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Iraq I: U.S., U.K. Look for U.N. Resolution Vote by End of Next WeekThe United States and the United Kingdom have decided that a vote on their latest draft U.N. resolution on Iraq should occur by the end of next week, but the two countries will not push for such a vote unless they are confident the draft resolution will receive the nine votes it needs to pass, U.S and diplomatic officials said yesterday (see GSN, March 3). President George W. Bush said in late January that “this issue will come to a head in a matter of weeks, not months,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said yesterday. “Nothing has changed that timetable,” Fleischer said. The impending Security Council briefing by U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, scheduled for Friday, is seen as the beginning of the final debate period over the draft resolution and the ultimate use of force against Iraq, officials said. “I think that … meeting will mark the final open break between council members,” a Security Council ambassador said. The United States believes that Russia and China, two permanent council members that oppose the use of force against Iraq, will abstain rather than veto a new resolution, leaving only France, according to the Washington Post. If the United States and the United Kingdom can round up the necessary nine votes among the nonpermanent members, and assure the Russian and Chinese abstentions, then a vote might be held by the end of next week, even under the threat of a French veto, U.S. and diplomatic officials said. “We could let them veto it and then turn on them,” an official said. If nine votes cannot be guaranteed, however, “then there will be no vote,” the official added. In his report to the Security Council Friday, Blix is expected to say that Iraq has still not made a full commitment to disarm, but it has made some progress, such as beginning to destroy its prohibited al-Samoud 2 missiles, according to the Post (see related GSN story, today; Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, March 4). The White House yesterday criticized Iraq’s new cooperation efforts, however, suggesting they were “the mother of all distractions.” While the United Nations has praised Iraq for agreeing to destroy its al-Samoud 2 missiles, the Bush administration said that, by doing so, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was admitting to lying in the declaration Iraq provided the United Nations in December concerning its WMD efforts. “Here’s the Catch-22 that Saddam Hussein has put himself in," Fleischer said yesterday. “He denied he had these weapons, and then he destroys things he says he never had. If he lies about never having them, how can you trust him when he says he has destroyed them?” Fleischer added. The White House also appeared unimpressed with Iraq’s pledge to provide a new report soon to inspectors on the destruction of its stockpiles of VX and anthrax, according to the New York Times. “How do you know this is not the mother of all distractions, diversions, so the world looks in one place while he buries them in another?” Fleischer asked (Sanger/Shanker, New York Times, March 4). The 10 nonpermanent Security Council members yesterday met with Canadian U.N. Ambassador Paul Heinbecker to discuss a his proposed compromise between those pushing for military action against Iraq and those calling for an extension to the inspections process (see GSN, Feb. 27). The Canadian proposal calls for the Security Council to authorize military action against Iraq at the end of March if Baghdad was found to be still not complying with inspections, according to United Press International. The proposal also includes a timeline for continued, enhanced inspections if inspectors reported “substantial Iraqi compliance” by March 28. While there was division among the 10 nonpermanent council members over the Canadian proposal, there were no negative comments, Heinbecker said. “We’ve been offering ideas and I think it has been appreciated,” Heinbecker said. “Whether or not there will be a sufficient agreement even among the elected members to take the issue forward is for them to answer,” he added (William Reilly, United Press International, March 3). Some council diplomats indicated that the Canadian proposal represented the best chance to maintain some sort of Security Council unity on the Iraq issue, according to the Globe and Mail. “If you want to obtain some sense of agreement … you would have to look at the Canadian alternative, probably in a modified way,” said Deputy Chilean U.N. Ambassador Cristian Maquieira (Paul Knox, Globe and Mail, March 4). U.S. Spying Controversy Meanwhile, Security Council diplomats yesterday were unimpressed by recent reports of a U.S. National Security Agency memo that ordered an increase of surveillance on them to help determine how they might vote on the new U.N. resolution on Iraq, according to the Washington Post. “The fact is, this sort of thing goes with the territory,” said Pakistani U.N. Ambassador Munir Akram. “You’d have to be very naive to be surprised,” Akram added. Espionage is considered a fact of life at the United Nations, U.N diplomats and analysts said, adding that they assume their conversations are being monitored. “I assume every phone conversation I have either on the cell phone or at the office is listened to by several people,” a European diplomat said. When another Security Council diplomat was asked during a telephone interview if he thought his calls were monitored, the diplomat replied, “Let’s ask the guy who’s listening to us” (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, March 4). Some of the smaller Security Council countries consider being the target of foreign intelligence efforts almost as a mark of prestige, said Bulgarian U.N. Ambassador Stefan Tavrov. “It’s almost an offense if they don’t listen,” Tavrov said. “It’s integrated in your thinking and your work,” he added. While U.S. officials refused to confirm or deny the reported NSA memo, current and former U.S. officials familiar with the agency said that it is very likely that the United States is monitoring U.N. diplomats concerning the Iraq issue. “It would be inconceivable to me, with the interest of the nation’s leadership on this set of issues, that we aren’t using all available means to collect as much information as possible,” a former U.S. official said. The leaked memo might have the effect of persuading foreign governments to take measures to block U.S. monitoring efforts, the former U.S. official said. “Not only is it embarrassing, but ultimately it’s compromising sources and methods,” the former official said. “People will go out of their way to prohibit you from having success in the future,” the former official added (Drogin/Miller, Los Angeles Times, March 4). The reports might also increase public opposition to the U.S. stance on Iraq, a former U.S. ambassador with experience in U.N. affairs said. “Diplomatically, it may stiffen opposition to the United States,” the former ambassador said. “It’s not a helpful development,” the former ambassador added. The history of espionage at the United Nations goes clear back to the conference held in San Francisco in 1945 to create the organization, where the United States monitored foreign delegations and pushed for the body to be located in New York to make it easier to conduct espionage, according to historians. “One would have to have the innocence of an unborn child to believe that espionage doesn’t go on every day at the United Nations,” said Loch Johnson, an authority on intelligence at the University of Georgia. “From a purist point of view, it’s unfortunate in a way, because after all, we’re the host nation for the United Nations. But the reality is, Europeans and everyone else engages in espionage in New York City, much of it focused on the United Nations,” Johnson added (Shane/Sabar, Baltimore Sun, March 4). Inspections U.N. inspectors visited at least 15 suspect Iraqi sites yesterday, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency press release. Chemical experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission visited al-Muthanna to observe the destruction of 14 empty 155 mm artillery shells, 10 of which had once been filled with mustard gas agent. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited the headquarters of the Mesopotamia State Company for Seeds in Baghdad and the Biology Department at the College of Science at Mosul University. UNMOVIC missile inspectors supervised the destruction of six al-Samoud 2 missiles at al-Taji. They also supervised the destruction of a casting chamber at al-Mutasim (see related GSN story, today). Inspectors also visited al-Furat State Company and an anti-aircraft missile component storage facility outside of Baghdad. Inspectors based in the northern city of Mosul visited a construction agency related to spray irrigation systems, the IAEA release said. IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey in an area north of Baghdad, near the town of Tarmya (IAEA release, March 3). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)
From March 4, 2003 issue.U.S. Response: CTR Program Hurt by U.S., Russian Bureaucracies, GAO SaysThe U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which helps fund efforts to safeguard Russian WMD stockpiles and materials, has been hindered by bureaucratic obstacles in both Moscow and Washington, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report expected to be presented to Congress this week (see GSN, Jan. 17). While the United States has contributed about $6 billion since 1992 to help Russia destroy or secure its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, basic security improvements have still not been made at dozens of Russian sites that store about 60 percent of the country’s nuclear materials, the GAO report says. One of the biggest problems is that Russia refuses to grant U.S. officials access to the sites where the security upgrades are to be made, it says. “Russia is not providing needed access to many of the sites,” the draft report says. “Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future,” it adds. In the United State, both the Congress and the White House have refused to provide essential funding or to grant waivers for the awarding of program contracts, the GAO report says (see GSN, Jan. 15). It also criticizes the U.S. Defense Department for implementing security improvements too slowly at sites where Russia has provided access (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, March 4). The threat reduction program also came under fire yesterday from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), who said that greater financial control over the program was needed following the collapse of two major projects. The United States spent almost $95 million to help Russia build a plant to destroy missile engines, which was ultimately wasted because Russian local officials blocked the plant’s construction, Hunter said. The United States also contributed $106 million to help Russia build a plant to destroy liquid missile fuel, only to be told by Russia last year that the fuel had been used in its civilian space program, he said (see GSN, May 29, 2002). “We’ve got two white elephants here,” said Hunter, whose committee was scheduled to hold a hearing on the issue today. “An enormous amount of money has been wasted here. Taxpayer money,” he added (Ken Guggenheim, Associated Press/Austin American-Statesman, March 4). Hunter continued his assault on the threat reduction program in a Washington Post commentary today. “Twelve years and more than $7 billion later, it is worth revisiting the original purpose of this program,” Hunter said. “Designed as a temporary, focused effort to shrink Moscow’s vast strategic arsenal with American funding and know-how, the CTR program has, over time, morphed into an open-ended, unfocused and sometimes self-defeating venture,” he added. The United States appears ready to make another mistake by considering helping Russia to dispose of missile engines through the use of outdoor-burners — an $80 million project that could cause environmental damage and has no guarantee of obtaining the needed permits, Hunter said. Hunter also warned that the U.S. threat reduction efforts could be instead aiding Russia militarily. “For every dollar the United States commits to helping Russia destroy these weapons, we run the risk that Moscow will use the savings to fund military programs that are contrary to U.S. national security interests,” he said, citing reports of Russia acquiring new ICBMs (see GSN, Jan. 30, 2002). The Pentagon needs to both return the threat reduction program to its original focus of destroying strategic systems and to maintain greater financial control, Hunter said. He said Congress needed to maintain strict oversight of the program. “If the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is to once again benefit U.S. national security, it must refocus its resources on real threats and ensure real Russian cooperation,” Hunter said. “Moscow’s leadership has to understand that it cannot stand by as CTR projects fail, $100 million at a time, and still expect U.S. assistance,” he added (Duncan Hunter, Washington Post, March 4). For further information, see: U.S. Defense Department CTR Site
From March 4, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Summary of InspectionsExperts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. About 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
From March 3, 2003 issue.Iraq I: United States Surveils U.N. Security Council DiplomatsThe United States has begun a surveillance campaign against U.N. Security Council diplomats in an effort to obtain information on how they might vote on a U.S.-British supported resolution on Iraq, the London Observer reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 28). The surveillance campaign was outlined in a memo prepared by Frank Koza, chief of staff in the Regional Targets section of the U.S. National Security Agency, according to the Observer. The memo, dated Jan. 31, directed agency staff to increase surveillance operations directed at Security Council members, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to determine their voting intentions. It also advised agency officials that information was wanted on policies, negotiating positions and alliances — the “whole gamut of information that could give U.S. policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to U.S. goals or to head off surprises.” There had been debate within the White House over launching the operation, which was requested by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, said sources in Washington. Some Bush administration officials warned of the serious consequences that could result if the operation was discovered, the Observer reported (London Observer, March 2). Blix’s Latest Report The latest report on Iraq’s disarmament from chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix makes a harsher evaluation of Iraq’s cooperation than has previous reports. “The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far,” Blix wrote in the report, which was distributed to Security Council members and journalists Friday afternoon. “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items,” Blix wrote. “It is hard to understand why a number of the measures, which are now being taken, could not have been initiated earlier. If they had been taken earlier, they might have borne fruit by now.” While this part of the report bolsters the U.S. position that Iraq will never voluntarily disarm, the document also details areas where Iraq has been cooperating with inspectors, giving something to governments that want to give UNMOVIC more time. The report envisions a work program that extends beyond the end of March, what is generally viewed as the deadline for the beginning of military action against Iraq. “Without the required cooperation, disarmament and its verification will be problematic,” Blix wrote. “However, even with the requisite cooperation it will inevitably require some time.” The report was written before Iraq agreed to destroy its al-Samoud 2 missiles, which Blix on Friday called “a very significant piece of real disarmament” (see related GSN story, today). Continuing a theme from earlier reports, Blix distinguished between Iraqi cooperation on process and substance. On process, such as providing access to sites, “in general, Iraq has been helpful,” he wrote. But on substance, such as providing information on illegal weapons of mass destruction, the report says Iraq has been less forthcoming. The 12,000-page Dec. 7 declaration from Iraq on its programs for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missile “has not been found to provide new evidence or data that may help to resolve outstanding disarmament issues,” other than information on the al-Samoud 2 missiles, according to the report. Blix said on most access questions, including use of helicopters and surveillance aircraft, Iraq was cooperating. However, on giving UNMOVIC unrestricted access to scientists, “the reality is that, so far, no persons not nominated by the Iraqi side have been willing to be interviewed without a tape recorder running or an Iraqi witness present.” Another issue is the list Iraq provided of people involved in what Baghdad described as the unilateral destruction of chemical and biological weapons Iraq was known to have at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. A batch of documents Iraq has provided that is supposed to detail that destruction is still being examined. On that topic, Blix wrote, “It is not possible to know whether they will prove to be a successful way to reduce uncertainty about the quantities unilaterally destroyed.” Although the United States is sending strong signals that it will push for a decision on its draft resolution within weeks, Blix lays out a program of work in the report that goes on at least until the end of March. UNMOVIC is completing “an internal document of some importance,” Blix wrote, which is a list of unresolved disarmament issues “and of the measures which Iraq could take to resolve them.” This list of “key remaining disarmament tasks” is required by Resolution 1284 and could “serve as a yardstick against which Iraq’s disarmament actions under Resolution 1441 may be measured,” wrote Blix. He is scheduled to brief the Security Council on his latest report, and developments that have occurred since, on March 7 (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, March 3). Iraq to Prove VX, Anthrax Destruction Meanwhile, the United Nations has said that Iraq will submit a new report on its stockpiles of VX chemical agent and anthrax within a week. Iraqi officials and U.N. experts discussed yesterday Iraq’s proposal to submit “quantitative verification” that it has destroyed its VX and anthrax stockpiles. Iraq has been accused of failing to provide adequate information as to the destruction of banned weapons and materials. “Iraq will be providing a report on the VX and anthrax in a week’s time,” U.N. spokesman Hiro Ueki said (Nadim Ladki, Reuters, March 3). Inspections U.N. inspectors Friday conducted a private interview with an Iraqi biologist, the first non-nuclear-related interview since Feb. 7, Ueki said Saturday. Previously, Iraqi chemical and biological scientists had refused to grant interviews without recording the conversations. Ueki indicated that Friday’s interview was not taped (Associated Press/New York Times, March 2). U.N. inspectors visited at least six suspect Iraq sites today, according to the Associated Press. Inspectors visited a chemical and explosives plant, a rocket factory, two import companies and a plastics factory. They also visited al-Aziziya, where Iraq has said it destroyed bombs filled with biological agents in 1991 (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 3). For further information, see: U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix’s current Security Council report (New York Times)
From March 3, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Report Documents Past U.S. Support for CW-Using IraqBy David Ruppe Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein, which draws on 61 declassified government documents and was published on the Internet last week by the nonprofit research organization the National Security Archive, concludes the Reagan administration chose to play down Iraq’s chemical weapons usage in favor of the maintaining good U.S.-Iraqi relations. “Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance,” the report says. Furthermore, it says the Reagan administration pursued the relationship despite knowledge of Iraqi human rights abuses, harboring of terrorists, and an interest in developing nuclear weapons. “The documents show that during this period of renewed U.S. support for [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein], he had invaded his neighbor (Iran), had long-range nuclear aspirations that would ‘probably’ include ‘an eventual nuclear capability,’ harbored known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens, and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people,” said a press release accompanying the report. The Bush administration currently is massing forces for a possible war against Iraq and is justifying its actions by citing many of those same issues. Two key differences in circumstances today, however, are that the United States and Iraq became outright enemies in 1990 after Iraq attacked Kuwait, kicking off the Gulf War, and that Iraq has for more than 10 years apparently failed to comply with numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding disarmament and other issues. Joyce Battle, who edited the report, said the documents have relevance for the situation today. “If the U.S. goes to war with Iraq, many people will be put in harm’s way, and I think that we all should seek some understanding of earlier developments and policies that led us to the current situation,” she wrote in a publicized Internet chat to discuss the report. She said the contrast between the Reagan administration’s condemnation of Iraqi chemical weapons use and its continued support of Iraq, “encouraged Saddam Hussein to believe that the United States did not really believe, or act on, its public posture.” The report says the documents offer a noteworthy contrast between the reasoning currently offered by the Bush administration for its preparations for a possible war on Iraq and the policies pursued by Washington in the early 1980s. “The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a pre-emptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be supported as a ‘just war,’” it says. “The documents in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that determined this country’s policies during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. … The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing,” it said. U.S. Opposed Regime Change Goal Perhaps the most striking contrast between the policies of the Bush and Reagan administrations is their declared policies regarding regime change in Baghdad. The report includes a 1984 State Department press release that for the first time publicly condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iranian forces, but which also condemned Iran’s goal of regime change in Baghdad. “While condemning Iraq’s chemical weapons use … the United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims,” it said. The report says, though, “When asked whether the U.S.’s conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have ‘any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations,’ the department’s spokesperson said ‘No. I’m not aware of any change in our position. We’re interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.’” Subsequent reporting has shown that the United States continued from 1986 to 1988 to allow then-legal, dual-use technology exports to Iraq that could aid its chemical and biological warfare efforts, such as bacterial strains for causing anthrax and gas gangrene, and for making botulinum toxin (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2002). Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during a hearing last September, “Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of reaping what we have sown?” Oil, Regional Balance a Concern Named for a now famous secret 1983 meeting between then-U.S. special envoy Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein and including a photograph of that encounter, the report provides copies of 61 declassified documents offering details on the U.S.-Iraqi relationship from 1980 to 1984, most of which were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Rumsfeld, then a former defense secretary, met with Hussein carrying a letter from [President Ronald] Reagan to Hussein, on a mission to bring the two governments closer together. The report shows that the Reagan administration was concerned greatly with preventing a disruption in the Persian Gulf oil flow and an Iraqi defeat, or a collapse of Hussein’s regime, by fundamentalist Islamic Iran. The report cites National Security Decision Directive 114 on the Iran-Iraq War, issued by Reagan in November 1983, which said the highest U.S. priority was to protect Gulf oil facilities. Not only at the time was there a concern Iran would defeat Iraq and gain greater control of the world’s oil, there was a concern Iraq would attempt to disrupt the oil flow to draw in greater powers to put an end to the conflict. The United States had no formal relations with Iraq since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Iraq severed them. Hussein came to power, first as vice president, around 1968. In the early 1980s, the United States had an official policy of neutrality toward Iran and Iraq as they waged war. U.S. commerce with Iraq continued however, and there were signs of a thawing in U.S.-Iraqi government relations as early as 1981, with the scheduled visit of a State Department official to Baghdad and the U.S. interests section there declaring that the United States then had “a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958,” according to one document. Despite Persistent Terrorist Ties In 1982, the State Department removed Iraq from its list of countries supporting international terrorism. Still, in 1983, the State Department continued to urge Iraq to sever association with suspected terrorist groups. In May of that year, for instance, Secretary of State George Shultz sent a message to senior Iraqi official Tariq Aziz implying Iraq should dissociate itself from certain Palestinian groups it had supported, which he observed opposed both the U.S. and Iraqi governments. He added, “Several recent events lead me to believe that Iraq hesitates to cut its threads to international terrorists.” An October 1983 State Department report indicated the United States had covertly been practicing a “qualified tilt” toward Iraq, which included providing tactical intelligence and more to help prevent an Iraqi defeat. While U.S. policy barred military exports to Iraq, the report says the documents show U.S. companies were allowed to negotiate for potential deals to export potentially dual-use items such as trucks and helicopters to the Iraqi military. “Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a “don’t ask, don’t tell” basis,” it says. In the spring of 1984, the administration deliberated on relaxing controls on dual-use exports judged “insignificant” for Iraq’s civilian nuclear agency, one document shows. A preliminary review, the document said, decided favorably towards relaxing the controls. A Defense Intelligence Agency report several months later warned that Iraq would probably “continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons,” by first developing its civil nuclear program. Priorities Faulted The National Security Archives report faulted the Reagan administration largely for a lack of emphasis it said was placed on the chemical weapons issue. It says a 1984 directive expressed a determination to “avert an Iraqi collapse,” while also calling for “unambiguous” condemnation of chemical weapons use. It faulted the document, however, for not calling for specific condemnation of Iraqi chemical warfare and for “including the caveat that the U.S. should ‘place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.’” The report criticized the previously noted National Security Decision Directive 114, which addressed the administration concern about preserving the oil flow, for not including a “reference to chemical weapons.” The report also suggests Iraq persuaded the Reagan administration to water down a proposed U.N. Security Council condemnation of Iraq’s chemical weapons use in Iraq. Iraq’s senior diplomat in Washington urged the Security Council to issue a presidential statement, rather than a resolution, and that it not mention any country regarding chemical weapons use. An official said the United States could accept the Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went along and asked for the Iraqi government’s help “in avoiding … embarrassing situation[s]” and said the U.S. did “not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship.” After the statement was issued, a State Department memo later noted, “The statement, by the way contains all three elements [the Iraqi diplomat] wanted.” The report also contained a previously reported cable record of the 90-minute Rumsfeld-Hussein meeting, which, it says, contradicts a recent account of the meeting by Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld on Sept. 21, 2001, claimed he had “cautioned” Hussein during the meeting about using chemical weapons. “Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and Syria, and the U.S.’s efforts to find alternative routes to transport Iraq’s oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by Iran, and Iran’s ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory,” the report said. “Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to detailed notes on the meeting,” it said, adding Rumsfeld raised the issue in a subsequent meeting with Aziz.
From March 3, 2003 issue.U.S. Response: Washington Should Triple Nonproliferation Funding, Campaign SaysBy David McGlinchey Washington should be promoting nonproliferation programs and avoiding efforts to develop new nuclear weapons, according to Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), who spoke Wednesday at the annual meeting of the Energy Facilities Contractors Group. Tauscher criticized the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, released January 2002, which diminishes the importance of nuclear retaliation but keeps alive the possibility of new U.S. nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield. “Rather than improve on past accomplishments, the United States is currently in a pattern of rejecting treaties, has put forth a Nuclear Posture Review that seems divorced from reality, and is making only paltry investments in nuclear nonproliferation,” Tauscher said. The United States should triple its nonproliferation budget and spend $30 billion over the next decade, she said. “To put this in perspective, for less than 1 percent of what the U.S. currently spends on defense, we can eliminate the risk of these deadly weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states,” according to Tauscher. The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, a nonprofit advocacy group, has pushed the same initiative, calling for nonproliferation funding roughly equal to 1 percent of the Pentagon budget. Former Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth, a senior adviser to the group, made the 1 percent appeal Wednesday at a conference held by the Center for Defense Information and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Congressional Support Inderfurth, currently a professor at George Washington University, said that support for threat reduction campaigns and nonproliferation funding must be directed toward Congress. “That is the place we can get traction to do some of the things we want to do,” he said. The 1 percent message catches the ear of public groups, but it is “also resonating on the Hill,” NTRC Director Brian Finlay told Global Security Newswire. Speaking on the panel with Inderfurth, the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Laura Holgate said that concerned arms control advocates must hold elected officials responsible for supporting arms control programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. “I like to say that Nunn-Lugar has destroyed way more Soviet missiles than even the wildest claims of missile defense,” she said. Tauscher Criticizes Moscow Treaty Tauscher said that the Moscow Treaty, officially known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, could decrease international security. “To make matters much worse, the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty will, ironically, make nuclear security problems worse because it does not commit either nation to actually destroying a single nuclear weapon. Instead, it will allow the United States and Russia to merely store weapons — like putting a car on blocks in a garage — leaving more nuclear parts in more locations where they will likely be less secure,” she said. [EDITOR'S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group, Inc.]
From March 3, 2003 issue.Iraq III: Summary of InspectionsExperts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. About 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
From February 25, 2003 issue.Iraq I: U.S. Says One Question Left: Will the U.N. Support a Certain War?Two competing proposals on Iraq were introduced yesterday to the U.N. Security Council, but U.S. officials indicated that the United States would go to war regardless of how the council votes on the resolution. The sole outstanding issue for the Bush administration was whether the council would support the war or cast itself into irrelevance, officials said (see GSN, Feb. 24). In meetings with officials from Security Council members, U.S. officials have indicated that the decision to go to war has already been made, according to the Washington Post. For example, in meetings with Russian officials yesterday, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the United States was going ahead with war regardless of the Security Council’s decision and that the U.S. focus was on maintaining the unity of the council, a senior Bush administration official said. A senior diplomat from another Security Council member said his government had also been told to not worry about making a decision on possibly launching war. “You are not going to decide whether there is war in Iraq or not,” the diplomat said U.S. officials told him. “That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It is already final. The only question now is whether the council will go along with it or not,” the diplomat added, quoting the U.S. officials. The United States has been conducting a high-level diplomatic campaign to rally the support of a majority of the Security Council for a new resolution introduced yesterday, according to the Post. So far, however, only Spain and Bulgaria have openly sided with the United States and the United Kingdom on the new resolution. Out of the 10 nonpermanent members, Germany and Syria are considered as being solidly in the “no” column. Pakistan is believed to be going to vote no or abstain, the Post reported. While the United States appears willing to accept a 9-2 vote in favor of the new resolution, with four abstentions, other council members have said such a result would equal a false victory. The resolution has to be adopted by “an important majority,” including most of the five permanent members, to maintain any sense of relevance, a nonpermanent council member diplomat said. “This idea of putting three members with veto power on the outside is not something that sounds much like unity,” the diplomat said. “Are they going to declare the Security Council “relevant” by virtue of submission by the smallest states?” the diplomat added (Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, Feb. 25). A New Resolution and a Memorandum Introduced With U.S. and Spanish support, the United Kingdom introduced the new draft resolution yesterday, formally charging that Iraq is still in violation of its disarmament obligations. If adopted, the resolution would have the council decide “that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in Resolution 1441” to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction — which would likely lead to war. Resolution 1441, agreed to unanimously by the council in November, gives Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face “serious consequences.” At the same time, France began circulating a two-page memorandum calling for “reinforced inspections” with timelines for Iraq’s cooperation on a schedule that could extend into the summer. The paper, supported by Germany and Russia, says, “Our priority should be to achieve [disarmament] peacefully through the inspection regime. The military option should only be a last resort. So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.” The memorandum is not a draft resolution. Rather, it is more of a counterpoint to the British draft. The authors of the memo say a second resolution is not needed. According to Ambassador Gunter Pleuger of Germany, the memo “is based on the present system of Security Council resolutions and therefore we feel we do not need a second resolution right now.” Pleuger said the memorandum “proposes things that have been proposed earlier [by the three governments] and have been repeated by the European Union on Feb. 17, that is, we have the common goal to disarm Iraq in a peaceful way.” British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, in introducing the draft resolution yesterday, told the council, “Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced towards that objective of complete disarmament.” He said the council was seeing “an all-too-familiar pattern of Iraq trying to get us to focus on small concessions of process, rather than on the big picture. The cardinal point is that there is no semblance of wholehearted cooperation, nothing like voluntary and active disarmament.” The one-page draft resolution does not explicitly authorize using force against Iraq, but that is the clear implication of the paper because the bulk of the draft details how Iraq has not cooperated with weapons inspectors. The draft would have the council decide “that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded it in resolution 1441.” It does not give any deadlines, so passage of the resolution could be enough to trigger the use of force. Speaking to reporters, U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said, “We have not seen what this council insisted on seeing — a strategic decision by Iraq to disarm. That is the bar set by Resolution 1441 and Iraq is immensely far from reaching that bar and we all know it.” French Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sabliere countered, “The time has not come to discuss a military option. We do think that the use of force should be the last resort. We have never ruled out the use of force, but we have always stated that it should be the last resort.” The French memorandum calls for more inspections and invokes the timeline established in Resolution 1284, adopted in December 1999. The memo says the inspectors should create a program of work that would identify “the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq.” Following on from 1284, the inspectors would then have 120 days to pursue inspections before presenting a new report on Iraqi cooperation to the council. Such a timeline, if immediately enacted, would push a possible invasion off to the hottest time of the year in the Middle East. The paper also says the inspection regime should include more inspectors, mobile inspections units and increased aerial surveillance. “We are saying that while Iraq is not yet fully cooperating, Iraq is making some progress,” de la Sabliere said. “Inspections are making some results. We must have a timeline.” Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov told journalists, “We don’t think the chance for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq has been lost or missed. We are convinced on the contrary that the inspections are proceeding effectively and that Iraq is responding to the demands of the international community and to the pressure exerted on it and we think that this should continue.” Negroponte said the French memo “is much more process than substance. We don’t see it as contributing to the disarmament of Iraq. We view that paper with deep skepticism.” The next report by the head of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Hans Blix, is due March 1, the same day Iraq must begin destroying its missiles that exceed the range permitted by the council (see related GSN story, today). The council is scheduled to meet March 7 to discuss the latest reports from Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A drive for a vote on the draft resolution could follow at time after that, diplomats said. Greenstock told journalists, “We haven’t set a date because we’re not setting an ultimatum in those terms.” He added, “There is still an opportunity to avert conflict. But the council’s judgment that Iraq has made the wrong choice should be clear and consensual.” Syrian Ambassador Mikhail Wehbe said that as an Arab country, “we could not accept such a draft resolution to come at this stage and as a declaration of war against the Iraqi people. We are not going to support such a resolution, as Resolution 1441 has not been exhausted fully.” At one level, this is a debate about the relative value of two council resolutions governing the activities of the inspectors. Resolution 1284 created UNMOVIC and laid out a program of work and a timetable for the inspectors once they got back into Iraq following the departure of UNMOVIC’s predecessor, the U.N. Special Commission, in 1998. Resolution 1441 gave the inspectors authority for a more intrusive regime and warned Iraq of “serious consequences” if it did not fully cooperate with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. An element of the debate is how much value the earlier resolution still has. “The problem about the memorandum and its wish for a much longer period of inspections under Resolution 1284 is that it sets aside the extra pressure which is being produced by 1441,” Greenstock said. Lavrov, however, said Resolution 1284 “is part of international law. Unless explicitly cancelled by the council, it remains the basis for the inspectors work, together with 1441. There is no contradiction.” The council will continue its debate tomorrow over the two conflicting initiatives (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 25). Inspectors’ Security Council Briefing IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will present his report on nuclear inspections within Iraq to the Security Council at the same time as the March 7 Blix briefing, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said today. ElBaradei had originally been scheduled to hold a separate briefing on April 11, according to Reuters (Reuters/MSNBC.com, Feb. 25). Blix met yesterday with the U.N. College of Commissioners, an advisory board, to review the report he will present to the Security Council on the status of weapons inspections in Iraq. The meetings are scheduled to last through today (U.N. press release, Feb. 24). Inspections U.N. inspectors visited at least 19 suspect Iraqi sites yesterday, according to an IAEA press release. UNMOVIC missile inspectors tagged SA-2 missiles that had undergone maintenance at the al-Harith Company. They also inspected al-Rasheed Company, al-Qaid Factory, al-Eyz State Company and al-Mutasim Factory. UNMOVIC chemical inspectors conducted a rebaselining inspection at the Baghdad Institute of Technology, according to the IAEA release. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited an airfield and a munitions test range, both located southwest of Baghdad. They also inspected munitions fragments at an old destruction site. Biological experts inspected the Environmental Engineering Laboratory at Mosul University’s Department of Civil Engineering and shelters and bunkers related to the Mosul Airfield. IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey in an area southwest of Baghdad, the agency release said. They also inspected the use of high-strength magnets at al-Midlad State Company, formerly known as al-Furat; al-Karama site; al-Razzi State Company, formerly known as Taji Laser; and al-Yarmook site (IAEA release, Feb. 24). For further information, see:
From February 25, 2003 issue.U.S. Response: Regan Escapes Death PenaltyA U.S. federal jury decided yesterday that Brian Regan had not attempted to sell U.S. war plans or information on specific weapons systems, including nuclear weapons, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Feb. 21). Regan was convicted last week on two counts of attempted espionage and one count of gathering national defense information, the Post reported. If the jury had agreed that he had attempted to sell specific information, Regan would have been eligible for the death penalty. He could face up to life in prison May 9, when he is scheduled to be sentenced. “As much as I am disappointed that he was convicted, I am so proud of this jury for not collapsing in this time of fear of terror,” said Jonathan Shapiro, one of Regan’s lawyers. “This should never have been a death penalty case to begin with. That message was sent loud and clear,” he added. A juror agreed with Shapiro, saying the prosecution did not produce enough evidence. “We weren’t even considering what the punishment would be,” the juror said (Jerry Markon, Washington Post, Feb. 25).
From February 25, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Summary of InspectionsExperts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. More than 200 U.N. personnel, including about 150 inspectors, are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
From February 24, 2003 issue.Iraq I: United States, United Kingdom to Submit New ResolutionThe United States and the United Kingdom are expected today to submit a new resolution to the U.N. Security Council declaring Iraq in violation of its disarmament obligations, U.N. diplomats said (see GSN, Feb. 21). British U.N. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock is expected to submit the resolution on behalf of the two countries, Security Council diplomats said (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, Feb. 24). The Bush administration plans to allow U.N. Security Council members only a short amount of time to decide whether they will support the resolution after the heads of the U.N. inspections teams brief the council next month, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said yesterday. “It isn’t going to be a long period of time from the tabling of the resolution until a judgment is made as to whether the resolution is ready to be voted on or not,” Powell said. Powell said he saw a briefing by U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, scheduled for March 7, as a last chance for Security Council members to make a decision. “I would assume that once (they have) made that report, everybody will have one last opportunity to make a judgment,” Powell said. “And shortly after that, judgment will have to be made as to what the Security Council should do,” he added. Senior White House officials have begun visiting Security Council members in an attempt to gain their support for the new resolution, according to the Washington Times. Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Kim Holmes recently visited Mexico, where diplomats complained of a hostile U.S. approach. “They actu | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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