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U.S. Response: Experts Debate Bush’s Controversial Nonproliferation StrategyBy David Ruppe Administration actions implementing the strategy include but are not limited to: declaring Iran, Iraq and North Korea to be an “axis of evil” (see GSN, Jan. 30, 2002), calling for an expanded justification for pre-emptive war (see GSN, July 15, 2002), abandoning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and pursuing national missile defenses (see GSN, June 13, 2002), opposing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (see GSN, July 31, 2002), and interest in possibly developing and using new nuclear weapons (see GSN, Feb. 19). Various elements of the Bush WMD nonproliferation strategy — which experts generally agree prioritizes the prospect of military solutions over traditional instruments of arms control and nonproliferation — were publicly disclosed last year in several administration policy documents, as well as in policy statements by President George W. Bush. A debate among experts is now growing about the strategy’s wisdom, as it is put to the test with escalating crises in Iraq and North Korea. Critics charge the new approach to combating proliferation is self-defeating, potentially hastening the very behavior it is intended to curb. “Even if U.S. forces succeed quickly in separating [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein] from his weapons of mass destruction, the war could accelerate proliferation,” wrote Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington in a recent article. Other states may feel threatened by the potential use of force against them as a disarmament tool and conclude that weapons of mass destruction are an effective deterrent, Krepon wrote. Administration officials and supporters, on the other hand, have argued Iraq must be disarmed by the prospect of force if necessary before it acquires nuclear capability or shares its most dangerous weapons with terrorists. They have asserted, further, that success in Iraq would discourage other potential proliferators by making clear that the United States will not tolerate WMD proliferation. “In the post-Cold War era, otherwise insignificant nations, or even terrorist groups, can vault onto the world stage with readily available technology. That’s why in today’s ugly world the United States needs to be prepared with a tough, effective array of military options — including nuclear options — and plans for their employment to deter, if possible, or to defeat, if necessary,” wrote David Smith, an analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, in a recent opinion piece. Emphasis on Force The Bush administration strategy has numerous aspects, including an increasing priority placed on “counterproliferation” — the threat and use of U.S. military capabilities to address WMD proliferation — relative to diplomatic, economic, and political tools. While previous administrations have always kept the option of employing preventive war potential enemies, the Bush administration has elevated that tool into a core element of U.S. security strategy and its approach toward Iraq. “Our enemies are seeking weapons of mass destruction. America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed,” said the administration’s September 2002 National Security Strategy. Specific counterproliferation tools could include developing and using nuclear weapons to deter other countries from acquiring or using chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and to strike such enemy weapons buried deeply underground. Another facet of counterproliferation includes developing missile defenses, not just for defense, but also to “preserve U.S. freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments,” according to the administration’s January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. As the role of military solutions is enhanced, traditional U.S. nonproliferation strategies have been downgraded, including arms control agreements, and application of the concepts of strategic containment and mutually assured destruction. The Bush administration over the past year has controversially sought to remove, weaken, or prevent arms control pacts that might compromise U.S. counterproliferation capabilities. The United States, for example, withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June and refuses to ratify the nuclear test ban treaty. Bush emphasized his approach in a major policy speech at West Point last June. “We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities — detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities — are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Approach Called Self Defeating Critics have charged the strategy’s various components may transform the international security system in many negative ways. The strategy could, they say, loosen international standards for using force, undermine the authority of the United Nations in deciding when force is acceptable, weaken the international taboo against renouncing international treaty commitments, and undermine norms prohibiting the development and use of nuclear weapons. North Korea has been cited as an example of the Bush administration’s strategy possibly backfiring. Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty earlier this year and is apparently accelerating its nuclear weapons development activities while citing a growing threat from the United States. “The way they’re committing counterproliferation is actually a stimulus to proliferation,” says Martin Butcher, an analyst with Physicians for Social Responsibility. Nonproliferation “has suffered severe setbacks over the past decade,” wrote the Stimson Center’s Krepon. “The Bush administration inherited this mess, and promptly made it worse by denigrating treaties, deterrence, export controls and multilateral diplomacy,” he wrote. Smith says proliferation occurred even when the United States did not play that role and cannot be pinned on Bush’s approach to dealing with it. “Why are we having this discussion? Because the nonproliferation regime has been undermined. … Then poor George Bush comes to office and hears, ‘Look what you’ve done with your new doctrine here.’ I think it’s just disingenuous. He’s got to do absolutely nothing with it. He’s looking at the situation as it is and trying to deal with it,” Smith said.Application of the strategy places the United States in the role of a global hegemon, wrote Yale professor John Lewis Gaddis last year, in an article praising the policy. “Pre-emption in turn requires hegemony,” he wrote, and cited the administration’s National Security Strategy goal of having U.S. forces “strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” Krepon contends hegemony, though perhaps intended to discourage proliferation, actually encourages it. “I think the counter to a hegemon is proliferation, and we’re seeing that happen,” he said. Gaddis and others say the international community has generally accepted U.S. hegemony, viewing it as “relatively benign.” Krepon says the pre-emption policy, however, has precipitated reactions abroad and at home that are undermining U.S. efforts to gain international support. “This is not something that has gone down very well internationally and it is not something that the American public feels terribly good about. It’s very hard in a democracy to get consensual agreement on waging a preventive war, even after 9/11. And it’s 15 times harder to do this in the U.N. Security Council,” he said. “The controversy in this area stems in part from the way in which the possibility of pre-emptive or preventative attack outside the confines of war undermines traditional notions of international sovereignty,” says Butcher. Smith acknowledges the dissatisfaction but contends the alternative is to continue to pursue strategies that have been proven ineffective. “What’s being tested here, the Bush doctrine or the United Nations? The real issue here is the people who have been criticizing us don’t take responsibility for their own words,” he said. New Era Requires New Strategy Advocates of the Bush strategy contend changes in the international system since the Cold War have brought new types of security challenges that warrant a new approach to international security. Administration officials have made a key assertion that unlike the former Soviet Union, some countries — particularly Iran, Iraq and North Korea — cannot be deterred by the massive U.S. nuclear and conventional superiority from attempting, or perhaps from cooperating with terrorists, to destroy the United States. “Some states” in the international community seek weapons of mass destruction not for deterrence, but “as tools of coercion and intimidation,” said the administration’s December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. “For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest,” it said. Critics of the administration’s strategy disagree that countries such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea cannot be deterred, arguing that Iraq was successfully deterred from using weapons of mass destruction during the 1991 Gulf War. They contend, furthermore, that threatening such countries with a pre-emptive, regime-ending attack, will encourage the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. A new approach to nonproliferation is therefore required to match the times. We need a new strategy to deal with proliferation and terrorism “that is not dominated by military strategy, but rather by what [Harvard University international security expert] Joseph Nye has described as ‘soft power,’ that is built around the economic and diplomatic strength of the United States and our allies,” Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information, said recently. It is doubtful, however, that the Bush administration would adopt such a strategy. “There is no such soft power strategy in evidence so far that really could compete persuasively in a coherent way with the military strategy that’s been promoted as the solution to proliferation and terrorism,” Blair said.
From March 5, 2003 issue.Iraq I: Blix Likely to Present Negative Report on CooperationU.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix will probably present a negative report on Iraq’s cooperation with inspections when he briefs the U.N. Security Council Friday, a senior U.N. official said yesterday (see GSN, March 4). During his report to the council, Blix is expected to say that Iraq typically increases its cooperation with inspectors only when pressured by the Security Council, the senior U.N. official said. As such pressure later decreases, so does Iraqi cooperation, the official said. “They are still not open,” the senior U.N. official said. “There is always an element of trying to bargain down,” the official added (Suzanne Goldenberg, London Guardian, March 5). Blix’s briefing is also expected to note that Iraq has begun to destroy its arsenal of al-Samoud 2 ballistic missiles, according to United Press International. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called the Iraqi action a “positive development” (see related GSN story, today). “I think Blix has indicated a positive development,” Annan said. “He has indicated there is much more to be done, but this is a positive development,” he added. Iraq’s decision to abide by the U.N. order to destroy the missiles will not be the only aspect of Iraqi cooperation that the Security Council members will consider as they decide whether to authorize military action, Annan said. “I think the council’s decision will be based on the totality of the presentation by the inspectors and the information they have in front of them,” Annan said. “Let’s not forget that in accordance with Resolution 1441 (unanimously approved Nov. 8, 2002) the council has the right to declare further material breach at any time based on the reports of the inspectors and then move on to ‘serious consequences,’” he added, referring to the resolution that established the current inspections regime. Both France and Germany announced yesterday that their foreign ministers would attend Friday’s Security Council briefing. Other council members said they were still awaiting notice from their respective governments as to whether their foreign ministers would also attend (William Reilly, United Press International, March 4). Shuttle Diplomacy Meanwhile, leaders from Security Council nations have continued to meet amongst themselves to seek a solution to the Iraq crisis, according to reports. British Prime Minister Tony Blair met today with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to dissuade Russia from vetoing the latest draft resolution on Iraq, according to CNN.com. Ivanov said yesterday that Russia would not abstain on a future vote over the draft resolution, but he did not indicate whether Moscow would support or veto it. “The Iraq question is precisely that sort of question when permanent members of the Security Council should not abstain,” Ivanov said (CNN.com, March 5). Ivanov, along with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin are expected to convene a quickly scheduled meeting today in Paris, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman said. The three officials are expected to discuss international developments at the meeting, the spokesman said, refusing to provide more details (John Leicester, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 5). Elsewhere, the 57-member Organization of the Islamic Conference met in Qatar today to discuss the Iraq situation. Muslim officials at the meeting could discuss several proposals put forward by various Islamic countries to avert a U.S.-led attack on Iraq. One such proposal, created by United Arab Emirates President Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan, calls for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to voluntarily step down from power and go into exile, according to the Associated Press (see GSN, Feb. 12). During the meeting, Kuwait offered support for the UAE proposal. “Kuwait ... calls on the Iraqi leadership to think in depth about offering the ultimate sacrifices,” Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah said during the conference’s opening session. Iran has also made a proposal, calling on both Hussein and Iraqi opposition groups to participate in U.N.-sponsored elections. An Iranian diplomat at the meeting did not say today whether the proposal would be discussed. “We believe that the initiative has a good chance to succeed because it is different from the U.A.E. initiative as it allows the regime to stay in power, but with national reconciliation,” the Iranian diplomat said. The conference got off to an inauspicious start with a vitriolic exchange between Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials, according to AP. During a speech by Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, criticizing al-Sabah for supporting the United States, the Kuwaiti official interrupted with an inaudible remark. At that point, al-Douri responded with “Shut up you monkey! Curse be upon your moustache (honor), you traitor!” The exchange escalated when Kuwaiti Information Minister Ahmad Fahd al-Ahmad rose to his feet and began waving a small Kuwaiti flag that had been on the desk, AP reported. “The Iraqis always behave like this,” he later said. Iraqi officials briefly stormed out of the meeting, but returned within an hour after mediation by Qatari delegates (Salah Nasrawi, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 5). The Bush administration rejected yesterday an argument put forth by Pope John Paul II that there is no moral justification for pre-emptive action against Iraq. The pope has called such a pre-emptive war a “defeat for humanity.” U.S. President George W. Bush, however, does see the use of military action as a “matter of legality” and respects the opinions of those who might differ from him, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said yesterday. “The president thinks the most immoral act of all would be if Saddam Hussein would somehow transfer his weapons to terrorists who could use them against us,” Fleischer said. “And so, the president does view the use of force as a matter of legality, as a matter of morality and as a matter of protecting the American people,” he added (Associated Press/Boston Globe, March 5). War and Post-War Plans A new U.S.-led attack on Iraq would have little in common with the 1991 Gulf War — the last time the two countries faced off on the battlefield, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 21). While in 1991 U.S. forces conducted a prolonged bombing campaign followed by a relatively short ground operation, a new attack places a high priority on speed and the massive and early use of precision-guided weapons, Myers said. “The template of Desert Storm will not fit very well,” Myers said. “What you would like to do is have it be a short conflict ... The best way to do that is to have such a shock on the system that the Iraqi regime would have to assume early on that the end is inevitable,” he added. The purpose of any potential attack on Iraq, however, is not to seek regime change, Myers said. “The ultimate objective is not Saddam Hussein,” but instead, to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, he said (Ann Scott Tyson, Christian Science Monitor, March 5). The United Nations has begun drafting plans for a post-Hussein Iraq — a move that could be in violation of the international body’s own charter, according to the London Times. The plan, ordered by Annan’s deputy Louise Frechette and created by a six-member preplanning group, calls for the United Nations to establish a new government in Iraq about three months after the end of conflict, with an ultimate goal of steering the country to self-government, the Times reported. The plan also warns the United Nations against establishing a full-scale administration and against taking full control of the country’s oil supply. Instead, the plan proposes that a U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) be created to help set up a new government, according to the Times. The U.N. planning for a post-Hussein Iraq is a controversial gesture, according to the Times. The U.N. charter forbids the international body from interfering in a member’s internal affairs (James Bone, London Times, March 5). Inspections U.N. inspectors visited at least three suspect Iraqi sites today, according to the Associated Press. Inspectors traveled to al-Taji to continue to observe the destruction of prohibited al-Samoud 2 missiles. They also traveled to al- Mutasim, where al-Samoud 2 engines and casting chambers have been destroyed. Inspectors traveled to al-Aziziyah Airfield and Firing Range, where Iraqi workers have excavated bombs filled with biological agents (Associated Press/MSNBC.com, March 5). Yesterday, inspectors traveled to at least six Iraqi sites, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency press release. Missile experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission observed the destruction of al-Samoud 2 missiles at al-Taji. They also observed the destruction of a second casting chamber at al-Mutasim. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited the Ibn Fernas Center in northern Baghdad. UNMOVIC chemical inspectors visited al-Basil Nawaran. Inspectors also conducted an aerial inspection of a North Oil Company-owned oilfield in the northern city of Kirkuk. Inspectors based in the northern city of Mosul visited the Northern Region Customs (IAEA release, March 4). For further information, see:
From March 5, 2003 issue.U.S. Response: U.S. Official Acknowledges Threat Reduction Problems, Defends ProgramBy David Ruppe The U.S. taxpayer funded program helps fund efforts to safeguard Russian WMD stockpiles and materials. Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch, appearing before the House Armed Services Committee yesterday, was responding to information disclosed by its chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) that two major projects spent a total of at least $185 million for neutralizing Russian strategic rocket fuel that produced no results. In one instance, the $100 million was spent to construct a facility at Krasnoyarsk for neutralizing the fuel, heptyl, but then Russian government officials informed that the fuel had been transferred to their space program. In another instance, according to Hunter, about $84 million provided for site development for a facility at another site in Votkinsk was “wasted” because the local planning authority never issued a permit for the site. “These are remarkable stories of massive waste of American taxpayer dollars,” said Hunter. A Pentagon Inspector General’s office investigation found that the U.S. agreements with Russia “did not require Russia to provide the heptyl and amyl for conversion, including remedies for nonperformance, and did not provide the department with adequate access rights to where the heptyl and amyl were stored,” said an official testifying from that office. The General Accounting Office also yesterday released a report saying the program continues to be hindered by bureaucratic obstacles in both Moscow and Washington. “U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges,” said a GAO official, adding, “the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs” and “Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites.” Wake-up Call Crouch acknowledged the incidents. “The year since the last time I testified to Congress on CTR has been a difficult one for the program,” he said. He told Hunter his description of the Krasnoyarsk incident was “on the mark.” The waste, he said, was “inexcusable. This was a major wake-up call for us.” He said the agency is implementing now semi-annual reviews with Russia to re-evaluate project plans, assumptions and schedules. Defending the program, he said, “The U.S., I think, does have a continuing interest in speeding the destruction of Russia’s mobile ICBM’s, and that interest remains.” He also said the administration was requesting a presidential authority to use up to $50 million of threat reduction funding for use to address “critical” proliferation threats outside the former Soviet Union. Concerns About Russian Treaty Violations Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter, also at the hearing, said her office remained concerned Russia that might be violating its 1972 Biological Weapons Convention commitment to eliminate its biological weapons programs and early its 1990s commitment to eliminate chemical weapons stocks and programs. While elements of its biological programs have been dismantled, she said, “We … believe that some key components of the former program may remain intact.” “Of particular concern is the possibility that some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce biological weapons and agents,” she said. She said the Untied States requires “greater access to and implementation of elimination of the biological weapons program.” Despite recent steps to strengthen its chemical weapons destruction program, she said, “progress has been slow, however, and Russia has had to request extensions on it chemical weapons destruction deadlines.” Russia also, so far, has only allowed U.S. visits to sites of declared stocks, and it continues to change its assessment of total nerve agent stocks, she said.
From March 5, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Summary of InspectionsExperts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27, 2002. About 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
From March 4, 2003 issue.Iraq I: U.S., U.K. Look for U.N. Resolution Vote by End of Next WeekThe United States and the United Kingdom have decided that a vote on their latest draft U.N. resolution on Iraq should occur by the end of next week, but the two countries will not push for such a vote unless they are confident the draft resolution will receive the nine votes it needs to pass, U.S and diplomatic officials said yesterday (see GSN, March 3). President George W. Bush said in late January that “this issue will come to a head in a matter of weeks, not months,” White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said yesterday. “Nothing has changed that timetable,” Fleischer said. The impending Security Council briefing by U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, scheduled for Friday, is seen as the beginning of the final debate period over the draft resolution and the ultimate use of force against Iraq, officials said. “I think that … meeting will mark the final open break between council members,” a Security Council ambassador said. The United States believes that Russia and China, two permanent council members that oppose the use of force against Iraq, will abstain rather than veto a new resolution, leaving only France, according to the Washington Post. If the United States and the United Kingdom can round up the necessary nine votes among the nonpermanent members, and assure the Russian and Chinese abstentions, then a vote might be held by the end of next week, even under the threat of a French veto, U.S. and diplomatic officials said. “We could let them veto it and then turn on them,” an official said. If nine votes cannot be guaranteed, however, “then there will be no vote,” the official added. In his report to the Security Council Friday, Blix is expected to say that Iraq has still not made a full commitment to disarm, but it has made some progress, such as beginning to destroy its prohibited al-Samoud 2 missiles, according to the Post (see related GSN story, today; Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, March 4). The White House yesterday criticized Iraq’s new cooperation efforts, however, suggesting they were “the mother of all distractions.” While the United Nations has praised Iraq for agreeing to destroy its al-Samoud 2 missiles, the Bush administration said that, by doing so, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was admitting to lying in the declaration Iraq provided the United Nations in December concerning its WMD efforts. “Here’s the Catch-22 that Saddam Hussein has put himself in," Fleischer said yesterday. “He denied he had these weapons, and then he destroys things he says he never had. If he lies about never having them, how can you trust him when he says he has destroyed them?” Fleischer added. The White House also appeared unimpressed with Iraq’s pledge to provide a new report soon to inspectors on the destruction of its stockpiles of VX and anthrax, according to the New York Times. “How do you know this is not the mother of all distractions, diversions, so the world looks in one place while he buries them in another?” Fleischer asked (Sanger/Shanker, New York Times, March 4). The 10 nonpermanent Security Council members yesterday met with Canadian U.N. Ambassador Paul Heinbecker to discuss a his proposed compromise between those pushing for military action against Iraq and those calling for an extension to the inspections process (see GSN, Feb. 27). The Canadian proposal calls for the Security Council to authorize military action against Iraq at the end of March if Baghdad was found to be still not complying with inspections, according to United Press International. The proposal also includes a timeline for continued, enhanced inspections if inspectors reported “substantial Iraqi compliance” by March 28. While there was division among the 10 nonpermanent council members over the Canadian proposal, there were no negative comments, Heinbecker said. “We’ve been offering ideas and I think it has been appreciated,” Heinbecker said. “Whether or not there will be a sufficient agreement even among the elected members to take the issue forward is for them to answer,” he added (William Reilly, United Press International, March 3). Some council diplomats indicated that the Canadian proposal represented the best chance to maintain some sort of Security Council unity on the Iraq issue, according to the Globe and Mail. “If you want to obtain some sense of agreement … you would have to look at the Canadian alternative, probably in a modified way,” said Deputy Chilean U.N. Ambassador Cristian Maquieira (Paul Knox, Globe and Mail, March 4). U.S. Spying Controversy Meanwhile, Security Council diplomats yesterday were unimpressed by recent reports of a U.S. National Security Agency memo that ordered an increase of surveillance on them to help determine how they might vote on the new U.N. resolution on Iraq, according to the Washington Post. “The fact is, this sort of thing goes with the territory,” said Pakistani U.N. Ambassador Munir Akram. “You’d have to be very naive to be surprised,” Akram added. Espionage is considered a fact of life at the United Nations, U.N diplomats and analysts said, adding that they assume their conversations are being monitored. “I assume every phone conversation I have either on the cell phone or at the office is listened to by several people,” a European diplomat said. When another Security Council diplomat was asked during a telephone interview if he thought his calls were monitored, the diplomat replied, “Let’s ask the guy who’s listening to us” (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, March 4). Some of the smaller Security Council countries consider being the target of foreign intelligence efforts almost as a mark of prestige, said Bulgarian U.N. Ambassador Stefan Tavrov. “It’s almost an offense if they don’t listen,” Tavrov said. “It’s integrated in your thinking and your work,” he added. While U.S. officials refused to confirm or deny the reported NSA memo, current and former U.S. officials familiar with the agency said that it is very likely that the United States is monitoring U.N. diplomats concerning the Iraq issue. “It would be inconceivable to me, with the interest of the nation’s leadership on this set of issues, that we aren’t using all available means to collect as much information as possible,” a former U.S. official said. The leaked memo might have the effect of persuading foreign governments to take measures to block U.S. monitoring efforts, the former U.S. official said. “Not only is it embarrassing, but ultimately it’s compromising sources and methods,” the former official said. “People will go out of their way to prohibit you from having success in the future,” the former official added (Drogin/Miller, Los Angeles Times, March 4). The reports might also increase public opposition to the U.S. stance on Iraq, a former U.S. ambassador with experience in U.N. affairs said. “Diplomatically, it may stiffen opposition to the United States,” the former ambassador said. “It’s not a helpful development,” the former ambassador added. The history of espionage at the United Nations goes clear back to the conference held in San Francisco in 1945 to create the organization, where the United States monitored foreign delegations and pushed for the body to be located in New York to make it easier to conduct espionage, according to historians. “One would have to have the innocence of an unborn child to believe that espionage doesn’t go on every day at the United Nations,” said Loch Johnson, an authority on intelligence at the University of Georgia. “From a purist point of view, it’s unfortunate in a way, because after all, we’re the host nation for the United Nations. But the reality is, Europeans and everyone else engages in espionage in New York City, much of it focused on the United Nations,” Johnson added (Shane/Sabar, Baltimore Sun, March 4). Inspections U.N. inspectors visited at least 15 suspect Iraqi sites yesterday, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency press release. Chemical experts from the U.N. Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission visited al-Muthanna to observe the destruction of 14 empty 155 mm artillery shells, 10 of which had once been filled with mustard gas agent. UNMOVIC biological inspectors visited the headquarters of the Mesopotamia State Company for Seeds in Baghdad and the Biology Department at the College of Science at Mosul University. UNMOVIC missile inspectors supervised the destruction of six al-Samoud 2 missiles at al-Taji. They also supervised the destruction of a casting chamber at al-Mutasim (see related GSN story, today). Inspectors also visited al-Furat State Company and an anti-aircraft missile component storage facility outside of Baghdad. Inspectors based in the northern city of Mosul visited a construction agency related to spray irrigation systems, the IAEA release said. IAEA inspectors conducted a radiation survey in an area north of Baghdad, near the town of Tarmya (IAEA release, March 3). For further information, see: U.N. Resolution 687 (Sanctions Regime)
From March 4, 2003 issue.U.S. Response: CTR Program Hurt by U.S., Russian Bureaucracies, GAO SaysThe U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which helps fund efforts to safeguard Russian WMD stockpiles and materials, has been hindered by bureaucratic obstacles in both Moscow and Washington, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report expected to be presented to Congress this week (see GSN, Jan. 17). While the United States has contributed about $6 billion since 1992 to help Russia destroy or secure its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, basic security improvements have still not been made at dozens of Russian sites that store about 60 percent of the country’s nuclear materials, the GAO report says. One of the biggest problems is that Russia refuses to grant U.S. officials access to the sites where the security upgrades are to be made, it says. “Russia is not providing needed access to many of the sites,” the draft report says. “Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future,” it adds. In the United State, both the Congress and the White House have refused to provide essential funding or to grant waivers for the awarding of program contracts, the GAO report says (see GSN, Jan. 15). It also criticizes the U.S. Defense Department for implementing security improvements too slowly at sites where Russia has provided access (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, March 4). The threat reduction program also came under fire yesterday from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), who said that greater financial control over the program was needed following the collapse of two major projects. The United States spent almost $95 million to help Russia build a plant to destroy missile engines, which was ultimately wasted because Russian local officials blocked the plant’s construction, Hunter said. The United States also contributed $106 million to help Russia build a plant to destroy liquid missile fuel, only to be told by Russia last year that the fuel had been used in its civilian space program, he said (see GSN, May 29, 2002). “We’ve got two white elephants here,” said Hunter, whose committee was scheduled to hold a hearing on the issue today. “An enormous amount of money has been wasted here. Taxpayer money,” he added (Ken Guggenheim, Associated Press/Austin American-Statesman, March 4). Hunter continued his assault on the threat reduction program in a Washington Post commentary today. “Twelve years and more than $7 billion later, it is worth revisiting the original purpose of this program,” Hunter said. “Designed as a temporary, focused effort to shrink Moscow’s vast strategic arsenal with American funding and know-how, the CTR program has, over time, morphed into an open-ended, unfocused and sometimes self-defeating venture,” he added. The United States appears ready to make another mistake by considering helping Russia to dispose of missile engines through the use of outdoor-burners — an $80 million project that could cause environmental damage and has no guarantee of obtaining the needed permits, Hunter said. Hunter also warned that the U.S. threat reduction efforts could be instead aiding Russia militarily. “For every dollar the United States commits to helping Russia destroy these weapons, we run the risk that Moscow will use the savings to fund military programs that are contrary to U.S. national security interests,” he said, citing reports of Russia acquiring new ICBMs (see GSN, Jan. 30, 2002). The Pentagon needs to both return the threat reduction program to its original focus of destroying strategic systems and to maintain greater financial control, Hunter said. He said Congress needed to maintain strict oversight of the program. “If the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is to once again benefit U.S. national security, it must refocus its resources on real threats and ensure real Russian cooperation,” Hunter said. “Moscow’s leadership has to understand that it cannot stand by as CTR projects fail, $100 million at a time, and still expect U.S. assistance,” he added (Duncan Hunter, Washington Post, March 4). For further information, see: U.S. Defense Department CTR Site
From March 4, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Summary of InspectionsExperts from the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have conducted hundreds of inspections in Iraq since resuming the post-Gulf War inspection regime Nov. 27. About 100 inspectors are now based in the country at two facilities in Baghdad and Mosul. The following chart summarizes some of the inspectors’ recently reported activities.
From March 3, 2003 issue.Iraq I: United States Surveils U.N. Security Council DiplomatsThe United States has begun a surveillance campaign against U.N. Security Council diplomats in an effort to obtain information on how they might vote on a U.S.-British supported resolution on Iraq, the London Observer reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 28). The surveillance campaign was outlined in a memo prepared by Frank Koza, chief of staff in the Regional Targets section of the U.S. National Security Agency, according to the Observer. The memo, dated Jan. 31, directed agency staff to increase surveillance operations directed at Security Council members, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to determine their voting intentions. It also advised agency officials that information was wanted on policies, negotiating positions and alliances — the “whole gamut of information that could give U.S. policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to U.S. goals or to head off surprises.” There had been debate within the White House over launching the operation, which was requested by national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, said sources in Washington. Some Bush administration officials warned of the serious consequences that could result if the operation was discovered, the Observer reported (London Observer, March 2). Blix’s Latest Report The latest report on Iraq’s disarmament from chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix makes a harsher evaluation of Iraq’s cooperation than has previous reports. “The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far,” Blix wrote in the report, which was distributed to Security Council members and journalists Friday afternoon. “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items,” Blix wrote. “It is hard to understand why a number of the measures, which are now being taken, could not have been initiated earlier. If they had been taken earlier, they might have borne fruit by now.” While this part of the report bolsters the U.S. position that Iraq will never voluntarily disarm, the document also details areas where Iraq has been cooperating with inspectors, giving something to governments that want to give UNMOVIC more time. The report envisions a work program that extends beyond the end of March, what is generally viewed as the deadline for the beginning of military action against Iraq. “Without the required cooperation, disarmament and its verification will be problematic,” Blix wrote. “However, even with the requisite cooperation it will inevitably require some time.” The report was written before Iraq agreed to destroy its al-Samoud 2 missiles, which Blix on Friday called “a very significant piece of real disarmament” (see related GSN story, today). Continuing a theme from earlier reports, Blix distinguished between Iraqi cooperation on process and substance. On process, such as providing access to sites, “in general, Iraq has been helpful,” he wrote. But on substance, such as providing information on illegal weapons of mass destruction, the report says Iraq has been less forthcoming. The 12,000-page Dec. 7 declaration from Iraq on its programs for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missile “has not been found to provide new evidence or data that may help to resolve outstanding disarmament issues,” other than information on the al-Samoud 2 missiles, according to the report. Blix said on most access questions, including use of helicopters and surveillance aircraft, Iraq was cooperating. However, on giving UNMOVIC unrestricted access to scientists, “the reality is that, so far, no persons not nominated by the Iraqi side have been willing to be interviewed without a tape recorder running or an Iraqi witness present.” Another issue is the list Iraq provided of people involved in what Baghdad described as the unilateral destruction of chemical and biological weapons Iraq was known to have at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. A batch of documents Iraq has provided that is supposed to detail that destruction is still being examined. On that topic, Blix wrote, “It is not possible to know whether they will prove to be a successful way to reduce uncertainty about the quantities unilaterally destroyed.” Although the United States is sending strong signals that it will push for a decision on its draft resolution within weeks, Blix lays out a program of work in the report that goes on at least until the end of March. UNMOVIC is completing “an internal document of some importance,” Blix wrote, which is a list of unresolved disarmament issues “and of the measures which Iraq could take to resolve them.” This list of “key remaining disarmament tasks” is required by Resolution 1284 and could “serve as a yardstick against which Iraq’s disarmament actions under Resolution 1441 may be measured,” wrote Blix. He is scheduled to brief the Security Council on his latest report, and developments that have occurred since, on March 7 (Jim Wurst, Global Security Newswire, March 3). Iraq to Prove VX, Anthrax Destruction Meanwhile, the United Nations has said that Iraq will submit a new report on its stockpiles of VX chemical agent and anthrax within a week. Iraqi officials and U.N. experts discussed yesterday Iraq’s proposal to submit “quantitative verification” that it has destroyed its VX and anthrax stockpiles. Iraq has been accused of failing to provide adequate information as to the destruction of banned weapons and materials. “Iraq will be providing a report on the VX and anthrax in a week’s time,” U.N. spokesman Hiro Ueki said (Nadim Ladki, Reuters, March 3). Inspections U.N. inspectors Friday conducted a private interview with an Iraqi biologist, the first non-nuclear-related interview since Feb. 7, Ueki said Saturday. Previously, Iraqi chemical and biological scientists had refused to grant interviews without recording the conversations. Ueki indicated that Friday’s interview was not taped (Associated Press/New York Times, March 2). U.N. inspectors visited at least six suspect Iraq sites today, according to the Associated Press. Inspectors visited a chemical and explosives plant, a rocket factory, two import companies and a plastics factory. They also visited al-Aziziya, where Iraq has said it destroyed bombs filled with biological agents in 1991 (Bassem Mroue, Associated Press/Yahoo.com, March 3). For further information, see: U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix’s current Security Council report (New York Times)
From March 3, 2003 issue.Iraq II: Report Documents Past U.S. Support for CW-Using IraqBy David Ruppe Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein, which draws on 61 declassified government documents and was published on the Internet last week by the nonprofit research organization the National Security Archive, concludes the Reagan administration chose to play down Iraq’s chemical weapons usage in favor of the maintaining good U.S.-Iraqi relations. “Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance,” the report says. Furthermore, it says the Reagan administration pursued the relationship despite knowledge of Iraqi human rights abuses, harboring of terrorists, and an interest in developing nuclear weapons. “The documents show that during this period of renewed U.S. support for [Iraqi President] Saddam [Hussein], he had invaded his neighbor (Iran), had long-range nuclear aspirations that would ‘probably’ include ‘an eventual nuclear capability,’ harbored known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens, and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people,” said a press release accompanying the report. The Bush administration currently is massing forces for a possible war against Iraq and is justifying its actions by citing many of those same issues. Two key differences in circumstances today, however, are that the United States and Iraq became outright enemies in 1990 after Iraq attacked Kuwait, kicking off the Gulf War, and that Iraq has for more than 10 years apparently failed to comply with numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding disarmament and other issues. Joyce Battle, who edited the report, said the documents have relevance for the situation today. “If the U.S. goes to war with Iraq, many people will be put in harm’s way, and I think that we all should seek some understanding of earlier developments and policies that led us to the current situation,” she wrote in a publicized Internet chat to discuss the report. She said the contrast between the Reagan administration’s condemnation of Iraqi chemical weapons use and its continued support of Iraq, “encouraged Saddam Hussein to believe that the United States did not really believe, or act on, its public posture.” The report says the documents offer a noteworthy contrast between the reasoning currently offered by the Bush administration for its preparations for a possible war on Iraq and the policies pursued by Washington in the early 1980s. “The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a pre-emptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be supported as a ‘just war,’” it says. “The documents in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that determined this country’s policies during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. … The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing,” it said. U.S. Opposed Regime Change Goal Perhaps the most striking contrast between the policies of the Bush and Reagan administrations is their declared policies regarding regime change in Baghdad. The report includes a 1984 State Department press release that for the first time publicly condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iranian forces, but which also condemned Iran’s goal of regime change in Baghdad. “While condemning Iraq’s chemical weapons use … the United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims,” it said. The report says, though, “When asked whether the U.S.’s conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons would have ‘any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations,’ the department’s spokesperson said ‘No. I’m not aware of any change in our position. We’re interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.’” Subsequent reporting has shown that the United States continued from 1986 to 1988 to allow then-legal, dual-use technology exports to Iraq that could aid its chemical and biological warfare efforts, such as bacterial strains for causing anthrax and gas gangrene, and for making botulinum toxin (see GSN, Oct. 2, 2002). Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during a hearing last September, “Are we, in fact, now facing the possibility of reaping what we have sown?” Oil, Regional Balance a Concern Named for a now famous secret 1983 meeting between then-U.S. special envoy Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein and including a photograph of that encounter, the report provides copies of 61 declassified documents offering details on the U.S.-Iraqi relationship from 1980 to 1984, most of which were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Rumsfeld, then a former defense secretary, met with Hussein carrying a letter from [President Ronald] Reagan to Hussein, on a mission to bring the two governments closer together. The report shows that the Reagan administration was concerned greatly with preventing a disruption in the Persian Gulf oil flow and an Iraqi defeat, or a collapse of Hussein’s regime, by fundamentalist Islamic Iran. The report cites National Security Decision Directive 114 on the Iran-Iraq War, issued by Reagan in November 1983, which said the highest U.S. priority was to protect Gulf oil facilities. Not only at the time was there a concern Iran would defeat Iraq and gain greater control of the world’s oil, there was a concern Iraq would attempt to disrupt the oil flow to draw in greater powers to put an end to the conflict. The United States had no formal relations with Iraq since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Iraq severed them. Hussein came to power, first as vice president, around 1968. In the early 1980s, the United States had an official policy of neutrality toward Iran and Iraq as they waged war. U.S. commerce with Iraq continued however, and there were signs of a thawing in U.S.-Iraqi government relations as early as 1981, with the scheduled visit of a State Department official to Baghdad and the U.S. interests section there declaring that the United States then had “a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958,” according to one document. Despite Persistent Terrorist Ties In 1982, the State Department removed Iraq from its list of countries supporting international terrorism. Still, in 1983, the State Department continued to urge Iraq to sever association with suspected terrorist groups. In May of that year, for instance, Secretary of State George Shultz sent a message to senior Iraqi official Tariq Aziz implying Iraq should dissociate itself from certain Palestinian groups it had supported, which he observed opposed both the U.S. and Iraqi governments. He added, “Several recent events lead me to believe that Iraq hesitates to cut its threads to international terrorists.” An October 1983 State Department report indicated the United States had covertly been practicing a “qualified tilt” toward Iraq, which included providing tactical intelligence and more to help prevent an Iraqi defeat. While U.S. policy barred military exports to Iraq, the report says the documents show U.S. companies were allowed to negotiate for potential deals to export potentially dual-use items such as trucks and helicopters to the Iraqi military. “Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided on a “don’t ask, don’t tell” basis,” it says. In the spring of 1984, the administration deliberated on relaxing controls on dual-use exports judged “insignificant” for Iraq’s civilian nuclear agency, one document shows. A preliminary review, the document said, decided favorably towards relaxing the controls. A Defense Intelligence Agency report several months later warned that Iraq would probably “continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons,” by first developing its civil nuclear program. Priorities Faulted The National Security Archives report faulted the Reagan administration largely for a lack of emphasis it said was placed on the chemical weapons issue. It says a 1984 directive expressed a determination to “avert an Iraqi collapse,” while also calling for “unambiguous” condemnation of chemical weapons use. It faulted the document, however, for not calling for specific condemnation of Iraqi chemical warfare and for “including the caveat that the U.S. should ‘place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.’” The report criticized the previously noted National Security Decision Directive 114, which addressed the administration concern about preserving the oil flow, for not including a “reference to chemical weapons.” The report also suggests Iraq persuaded the Reagan administration to water down a proposed U.N. Security Council condemnation of Iraq’s chemical weapons use in Iraq. Iraq’s senior diplomat in Washington urged the Security Council to issue a presidential statement, rather than a resolution, and that it not mention any country regarding chemical weapons use. 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