Czech Response:  Chemical Warfare Specialists Return Home

After spending several months in Kuwait, Czech chemical warfare specialists are heading home, according to the Prague Pravo (see GSN, Feb. 12).

The chemical detection battalion at Camp Doha has been serving in the Gulf region for more than a year (see GSN, Feb. 27, 2002).  The first 30 soldiers returned to the Czech Republic Wednesday, accompanied by Czech Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, while another 100 will return next week (Prague Pravo, May 6 in FBIS-EEU, May 8).

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CWC:  United States Will Miss 2007 Treaty Deadline, Group Says

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Even as U.S. officials and legislators chide Russia for straying from a Chemical Weapons Convention deadline to destroy its chemical weapons, an international nongovernmental organization has charged that the United States will do the same.

The treaty requires all parties to destroy their entire chemical weapons stocks by 2007, but allows parties to request extensions that would not go beyond 2012.

Paul Walker, director of Global Green USA’s Legacy Program, said it is possible neither the United States or Russia would even meet the extended deadline for destroying their chemical weapons.

“There is not a snowball’s chance in hell” the United States will meet the treaty’s 2007 goal and, “We’re going to have a hard time meeting 2012,” he said.  The United States has not sought an extension so far, but Russia has made clear that it will need one (see GSN, Oct. 9, 2002).

Walker said Russia was even more certain than the United States to miss the 2012 deadline (see GSN, Nov. 11, 2002).

He made the charges last week at the treaty’s first five-year review conference in The Hague.  U.S. officials there have not responded to requests for comment.

As evidence of Walker’s charges, his colleague Stephen Robinson, a Green Cross International program coordinator in Switzerland, cited a 2001 Congressional Research Service assessment of an internal U.S. Army report.

The Army report, according to the Congressional Research Service, demonstrated significant delays at all U.S. chemical weapons destruction sites. 

The Army responded at the time that the report was reflecting a “worst-case scenario,” and last week U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker told the treaty conference that U.S. destruction efforts were on schedule.

“Since entry into force, we have met every treaty milestone, and to date have destroyed over 22 percent of our stockpile,” he said.

Citing Army documents in 2001, the Los Angeles Times reported that the destruction program would probably go past the 2007 deadline and result in a cost increase from a projected $15 billion to $24 billion.

A Complex Task

Walker attributed the projected delays in part to inherent difficulties in destroying the estimated 31,000-ton U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons agents.

“I think the issue is … the fact that even though the United States is pressing ahead with over $1 billion funding every year for our program, the programs remain susceptible to political winds and technical crises which are to some extent unpredictable,” he said.

He said the Army’s decision in the 1980s to incinerate its chemical weapons was also a problem.  Community concerns about the safety of the method prompted lawsuits that held up site construction, and congressional legislation has stalled construction at two sites in Pueblo, Colo., and Richmond, Ky., he said. 

“I think it was a big mistake a couple of years ago to put all of our eggs in the incinerator basket,” he said.

U.S. Facilities in Different Stages of Operation

The Army was forced to abandon incineration plans for the sites at Pueblo, Richmond, Aberdeen, Md. (see GSN, Dec. 11, 2002), and Newport, Ind. (see GSN, Nov. 19, 2002).  Nonincineration facilities have since been constructed at Aberdeen and Newport and formal decisions are pending on what destruction technology to use at the Pueblo and Richmond sites (see GSN, July 25, 2002).

The Army’s use of incinerators at Umatilla, Ore. (see GSN, Dec. 13, 2002), Anniston, Ala. (see GSN, March 3), and Tooele, Utah (see GSN, April 29), meanwhile, has proven technologically challenging, with glitches stalling operations over the past year, Walker said.

Umatilla has been unable to begin incineration because it has not met Environmental Protection Agency requirements, he said.

While incineration was considered to be the most mature technology for chemical demilitarization in the 1980s, he said “the technology is so complicated, and so difficult to manage and maintain, that what we’re finding is it has become fairly problematic to operate.”

A fourth incinerator in Pine Bluff, Ark., is still being prepared (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2002).

In 2000, the Army completed destroying 400,000 munitions containing VX, mustard and sarin, and 2,031 tons of mustard agent at an incineration facility on Johnston Atoll, a Pacific island.  The shutdown of that facility is currently underway following a significant cleanup (see GSN, April 30).  The island also was used for nuclear testing in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Destruction a Concern

While noting U.S. progress last week, Stephen Rademaker told the review conference that “destruction of chemical weapons, on the whole, is not proceeding at the rate foreseen in the convention, and this lack of progress must concern us all.”

He pointed to Russia: “While we welcome the recent beginning of destruction operations at Gorny in the Russian Federation, destruction of the Russian stockpile remains a significant challenge” (see GSN, April 28).

For further information, see:

CWC Text

OPCW Main Page

CWC States Parties

Pentagon Executive Summary of CWC

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CWC:  Most Treaty Parties Have Not Established Required Domestic Measures

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

THE HAGUE — Although 151 nations have joined the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, less than a quarter of those have adopted domestic measures to comply with the treaty, according to a official U.S. and British estimates circulated here last week at the pact’s first review conference.

By joining the treaty, nations agree to pass and enforce domestic legislation to ensure their compliance with treaty requirements.  Such legislation has been cited by many countries here as a key measure for discouraging terrorists and states from acquiring chemical weapons.

So far, only 55 percent of treaty parties have indicated they have taken any measures to implement the treaty, according to a U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker’s opening statement to the conference.  Furthermore, only 26 percent of the parties say they have fully implemented the treaty’s national enforcement requirements, according to a British estimate.

“I believe that this troubling situation undermines the overall effectiveness of the convention to the detriment of all states parties and does little to deter the scourge of terrorism,” said Denis MacShane, the British minister of state for Europe, in his opening statement to the conference last week.  The two-week meeting is scheduled to end Friday.

The conference is trying to complete a political statement and a final document that sets out an action plan for treaty parties to follow until the next review conference in five years. 

Implementing domestic compliance measures and achieving universal membership have emerged as two common goals for most of the delegations here. 

“The Chemical Weapons Convention, first and foremost, aims to prevent governments and other entities from using chemical weapons,” said Rademaker, addressing the conference in a statement.

China and the 82-nation Nonaligned Movement, in a joint statement presented by Malaysia, said “the CWC and the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons] play an important role in the global antiterrorist efforts … [and so we] are making every effort in promoting universal adherence to the convention as well as ensuring the implementation of the various provisions of the convention.”

Developing countries account for the majority of those failing to fully implement the treaty, and there appear to be areas of potential disagreement between developed and developing countries on what is needed to meet treaty requirements.

Insufficient Resources, Experience

Reasons that have been cited for the lack of full membership and compliance include a lack of resources and expertise in some developing countries. 

Malaysia, for instance, which acknowledges it is has not fully enacted its domestic measures, currently has just one person responsible for disarmament issues.  Malaysia and many other countries want to comply, said Malaysian delegate Reidzal Abdul Malek, but do not have the experience or resources available for implementing the arms control agreement.

“We are just beginning to learn about these issues,” he said.

A number of countries, including the United States, have said they would provide assistance to help countries implement national legislation.

Aid Sought

In addition, some developing country delegates have suggested that the failure to achieve universal adherence may stem both from a perceived defensive need for chemical weapons by some countries and from a view among poorer countries that the treaty offers little for them while it imposes significant costs.

“It is clear that states which have not yet joined the convention have very specific reasons which relate either to a perception of their own security interests, or a perceived lack of benefit to joining the convention,” said South African Ambassador Priscilla Jana, her country’s permanent representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

She argued that developing states could entice poorer countries with increased assistance provided through the treaty.

“For a region with virtually no history of the use or manufacture of chemical weapons, the focus of the convention is international cooperation and assistance, designed, in part at least, to address the developmental needs of states parties in the field of chemistry,” she said, saying such assistance should no longer be a “peripheral feature” of the treaty.

Western delegates have said that while the treaty does provide for chemical defense assistance, it is not intended to be an aid program.

Rademaker said national implementation is a “basic obligation” of treaty membership for every state party and failure is “intolerable under any circumstances” and “more troubling in light of efforts of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to acquire chemical weapons.”

Export Controls

In another apparent area of disagreement here, the Indian delegation called for Western nations to abolish the Australia Group, an informal arrangement among industrialized nations to coordinate common chemical and biological export rules.  Removing the group’s restrictions would create an incentive for nations to join the treaty, India said.

When the treaty text was finalized in 1992, developing countries believed the treaty would lead to the abandonment of such technology export control regimes, said India’s permanent representative, Ambassador Shyamala Cowsik. 

The 34-member Australia Group is intended to combat chemical and biological weapon proliferation by controlling the transfer of precursor chemicals and dual-use manufacturing equipment.

“This situation needs to be addressed in a forthright manner by the review conference, if the CWC is, in the coming years, to become universal and, more importantly, gain universal acceptance,” Cowsik said.

“This has always been an area of sharply divergent opinion in all the arms control fora,” said the United Kingdom’s MacShane.

“A blanket relaxation or abandoning of monitoring or control arrangements between states parties would both undermine the fundamental object and purpose of the convention, and prevent states parties from meeting their obligations,” he said.

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Syria:  Powell Warns Syria, Washington is Watching

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, meeting with top officials in Damascus Saturday, said yesterday that the United States is closely watching Syria, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, May 2; Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, May 5).

U.S. President George W. Bush and other top U.S. officials have accused Syria of developing chemical weapons, harboring members of the deposed Iraqi leadership and supporting terrorist groups.

“I think that we believe there are chemical weapons in Syria,” Bush said April 13 (see GSN, April 14).

Two days later, immediately before announcing his trip to Damascus, Powell said that the United States is “concerned about Syria’s development of [chemical] weapons.  We are concerned about Syria’s continuing support of terrorist organizations” (Global Security Newswire, May 5).

Syrian President Bashar Assad understands there will be “consequences” if Syria does not comply with U.S. demands, Powell said yesterday.

“It’s performance that we’ll be looking at in the days and weeks and months ahead,” Powell said of Assad.  “We had a good, candid exchange of views, and there are no illusions in his mind as to what we are looking for from Syria,” he added.

Pentagon adviser Newt Gingrich had sharply criticized Powell’s visit to Damascus, calling it “ludicrous” and alleging that the State Department is “broken.”

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rebuked that criticism and said Bush decided on the Syria visit.

“If you don’t like the decision (to go to Syria), don’t blame the secretary, blame the president.  He’s the one who made the decision.  I happen to agree with it,” Rumsfeld said (DeYoung, Washington Post).

Powell also dismissed Gingrich’s comments.

“Mr. Gingrich was taking a broad swipe and shot at the policies of the United States,” Powell said, adding, “he missed the State Department and hit the president” (CNN.com, May 4).

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