U.S.-Russia:  Disarmament Through Mutual Transparency

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

U.S. and Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and shared scientific research projects have the potential to significantly increase the transparency and efficiency of nuclear disarmament, according to a policy brief released yesterday by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see GSN, Feb. 11).

U.S. companies have access to Russian programs because of U.S. threat reduction efforts that have existed for more than a decade, but Russian companies “do not have the same opportunities to develop industrial relationships at U.S. facilities,” according to Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russian and Eurasian program.

“In effect, they lack the natural transparency that accrues from these relationships,” she added.

Token contracts for Russian companies, such as disposal of scrap metal, could go a long way to make the process more even handed and build Moscow’s faith, Gottemoeller argues.  Even briefing Russian officials on the timetable and location of the U.S. disarmament projects could build confidence and trust between the two countries, according to the brief.

Gottemoeller also wrote that new scientific techniques could speed the disarmament process.

“There is no arms control or reduction task to which the U.S. and Russian scientific and technical communities could not immediately contribute as a team.  This is a radical departure from earlier arms control talks, when technologies or procedures were developed in their initial form by one side, then proposed to the other and laboriously negotiated over many months or even years,” the brief says.

Benefits of the Moscow Treaty

The U.S-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which could be discussed on the U.S. Senate floor this week, might be the applicable tool to make such nuclear reductions a reality in the current political climate (see GSN, Feb. 5).

Much thinner than it’s Cold War predecessors, the treaty’s slight content might allow modern tools, U.S.-Russian technical cooperation and existing Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to work, the policy brief says.

While the treaty does not set out a timeline for reducing nuclear stockpiles, the Cooperative Threat Reduction “contracting process has become so established that it could effectively become the means for transparent Russian reductions, Gottemoeller wrote.

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Washington and Moscow included 500 pages of detailed instructions, hammered out over several years, but “there is no stomach on either side for another round of Cold War-style arms control negotiations,” the policy brief says.

“The Moscow Treaty, by contrast, was negotiated in a few months and ended up at fewer than three pages,” according to Gottemoeller.  “It is a straightforward, simple commitment to nuclear arms reduction, without the high level of detail in START I — which in fact points to START’s Cold War limitations.  Officials had no other way of attaining a high level of confidence in the reductions of the other side,” she added.

The abundance of new tools means that Washington and Moscow no longer need to rely on treaty mechanisms alone to enforce disarmament obligations, according to Gottemoeller.

As relations grow warmer between the former Cold War adversaries, officials are facing a new opportunity to speed and enhance the disarmament process, the policy brief says.  While older treaties such as START I provide a solid underpinning, existing programs and innovative technologies can now be used to reduce stockpiles, make the process more transparent and produce “a better and quicker way to achieve nuclear arms reduction than the old treaty system alone could provide,” Gottemoeller wrote.

“Nuclear weapons will not magically go away without direct attention from policymakers, notwithstanding the absence of threats between the United States and Russia.  Negotiation, for better or worse, has historically been the major facilitator of nuclear arms reduction by both countries.  In the future, however, cooperation need not be limited by past models,” Gottemoeller wrote.

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North Korea:  Roh Says Pyongyang Must Abandon Nuclear Ambitions

During his inauguration today, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he would continue to engage Pyongyang but he warned that “North Korea’s nuclear development can never be condoned” (see GSN, Feb. 24).

“It is up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support,” he said, as 45,000 people gathered for his swearing-in ceremony.  “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development.  If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things it wants,” he added.

Roh noted the U.S. contribution to South Korea’s growth and security, but said that the two countries must develop more balanced ties.

“We will see to it that the alliance matures into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship,” Roh said.

Washington and Seoul are scheduled to take part in meetings to review their military alliance, the Korea Herald reported (Hwang Jang-jin, Korea Herald, Feb. 25).

In his farewell address, delivered yesterday, former President Kim Dae-jung urged Washington and Pyongyang to sit down to negotiations.

“Dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution,” he said.  Kim also defended his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea and said it had “greatly eased tension” on the peninsula.  Roh has said he will continue the policy.

The inauguration took place shortly after South Korea announced that Pyongyang had tested an anti-ship missile, the Financial Times reported (see related GSN story, today; Reuters/Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Feb. 24).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who attended the inauguration, said such a missile test was “not surprising.”

“It seems to be a fairly innocuous kind of test,” he added.

Powell also announced today that the United States will donate 40,000 metric tons of food to North Korea and is willing to donate another 60,000 metric tons later this year, the Associated Press reported (George Gedda, Associated Press/Salon.com, Feb. 25).

Japan announced today that it does not plan to resume food shipments to North Korea, citing security concerns and kidnapped Japanese citizens.

“Japan is negative about providing additional food aid to North Korea,” said an aide to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.  “Japan has two issues of priority, abduction and security concerns including missiles and nuclear weapons,” he added.

North Korea might follow today’s missile test with another tomorrow, Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 25).

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Iran:  Tehran Rejects Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards

During a visit of international nuclear experts, Iran announced Saturday that it has rejected for now a request to cooperate with enhanced measures to monitor its nuclear activities (see GSN, Feb. 21).

The International Atomic Energy Agency had asked Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the nuclear watchdog.  The protocol would permit the agency to conduct more intrusive inspections and environmental monitoring in Iran.

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran’s top nuclear energy official, said Iran would not sign the protocol because few other countries have done so.  It would, however, comply with its existing nuclear nonproliferation commitments as it builds new nuclear reactors and fuel production facilities, he said.

“All our developments will be under the oversight of the IAEA, but we will leave the road open to the Additional Protocol in the future,” Aghazadeh said.

After arriving Friday for a three-day visit, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei left one day earlier than scheduled, leaving his delegation to complete their tour of Iranian nuclear facilities (Azadeh Moaveni, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 23).

“I made it clear that with Iran developing a sophisticated fuel-cycle program, it is important for the agency to have as much authority, as much information, as possible,” ElBaradei said.  “I was assured that this issue will be under active consideration by the Iranian government, and this is an issue I will continue to discuss,” he added.

In Washington meanwhile, a State Department statement reaffirmed the U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear intentions, saying Iran has a “nuclear program based on deception and bad faith, and an ambitious rush to develop a nuclear fuel cycle, whose true purpose can only be to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program”

“Whatever the Iranians showed him [ElBaradei] about their hitherto clandestine uranium-enrichment program, it is akin to a midnight conversation, disclosed only after the facility’s existence was revealed by an Iranian opposition group,” the State Department said (Miranda Eeles, London Times, Feb. 24).

Iran, however, said it was acting in good faith.  “Iran intended to clarify that all doors would be open to the agency and its members and that Iran would proceed transparently,” Aghazadeh said.  “If a country has any doubt about Iran’s nuclear programs, it should go to the agency rather than slandering Iran,” he added (Moaveni, Los Angeles Times).

ElBaradei and a team of experts visited a developing uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz but the IAEA chief did not travel to the heavy water plant under construction at Arak or the nuclear reactor being built at Bushehr (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Feb. 23).

At Natanz, the IAEA experts saw a network of centrifuges to enrich uranium and they learned that Iran has the capability to build more centrifuges (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Feb. 22).

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North Korea:  Powell Meets Jiang Zemin, But No Agreement Reached

After four hours of meetings in Beijing with President Jiang Zemin and senior Chinese officials, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said the two countries had not agreed to a shared strategy on North Korea or Iraq (see GSN, Feb. 20).

The White House wants China to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear aspirations, the New York Times reported.

“I think they are anxious to play as helpful a role as they can” regarding North Korea, Powell said.  “I think they will play that role quietly,” he added.

Powell also met with Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, who is set to assume the country’s top position.  There are “new ideas” being discussed to bring Pyongyang to negotiate an end to the crisis, according to Powell (James Dao, New York Times, Feb. 24).

Powell also issued a warning to North Korea on its alleged weapons program.

“I cannot emphasize enough how seriously all of us would view any move by North Korea toward reprocessing of the spent fuel rods and production of nuclear weapons,” he said (see GSN, Jan. 31).

The next stop on Powell’s East Asian trip is South Korea, where he is scheduled to meet with President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who will take office tomorrow.  Roh urged the United States to view North Korea as a partner in negotiations.

“North Korea was opening up and … is already changing,” Roh said.  “If we give them what they desperately want — regime security, normal treatment and economic assistance — they will be willing to give up their nuclear ambitions.  We should not, therefore, treat them as criminals but as partners in negotiations,” he added (Charles Whelan, Agence France-Presse, Feb. 24).

Food Aid to Resume

Powell said Saturday that the United States would soon resume food shipments to ease North Korean hunger (see GSN, Feb. 12).

“The need is still great.  You go through all the politics; there are kids out there that are starving.  If we can help them, we will,” Powell said.

The World Food Program said that it cannot feed large areas of North Korea because of insufficient international support.  The United States has not contributed to the program since December, Knight Ridder news agency reported.

The U.S. Congress recently granted budgetary authority that will allow donations to resume, according to Powell (Michael Zielenziger, Knight Ridder/San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 22).

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United States:  Pentagon Considering Converting ICBMs to Conventional Warheads

The U.S. Defense Department is examining a proposal to replace the nuclear warheads on some ICBMs with conventional weapons for use in short-notice strikes against enemy states, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, July 24, 2002).

Such a plan, which is just starting to be considered, would give the United States the ability to conduct long-range strikes with conventional weapons and avoid putting U.S. pilots at risk, military officials said.  The Air Force Space Command is expected to begin formally considering converting some Minuteman 3 ICBMs to conventional warheads this fall during a two-year review, the Times reported.

The conventional warhead on top of the converted missile could be taken from a number of high explosive or other specialized warheads, including bunker-busting munitions, said Maj. Gen. Timothy McMahon, commander of the 20th Air Force at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, which maintains the U.S. arsenal of 500 long-range Minuteman 3 and 45 Peacekeeper missiles.  The sheer impact of the missile, which moves at a speed of 14,000 feet per second, would be itself highly damaging, he added.

McMahon said he would be “very, very surprised,” if at some point the United States did not employ ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.

“If the nation decides that it wants to place at risk certain targets that emerge, and that if you need to strike those things in a very prompt manner — 35 to 45 minutes — a ballistic missile gives you that capability,” McMahon said.  “It’s basically long-range artillery.  But the type of munition on board would be unlike any other artillery we’ve ever used,” he added.

The proposal does raise several concerns, according to the Times.  For example, any long-range missiles armed with conventional warheads would still be counted under existing arms control treaties, such as START, said Pentagon officials.  Arms control experts said that even though converting nuclear missiles to a conventional role would reduce the number of U.S. strategic weapons, there is no guarantee that the missiles will not be refitted someday with nuclear warheads — a move other countries could follow.

“It could elicit a response from other missile powers, like China or Russia,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (Eric Schmitt, New York Times, Feb. 24).

For further information, see:

START I Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

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CTBT:  U.S. Seeks to Replace Head of Test Ban Treaty Organization

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON ð— Less than one year after successfully ousting the leader of an international arms control organization, the United States is trying to replace the head of another:  the organization that implements the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests worldwide, a senior U.S. official said yesterday.

Wolfgang Hoffmann, executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), however, indicated he has no plans to leave his Vienna post.

The Bush administration is seeking to find a successor for Hoffmann, a long-time German diplomat, once he has completed seven years of running the organization in 2004.  CTBTO rules require that all professional staff leave after a maximum seven years and the U.S. view is that the seven-year rule applies to Hoffmann.

“We are not trying to remove Ambassador Hoffmann prior to the end of his tenure in office.  However, there is a limited tenure policy with the CTBTO and, therefore, given the importance of the job we do think it is important to look for a good replacement recognizing that Ambassador Hoffmann is not going to be able to remain in the job indefinitely,” according to the official.

Hoffmann’s administration maintains that that tenure rule does not apply to the executive secretary, who is reappointed to his post annually through a vote each November of the treaty’s signatory states.

“Mr. Hoffmann is not a staff member and the rule applies to staff members in the professional category,” CTBTO spokeswoman Daniela Rozgonova said from Vienna.

A Matter of Principle

The decision to find a replacement for Hoffmann is motivated by a matter of principle and not his politics or management record, the U.S. official said.

“If we have a tenure policy, and if we exempt the director from tenure policy, and that’s the only person we exempt from tenure policy, what you’re going to end up with is a bunch of lawsuits in the ILO [International Labor Organization] from other people who get removed by the tenure policy,” the official said.

In a separate matter over that policy, at least 44 CTBTO staffers filed a complaint last October with the ILO, which adjudicates labor disputes involving international organizations, asking that the seven-year rule begin counting in 1999, when the rule was passed, and not retroactively for people hired before then (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The U.S. official said once a suitable replacement is identified, “then the issue is to try to talk to both Hoffmann and the Germans to make sure that a transition happens in as quiet and peaceful a fashion as possible.”

If no suitable replacement is found, then changing the organization’s tenure policy might be considered, though U.S. officials do not favor that course, the official said.

U.S. Disputes Hoffman’s Exemption

Hoffmann’s spokeswoman Rozgonova asserted the whole matter was settled during meetings, which were mediated by the United Kingdom, earlier this month and said Hoffmann will stay on for as many years as he continues to receive an annual reappointment.

“That issue has been resolved and Mr. Hoffmann will continue to serve, to carry out his duties leading the Secretariat,” she said.

The U.S. official responded, “It’s the first we’ve heard about it.  I know Hoffmann considers himself above the PTS [Provisional Technical Secretariat] and therefore that the seven-year rule does not apply to him.  But that is not a position that we have taken formally and I do not think that this matter has been formally resolved yet.”

The Provisional Technical Secretariat consists of the organization’s 250-member professional staff responsible for supervising and coordinating a global monitoring system to detect nuclear testing.

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, a press attache at the German embassy in Washington, said his government does not view the matter as “a major political issue,” but rather a technical one.

“What it boils down to is a technicality.  It’s a matter for the lawyers who are looking at it,” he said.

A Critic of the U.S. View

Hoffmann has led the CTBTO since its creation on November 19, 1996, enlisting 166 signatories and 97 ratifications to the test ban treaty in nearly seven years. 

Presently, 27 countries have not signed and 96 countries have not ratified, including the United States.  President George W. Bush’s determination not to ratify the pact, as well as the refusal of 12 other countries to join, effectively prevents the treaty from entering into force under its rules.

A prominent critic of the Bush administration’s nuclear testing policy criticized the U.S. position that Hoffmann should be replaced.

“I find it interesting that the United States is so bold as to have an opinion about matters of principle on the CTBT when it has abandoned its solemn commitments and promises to pursue the entry into force of the CTBT and has done much to undermine the CTBTO by unilaterally withdrawing support for work related to on-site inspections,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.

“Ambassador Hoffmann has built the CTBTO from the ground up and by all accounts he has done a very good job.  What probably matters more than arbitrary rotation rules is that the best person remains in the job,” he said.

While the Bush administration policy opposes ratification of the treaty and an inspections mechanism for checking suspicious activity, the United States nevertheless historically has contributed at least one-fifth of annual funding to the organization in accordance with treaty rules.  U.S. military officials previously have said they value CTBTO’s network of more than 100 monitoring stations worldwide and growing as a supplement to U.S. capabilities (see GSN, March 19, 2002).

Management, Politics Said Not an Issue

The Bush administration last year drew some criticism when it led the ouster of the head of another international arms control organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In that case, U.S. officials published a long list of grievances against OPCW head Jose Bustani and asserted he was mismanaging the organization by, among other things, budgeting for activities beyond the scope of the organization (see GSN, April 12, 2002), a view backed by many independent arms control experts.

Bustani, now Brazil’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, maintained his removal was sought because of political differences, chiefly, that that the Bush administration did not favor his official views on inspections of chemical facilities that might affect the United States or on Iraq.  Bustani advocated encouraging Iraq to sign the treaty, which would make Iraq subject to chemical inspections.  U.S. officials last year privately expressed concern that such inspections might undermine efforts to compel Iraq to disarm by forestalling the threat of force.

The United States was criticized for pressuring for Bustani’s ouster, rather than allowing him to be voted out at the end of his term, and for withholding its substantial annual dues to the OPCW until Bustani was removed.

In the case of Hoffmann, the senior U.S. official said the U.S. search was not motivated by any concerns with Hoffmann’s management or politics.

“He’s been doing as good a job as can be expected under the circumstances.  He’s got an organization … for a treaty that’s not about to enter into force.  He’s therefore limited very severely in terms of what kinds of activities he is able to engage in and that gives you a certain amount of difficulty in terms of budget size and morale of your staff, and we think he’s done a pretty good job with those things,” the official said.

The Bush administration admittedly differs with Hoffmann on a couple of key issues: whether the treaty should enter into force and whether the organization should make preparations to conduct on-site inspections of suspected tests.  U.S. officials say no to both. 

Bush has indicated he will not ratify the treaty which then-President Bill Clinton signed in 1996.  U.S. officials have said they prefer to keep U.S. options open for possible future testing, though there are no plans to break a current moratorium.  Some within the administration have argued testing could be needed to ensure the viability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and possibly for proving new nuclear weapons, as the administration is presently considering whether to develop low-yield weapons for destroying bunkers with reduced potential damage to surrounding areas.  The administration last year unsuccessfully sought congressional approval for reducing the preparation time for resumed testing if a decision is made.

Unlike during the Clinton administration, the current State Department Web site does not list the treaty in its sections on “current treaties and agreements” or “past treaties and agreements.”

With respect to CTBTO dues, the administration also last year began withholding money for inspections-related activities, maintaining they are unnecessary since the treaty has no chance of entering into force.

Asked whether the U.S. view on Hoffmann’s tenure was at all related to his advocacy of entering the treaty into force, the official said:

“No.  Wolfgang is free to express his views on that is he will express them certainly in some respects in the responsibility of the position he holds.  I wouldn’t say we’ve agreed with all of his views on that,” the official said.

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Iran:  IAEA Team Arrives in Iran for Weekend Visit

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is leading an agency team to Iran this weekend amid charges from an opposition group that Tehran is maintaining a secret nuclear facility disguised as a watch factory (see GSN, Feb. 20).

The National Council of Resistance of Iran said yesterday that one building of the facility houses equipment to test centrifuges, and opposition officials predicted that the IAEA team would not be allowed into that building.

“If the IAEA is denied access to a building, it will be a very serious matter,” said David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security.

The IAEA team is scheduled to visit a recently revealed uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, about 200 miles south of Tehran.  The nuclear officials will be looking for confirmation of Iran’s claims that the nuclear program is being developed for peaceful purposes.

“It’s an opportunity for Iran to really open up and come clean about all its nuclear activities, which we now know are very extensive, or it could be a weekend where there’s a serious confrontation between the inspectors and the Iranian government,” according to Albright (David Ensor, CNN.com, Feb. 20).

The United States contends that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

“We believe Iran is actively and secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program under the guise of a ‘peaceful’ civilian program,” said U.S. State Department spokesman Lou Fintor.

Fintor described the Iranian opposition group, however, as “an anti-Iranian terrorist organization.”

The IAEA visit coincides with heavy activity and construction at Natanz (Anwar Iqbal, United Press International, Feb. 20).

The Natanz site consists of three main areas, according to analysis of commercial satellite images by the ISIS.  The first has three large underground structures and a vehicle tunnel leading underground, as well as several incomplete underground structures.  The two largest underground buildings could contain centrifuges to enrich uranium, the analysis says.

The second area contains six large, fenced, aboveground buildings.  The third has a large, separate and unfenced building, which is most likely the main administrative building or a research and development facility, according to the ISIS (Institute for Science and International Society analysis, Feb. 20).

U.S.-Russian Talks

The United States and Russia are slated to discuss Iran’s nuclear fuel production and potential efforts to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, Reuters reported.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton, the top U.S. arms control official, is expected in Moscow for three-day talks beginning Monday.

“A lot of the basis for the Russian argument that Iran’s nuclear program is not a problem has now disappeared, and we need to talk to them about that and to think about how to deal with Iran in the post-Saddam period,” a U.S. official said (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Feb. 20).

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North Korea:  Security Council Delays Action on Korean Nuclear Crisis

The Security Council yesterday held its first formal meeting on North Korea’s nuclear program since a crisis heightened over the issue last month, when Pyongyang announced it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Instead of taking any immediate action, the council decided to refer the issue to another group of experts (see GSN, Feb. 19).

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors last week found North Korea was in “noncompliance” with its IAEA safeguards commitments and referred the matter to the United Nations (see GSN, Feb. 12).

After a brief closed-door consultation, German U.N. Ambassador Gunter Pleuger, this month’s Security Council president, said council members were taking the IAEA report to their own national experts so that they may “draw their substantial and legal conclusions and make their recommendations to the members of the council.  On that basis the council will take the matter up and discuss it.”

Calling the possibility of North Korea restarting its nuclear weapons program “an important and very complicated issue,” Pleuger said, “The council wanted to refer this to the experts first before discussing it in the council itself.”  There is no deadline for the experts to report back to the council, he added.

U.S. Deputy U.N. Ambassador James Cunningham said, “We look forward to working with our colleagues on the council on finding a way to achieve a verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program.”  He rejected the North Korean contention that the issue should be dealt with bilaterally between Pyongyang and Washington.  This is “a matter of concern to the entire international community,” he said (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 20).

Powell Begins Asian Trip Tomorrow

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell is scheduled to leave tomorrow for Japan, China and South Korea to discuss the nuclear standoff and attend the inauguration ceremony of South Korean President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, the Associated Press reported.

It will be his first visit to the region since the latest crisis began, according to AP.

Roh, meanwhile, said that he would oppose any plans to attack North Korea.

The president-elect said he is “willing to differ with the United States … if that helps prevent a war.”

“An attack on North Korea could trigger a war engulfing the entire Korean Peninsula,” Roh said.  “It’s a serious issue, and at this moment, I am against even consideration of such an option,” he added (George Gedda, Associated Press/Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Feb. 20).

Powell’s Methods

Powell has chosen not to take such trips as often as some of his predecessors and some critics charge that his diplomatic style relies too much on telephone conversations, the Washington Post reported today.

Powell reportedly canceled a trip late last year to Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing and has not made any solo diplomatic visits lasting more than two days since last September, according to the Post.

Experts said that, in general, longer trips allow officials more time to appreciate the nuances of complicated relationships and issues.

Senior officials from Washington should “go to smaller countries and persuade them,” said a diplomat from an East European country that has supported the White House on its Iraq confrontation.  “You’ve got Powell and (national security adviser Condoleezza) Rice on TV.  Why didn’t they go to Europe … you should have been all over Europe.  It’s been missing,” the diplomat added (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Feb. 20).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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Iran:  Opposition Group Plans to Reveal New Nuclear Facility

An Iranian opposition group plans to expose a site where they say Iran houses equipment to enrich uranium for building nuclear weapons, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Feb. 11).

The National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed two nuclear sites last August, which are due to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency this weekend (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2002).  The group announced it will reveal the new site today and alleged that Tehran has removed equipment from Natanz, one of the sites to be visited by inspectors, the Post reported.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, the group’s Washington representative, alleged that Chinese and North Korean experts have aided the Iranian nuclear program.  North Korean and Chinese experts oversaw the installation of centrifuge equipment used to enrich uranium near Isfahan and about 50 Chinese have been seen at a uranium mine at Saghand, he said.

The centrifuge systems were tested at Kola Electric, a supposed watch factory near Tehran, Jafarzadeh said.  The site has two 4,500 square foot rooms, he added.

The nuclear effort at Natanz began two years ago, covers 25 acres and has sections that are 25 feet underground and protected by eight-foot-thick concrete, the Washington Post reported.  The other facility, at Arak, began in 1996 and is designed to produce heavy water to use plutonium in weapons, according to the Post.  That site is set to be ready for testing in April and Iran will claim the heavy water is necessary for industrial use, according to the opposition group.

The Natanz site is too big to be Iran’s first enriched uranium project, according to some experts.  Iran, therefore, might be running a smaller pilot program now that has paved the way for new facility, they added (Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Feb. 20).

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Japan:  1995 Defense Study Rejected Weapons Development

Eight years ago, Japan studied, and rejected, developing its own nuclear weapons, the Asahi Shimbun reported today.  A 1995 Japanese Defense Agency study concluded that the military balance in Asia would have been upset if the country were to do so (see GSN, June 5, 2002).

The study, obtained by the Japanese newspaper, found several disadvantages to Japan developing its own nuclear arsenal.  For example, a nuclear-armed Japan would have destroyed the basis for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would have been damaged, and Washington would have questioned Tokyo’s commitment to their military alliance, the Shimbun reported.  In addition, the political and economic costs of establishing a nuclear weapons infrastructure would have been too high, according to the study.

The 1995 report was the second time that Japan examined the idea of developing nuclear weapons, with an earlier study conducted between 1967 and 1970, according to the Shimbun (Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 20).

Japanese Defense Agency spokesman Manabu Shimamoto said today that the report was an internal agency document and had never been intended to be made public (Kenji Hall, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 20).

For further information, see:

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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North Korea:  Chinese Officials Meet With Pyongyang Envoy

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi met North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun yesterday to discuss the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula, CNN.com reported (see GSN, Feb. 18).

“Both sides had a deep and broad discussion on the nuclear issue in North Korea, and exchanged views on the issue.  Each side also said they want to see the issue resolved through peaceful means and through dialogue,” according to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue.

Chinese officials would not say if the officials discussed Pyongyang’s recent threat to pull out of the 1953 Armistice Agreement (Lisa Weaver, CNN.com, Feb. 18).

A South Korean military official said that the North Korean threat was not a new development, Agence France-Presse reported today.

“North Korea said in 1994 they were no longer bound by the Armistice Agreement,” the official said.

Pyongyang again called for a nonaggression treaty with Washington yesterday, and urged the United States to engage in direct negotiations.

“The U.S. is insisting on its strange assertion that it cannot respond to the D.P.R.K. (North Korea)-U.S. talks as they mean a sort of reward for the D.P.R.K. despite the unanimous world public opinion that D.P.R.K.-U.S. direct talks should take place to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.  This is an illogical far-fetched assertion,” said a statement from the Korean Central News Agency.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit Beijing “shortly” to discuss the crisis, Zhang said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Feb. 19).

South Korean President Kim Dae-jung said that Japan and South Korea could be forced to build their own nuclear capacity if North Korea continues its weapons development.

“If North Korea gets nuclear weapons, the stance of Japan and our country toward nuclear weapons would change,” Kim said (Hamish McDonald, Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 19).

Kim said, however, that the current standoff will probably not end in war.

“I believe the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula is slight — in fact, nonexistent,” he said yesterday (Cho/Struck, Washington Post, Feb. 19).

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United States:  Pentagon Planning Nuclear Weapons Meeting

Pentagon officials are planning to meet later this year to discuss U.S. nuclear weapons requirements, including the possibility of a new generation of nuclear warheads to target hardened and deeply buried underground bunkers, according to a New Mexico organization opposed to nuclear testing (see GSN, Feb. 14).

The Los Alamos Study Group, an advocacy group, published minutes of a Jan. 10 Defense Department meeting on its Web site and said Pentagon officials were planning a secret conference “to discuss what new nuclear weapons to build, how they might be tested … and how to sell the ideas to Congress and the American public.”

The document says that the meeting is being planned to consider nuclear issues but there has been no decision to resume nuclear testing.

The “genesis” of the planned meeting is an October 2002 memo from Pentagon acquisition and technology chief Pete Aldridge, which deals with “the risk associated with not testing our nuclear weapons,” according to the minutes (see GSN, Nov. 19, 2002).  “Although the conference will consider issues related to nuclear testing, it is not the policy of the administration to return to nuclear testing,” the document says.

The meeting will produce a “recommended roadmap and offer suggestions,” according to the document.

During a meeting of the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about money requested to study nuclear weapons development (see GSN, Feb. 14).

“If the United States sends signals that we’re considering new uses for nuclear weapons, isn’t it more likely that other nations will also want to explore greater use or new uses for nuclear weapons?”  Levin asked.

Rumsfeld said the U.S. military must be able to reach and destroy deeply buried bunkers.

“Not having the ability to penetrate and reach them creates a very serious obstacle to U.S. national security,” he said (Reuters, Feb. 19).

Officials are considering holding the meeting “the week of Aug. 4, 2003,” according to the leaked documents.

The National Nuclear Security Administration confirmed the validity of the leaked document yesterday but Anson Franklin, the NNSA’s head of governmental affairs, said that “we have no request from the Defense Department for any new nuclear weapon, and we have no plans for nuclear testing,” according to the London Guardian.

Greg Mello, head of the Los Alamos Study Group, said that the meeting could be a first step toward the U.S. withdrawal from nuclear treaties.

“It is impossible to overstate the challenge these plans pose to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the existing nuclear test moratorium, and U.S. compliance with Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” he said (Julian Borger, London Guardian, Feb. 19).

“What’s clear is, in this administration, the brakes are off in nuclear development and the push for nuclear testing,” he added (Ian Hoffman, Oakland Tribune, Feb. 19).

For further information, see:

CTBT Text

States Parties to the CTBT (Federation of American Scientists)

NPT Text

States Parties to the NPT (U.N.)

U.N. Background on NPT

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