North Korea:  Reprocessing Plant Could Restart on “Short Notice”

Following news accounts yesterday that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, U.S. officials said yesterday that Pyongyang has reactivated a steam plant linked to North Korea’s nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing facility, Reuters reported (see GSN, Feb. 27).

“They could start (reprocessing) on fairly short notice, but they haven’t yet,” said an official.  “There also seems to be some effort to make sure they have the necessary chemicals in stock for reprocessing,” according to the official.

“There have been railroad cars full of chemicals arriving at Yongbyon,” the official added (Paul Eckert, Reuters, Feb. 28).

The International Atomic Energy Agency yesterday strongly criticized the restarting of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

“If this is true, the IAEA deplores the operation of the D.P.R.K.’s nuclear facilities without the presence of safeguards inspectors,” a statement from the IAEA said.  “Restarting this now-unsafeguarded nuclear facility will further demonstrate the D.P.R.K.’s disregard for its nuclear nonproliferation obligations,” the statement added.

Without inspectors at the plant, the agency cannot confirm the restarted nuclear facility, but the IAEA said it still considers Pyongyang’s safeguards agreement to be “binding and in force” (U.N. release, Feb. 27).

U.S. officials said the reactor’s restart is clearly intended to produce nuclear weapon material.

“The only reason to operate a reactor like this is to produce spent fuel that can then be turned into plutonium for weapons,” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said yesterday (Josef Hebert, Associated Press/Arizona Daily Sun, Feb. 28).

U.N. Envoy Scheduled to Visit Pyongyang

Maurice Strong, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s envoy, said he would bring ideas to Pyongyang in an attempt to resolve the standoff.

“I will present some ideas to [the] North Koreans in my facilitating role and will help them (North Korea and the United States) find a formula in which they can move toward peace,” Strong said.  The envoy pushed for negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.

“As long as they are not engaging, there are always possibilities that the situation could lead to renewed conflict on the peninsula.  And the danger will increase as long as the parties are not engaged,” he added (Seo Hyun-jin, Korea Herald, Feb. 28).

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South Asia:  Maritime Confidence-Building Measures Could Reduce Tensions, Report Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — India and Pakistan should look to the sea to help reduce tensions between them, according to a paper released this month by the Henry L. Stimson Center.

The paper, written by Rajesh Pendharkar, a senior Indian Navy officer and a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center, proposes that the nations begin to engage in maritime confidence-building measures as a starting point for further development of bilateral relations. 

In the 55 years of conflict between India and Pakistan, centered mainly on the disputed region of Kashmir, most of the fighting was conducted with land and air forces.  This has left the maritime arena as the least-contentious dimension of the India-Pakistan conflict, the paper says. 

“The maritime arena ... thus offers the greatest prospects for building upon the previous trust that may not be present in other arenas,” it says.

Naval confidence-building measures also have a greater chance of succeeding where others, such as humanitarian and conflict resolution measures, have failed because India and Pakistan have an broader obligation to the international community to ensure the safe traffic of neutral trade, such as oil, through the region, according to the paper.  In addition, there are number of mutually beneficial areas of cooperation, including search-and-rescue operations, smuggling interdiction and marine environment protection, it says.

The Stimson Center paper proposes a “two-pronged approach” toward establishing maritime condifence-building measures.  First, the two countries should work to develop a multilateral framework among Arabian Sea countries based on a search-and-rescue agreement and regional maritime security management, which could then lead to a bilateral agreement between the Indian and Pakistani navies, the paper says. 

India and Pakistan should also use an incidents-at-sea agreement, such as the one called for in the Indian-Pakistan 1998 Lahore Declaration, to construct a bilateral framework for continued engagement, the paper says.  In the 1998 declaration, the two countries agreed to “conclude an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.”

An incidents-at-sea agreement has the best chance of beginning a sustained India-Pakistan engagement, according to the paper.

“An incidents-at-sea agreement is the ideal practical mechanism for ensuring a continued form of bilateral engagement free from politicization and media sensationalism,” the paper says.  “Continued dialogue or activity that engages adversaries in working together is a powerful catalyst for confidence,” it adds. 

India and Pakistan could look to the U.S-Soviet Cold War relationship for guidance in developing an incidents-at-sea agreement, according to the paper.  In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed such an agreement and the agreement promoted maritime engagement because it had a number of confidence-building measures built into it, including communication, transparency and verification, the paper says.  Washington and Moscow successfully maintained the measures even during such flare-ups as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

After creation of an incidents-at-sea agreement, India and Pakistan should work to create a framework in which to hold regular consultative meetings and establish a maritime risk reduction center to exchange incident-related information and notifications of major naval exercises and naval ballistic missile tests, the paper says. 

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United States:  Los Alamos Investigation Could Trigger U.S. Brain Drain

The investigation into theft and fraud charges at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico could result in “a huge national security problem” if it triggered the departure of the facility’s scientists, a top U.S. nuclear official said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 4).

“What’s irreplaceable is what’s in the minds of the people,” said Linton Brooks, acting head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Energy Department agency responsible for nuclear weapon design and maintenance.  He added that he is worried about the effect the investigation is having on the morale of Los Alamos scientists.  Many of them could choose to retire or work at another facility, which would result in “a huge national security problem if we don’t get this behind us,” Brooks said (Dan Stober, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 28).

Because of the number of theft and fraud reports at Los Alamos, the Energy Department is considering whether to allow other institutions to compete with the University of California to manage the facility, according to the Associated Press.  Such a change in management, however, could harm the facility’s national security work, a university official said Wednesday.

The most experienced Los Alamos scientists are close to retirement age and might choose to leave if there were a change in management, said Bruce Darling, a senior university official, told the House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.  “Turning over the contract on a regular basis creates a real threat of disruption to our nation’s security,” Darling said.

While Los Alamos did appear to suffer from a lack of financial controls, there are no signs that weapons secrets were lost or that national security was compromised, Energy Inspector General Gregory Friedman told the subcommittee.  That cannot be guaranteed, however, with 400 of the facility’s computers having been stolen over three years, he said (Robert Gehrke, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 27).

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North Korea I:  Pyongyang Restarts Nuclear Reactor

U.S. officials confirmed yesterday that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, as it indicated it would do earlier this month (see GSN, Feb. 6).

“North Korea started its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.  It had been closed since 1994,” said a U.S. official.  “This is certainly less provocative than starting up the reprocessing facility, but it is significant nonetheless,” the official added, referring to an adjoining facility capable of removing weapons-usable plutonium from the reactor’s spent fuel (Andrew Buncombe, London Independent, Feb. 27).

“We have no evidence the reprocessor has started up yet,” a senior U.S. official told the New York Times (see GSN, Jan. 31).  “Either they are stopping just short of that, or they are waiting to turn the screws once again,” the official added (David Sanger, New York Times, Feb. 27).

The White House criticized the development.  “With each step it takes to advance its nuclear capability, North Korea further isolates itself from the international community,” said White House spokesman Sean McCormack.

GlobalSecurity.org, an online think tank, has posted satellite photographs of Yongbyon on its Web site, including two January pictures that show test runs of the coal-fueled plant that powers the nuclear reactor.

“They are getting close to the top of the escalation ladder.  There’s not much more they can do without provoking a U.S. military strike,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org.

A strike on the nuclear reactor would not entail serious radiological problems, Pike said, because the spent fuel is not highly radioactive.  However, if North Korea reactivated the reprocessing facility and the United States attacked it, the consequences could be much more severe.

“If it was bombed, and the fuel in it was dispersed, it could create a mini-Chernobyl, and I underline the word ‘mini’ because Chernobyl was dozens of times larger,” Pike said (John Donnelly, Boston Globe, Feb. 27).

The reactor at Yongbyon could turn out enough spent fuel in one year to produce about 13 pounds of plutonium, enough to make a single nuclear weapon, according to experts (Diamond/Nichols, USA Today, Feb. 27).

Diplomacy Continues

After meeting today in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov issued a joint statement urging a peaceful resolution to the crisis and expressing their support for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

“The two sides pointed out that an equal and constructive dialogue between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will be of great significance to resolving the ‘D.P.R.K.’s nuclear issue’ and realizing the normalization of U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations,” the statement said (Xinhua News Agency/BBC Monitoring, Feb. 27).

Expert Says North Korea Threat Overblown

The nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs of North Korea are not nearly as sophisticated as often portrayed, therefore there is a window of opportunity to resume talks to halt the programs before they pose a more serious threat to regional stability, a nongovernmental nuclear expert said yesterday in New York.

“The reality of the North Korean threat has been greatly exaggerated in certain respects, certainly in terms of their capability to have nuclear weapons, to put them on missiles, to target them and shoot them,” said Robert Alvarez of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies.

“I think we have reasonable period to time to get back on track.  But time’s a wasting,” he said.  “Technically speaking,” if North Korea immediately decided to start producing plutonium, “it could probably happen in a period of several months” and “meaningful amounts [could be produced] in about one year,” said Alvarez at a news conference that included satellite photographs of uranium and plutonium plants and missile sites.

Referring to the possibility that North Korea might take uranium from its reactor and transfer it to a reprocessing site to produce weapon-grade plutonium, he said, “It’s the crossing of that threshold that really is the important issue … Once you get to that point it’s almost a point of no return.”

He said North Korea probably would not take “tangible steps” towards reprocessing, he said, because “they recognize what an important bargaining chip this really is.”  However it could happen if  “pushing and shoving continues,” said Alvarez.  “Then there would be the very real possibility of life with a nuclear-armed, starving North Korea,” he added.

Alvarez, who was an adviser on North Korea at the Energy Department during the Clinton administration, said the Bush administration’s policy of isolating the country is not working.  “If the United States persists in its heavy handed isolation, the collapse of a heavily armed North Korea will have a very serious impact on political stability in this region and also on the nonproliferation regime,” he said.

He said the Agreed Framework of 1994 “should not be terminated.  We’re in a situation where the policy of isolation is merely fueling and escalating confrontation.”  That agreement involved North Korea halting its nuclear program — which it says is for energy production — in exchange for fuel oil and assistance in building light-water reactors that are more “proliferation resistant.”  That agreement is at the point of collapse with both the United States and North Korea accusing the other of violating its provisions.

“There is so much animus against the Agreed Framework” that it would be difficult to resurrect it, Alvarez said.  The best choice may be to “come up with something else that looks like the Agreed Framework and then go 10 steps backwards … it beats where we’re heading right now.”

Alvarez said neither the nuclear weapons nor missile programs are the imminent threat they are often portrayed as being.  Both the North’s uranium-powered nuclear reactor and the reprocessing complex that extracts weapon-grade plutonium from uranium fuel rods are based on designs from the 1950s, he said.

The North’s short-range missiles are based on Soviet Scuds from the 1980s, said Alvarez.  He showed satellite photographs that he said showed the launch sites for the Nodong longer-range missiles are at the end of dirt roads and lack basic infrastructure.  Missiles have to be moved to the site in parts, assembled and then fired, he added.  He called the Nodong “the poor man’s ballistic missile.”  The missile billed as able to reach the western United States might be able to hit “one of the islands off of Alaska, but that’s about it,” he added (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 27).

For further information, see:

Agreed Framework Text

KEDO

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Iran:  Russian Nuclear Assistance Motivated by Economic Needs

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

Economic concerns are driving Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran and the assistance will most likely continue unabated unless the United States makes an effort to compensate Moscow for the business it would lose, according to Russian and U.S. lawmakers (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2002).

Russia is currently assisting Tehran with the construction of a nuclear reactor at the southern city of Bushehr, which Iranian officials said is being developed for civilian energy needs.  Earlier this month, Iran announced it has expanded its nuclear efforts and will begin mining its own uranium.  A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency recently visited Iran to examine its nuclear efforts (see GSN, Feb. 24).

U.S. officials, however, have alleged that Iran is using the facilities to develop a nuclear weapons program.  Russian officials concur that they do not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran, but have argued that Russian assistance has served strictly peaceful purposes.

“We definitely do not want Iran to have nuclear weapons,” said Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee.  Margelov testified yesterday to the U.S. House International Relations Committee regarding Russian relations with Iran and Iraq.

“I would like to stress here that our nuclear sector needs contracts and if the United States of America, if other Russian partners and antiterrorist coalitions can offer such contracts, that can be good for our nuclear industry, that will, I think, limit its cooperation with Iran.  They have to survive, so try to help them,” he said.

Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) said that he had discussed that issue with Russian nuclear officials.

“We do realize that your nuclear industry needs to survive and there are certainly more creative ways of achieving that survival than to close our eyes to exports to Iran, which we view as extremely, extremely dangerous and destabilizing,” Lantos said.

Faced with a string of congressional criticism of Russia’s collaboration with Iran, Margelov criticized Washington for oversimplifying the situation.  He said the “axis of evil” label — affixed by U.S. President George W. Bush to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea — was a public relations tool.

“In the United States, these countries are often defined as ‘axis of evil.’  I used to be much involved in the Soviet propaganda machine.  Lately I worked for some American consulting companies, for at least five years.  Therefore, I understand that directly defining the enemy facilitates many goals, particularly in the sphere of public relations,” Margelov said.

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton visited Moscow this week and urged Russian officials to end their nuclear relationship with Iran.  The Los Angeles Times quoted a U.S. official as saying that recent revelations of Iranian nuclear facilities were creating concern in Moscow.

“They are now more persuaded than they were before that Iran does have a clandestine nuclear weapons program,” the official said.  “I think for some time the Russians felt that Iranians can’t develop a nuclear weapons program.  I think they’re beginning to see that in fact they are,” the official added.

During a Heritage Foundation panel yesterday, several nonproliferation experts said any nuclear cooperation with Iran was fraught with danger.

The Iranian nuclear projects are “very disturbing, even if they are placed under inspection,” said Leonard Spector, from the Washington office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.  Drawing a parallel with the current North Korean nuclear crisis, Spector said the nuclear projects allow Iran to expel inspectors and quickly move toward developing nuclear weapons.

“One has to ask why Russia was prepared to provide such a powerful reactor … where is this leading?” Spector asked.

“This is one of the issues that puts Russian credibility on the line,” said Ariel Cohen, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation who participated in both the congressional hearing and the Heritage panel.

Cohen also encouraged an economic solution to the situation.

“We should be considering an economic package that will bring to closure Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, will provide full disclosure of private prior cooperation and will finalize a list of unstable or terrorist-supporting countries that the Russians should not sell nuclear, dual-use or military technology,” he said.

It remained unclear if an end to Russian cooperation would stop Iran’s nuclear program.  Countries other than Russia are most likely assisting Iran as well, and Tehran could be close to running the nuclear effort on its own, experts said.

Running a nuclear plant is not easy and current unclassified information suggests that Iran still needs outside assistance, Spector said.

U.S. intelligence agencies, however, do not share their latest reports with the public, he added.

Panel members also criticized Moscow for being shortsighted in its nuclear cooperation.  The same nuclear technology Moscow is currently sharing could be widely proliferated and eventually aimed at Russia, Cohen said.

While Margelov told the House committee that Iran is an “important regional partner,” Russian relations with Iran are not always harmonious, several experts said.

This is “an anomalous period in the Russian-Iranian relationship,” said panel member Michael Eisenstadt, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Eisenstadt noted, however, that the Bushehr project has taken about twice as long as was originally intended and is not due to be completed for several years.  Russia, he suggested, might be attempting to make money from the project without providing Iran a nuclear capability.

“I wouldn’t be surprised if this drags on,” he said.

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Threat Assessment:  Low-End Materials Can Make Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Reports Say

Classified U.S. nuclear threat reports indicate that rogue states and terrorist groups have learned that they can make nuclear weapons with low-enriched uranium or materials obtained from spent nuclear fuel, USA Today reported today (see GSN, Feb. 12).

Historically, international efforts have sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by focusing on strictly controlling two hard-to-make materials, highly enriched uranium and plutonium, according to USA Today.

Five years ago, however, scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory were able to design a small nuclear weapon using low-enriched uranium, USA Today reported.  The weapon had the capability to destroy a square mile of a city. 

Interested parties could obtain LEU from research reactors, of which many use uranium containing less than 20 percent of the highly fissionable isotope uranium-235 (see GSN, Oct. 22, 2002).  Making a weapon with such material, however, would require expertise and relatively large amounts of material, according to USA Today.

Even nuclear power reactors that use uranium enriched to less than 5 percent could be a potential source for weapons materials since it would be relatively easy to further enrich such uranium, according to experts.

“If you got a stack of uranium enriched to 4-5 percent, which as a rule is not seriously protected, the plant needed to convert it to 90 percent enrichment is potentially small and easy to hide,” Harvard University nuclear specialist Matthew Bunn said.

Scientists have also discovered that a rogue state or a well-supported terrorist group would be able to obtain necessary materials from spent fuel, according to USA Today.  A recently declassified study conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1995 found that rogue states or terrorist would need only “modest facilities and equipment” to obtain weapon-usable materials from spent nuclear fuel.

Even though low-enriched uranium and spent fuel can be used to develop weapons, U.S. counterproliferation efforts continue to focus much more on plutonium and highly enriched uranium, according to USA Today (see GSN, Jan. 31).  Under U.S. and international guidelines, facilities that handle low-enriched uranium or spent fuel are not required to have security systems to prevent theft — a measure required of those facilities that handle highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

International Atomic Energy Agency officials defended the distinction between the two types of materials, saying that interested parties would have the easiest time making an effective weapon using highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

“We work on the assumption that rogue states, or terrorists for that matter, know how to make (nuclear) weapons with small amounts of material and different types and combinations of material,” said IAEA senior safeguards expert Davis Hurt.  “But we’ve been advised by experts with the nuclear weapons states that it would be very difficult,” Hurt added,

Another concern is a fear that efforts to secure highly enriched uranium and plutonium stockpiles would be hurt if more attention was paid to low-enriched uranium and spent-fuel supplies, USA Today reported.  Russia’s economic situation has prevented it from adequately funding efforts to secure former Soviet sites.  U.S. nonproliferation funding has only reached fewer than half the sites of concern, according to USA Today.

“We need to have more countries throwing money into the pot,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former assistant secretary of energy now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Peter Eisler, USA Today, Feb. 27).

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North Korea II:  Experts, Former Officials Urge Bush Administration to Negotiate

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A group of 27 U.S. experts and former government and military officials have published a report urging the Bush administration to attempt negotiations with North Korea that include ending its nuclear weapons program and issues of concern to Pyongyang.

The task force report was sponsored in part by the University of Chicago’s Center for East Asian Studies and was chaired by North Korea expert Selig Harrison, who said the report was “not a Beltway report” and “represented the best expertise on Korea throughout the United States.”

While not specifically critiquing the Bush administration’s current approach toward North Korea, the report warned that “confrontational U.S. policies toward North Korea, adopted unilaterally, would not only exacerbate the nuclear crisis but would also undermine U.S. relations with Northeast Asia as a whole.”

At a Tuesday press conference Harrison went further, however, saying the underlying conclusion of the task force was that “the present policy of the administration isn’t working … It’s not stopping the North Korean nuclear weapons program, in fact, it’s pushing North Korea closer to the brink every day” (see related GSN story, today).

North Korea, which recently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has sought direct talks with the United States to secure a nonaggression pact, food and energy aid, and normalized relations (see GSN, Jan. 10).

The report recommends that such talks include the possibility of constructing a single light-water reactor.

The Bush administration, however, so far has rejected bilateral until North Korea first “verifiably and irreversibly” dismantles its nuclear weapons program and abides by its international obligations.

“We want North Korea to understand that the United States stands ready to build a different kind of relationship with it, once Pyongyang eliminates its nuclear       weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner, and comes into verifiable compliance with its international commitments,” said Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, explaining the policy last week.

“President [George W.] Bush stated during his visit to South Korea last year that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea.  However, the president has also made clear that all options remain on the table for addressing this situation,” he also said.

The Bush administration has unsuccessfully sought to persuade China to compel North Korea to end its nuclear activities.  As an alternative to bilateral negotiations, the administration has been seeking to arrange multilateral talks with North Korea involving China, South Korea, Australia, Russia and Japan.  The effort has not found much support and in a recent visit to Beijing, Secretary of State Colin Powell was unable to persuade China to call for multilateral talks (see GSN, Feb. 26).

“The administration is demanding that they dismantle their nuclear program first before we’ll negotiate.  That is completely unrealistic and it’s a prescription for continued stalemate,” said Harrison.

Challenge to Bush Strategy

Harrison asserted the administration’s unwillingness to promise not to attack Korea is motivating the country to continue to pursue its weapons.

“North Korea fears a U.S. pre-emptive strike.  They think they’re next after Iraq.  And that fear can only be addressed with bilateral security guarantees from the United States, plus normalized relations, in return for the complete disarmament of their nuclear program under adequate inspection safeguards,” he said.

Other experts have argued it would be unwise to do that, or to offer North Korea too much through negotiations, because it would send a signal to other states that acquiring weapons of mass destruction can have rewards.

“There are many others waiting in the wings taking notes on these three courses [of proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea] and we are going to inherit a whirlwind of proliferation if we don’t make it clear that there is going to be some price to be paid and that if you do this you are not going to increase the power and influence of your country in your region,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

He said, further, that renouncing force would be unwise because you could never be certain North Korea was not secretly violating the terms of disarmament.

“I think that’s silly.  It’s like thinking you can negotiate total disarmament.  North Korea thinks it has a right to nuclear weapons,” he said.

Kelly said last week the United States will not “dole out ‘rewards’ to convince North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.”

North Korea May be Bluffing

Harrison acknowledged that a minority of the task force believes that North Korea is already committed to nuclear weapons, and that country will never dismantle its program.

“But all 28 members agree that this should be seriously tested through bilateral negotiations, he said.

The report said that if North Korea resumed producing plutonium or began enriching weapon-grade uranium, it “would be likely to have a disastrous impact on the stability and security of Northeast Asia and on the global nonproliferation regime.”

Recent news reports have indicated that North Korea has taken steps to resume the plutonium production activities it froze in 1994.  Today, news agencies reported that North Korea has restarted its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

The task force included retired Navy Adm. William Crowe, Jr., a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Reagan and former commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, and former Brig. Gen. James Grant, a former assistant chief of staff for intelligence for U.S. forces in South Korea.

Other members of the task force included former ambassadors James Goodby, Donald Gregg, and Robert Gallucci, former congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), George Washington University Asia scholar David Shambaugh, and a range of arms control and Asia experts and scholars.

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U.S.-Russia:  U.S. Experts Inspect ICBM Base

U.S. defense experts began today a four-day inspection of a Russian Topol ICBM base, according to ITAR-Tass (see GSN, Jan. 29).  The inspection, conducted under the auspices of START, will examine compliance with the treaty and whether the ICBMs are equipped with warheads (Vladislav Kuznetsov, ITAR-Tass, Feb. 27).

For further information, see:

START I Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

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North Korea:  Powell Gains Little Support on Asia Trip

During his four-day Asia trip, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell did not meet with much public success in gaining regional support for U.S. policies on Iraq and North Korea, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Feb. 25).

As he headed back to the United States, Powell said that North Korea had not restarted a reactor or a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, the Post reported.

“I think that’s a wise choice, if it’s a conscious choice,” he said (Doug Struck, Washington Post, Feb. 26).

If Pyongyang restarted the facilities, however, it would “change the entire political landscape,” Powell added (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, Feb. 26).

Backchannel Meetings Continue

Han Song Ryol, North Korea’s second highest ranking U.N. official, visited Atlanta last week for discussions with James Laney, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Han Park, a professor at the University of Georgia who has connections with officials from Pyongyang and Seoul.

During the discussions, Han also met with John Kelly, former assistant U.S. secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia and Gen. William Livsey, former commander of U.S. military forces in Korea (Moni Basu, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Feb. 25).

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U.S.-Russia:  Disarmament Through Mutual Transparency

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

U.S. and Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and shared scientific research projects have the potential to significantly increase the transparency and efficiency of nuclear disarmament, according to a policy brief released yesterday by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see GSN, Feb. 11).

U.S. companies have access to Russian programs because of U.S. threat reduction efforts that have existed for more than a decade, but Russian companies “do not have the same opportunities to develop industrial relationships at U.S. facilities,” according to Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russian and Eurasian program.

“In effect, they lack the natural transparency that accrues from these relationships,” she added.

Token contracts for Russian companies, such as disposal of scrap metal, could go a long way to make the process more even handed and build Moscow’s faith, Gottemoeller argues.  Even briefing Russian officials on the timetable and location of the U.S. disarmament projects could build confidence and trust between the two countries, according to the brief.

Gottemoeller also wrote that new scientific techniques could speed the disarmament process.

“There is no arms control or reduction task to which the U.S. and Russian scientific and technical communities could not immediately contribute as a team.  This is a radical departure from earlier arms control talks, when technologies or procedures were developed in their initial form by one side, then proposed to the other and laboriously negotiated over many months or even years,” the brief says.

Benefits of the Moscow Treaty

The U.S-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which could be discussed on the U.S. Senate floor this week, might be the applicable tool to make such nuclear reductions a reality in the current political climate (see GSN, Feb. 5).

Much thinner than it’s Cold War predecessors, the treaty’s slight content might allow modern tools, U.S.-Russian technical cooperation and existing Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to work, the policy brief says.

While the treaty does not set out a timeline for reducing nuclear stockpiles, the Cooperative Threat Reduction “contracting process has become so established that it could effectively become the means for transparent Russian reductions, Gottemoeller wrote.

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Washington and Moscow included 500 pages of detailed instructions, hammered out over several years, but “there is no stomach on either side for another round of Cold War-style arms control negotiations,” the policy brief says.

“The Moscow Treaty, by contrast, was negotiated in a few months and ended up at fewer than three pages,” according to Gottemoeller.  “It is a straightforward, simple commitment to nuclear arms reduction, without the high level of detail in START I — which in fact points to START’s Cold War limitations.  Officials had no other way of attaining a high level of confidence in the reductions of the other side,” she added.

The abundance of new tools means that Washington and Moscow no longer need to rely on treaty mechanisms alone to enforce disarmament obligations, according to Gottemoeller.

As relations grow warmer between the former Cold War adversaries, officials are facing a new opportunity to speed and enhance the disarmament process, the policy brief says.  While older treaties such as START I provide a solid underpinning, existing programs and innovative technologies can now be used to reduce stockpiles, make the process more transparent and produce “a better and quicker way to achieve nuclear arms reduction than the old treaty system alone could provide,” Gottemoeller wrote.

“Nuclear weapons will not magically go away without direct attention from policymakers, notwithstanding the absence of threats between the United States and Russia.  Negotiation, for better or worse, has historically been the major facilitator of nuclear arms reduction by both countries.  In the future, however, cooperation need not be limited by past models,” Gottemoeller wrote.

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North Korea:  Roh Says Pyongyang Must Abandon Nuclear Ambitions

During his inauguration today, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he would continue to engage Pyongyang but he warned that “North Korea’s nuclear development can never be condoned” (see GSN, Feb. 24).

“It is up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support,” he said, as 45,000 people gathered for his swearing-in ceremony.  “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development.  If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things it wants,” he added.

Roh noted the U.S. contribution to South Korea’s growth and security, but said that the two countries must develop more balanced ties.

“We will see to it that the alliance matures into a more reciprocal and equitable relationship,” Roh said.

Washington and Seoul are scheduled to take part in meetings to review their military alliance, the Korea Herald reported (Hwang Jang-jin, Korea Herald, Feb. 25).

In his farewell address, delivered yesterday, former President Kim Dae-jung urged Washington and Pyongyang to sit down to negotiations.

“Dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to a solution,” he said.  Kim also defended his “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea and said it had “greatly eased tension” on the peninsula.  Roh has said he will continue the policy.

The inauguration took place shortly after South Korea announced that Pyongyang had tested an anti-ship missile, the Financial Times reported (see related GSN story, today; Reuters/Andrew Ward, Financial Times, Feb. 24).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who attended the inauguration, said such a missile test was “not surprising.”

“It seems to be a fairly innocuous kind of test,” he added.

Powell also announced today that the United States will donate 40,000 metric tons of food to North Korea and is willing to donate another 60,000 metric tons later this year, the Associated Press reported (George Gedda, Associated Press/Salon.com, Feb. 25).

Japan announced today that it does not plan to resume food shipments to North Korea, citing security concerns and kidnapped Japanese citizens.

“Japan is negative about providing additional food aid to North Korea,” said an aide to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.  “Japan has two issues of priority, abduction and security concerns including missiles and nuclear weapons,” he added.

North Korea might follow today’s missile test with another tomorrow, Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 25).

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Iran:  Tehran Rejects Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards

During a visit of international nuclear experts, Iran announced Saturday that it has rejected for now a request to cooperate with enhanced measures to monitor its nuclear activities (see GSN, Feb. 21).

The International Atomic Energy Agency had asked Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the nuclear watchdog.  The protocol would permit the agency to conduct more intrusive inspections and environmental monitoring in Iran.

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran’s top nuclear energy official, said Iran would not sign the protocol because few other countries have done so.  It would, however, comply with its existing nuclear nonproliferation commitments as it builds new nuclear reactors and fuel production facilities, he said.

“All our developments will be under the oversight of the IAEA, but we will leave the road open to the Additional Protocol in the future,” Aghazadeh said.

After arriving Friday for a three-day visit, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei left one day earlier than scheduled, leaving his delegation to complete their tour of Iranian nuclear facilities (Azadeh Moaveni, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 23).

“I made it clear that with Iran developing a sophisticated fuel-cycle program, it is important for the agency to have as much authority, as much information, as possible,” ElBaradei said.  “I was assured that this issue will be under active consideration by the Iranian government, and this is an issue I will continue to discuss,” he added.

In Washington meanwhile, a State Department statement reaffirmed the U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear intentions, saying Iran has a “nuclear program based on deception and bad faith, and an ambitious rush to develop a nuclear fuel cycle, whose true purpose can only be to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program”

“Whatever the Iranians showed him [ElBaradei] about their hitherto clandestine uranium-enrichment program, it is akin to a midnight conversation, disclosed only after the facility’s existence was revealed by an Iranian opposition group,” the State Department said (Miranda Eeles, London Times, Feb. 24).

Iran, however, said it was acting in good faith.  “Iran intended to clarify that all doors would be open to the agency and its members and that Iran would proceed transparently,” Aghazadeh said.  “If a country has any doubt about Iran’s nuclear programs, it should go to the agency rather than slandering Iran,” he added (Moaveni, Los Angeles Times).

ElBaradei and a team of experts visited a developing uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz but the IAEA chief did not travel to the heavy water plant under construction at Arak or the nuclear reactor being built at Bushehr (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo.com, Feb. 23).

At Natanz, the IAEA experts saw a network of centrifuges to enrich uranium and they learned that Iran has the capability to build more centrifuges (Michael Gordon, New York Times, Feb. 22).

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North Korea:  Powell Meets Jiang Zemin, But No Agreement Reached

After four hours of meetings in Beijing with President Jiang Zemin and senior Chinese officials, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said the two countries had not agreed to a shared strategy on North Korea or Iraq (see GSN, Feb. 20).

The White House wants China to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear aspirations, the New York Times reported.

“I think they are anxious to play as helpful a role as they can” regarding North Korea, Powell said.  “I think they will play that role quietly,” he added.

Powell also met with Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao, who is set to assume the country’s top position.  There are “new ideas” being discussed to bring Pyongyang to negotiate an end to the crisis, according to Powell (James Dao, New York Times, Feb. 24).

Powell also issued a warning to North Korea on its alleged weapons program.

“I cannot emphasize enough how seriously all of us would view any move by North Korea toward reprocessing of the spent fuel rods and production of nuclear weapons,” he said (see GSN, Jan. 31).

The next stop on Powell’s East Asian trip is South Korea, where he is scheduled to meet with President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who will take office tomorrow.  Roh urged the United States to view North Korea as a partner in negotiations.

“North Korea was opening up and … is already changing,” Roh said.  “If we give them what they desperately want — regime security, normal treatment and economic assistance — they will be willing to give up their nuclear ambitions.  We should not, therefore, treat them as criminals but as partners in negotiations,” he added (Charles Whelan, Agence France-Presse, Feb. 24).

Food Aid to Resume

Powell said Saturday that the United States would soon resume food shipments to ease North Korean hunger (see GSN, Feb. 12).

“The need is still great.  You go through all the politics; there are kids out there that are starving.  If we can help them, we will,” Powell said.

The World Food Program said that it cannot feed large areas of North Korea because of insufficient international support.  The United States has not contributed to the program since December, Knight Ridder news agency reported.

The U.S. Congress recently granted budgetary authority that will allow donations to resume, according to Powell (Michael Zielenziger, Knight Ridder/San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 22).

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United States:  Pentagon Considering Converting ICBMs to Conventional Warheads

The U.S. Defense Department is examining a proposal to replace the nuclear warheads on some ICBMs with conventional weapons for use in short-notice strikes against enemy states, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, July 24, 2002).

Such a plan, which is just starting to be considered, would give the United States the ability to conduct long-range strikes with conventional weapons and avoid putting U.S. pilots at risk, military officials said.  The Air Force Space Command is expected to begin formally considering converting some Minuteman 3 ICBMs to conventional warheads this fall during a two-year review, the Times reported.

The conventional warhead on top of the converted missile could be taken from a number of high explosive or other specialized warheads, including bunker-busting munitions, said Maj. Gen. Timothy McMahon, commander of the 20th Air Force at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, which maintains the U.S. arsenal of 500 long-range Minuteman 3 and 45 Peacekeeper missiles.  The sheer impact of the missile, which moves at a speed of 14,000 feet per second, would be itself highly damaging, he added.

McMahon said he would be “very, very surprised,” if at some point the United States did not employ ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.

“If the nation decides that it wants to place at risk certain targets that emerge, and that if you need to strike those things in a very prompt manner — 35 to 45 minutes — a ballistic missile gives you that capability,” McMahon said.  “It’s basically long-range artillery.  But the type of munition on board would be unlike any other artillery we’ve ever used,” he added.

The proposal does raise several concerns, according to the Times.  For example, any long-range missiles armed with conventional warheads would still be counted under existing arms control treaties, such as START, said Pentagon officials.  Arms control experts said that even though converting nuclear missiles to a conventional role would reduce the number of U.S. strategic weapons, there is no guarantee that the missiles will not be refitted someday with nuclear warheads — a move other countries could follow.

“It could elicit a response from other missile powers, like China or Russia,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (Eric Schmitt, New York Times, Feb. 24).

For further information, see:

START I Text and Associated Documents (U.S. Defense Department)

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