani Embassy to the United States

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U.S.-Kazakhstan:  Former Kazakh Weapons Scientists Aid U.S. Medicine

By Anne Marie Pecha
Global Security Newswire

A group of former nuclear scientists in Kazakhstan will soon be using U.S. Energy Department funds to help supply diagnostic medical materials to the United States, a department official said yesterday.

Officials from the department’s Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Kazakh Institute of Nuclear Physics signed an agreement Sept. 16 at a conference in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to supply radioactive isotopes to the U.S. medical industry, institute director Kayrat Kadyrzhanov told the Almaty Ekspress-K newspaper last week.

U.S. contractor Technology Commercialization International also plans to participate in the project, which involves nearly 150 specialists in producing and processing nuclear materials, said the official from the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration.

“If the project is successful, it will lead to the creation of permanent, long-term peaceful employment for these former weapons of mass destruction personnel,” the official said.

According to the recent agreement, Kazakh specialists will produce medical isotopes, Los Alamos technicians will verify their quality and Technology Commercialization International will buy them.

Funded with $1.1 million over three years from the NNSA’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program — and with matching funds from Technology Commercialization International — the project aims to enhance potentially scarce supplies of the medical isotope Germanium 68.  Health care personnel are increasingly using the isotope to help diagnose certain types of cancer and other diseases in the heart and nervous system with a technique called positron emission tomography, the official said.

The Energy Department is the main supplier of Germanium 68 in the United States, according to the official.  The United States has many diagnostic technologies and demand for necessary isotopes is growing quickly.  Meanwhile, Kazakhstan easily produces medical isotopes but has few technologies in which to put them to use, according to Ekspress-K.

“The project redounds to the economic benefit of both the U.S. and Kazakhstan and will advance medical care in the U.S.,” the NNSA official said.

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United States:  Energy Prepares to Move Weapon-Grade Materials

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

The U.S. Energy Department recently released an environmental impact statement for a proposed move of nuclear weapon materials and equipment from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico to the Nevada Test Site (see GSN, Aug. 13).

A former Energy official criticized the length of time it has taken to reach this stage, however, saying the process should have been completed in early 2001.

Completing the impact statement clears the way for two metric tons of weapon-grade materials and components to be relocated from the Los Alamos site known as Technical Area 18, National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman Bryan Wilkes said.  Most of the scientists involved with TA-18 will not move to Nevada but will travel there periodically to work at the site, he said.

Cost and security considerations prompted the move, Wilkes said (see GSN, Aug. 12).  Nearby Nellis Air Force Base allows military aircraft to patrol the area, Wilkes said, and officials plan to house the relocated material in the Test Site’s 1990s-built Device Assembly Facility — which is new compared to the 1940s-era facilities at Los Alamos.

“The Nevada Test Site is one of the most secure, if not the most secure place in the country,” Wilkes said.  “It was built with security in mind.”

Move Overdue

The recently completed impact statement was originally due in December 2000, said Pete Stockton, former special assistant to Clinton administration Energy Secretary Bill Richardson.  Stockton now works for the Project on Government Oversight, a private government watchdog group.

A plan had been put in place by April 2000 to make the move within nine months, he said.

“We absolutely have to be out of there as soon as possible,” he said.

Mock attacks on the facility have made its vulnerability apparent for years, Stockton said.  In 1997, U.S. Army Special Forces made their way into the facility with a garden cart purchased from Home Depot “and left with enough nuclear material to make an atom bomb,” according to project documents (see GSN, Oct. 5, 2001).

Another test of the facilities defenses in October 2000 showed similar weaknesses, Stockton said.  For example, the Los Alamos facility was built at the bottom of a canyon so the canyon walls would absorb radiation produced at the facility.  This location — surrounded by uncontrolled higher ground — has made upgrading security extremely difficult, according to Stockton.

Stockton said he is now concerned that deputy NNSA administrator Everet Beckner will not have full support for the move within the security administration, slowing the process.

“We felt it couldn’t be defended,” Stockton said of Los Alamos.  This security lapse is confusing, he said, considering the worldwide rush to secure nuclear stockpiles.  “It is interesting how critical we are of the Russians.”

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U.S.-Russia:  Cold War Rivals Cooperate on Space Launcher

The U.S. Atlas 5 space launch vehicle, which lofted its first satellite last month, is a unusual demonstration of cooperation between former Cold War rivals.  The basic rocket design evolved from a former U.S. ICBM and it is powered by Russian-designed engines.

To make the Atlas 5, a U.S. Air Force project to design dependable, inexpensive launch vehicles — the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program — allowed U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin to pursue Russian technology available after the end of the Cold War.

“The Russians were able to develop systems and metals and capabilities that allowed them to fire engines at higher pressures, temperatures and efficiencies,” Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Joan Underwood said.

Subcontractor Pratt & Whitney joined with Russian company NPO Energomash to build the RD-180 engine, which has at least 10 percent better performance than its Western rivals, according to the Times (William Broad, New York Times, Sept. 22).

For further information, see:

Atlas ICBM Historical Society

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Iraq: Expert Says U.S. Bill Could Aid Iraq’s Weapons Program

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Provisions of pending export control legislation before Congress intended to help U.S. exporters also could aid Iraq in acquiring certain technologies that are useful for building nuclear weapons, a U.S. expert said yesterday.

The bill would amend U.S. export law to relax controls on a class of sensitive technologies, those determined by the Commerce Department to have “mass market availability,” whether through U.S. companies or foreign firms.  Such items would no longer require government review and license before they are exported.

That could include special aluminum tubing, maraging steel, and carbon fibers, which can be key ingredients in nuclear weapons programs, said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control testifying before the House Armed Services Committee.

“Since Sept. 11, we can no longer afford to put trade above security,” he said.

Aluminum tubing is currently available from numerous U.S. sellers, and therefore would meet the mass-market criteria and could be sold abroad without a license, Milhollin said.  The other two types of equipment also would meet the criteria, he said.

If the legislation is passed, the United States would have a hard time persuading other countries to stop selling such equipment, since it is equipment “our exporters were entitled to sell without restriction,” said Milhollin.

“Thus, countries like Iraq would have a much easier time importing the means to make nuclear weapons,” he said.

The legislation, called the Export Administration Act of 2001, was approved by the Senate, is supported by the White House and was approved by the House International Relations Committee with some modifications.  The House Armed Services Committee passed a different version of the bill considered more restrictive.  It would require concurrence of the secretaries of state and defense before decontrolling technologies deemed to have mass market availability and such controls also would remain in place if the item is covered by a multilateral export control or other international regime.

The House has yet to bring either version to a vote (see GSN, March 7).

“The irony is that, rather than strengthening these systems of control, the legislation that is being pushed through Congress dramatically liberalizes these key protections, making it easier for Saddam Hussein and his ilk to continue their weapons of mass destruction programs,” Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Research and Development Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) said.

Milhollin noted recent reports that aluminum tubing of unspecified origin had been intercepted on its way into Iraq (see GSN, Sept. 9).    Such items are currently barred from Iraq by U.S. export regulations and by an international embargo on the country, as they could be used by Iraq to construct centrifuges for enriching uranium. 

Experts say the seizures were a sign Iraq has continued to try to build nuclear weapons, and while not finished, may be near completion.

“The recent announcement of interception of large orders for aluminum cylinders indicate[s] that the process of putting together large enough units for full production is not complete yet. At the same time it also indicates that Iraq has already bypassed the initial testing and possibly pilot plant stage,” said Khidir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear engineer and the director of the Council on Middle East Affairs, also testifying yesterday. 

He estimated Iraq would be capable of fissile material production in two years and have accumulated enough for two or three weapons in three years.

“We must convince the rest of the world to keep the means to make weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists and the countries that support them,” said Milhollin.  “Either we protect ourselves from terrorism, or we make a few more bucks from trade.”

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United States I:  Energy Department Considers Trigger Plant Sites

The U.S. Energy Department is considering five sites for a new facility to manufacture plutonium triggers, or “pits,” for nuclear weapons, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 23).

The sites are the Nevada Test Site, the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and Los Alamos National Laboratory, also in New Mexico, Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) said yesterday.

There is a strong possibility that Energy will choose the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for the new pit production site, New Mexico state Representative John Heaton said.  The plant is a viable choice because pit production could be kept separate from other facilities such as Los Alamos that are involved in nuclear weapons research, but still be located near them, he said (Associated Press, Sept. 20).

A spokesman for Los Alamos declined to say whether the laboratory is actively seeking to house the pit production facility.  Los Alamos has developed an “interim” pit production site designed to make as many as 50 pits per year by 2007, according to the Albuquerque Journal.

The purpose of the interim pit production site at Los Alamos is to “recapture” the capability to make nuclear weapons triggers and to transfer that ability to the planned full-scale production site, Los Alamos spokesman Jim Danneskiold said (Mark Oswald, Albuquerque Journal, Sept. 18).

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Iran:  Spent-Fuel Deal Is Lagging, Russia Says

Iran has not yet finalized an agreement to return spent fuel to Russia from the Bushehr nuclear plant, which Russia is helping to build, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 4).

Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said last month that Russian officials have prepared all the necessary agreements to reclaim spent Bushehr fuel.  Iran, however, has not yet given its agreement, a Russian Atomic Energy Ministry official said.

A new clause to the Russian-Iranian agreement on the Bushehr plant “has been presented to Iran,” the official said.  “As soon as Iran makes a judgment on documents concerning the return of spent nuclear fuel, the clause will be added to the agreement.”

Russia plans to continue to pressure Iran for the return of the fuel, the official said.

“The position of the Atomic Energy Ministry has not altered,” the official said.  “We will not supply nuclear fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power plant until we sign an agreement on its return to Russia” (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 19).

Iran is not being uncooperative with Russia on the Bushehr issue, Rumyantsev said Wednesday at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s annual general conference in Vienna (see GSN, Sept. 16).

“On the contrary, at the general conference the Iranians proclaimed the complete openness of their nuclear activities,” Rumyantsev said (ITAR-Tass, Sept. 18 in FBIS-SOV, Sept. 18).

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South Asia:  Arsenals Are Secure, Study Says

A new U.S.-funded study says that nuclear theft is unlikely in India and Pakistan because they have significantly tightened security on their nuclear facilities, the Times of India reported today (see GSN, Nov. 12, 2001).

Study authors Hasan-Askari Rizvi, a former Columbia University professor of Pakistani studies, and Rajesh Basrur, a former nuclear security analyst at Bombay University, presented their conclusions at Columbia University in New York (see GSN, Aug 15).

Rizvi acknowledged there is still a possibility that an employee could steal radioactive material.  He also said there is no evidence that Pakistan has taken advantage of an offer from the United States to help secure nuclear sites (see GSN, Nov. 5, 2001; Times of India, Sept. 20).

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United States II:  Air Force Test-Fires Minuteman 3 ICBM

The U.S. Air Force yesterday test-fired an unarmed Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (see GSN, June 7).

The missile traveled 4,200 miles in 30 minutes, hitting a target at the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean, the Air Force said.  The test evaluated the missile’s launch systems and accuracy (Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Sept. 20).

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