United States:  On-The-Lam Monkey Raises Fears Over Proposed Laboratory

The recent escape of a research monkey from a University of California at Davis facility has raised concerns among area residents about the security of a proposed Biosafety Level 4 laboratory the university is seeking to build, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, July 18, 2002).

The 2-year old female rhesus macaque, which was to be used for breeding purposes, escaped the California National Primate Research Center Feb. 13 when handlers were cleaning cages.  The macaque went behind the cages, and the center’s employees reported hearing a slurping sound, as if the monkey had went down a small drain, according to the AP.  A search of the center’s plumbing using fiber-optic cameras, however, failed to find the monkey. 

In the 41 years that the primate center has been in operation, 82 monkeys have been able to escape and enjoy life on the outside before being quickly captured or return voluntarily, said UC-Davis spokeswoman Lisa Lapin. 

The primate center would supply research animals to the proposed laboratory, for which UC-Davis submitted a grant application this month to the National Institutes of Health.  The at-large monkey is disease-free because the primate center raises research animals for Biosafety Level 2 and 3 diseases, which have treatments available, university officials said.  They added that the monkey would not have been able to break out of the proposed laboratory, which would employ armed guards.

Still, area residents who oppose the Biosafety Level 4 facility said the escape raised questions about the proposed laboratory’s security. 

“If they can’t manage these monkeys when they’ve got level two and three diseases, how will they manage monkeys with level four diseases?” said Joshua English.

California National Primate Research Center Director Dallas Hyde said the security levels between the primate center and the proposed laboratory would be very different.  “Animals that go in there don’t come out alive,” he said (Brian Melley, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 23).

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Japan:  Aum Shinrikyo Released Harmless Anthrax in 1993

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

DENVER — While Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult became infamous for the murderous sarin attacks the group conducted in the mid-1990s, most notably the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway, the group also conducted a biological weapons attack in 1993 that went undetected for years, biologist Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University said Sunday.

Had the 1993 Tokyo attack, which failed, been detected and investigated, the cult might have been prevented from carrying out its later sarin attacks, Keim said during a panel discussion here at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The case began in late June 1993, when residents near a cult-owned building in the Kameido section of Tokyo filed more than 160 complaints over a four-day period of a strong odor coming from the building.  When Japanese authorities arrived to investigate, cult members refused allow them into the building, saying the odor was the result of cooking beans.  Soon after the complaints, the cult closed the facility and left, Keim said.

Photographs of the building, taken while Japanese authorities investigated the complaints, showed a mist being emitted from the roof, Keim said.  When authorities entered the building after the cult had departed, they found that the cult had apparently pumped a liquid up to the roof from containers in the basement, Keim said.

This method, however, resulted in leakage, which produced slime on the walls of the building, Keim said, and Japanese authorities collected five sample vials.  Four of the vials were tested in an effort to determine the makeup of the slime, Keim said, but no tests for anthrax were conducted.  The tests did go so far as to look for the presence of human proteins, on the theory that the slime was the result of the cult boiling human bodies, he added.

While the tests on the four vials resulted in little information, the fifth vial sat in storage until the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, Keim said.  As Japanese authorities interviewed captured Aum members, they described the cult’s earlier efforts to conduct an anthrax attack, which had gone undetected because of a total absence of casualties or reported symptoms.  Keim said he was able to receive the forgotten fifth vial of slime recovered from the Kameido facility, from which he was able to grow a culture of anthrax through a series of experiments conducted in 2001.  In a foreboding coincidence, Keim said he had submitted a paper on his research on the 1993 incident on Sept. 12, 2001.

From his experiment, Keim was able to determine why the attack had resulted in no casualties and why it had been able to go undetected for so long.  For some reason, Aum had decided to use the Sterne strain of anthrax; a nonvirulent strain often used to produce animal anthrax vaccines. 

Keim offered three possible explanations why the cult had used a harmless anthrax strain. 

First, perhaps the cult was simply incompetent.  Keim discounted this theory, however, because the cult membership included a number of scientists and because the veterinary supply company where the cult obtained its original samples would probably have told them it was a nonvirulent strain.

A second, more frightening theory is that the 1993 incident was only a dry run for a later attack that would have used virulent pathogens, Keim said. 

A third explanation, Keim said, is that the cult suffered from poor leadership.  The cult’s leader, Shoko Asahara, had been known to order the assassination of his own followers, which instilled in the members of the cult a fear for their lives (see GSN, May 23, 2002).  When Asahara ordered in 1993 that a biological weapons attack be carried out, Aum members were probably too afraid to acknowledge that they did not have the necessary materials, so they attempted to obtain whatever they could quickly get their hands on, leading to the failed attack, Keim said.

Since the Tokyo subway attack, a number of Aum members have been prosecuted and sentenced for their roles in the development of the nerve agent and its subsequent use (see GSN, Feb. 4).  Last year, two Aum scientists were sentenced to death for their roles in the two sarin attacks the cult conducted in Japan in 1994 and 1995 (see GSN, Oct. 11, 2002).  Last month, Japanese prosecutors requested the death penalty for another Aum scientist believed to have been involved in the cult’s sarin attacks (see GSN, Jan. 30). 

Keim said, however, that he had no information as to whether any of the cult members were charged for the 1993 incident.  It is doubtful that Japanese authorities have done so because of the seriousness of the other charges involved and the long criminal trials for Aum members involved in the cult’s sarin attacks, he said.

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U.S. Response:  Microbial Forensic Capability Needed, Experts Say

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

DENVER — The United States needs to develop a microbial forensics capability to better detect and investigate acts of biological terrorism and crime, says a report by the American Society for Microbiology released Sunday.

While acts of biological terrorism, such as the autumn 2001 anthrax attacks, are rare, they have shown that authorities have difficulty identifying those responsible and gathering evidence suitable for a criminal prosecution, according to the report, released here at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.  Investigators should be able to call on trained microbiologists, who rarely participate in criminal prosecutions, the report says.

“If not us, who?” Georges Benjamin, executive director of the American Public Health Association, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.

Public health scientists need to learn proper evidence handling techniques so that samples can be used in a later criminal prosecution, Benjamin said, adding that specimens from bioterrorism acts are likely to make their way through the public health system.  Scientists do not want to be responsible for allowing the perpetrator of such an act to go unpunished, he said. 

Therefore, the United States needs to develop better systems to track and detect suspicious outbreaks of diseases and to gather evidence during the course of an investigation, the report says.

“Developing systems and methods to detect and track bioattacks will lead to greater safety and security for our nation against international terrorists,” the report says.  “But it will also benefit the investigation of all biocrimes, including those carried out in a personal matter,” it adds.

At the scene of a biological attack, law enforcement and public health officials need to be trained to both protect those on-site from infection and to properly gather evidence, according to the report.  To do this, permanent communication and cross-discipline education programs need to be created for both types of personnel, it says.  In addition, certain first responders in each community should received forensics training and panels of experts with knowledge of pathogens that could be used in attack should be created in order to provide additional expertise if needed.

Those who will be the first to arrive on the scene of a suspected biological attack will also need to be trained in how to properly recover pieces of possible evidence, the report says.  It recommends that standard operating procedures be developed for the collection, storage, and documentation of samples so they can be used later in a criminal prosecution.  Such procedures could be based on the FBI’s evidence-gathering standards.

During the course of an investigation, it will also become important to identify both the pathogen used and its source, the report says.  To do this, a national disease surveillance network should be established for both humans and animals to detect suspicious outbreaks (see GSN, Jan. 23).  Such a network could be based on the PulseNet surveillance system, which tracks outbreaks of food-borne diseases.  Test kits should be created to better identify pathogens, according to the report.  The United States should encourage private development of these kits through increased research funding, it says.

The United States also needs to develop an improved capability to differentiate between intentionally caused outbreaks and naturally occurring diseases, according to the report.  To do this, databases should be created that include information on pathogens that occur regionally and those that would raise suspicion by their presence.  For example, while anthrax occurs naturally in regions with large livestock industries, the 2001 outbreaks in urban areas of Florida and the northeast United States raised immediate suspicion.

Genetic sequencing is another tool that can be developed to help identify an attack pathogen and to help locate its source, the report says.  Such methods have been used during the course of the investigation into the autumn 2001 anthrax attacks.  The report recommends that more complete genomic sequencing of all possible biological terrorism agents such be done to assist in identification.  High priority pathogens should have up to 20 strains sequenced to better understand the biological variation between them, the report says.  The United States should also compile a national strain repository to establish a centralized repository of live cultures and reference strains, the report says.

U.S. authorities should conduct frequent re-evaluations of priority lists of agents that could be used in a biological attack, according to the report.  By doing so, they could better determine what pathogens would be attractive to terrorists.  These re-evaluations should also consider pathogens that could cause economic damage, as well as those that could cause mass casualties.  Those pathogens that can cause easily communicable diseases and those for which there are no vaccines or treatments should be given a higher priority, it says.  Plant, animal and food-borne pathogens should be given more attention than they are currently, where the focus is more on military agents, the report adds (see GSN, Feb. 3).

The United States should also create a pyramid system of microbial forensics laboratories, which is currently “nonexistent,” the report says.  Such a system could be based on the Laboratory Response Network, which is a four-tiered system of U.S. laboratories with the capability to conduct progressively more complex procedures — ranging from hospital and commercial reference laboratories at the bottom of the pyramid to a relatively few laboratories that can perform a wide range of tests, including genomic sequencing.

The United States also needs better education and training of scientists, law enforcement officials and first responders, according to the report.  Microbiologists need to receive forensics training, while forensic personnel should be trained in microbiology, it says.  Public health personnel should also receive forensic training to take advantage of the existing architecture. 

In addition, first responders also need to be better trained in biological safety and criminal investigation procedures, the report says.

“In most cases, first responders will not be trained in knowing how to deal with a potential biocrime scene,” the report says.  “Education is key to inform likely first responders how to determine whether there might be a biological threat,” it adds.

Experts agreed of the need to train microbiologists and public health scientists in forensic methods so they would be better able to investigate an act of biological terrorism.

This would require additional funding, however, said APHA’s Benjamin.  “The real issue here” is whether public health officials will receive increased resources, such as higher numbers of laboratory technicians, to handle the increased forensics responsibilities, he said.  To better allocate such limited resources, Benjamin recommended creating “centers of excellence” — laboratories that would focus on microbial forensics.  Either the public or private sector could operate such facilities, he said.

The United States is already on its way to being better able to investigate acts of bioterrorism, Benjamin said.  Necessary technologies, such as genetic information libraries and an information-sharing infrastructure, already exist he said.  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, along with the FBI, have already begun conduct courses in epidemiological forensics, which train scientists in detecting suspicious disease outbreaks and determining if they were intentionally caused, he said.  Benjamin predicted that within the next two years there would likely be a new, aggressive capability, to track down biological terrorists.

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Smallpox:  No Serious Smallpox Reactions in Civilian Program

As of Wednesday, more than 4,000 U.S. civilians have received smallpox inoculations and no serious reactions have been recorded, U.S. health officials said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 14).

The Pentagon has immunized more than 100,000 personnel and has experienced five serious reactions.  The Defense Department said that all five are in good condition.

Another six military personnel had mild rashes that might be classified as generalized vaccinia.

Of the 4,213 civilians immunized, seven people reported reactions but none were considered life threatening (Laura Meckler, Associated Press/The Australian, Feb. 21).

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International Response:  Scientific Journal Editors Call For Restraint

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

DENVER — A group of editors from leading scientific journals have called for restraint in publishing articles that might contain information useful to terrorists seeking to conduct biological attacks.

While there is a need for scientific research to be published and distributed, scientists and journal editors must also consider the need to prevent terrorists from acquiring information that could aid them in developing biological weapons, said a statement by the Journal Editors and Authors Group released here Saturday at annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

“There is information, that, although we cannot now capture it with lists or definitions, presents enough risks of use by terrorists that it should not be published,” said the group, consisting of editors from publications such as Science and Nature.  “How and by what processes it might be identified will continue to challenge us, because … it is also true that open publications brings benefits not only to public health but also in efforts to combat terrorism,” they added.

The group has called on editors from international scientific journals to modify, or even refuse to publish, papers that might contain information useful to terrorists.  Scientific papers, however, must also remain of a high quality and contain enough detail to allow for reproducibility — “a requirement for scientific progress,” the group said in its statement.  The statement is set to be published this week in several scientific journals, said Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, who spoke at a press briefing.  Atlas said the editors would not act as censors.

There are no set qualifications as to what information would be too dangerous to block from publications, Atlas said.  He compared the situation to pornography — “You know it when you see it.”  Many editors and scientists involved in peer review boards have worked in biological defense and should have the background needed to recognize dangerous information, Atlas said.

Almost all of the papers published in the last several years that were considered by the group as they developed their statement would have still been published under the new mindset of restraint, Atlas said.  For example, more than 14,000 papers were submitted to journals published by the ASM between 2001 and 2002, according to an ASM press release.  Out of those, 224 dealt with “select agents” — biological agents subject to new U.S. regulations because of their potential threat.  Of those 224 articles, only two raised security concerns.  The articles were modified and are now set to be published, Atlas said.

One of the two papers was modified to have the rhetoric in its introduction, describing the dangerousness of the pathogen being studied, toned down, Atlas said.  In addition, information in the paper that described how the pathogen could be made more dangerous was removed, he added.  The authors of the two papers were not angered by the modifications, Atlas said.

Even some articles that raised public concerns when released would still deserve to be published with new security considerations, Atlas said.  One such article was a paper published in July of last year that explained how scientists at the State University of New York at Stony Brook was able to recreate the polio virus (see GSN, July 12, 2002).  The Los Angeles Times reported at the time that a number of scientists criticized the paper’s publication, calling it irresponsible.  Atlas Saturday defended the paper’s publication, saying it was considered at the time to have no new information and posed little security risk.

There are types of articles that should be blocked outright from being published and made widely available, Atlas said.  For example, there is no need to release information on how to weaponize anthrax, he said.

The group developed their statement in a series of meetings held last month.  The National Academy of Sciences, at the ASM’s request, held a meeting Jan. 9 with journal editors to consider the balance of open publication with security concerns (see GSN, Jan. 10).  On Jan. 10, the ASM hosted a meeting of journal editors, scientists and representatives from various U.S. agencies, such as the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, to determine what measures journals could take to prevent terrorists from obtaining useful information.

Although representatives from U.S. agencies took part in the discussions leading to the creation of the group’s statement, there has been no request from the government to become involved in the peer review process, Atlas said.  Donald Kennedy, editor of Science, said he doubted any type of legislation on the issue would be proposed, noting that attitudes of the U.S. officials present at the discussions leading to the statement’s creation.

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U.S. Response:  Overuse Makes Cipro Less Effective Against Illness

The antibiotic Cipro, most famously used during the 2001 anthrax attacks, is becoming increasingly weak in treating infections because of dangerous overuse, according to a study published today in the Journal of the American Medical Association (see GSN, Oct. 26, 2001).

The study was conducted on patients with sicknesses such as respiratory and urinary infections, and the results of the study do not mean that Cipro has become less effective in treating anthrax, the Associated Press reported.

Researchers studied the effects of fluoroquinolone antibiotics, which include Cipro, on patients in 43 states and Washington from 1994 to 2000.

In 1994, Cipro was 86 percent effective against bacteria samples.  In 2000, however, Cipro was effective against 76 percent of bacteria samples.

“More judicious use of fluoroquinolone antibiotics will be necessary to limit this downward trend,” according to the study, which was headed by Melinda Neuhauser of the University of Houston.  The study said that doctors are now prescribing Cipro for common sicknesses (Associated Press/Los Angeles Times, Feb. 19).

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Anthrax:  Victim’s Widow Files $50 Million Claim From U.S. Army

The widow of the first person to die in the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks has filed a $50 million claim against the U.S. Army, alleging that poor security at Maryland’s Fort Detrick research center permitted someone to steal the anthrax that killed Robert Stevens in Florida (see GSN, Feb. 3).

Stevens was the first of five fatalities in Florida, Connecticut, New York and Washington after anthrax-laden letters were processed and delivered by the U.S. Postal Service.

Stevens’ widow, Maureen Stevens, is trying to get more information about his death, including an autopsy report, and is seeking a financial settlement, her attorney Richard Schuler said Friday.  She has been frustrated by the federal investigation into Stevens’ death, Schuler said.

“There have been no arrests.  There’s been no information given to her, no indication that the investigation is progressing,” Schuler said.

AMI Building Deal

In a measure approved by Congress Thursday, the federal government would buy and clean up the building where Stevens worked as a photo editor for American Media Inc., publisher of tabloid newspapers, including the National Enquirer.

The arrangement calls for the United States to purchase the building for $1, and then assume all the clean-up costs, estimated at $7 million to $20 million (Kathy Bushouse, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Feb. 16).

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