U.S. Plans:  MDA Awards Airship Demonstration Contracts

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has awarded contracts to three U.S. defense contractors to develop concepts for an airship that would be used in a U.S. missile defense system, Space & Missile reported today (see GSN, Nov. 11, 2002).

The defense contractors — Aeros Aeronautical Systems Corp., Boeing, and Lockheed Martin — will take part in an initiative called the High Altitude Airship Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration.  For the next four months, the companies will work to define concepts for a solar-powered airship that can fly at 65,000 feet and track ballistic missiles, an agency spokesman said.  The prototype airship, which is scheduled to be tested in 2006, must be able to provide 10 kilowatts of power to a 4,000-pound payload, as well as stay on station and control flight on its own.

By September, the agency will choose two of the three companies to further define their concepts, the spokesman said.  The Pentagon will then choose one contractor by summer 2004 to build a prototype airship for the demonstration initiative (Ann Roosevelt, Space & Missile, April 21).

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U.S. Plans:  Pentagon Cancels Three More Intercept Tests

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Defense Department has cancelled three additional national missile defense flight-intercept tests, including one that experts say would have been the “dress rehearsal” for the Bush administration’s planned fielding of part of the system in the autumn of 2004 (see GSN, Jan. 7).

Now, only two flight-intercept tests remain between the most recent, failed test in December and the limited deployment some 20 months later (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2002).  So far this year, the Missile Defense Agency has announced the cancellation of six planned intercept tests, four of which were originally scheduled to occur before the system is declared as fielded. 

“The Missile Defense Agency has a lot riding on the next two flight intercept tests.  It won’t be easy to successfully conduct two complex tests involving new hardware and software, and perhaps with new objects in the target cluster as well,” said former Pentagon testing director Philip Coyle.

Explaining the change, an agency spokesman cited “program data needs” and a busy schedule preparing for the deployment.

The tests have been politically charged, with Pentagon officials citing the test record of five successful intercepts in eight attempts as proof that a limited system is ready field as a test-bed, and critics questioning whether tests have been simplified or cancelled to ensure a successful record.

Recent Cancellations

The cancellations were reflected in the Pentagon’s recently released 2004 budget request documents, which included a schedule of planned “Integrated Flight Tests,” or IFTs, of its Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which is being developed to destroy long-range enemy warheads in space.

The schedule shows that IFT-16 — which would have been the 11th intercept test and which officials earlier this year said was scheduled to occur just prior to the system’s deployment — is no longer planned.

Pentagon officials announced in January that three predeployment intercept tests (IFT-11, -12, -13) were cancelled, with the latter one replaced by two nonintercept flights (IFT-13A and IFT-13B) to test two prospective replacements to an unsatisfactory missile booster (see GSN, Feb. 10).

The remaining two predeployment intercept tests are IFT-14 and IFT-15, which will involve one or both of the two possible follow-on boosters, according to the agency.

“IFT-16 was to have been the dress rehearsal for deployment,” said Coyle, the former assistant secretary of defense in charge of testing during most of the Clinton administration.

It’s “the big one before the deployed test bed,” said Matt Martin, an analyst with the Center for Nonproliferation and Arms Control.

Scheduling and “Program Data Needs” Cited

Missile Defense Agency spokesman Richard Lehner said in an email that IFT-16’s cancellation, and a plan to focus on an already scheduled nonintercept flight test of the system’s radar around that time, “better meets the program data needs during the summer/fall FY 04 when we are simultaneously installing interceptors at Fort Greely and VAFB [Vandenberg Air Force Base] and doing system integration check-out and testing.”

The agency is renaming the nonintercept test, which was called Radar Characterization Flight 2, IFT-16A, Lehner said.

Lehner’s comments, Martin said, suggest the deployment goal of October 2004, set officially by President George W. Bush in December, might be interfering with the system’s testing program.

“I can certainly imagine that they are having trouble trying to deploy and test at the same time and I think that in itself points out the weakness of the plan.  [The plan] says you’ve got to test, because they have only succeeded in the most basic tasks at this time.  Now they’re saying you can’t test because we have this political mandate to deploy,” he said.

Martin added the cancellation might, intentionally or not, support the deployment objective by eliminating the risk of a test failure just prior to the deployment and presidential elections.

“IFT-16 was planned in the fall of 2004, which happily, coincidentally is right in the middle of the election season,” he said.

Lehner appeared to dismiss the significance of IFT-16 as a test run, saying the system’s capabilities already have been validated in previous testing, and would be further tested with a new booster or boosters in IFT-14 and IFT-15.

“The GMD system’s capability has already been demonstrated for initial operations in previous and ongoing intercept tests, ground tests, modeling and simulation and numerous exercises,” he said.

The budget documents also show tests IFT-19 and IFT-20 also have been scrubbed.  They would have occurred after the scheduled deployment.

Lehner said, “It is likely the test objectives from those flights will be consolidated into earlier tests.” 

Tougher Testing Ahead

Martin charged the intercept-testing regime so far has lacked realistic complexity.

“They haven’t done anything really to stress the system yet.  All they’ve really proven right now is the hit-to-kill ability  … that’s certainly impressive, but they aren’t doing anything to move forward,” he said.

He said two of the eight completed tests were repeats of previously failed tests and the most recently failed test “as I understand it had nothing that added any complexity to the system.”

Lehner wrote that “In order to develop more operationally realistic tests” after 2004, officials are considering redesigning some tests to try intercepting two enemy decoy warheads aimed at a single target or two targets.

They also are considering launching targets from the air, rather than the ground, so the system could be tested against targets from a “more realistic direction,” he said.

“The test program is and will be flexible over time and will be adjusted from time to time to take advantage of new and/or improved technology and also to make efficient use of expensive and/or scarce resources for each and every test, as well as construct the tests to take advantage of new capabilities demonstrated or projected by potential adversaries,” he said.

Missile Defense Testing Schedule

IFT	Date	Purpose
10	1st Quarter, 2003	Intercept, Failed (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2002)
11	Canceled	Intercept
12	Canceled	Intercept
13a	3rd Quarter, 2003	Booster Verification
13b	4th Quarter, 2003
14	1st Quarter, 2004	Intercept
15	3rd Quarter, 2004	Intercept
16	Canceled	Intercept
17	2nd Quarter, 2005	Intercept
18	4th Quarter, 2005	Intercept
19	Canceled	Intercept
20	Canceled	Intercept
21	2nd Quarter, 2006	Intercept
22	4th Quarter, 2006	Intercept
23	2nd Quarter, 2007	Intercept
Source:  U.S. Defense Department release, February 2003.

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From April 17, 2003 issue.

United States:  Patriot System Has Troubled History of Identifying Friend From Foe

The U.S. Defense Department’s former top testing official has said the Patriot missile interceptor system had difficulties distinguishing between friend and foe during tests conducted in the 1990s, the Boston Globe reported today (see GSN, April 16).

U.S. military officials are currently investigating three friendly fire incidents during the war in Iraq where the Patriot is believed to have shot down U.S. and British aircraft.

In military tests going back to 1992, data taken from radars and sensors in several systems, including the Patriot, sometimes resulted in a confusing picture of friendly and hostile aircraft, said Philip Coyle, Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation during the Clinton administration.  The exercises were meant to test whether defenders could accurately combine data taken from several systems. 

During a 1993 test, the Patriot would have shot down a friendly aircraft returning from a mission, even though it was flying in an area reserved for friendly aircraft, according to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an advocacy group.

Overall, the systems performed adequately during the tests, Coyle said.  “But there were examples where there was confusion, in one place or another, where someone would report something differently than someone else,” he said (Ross Kerber, Boston Globe, April 17).

During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. rules of engagement did not allow Patriot systems to engage aircraft, for fear of friendly fire incidents, POGO said yesterday in a press release.  Some critics have said those same rules of engagement should have been applied during the recent war with Iraq, according to the group.

POGO Executive Director Danielle Brian harshly criticized the Patriot system, and the Pentagon’s touting of the system’s successes.

“The Pentagon has known for a decade that the Patriot cannot distinguish its targets from our own aircraft,” Brian said.  “It is an outrage that they have not fixed this fundamental flaw, yet continue to buy it and sell it to our allies, and have the gall to promote this weapons in both Gulf Wars as a star when they’ve known it is a dud,” she added (Project on Government Oversight release, April 16).

For further information, see:

PAC-3 Fact Sheet

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Japanese Plans:  Top Official Wants Increased Missile Defense Capability

Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba yesterday urged Japan to expand its missile defense capabilities because of concerns of a possible North Korean missile strike, the New York Times reported (see GSN, April 4).

Japan is interested in purchasing the latest version of the Patriot interceptor from the United States, Ishiba said.  He noted the growing threat of a missile attack by North Korea, which currently has about 100 Rodong ballistic missiles capable of hitting any target within Japan within 10 minutes of launch, according to the Times.

“They are not obtaining missiles just for a joke, just for play,” Ishiba said.  “We have to say it is a serious threat to our country,” he added.

Of all the countries in the region, Japan is the most likely target of a North Korean missile attack, prompting the need for better antimissile defenses, Ishiba said.

“North Korea’s missiles will not be launched against China,” Ishiba said.  “They won’t be launched against Russia.  They won’t be launched against South Korea, because it’s too close.  They can’t reach the United States,” he added (James Brooke, New York Times, April 17).

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U.S. Plans:  Pentagon Sees  $20 Billion Cost Growth for National Defense System

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Defense Department says the cost of developing a national missile defense will be $19.5 billion more than previously projected through 2009. 

Combining that with the costs of developing other systems to address shorter-range threats, the Bush administration is projecting that total missile defense costs will increase by $15.7 billion to $62.9 billion.  The national missile defense increase would be offset somewhat by projected reductions elsewhere, according to the report.

The new projections were briefly described in a required report to Congress called a selected acquisition report released Saturday.  Congress left for a two-week spring break Friday.  The increased cost estimates were already incorporated into Pentagon figures released in February, but were not enunciated by officials (see GSN, Feb. 4).

“It’s a big jump,” said Philip Coyle, the former assistant secretary of defense in charge of testing during most of the Clinton administration.

The bulk of the increase, about $18 billion, is associated with “engineering changes” resulting from Bush administration plans announced in December to develop and potentially deploy layers of new systems during this decade for defeating long-range enemy missiles, according to the report.

The Pentagon has said such work is intended for new systems such as a group of missile tracking satellites (see GSN, April 14), a new multipurpose “kill vehicle” for intercepting missiles and warheads, a new platform for the airborne laser (see GSN, March 7), and sea- and space-launched interceptors (see GSN, Jan 22).

The other $1.45 billion component of the increase would result from another part of the plan announced by Bush and Pentagon officials in December to begin two initial fieldings in 2004 and 2005 of some missile defense components intended for operational use as well as for testing, according to the report (see GSN, April 11).

Congress has been deliberating in recent weeks whether to approve half of that $1.45 billion request, as part of the $8 billion the Missile Defense Agency budget requested for fiscal 2004.  Republican advocates have argued that fielding limited capabilities is preferable to having none in the event of an attack, while Democratic critics have questioned the wisdom of employing defenses that are not fully developed or tested under realistic conditions (see GSN, March 19).

Coyle’s successor and the Pentagon’s current top testing official, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Thomas Christie, said in April 9 Senate Armed Services Committee testimony that the ground-based midcourse defense element, the leading interceptor for the national system, “in essence, at this time has yet to demonstrate operational capability.  This conclusion is based on the fact that many essential components of the GMD element have yet to be built.”

Critics further have questioned whether some of the proposed early fieldings, such as interceptor missiles in Alaska, would amount to de facto deployments of a system.  Operational deployments are supposed to be paid for by the armed services, not the research-and-development-oriented Missile Defense Agency, and traditionally only after a process certifying that systems to be deployed have been proven to work under operationally realistic conditions, experts say.

Total System Cost Unclear

Saturday’s report does not say what portion of total missile defense development, slated to cost $62.9 billion from 2002 to 2009, will be devoted to national missile defense.

“The way the Missile Defense Agency lumps these programs together it’s hard to tell [how much will be directed to national missile defense].  As a matter of management philosophy, the MDA wants to include all of the [missile defense] systems … in one line item, with flexibility to move money around between the major systems,” said Coyle, who now heads the Center for Defense Information’s Los Angeles office.

“The Congress is having some difficulty with this because each of the missile defense systems is as large as a normal major defense acquisition of, say, tanks or helicopters, and it makes it so difficult for the Congress to see what’s going on,” he said.

Total missile defense development costs for the 2002-2009 period, which includes Missile Defense Agency and Army costs, is projected to rise by $15.7 billion, from $47.2 billion to $62.9 billion.

That increase includes the $19.5 billion increase on national missile defense as well as $3.8 billion in reduced costs, in part from projected cuts to shorter-range defenses such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 missile and Medium Extended Air Defense System, according to the report.

The selected acquisition reports are intended to provide Congress with an indication of how major weapons systems programs are faring in meeting cost and time targets for development, but also reflect changes in the plans for a program.  The Pentagon set the previous $47.2 billion cost projection for 2002-2009 period last year. 

The cost estimates do not reflect the full future cost to develop the various missile defense systems, according to Coyle.  He said further blocks of developmental work extending as far as 2014 “are still to come.”

Also, the projected increases are for Pentagon research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and do not include money the armed services might someday request to actually build and deploy missile defense components (see GSN, Jan. 6).

Pentagon officials previously have refused to provide figures for how much the ultimate deployment might cost, or describe what the deployed system would look like, saying they intend to tailor the system as components are developed, and so as a Pentagon document put it, “there is no final or fixed missile defense architecture.”

“All of the money is for RDT&E money, so they’re never proposing a production phase,” said Coyle.

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United States:  Patriot Interceptors Successfully Engaged Nine Iraqi Missiles

Coalition-operated Patriot missile interceptor batteries successfully intercepted nine Iraqi ballistic missiles during the month-long course of the war, the Boston Globe reported today (see GSN, April 10).

Of the nine missiles, U.S.-operated batteries destroyed six and Kuwaiti-manned batteries destroyed three, according to U.S. Army spokesmen.  Eight of the missiles were “destroyed in the air,” while the other was “significantly damaged” and landed without causing harm, the U.S. Central Command said.  Other Iraqi missiles were not engaged because they were projected to land in either empty areas or the ocean, according to Globe.

In addition to intercepting nine Iraqi missiles, Patriot interceptors have also been involved in three friendly-fire incidents during the war, the Globe reported.  Early reports indicate that a Patriot was responsible for destroying a Navy F/A-18 Hornet over Iraq on April 2, the Central Command said Monday.

There have been differing accounts over which versions of the Patriot interceptor were used to intercept Iraqi missiles.  In testimony before the U.S. Congress earlier this month, Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish said the Army fired four Patriot Advanced Capability 3 interceptors, but mostly used older PAC-2 interceptors.  The new PAC-3s were not exclusively used because “we just don’t have enough of them,” Kadish said.

Army officers, however, refused to confirm Kadish’s figures, according to the Globe.  In an e-mail sent to the newspaper last week, Army spokesman Capt. Henry Vasquez said Kadish’s numbers were “incorrect” but refused to provide more detail other than to confirm that both PAC-2s and PAC-3s were used.

One missile defense critic suggested that the differing accounts stem from Kadish’s desire to promote the Patriot’s successes while Army officials were being more cautious.

“I think the Army is probably trying to avoid embarrassment from making one set of claims and having another set of facts come out,” said Theodore Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a frequent critic of the U.S. missile defense plans.  “Kadish doesn’t care about those sorts of things,” Postol said (Ross Kerber, Boston Globe, April 16).

For further information, see:

PAC-3 Fact Sheet

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Japan:  Aegis Destroyer Tracked Rocket Launch to Simulate North Korean Missile Launch, Sources Say

A Japanese Aegis destroyer last month tracked a Japanese rocket launch last month to simulate the tracking of a North Korean ballistic missile, Xinhua News Agency reported yesterday (see GSN, March 28). 

The destroyer tracked the H-2A rocket, which carried two Japanese spy satellites, as if it were a North Korean Taepodong missile in an attempt to collect data for use in a planned U.S.-Japanese missile defense system, sources said.  While the National Space Development Agency of Japan has denied sharing information with any government ministry, sources said the Japanese military has been collecting data on Japanese rockets for several years (Xinhua News Agency, April 15).

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Israel:  United States Pulling Patriots Out

The United States is withdrawing Patriot missile defense batteries from Israel, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, March 4).  U.S. defense officials yesterday said Iraqi missiles no longer pose a threat to Israel, according to the Times (Washington Times, April 15).

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