Chinese Response:  U.S Plans Could Escalate Taiwan Tensions, Report Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. efforts to develop a missile defense system could lead to increased tensions in the current standoff between China and Taiwan, according to a report released Tuesday by the Henry L. Stimson Center (see GSN, July 12, 2002).

Missile defense “is a potentially destabilizing factor in the Taiwan Strait where chances for conflict have grown stronger over the past decade,” says the report, China and Missile Defense:  Managing U.S.-P.R.C. Strategic Relations.  “In a triangular dynamic where the U.S. and the P.R.C. are the two major military vectors, Taiwan is increasingly becoming a wild card,” it says.

In addition to increasing cross-Taiwan Strait tensions, U.S. missile defense plans could also affect China’s military modernization efforts and ultimately lead to increased U.S-Chinese strategic tensions, the report says.  It presents a number of recommendations as to how the United States can proceed with missile defense development without increasing tensions with China.

If the United States develops a workable missile defense system, it could lead to the Untied States, China and Taiwan all upgrading and increasing preparations for a possible conflict, according to the report.  China, in particular, is likely to be concerned that a U.S. missile defense system will give Washington greater freedom of action in any conflict over Taiwan, because such a system would weaken China’s nuclear deterrence and its effect on U.S. conventional planning, the report says. 

The report warns that China is likely to do “whatever is necessary” to maintain a credible deterrent and limit the U.S. freedom of action.  For example, China could accelerate the deployment of road-mobile ICBMs and countermeasures in order to overcome a U.S. missile defense system (see GSN, Sept. 25, 2002). 

There are concerns that if China believes that a missile defense system gives the United States a large military advantage, then China could accelerate conflict escalation with Taiwan, the report says.  Such escalation could even lead to the point where China pre-emptively attacks Taiwan before the United States is able to put much of its missile defense system in place, it says.

Taiwan itself might become more emboldened with a U.S. missile defense system in place, according to the report.  Such a system, along with more concrete assurances from the United States that it will aid Taiwan if attacked by China, could lead Taipei to further move away from Beijing toward independence.  Major Taiwanese purchases of U.S. missile defense systems are also likely to be viewed by China as an attempt to integrate with the larger national U.S. missile defense system and would increase U.S.-Chinese tensions, the report says.

Strategic Planning

U.S. efforts to develop a missile defense system could also influence China’s strategic planning and the development of its strategic forces, according to the report.  For example, China could choose to develop a smaller, but more modern, strategic capability that would include mobile tactical systems to limit the U.S. missile defense system’s ability to support a U.S. first strike against China’s nuclear arsenal.  China could also choose to develop an “assured minimum deterrence,” the report says.  This would involve developing mobile ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles, as well as increasing multiple-warhead systems and deploying decoys to spoof U.S. defenses.

In July of last year, the U.S. Defense Department released a report warning that China was working to strengthen its ballistic missile arsenal to counter a U.S. missile defense system (see GSN, July 15, 2002).  As China continues to upgrade its ballistic missile arsenal, it will likely “take measures to improve its ability to defeat the defense system in order to preserve its strategic deterrent,” the Pentagon report said.  Such measures could include increased penetration packages for Chinese ICBMs, an increase in deployed ICBMs and the development of multiple warhead technologies (see GSN, Feb. 11). 

If China felt significantly threatened, Beijing could choose to undergo a strategic doctrinal change and pursue a limited nuclear deterrence capability, which would give Beijing the option to respond to any kind of attack and be enough of a deterrent to avoid an escalation to a nuclear war, the report says.  There would be political drawbacks to this approach, however, as it would signal a much more aggressive posture and an intent to dominate East Asia, it says.

Under a limited nuclear deterrence strategic doctrine, “any claim that its [China’s] nuclear forces support a purely defensive posture would be unconvincing,” the report says.

There would likely be several brakes on China’s strategic planning response to a U.S. missile defense system, according to the report.  For example, one such brake might be regional considerations.  Beijing would probably not be quick to abandon the image it puts forth as a peace-loving nation, it says. 

“China also is wary of not being drawn into a self-defeating arms race with the U.S.,” the report says, noting that Beijing has learned from the example of the U.S.-Soviet arms race.

China has also not put much faith in assurances from the United States that it is not building a missile defense system with the purpose of ending China’s deterrent capability, according to the report.  One reason for this is a lack of information on what missile defense components the United States plans to deploy, it says.  In addition, even if U.S. missile defense efforts were not directly targeted at China, any system the United States deploys would have the capability of defeating China’s missile force.

“China sees its small nuclear ICBM force as directly threatened by even a limited U.S. missile defense program,” the report says. 

Recommendations

For U.S. missile defense efforts to not escalate tensions with China or in the greater East Asian region, the United States needs to better determine the relationship it wishes to have with Beijing, according to the report.  For example, Washington needs to decide if it could live with a China that possesses a small, but evolving, strategic deterrent or if the United States needs a missile defense system capable of nullifying China’s deterrent capabilities.  The report warns, however, that the latter option could trigger a “defensive versus offensive race” with China — a constant escalation of U.S. defenses and Chinese efforts to overcome them.

“U.S. relations with China will be better served if Washington views China as a rising power whose future is uncertain rather than a presumptive strategic competitor,” the report says.

The United States also should attempt to begin a series of substantial talks with China on strategic issues and concerns in order to have an influence over the future of Chinese strategic deployments, according to the report.  In order to prevent U.S. missile defense efforts from nullifying its deterrent capability, and to preserve a diplomatic relationship akin to that shared by the United States and Russia, China could attempt to establish some sort of undertaking with the United States, the report says.  This could be in the form of expressed reassurances or parallel statements, it says, adding that China is not likely to seek formal agreements. 

Both countries will also have to proceed with a policy of restraint, in order to prevent the rise of suspicions and resultant build-ups, the report says.  New U.S.-Chinese strategic talks could lead to expressions by both sides of restraint.

“It is in the interest of both the P.R.C. and the U.S. to seek mutual restraint to the extent possible,” the report says.

The Stimson Center report also recommends that the United States should increase transparency of its missile defense efforts.  China views some potential system components with more concern than others, the report says.  While the United States might not yet know exactly which components will be deployed, it may be able to reduce Chinese concerns by making clear those components that will not be deployed for whatever reasons, be they cost concerns or technical difficulties, the report says. 

Greater transparency over U.S. missile defense efforts could also lead China, in turn, to be more open regarding its strategic forces, which would benefit the United States, according to the report

“As difficult as this would be to achieve,” the report says, “it is worth a constant effort because Beijing must come to understand that its actions also have consequences and continued secrecy regarding its long-term strategic plans and objectives is likely to disadvantage China over the long run,” the report says.

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South Korea:  Patriot Deal Moving Again

South Korea announced Tuesday that a once-failed deal to buy 48 Patriot missile systems from U.S. defense contractor Raytheon could be back on track (see GSN, May 6, 2002).

The $1.65 billion “SAM-X” effort almost collapsed last year because of differences over the price and the payment schedule, the Korea Herald reported.

“The consensus opinion in the military is that the nation needs to beef up its missile capability.  Negotiations (for the SAM-X) will go ahead and we hope for a good result in future negotiations,” said a senior South Korean procurement official (Korea Herald, Feb. 12).

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Israel:  U.S., Israeli Contractors Sign Arrow Interceptor Production Agreement

The U.S. defense contractor Boeing and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) have signed an agreement for components of the Israeli Arrow missile interceptor to be produced in the United States and shipped to Israel for final assembly, the two companies announced yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 1, 2002).

Under the agreement, Boeing will be responsible for producing 50 percent of Arrow components.  IAI would then be responsible for the assembly of the interceptors in Israel.  Boeing will coordinate component production at more than 150 U.S. companies, Boeing and IAI said in a press release.

Officials from both companies praised the new agreement.

“Israel and the United States have been friends and allies for many years.  It is our privilege to work with IAI on the Arrow program,” said James Evatt, senior vice president & general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems.  “This agreement is important because it marks the beginning of our work together and our commitment to the success to the Arrow project, it also opens the way for future missile defense efforts between Boeing and IAI,” he added (Boeing release, Feb. 11).

For further information, see:

MDA Terminal Defense Segment

Federation of American Scientists Background on Arrow

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United States:  Air Force Spends $500 Million to Maintain Launch Capability

The U.S. Air Force plans to provide U.S. defense contractors Boeing and Lockheed Martin with more than $500 million over the next several years to maintain a satellite launch capability, the Wall Street Journal reported.

The service plans to provide the two companies with $538 million over a five-year period beginning in fiscal 2004 to maintain their rocket launch programs, according to the Journal.  In fiscal 2004, the Air Force plans to allot $164 million to be split between Boeing’s Delta 4 rocket program and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas 5 program, with $140 million going toward facility and personnel costs (see GSN, Sept. 23, 2002).  The funding is expected to decrease over the remaining four years, but has not been budgeted yet, industry officials said.

“We’re committed to maintaining two launch providers,” said Gen. Lance Lord, commander of the Air Force Space Command.

Both companies have said that they need the U.S. funding to maintain their rocket launch programs in the absence of commercial orders, the Journal reported.  Boeing executives have said the company does not expect a profit on the Delta 4 rocket for several years, and Lockheed Martin executives have said they do not expect to break even on the Atlas 5 until at least 2010 (Squeo/Pasztor, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 12).

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U.S. Plans:  Booster Successfully Launched, Intercept Planned for This Year

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. defense contractor Orbital Sciences test launched the first prototype of its missile defense boost vehicle last Thursday and officials hope to conduct a fully integrated intercept test later this year, according to a company official (see GSN, Dec. 9, 2002).

The launch was “excellent,” Orbital spokesman Barron Beneski said.

There were “no issues.  The vehicle performed fully, as expected,” he added.

The launch is the first of several planned for this year, according to Beneski.  Each one will be more complex than the last and the company expects to attempt an intercept flight in the second half of this year (see GSN, Jan. 7).

The boost vehicle, dubbed Taurus Lite, is being developed for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.  Orbital Sciences is producing the boost vehicle under a contract with lead systems integrator Boeing.

Lockheed Martin is also developing a GMD boost vehicle and Boeing officials are scheduled to decide between the two options later this year.

Officials launched the unarmed rocket from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.  This was the first launch from Vandenberg this year, according to a Missile Defense Agency release.

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