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U.S. Plans: Scarce Booster Rockets Cause Testing ReductionsA shortage of booster rockets could be behind the cancellation of several missile defense tests this year, Inside Missile Defense reported today (see GSN, April 18). “You can only produce so many boosters a year … if you want 20 boosters in [Fort] Greely, [Alaska,] you have to give up something,” a source said this week. The Missile Defense Agency plans to test boosters from Lockheed Martin and Orbital Sciences soon (see GSN, April 29), and production could follow shortly, but the companies are expected to turn the rockets out slowly. The Missile Defense Agency recently informed Congress that it plans to significantly alter its testing plans for the national missile defense system after Boeing, the lead contractor on the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, suggested the testing changes, according to an agency spokesman (Duffy/Costa, Inside Missile Defense, April 30).
From April 29, 2003 issue.U.S. Plans: Orbital Will Test Booster First for Missile Defense ContractIn the competition to provide the kill vehicle booster for the U.S. national missile defense system, Orbital Sciences has developed their rocket faster than Lockheed Martin and will be the first to test launch its complete system this autumn, according to a Missile Defense Agency spokesman (see GSN, Feb. 10). Lockheed Martin had initially been scheduled to test their offering first. “Orbital’s booster stack is going to be ready to go sooner than Lockheed’s,” but that does not mean Lockheed Martin is having problems with their development, according to Missile Defense Agency spokesman Richard Lehner. Boeing is the Ground-based Missile Defense system’s prime contractor and will choose to buy boosters from either one or both of the companies (see GSN, April 18; Ann Roosevelt, Defense Week, April 28). Further Environmental Review Unnecessary The United States has the option of add missile interceptors to its Ft. Greely, Alaska site in future years without environmental review, according to documents signed last week by the top U.S. missile defense official (see GSN, May 15, 2002). Missile defense chief Ronald Kadish approved a future expansion of the Alaskan portion of the national missile defense shield without another environmental review, which can take up to two years, Aerospace Daily reported. The Missile Defense Agency currently plans to deploy 16 interceptors in Alaska by 2005. After Kadish’s decision, the agency may now build up to 40 interceptor silos there. There is currently “no requirement” and “no funding” for more than 16 interceptors in Alaska, according to agency spokesman Rick Lehner. “At least we’d have that flexibility in the future,” he added. The agency is currently working on an environmental review of Vandenberg Air Force base in California, where it intends to place four interceptors by 2005 (Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily, April 28).
From April 25, 2003 issue.U.S. Plans I: Army Calls for Accelerated THAAD, MEADS DeploymentA top U.S. Army general called yesterday for the accelerated deployment of two U.S. missile defense systems — the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) (see GSN, May 6, 2002). The THAAD system should be deployed “as early as possible” to complement the Patriot missile interceptor systems already in use by the Army, said Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, head of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command (see related GSN story, today). The two systems are envisioned to work together, with the Patriot intercepting enemy missiles within the atmosphere and the THAAD system intercepting missiles above the atmosphere, according to Cosumano. “We need that two-tiered, layered defense in the future,” Cosumano said, “so we would advocate any way to accelerate the fielding of THAAD.” The Missile Defense Agency has indicated that the THAAD system could be ready to provide an emergency defense capability by the end of 2005, according to Aerospace Daily. It would also be “very, very useful” to accelerate the MEADS deployment, which has a current fielding date of 2012, Cosumano said (see GSN, April 1; Marc Selinger, Aerospace Daily, April 25).
From April 25, 2003 issue.U.S. Plans II: Danish Lawmakers Consider U.S. Radar Upgrade RequestDanish lawmakers Wednesday heard from U.S. officials and nonproliferation analysts on a U.S. request to upgrade the Thule radar facility in Greenland as part of efforts to develop a U.S. national missile defense system (see GSN, March 6). Assistant Defense Secretary J.D. Crouch urged Danish legislators to allow the United States to improve the radar. “An upgraded radar plays an important role in the U.S. initial missile defense system in dealing with potential threats emanating from the Middle East,” Crouch said. “If upgraded, the Thule early warning radar, like other upgraded early warning radars, would detect incoming ballistic missiles, track them and provide info to a missile defense system,” he said. U.S. nonproliferation analyst Joseph Cirincione argued against approving the U.S. request. While Denmark might want to approve the request out of a sense of friendship, they should not do so out of concern over the threat of a ballistic missile strike, said Cirincione, director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. He argued that the threat of a missile attack is actually decreasing, especially with the U.S. defeat of Iraq. Danish lawmakers also heard from a representative of Greenland’s home-rule government who argued that the original 1951 agreement authorizing the Thule radar station gave Greenlanders little say in how the facility would be used. Danish officials have said they would attempt to reach a decision on the U.S. upgrade request before parliament recessed for the summer (Peter Heinlein, VOA News, April 23).
From April 24, 2003 issue.United States I: Pentagon Analyzing Patriot Success Rate in Iraq WarBy David Ruppe The U.S. Central Command is conducting an analysis of the Patriot record and the results will be released as soon as they are available, said Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, director of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command. Speaking at an event sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation and the National Defense Industrial Association, he repeated a previously reported Army statement that the system had successfully “engaged” nine Iraqi missiles fired within the range of deployed Patriot systems during the war. The engagements were determined successes based on the fact that none of those Iraqi missiles destroyed anything, Cosumano said. “The commander in the field says it was apparently effective because there was nothing damaged,” he said. That calculation, however, does not take into account the possibility that the missiles could have been poorly aimed or inaccurate and may have simply missed their targets. “The data is being collected right now as we speak,” he said. The engagements “appeared to be effective because of new sources of data that we have,” he said, including ship-based radar. “We’re sorting through all of that data now to give the scientific answer as to how effective Patriot was.” The Boston Globe on April 16, citing a Central Command official, reported that eight of the missiles were “destroyed in the air,” while the other was “significantly damaged” and landed without causing harm. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Army estimated a high success rate for an early version of the Patriot missile defense system, which was later shown to be incorrect. In the recent war, U.S. forces used a combination of older Patriots and an upgraded system called Patriot Advanced Capability 3. Cosumano also said a separate investigation was underway to determine the cause or causes of three incidents in which Patriot batteries engaged friendly aircraft (see related GSN story, today).
From April 24, 2003 issue.United States II: Electronic Confusion Could Be Responsible for Patriot Friendly Fire IncidentsLarge amounts of electronic information in today’s battlefield could make it more difficult for the Patriot missile interceptor system to distinguish aircraft from ballistic missiles, Inside the Pentagon reported today (see GSN, April 17). U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Howard Bromberg, commanding general of the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense command, noted in an interview late last month that some battlefield electronics could confuse the Patriot’s radar system. “We’re not 100 percent sure what the effect of those electronic signatures (is) on the battlefield,” he said. During the month-long war in Iraq, the Patriot was involved in two friendly fire incidents that resulted in the loss of a British Tornado aircraft on March 23 and a U.S. F/A-18 Hornet on April 2, according to the U.S. Defense Department. In the Tornado incident, “the airplane didn’t look like an airplane to the operator,” Bromberg said. The fact that the Patriot system operator did not recognize the Tornado as an aircraft could be an important factor in the investigation into the friendly fire incident. No Iraqi aircraft flew during the war, which would give the operator little reason to think that an aircraft he saw on radar was hostile, according to Inside the Pentagon. “We have not ruled out human error,” Bromberg said prior to the downing of the F/A-18 Hornet. Other Pentagon officials have said that a combination of human error and technical problems could be responsible for a friendly fire incident. “I think it’s key to remember that the Patriot operator and the system have to make very, very rapid decisions as to whether to engage or not,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Dan Leaf, senior air component representative to the ground headquarters at Camp Doha in Kuwait, said in an interview April 8. The detection of an incoming enemy missile, the launching of the Patriot interceptor and the intercept of the incoming missile all occur within a matter of seconds, Leaf said (Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, April 24). A spokesman for the U.S. defense contractor Raytheon, which produces the Patriot system, said it was too soon to determine the performance of the missile interceptor system during the Iraq war (see related GSN story, today). Company spokesman Steve Brecken referred all questions about the system to the U.S. Central Command. “We’re only the manufacturer of the system, not its operational user,” Brecken said. Central Command spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Charles Owens said the interceptor’s overall performance during the war was “pretty good,” but the U.S. military still plans to investigate the friendly fire incidents (Hans Greimel/Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, April 23).
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