Iraq:  CIA Says It Informed White House of Intelligence Doubts

The CIA yesterday said it sent a cable to the White House and other U.S. agencies in March 2002 that cast doubt on the credibility of a report that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger (see GSN, June 12).

The cable did not, however, include the conclusions of a former U.S. ambassador who had been sent to Niger in April 2002.  The former ambassador determined that documents purporting to describe the attempted purchase had been forged, Bush administration officials said.  Instead, the CIA cable attributed its assessment only to an anonymous source, failing to mention the name of the former ambassador — a known Africa expert — or that the agency had sent him to Niger, according to the Washington Post.

The CIA cable was one of a large number of such reports the White House received every day, a Bush administration official said yesterday.  Other information received after the cable transmission supported claims that Iraq was attempting to purchase uranium prior to the recent war, the officials said.  The cable was not considered especially important because it cited an anonymous source and therefore was not distributed to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice or other senior White House officials, the Post reported.

Rice said Sunday that she did not know there had been doubts about the documents that purported to show that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger.

“Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery,” Rice said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, June 13).

The CIA also informed the United Kingdom that the Niger claims were false, months before London would include the claim in a dossier justifying war, according to the Associated Press.

The CIA passed on the information to British officials, a senior intelligence official said.  Even so, the claim that Iraq “sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” was still included in a British dossier released Sept. 24 that cited intelligence sources (John Lumpkin, Associated Press/London Independent, June 13).

Former U.N. Inspector Criticizes Intelligence

Meanwhile, former U.N. weapons inspector Steve Allinson has said that every piece of intelligence provided to the inspectors by the United States and the United Kingdom was “absolute rubbish.”

Allinson said that in the three months prior to the war that he worked in Iraq, inspectors were often sent to sites named in U.S. and British intelligence, but no weapons of mass destruction were found.  At one site, U.S. intelligence said that equipment was being moved and that some pieces had been placed on the roof of a store, he said.

“That site I had been to several times ... and it is basically just a warehouse full of mechanical bits and pieces,” Allinson said.  “Even though we had been to this site, we had to act on the intelligence to appease the Americans,” he said (Press Association/London Guardian, June 13).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday defended the U.S. intelligence that said Iraq possessed and was attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction.

“This isn’t a figment of somebody’s imagination.  This isn’t something that was overblown, or made up in the basement of the CIA late one night,” Powell said.  “These were real weapons, real programs, that Saddam Hussein refused to come forward and explain. ... Do you want to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt?  Well, we didn’t.  And now we don’t have to worry about it anymore,” he added.

The Bush administration believes that prior to the war Iraq possessed both actual weapons of mass destruction and WMD programs, Powell said.  Once coalition teams finish examining suspect WMD sites, interviewing Iraqi scientists and reviewing documents, “it will lead us not only, we believe, to weapons that may exist, but to the programs themselves,” Powell said (Sonya Ross, Associated Press/Washington Post, June 13).

U.S. Secret Forces Played Role in WMD Search

A U.S. Army special forces unit that has been operating in Iraq since before the war began has played an important — but unsuccessful — role in the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, according to military and intelligence sources.

The unit’s main mission is to “seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction,” according to a special operations mission statement.  As part of that mission, the unit conducted raids ahead of coalition forces to capture suspected WMD stockpiles, collected hundreds of samples and captured as many as half of the Iraqi scientists and Baath Party officials now in custody, according to the Washington Post.

The U.S. Defense Department has so far refused to publicly release the unit’s preliminary findings, which include the discovery of a cache of land mines believed to have been designed for use with biological agents, the Post reported.  A Task Force 20 “direct action” team discovered the mines during a raid on an Iraqi military base near the western city of Qaim shortly before the war. 

Testing on the mines helped to convince some U.S. analysts that the mines were once loaded with botulinum toxin, according to two sources.  The mines are not considered to be offensive weapons, however, and they had deteriorated to the point where their contents could be disputed, the sources said.

While Task Force 20 had initially sent a number of reports to Washington indicating the possibility of WMD discoveries, it has found no conclusive evidence of such weapons or programs, sources said (Barton Gellman, Washington Post, June 13).

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Iraq:  Powell Praises Blix; U.S. Taps Former Inspector to Coordinate WMD Search

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday praised chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, who recently accused U.S. officials of conducting a smear campaign against him (see GSN, June 11). 

“There is no smear campaign I am aware of,” Powell said.  “I have high regard for Dr. Blix.  I worked very closely with Dr. Blix.  I noted the president had confidence in him as well,” he said (Barry Schweid, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 11).

CIA Appoints Former U.N. Inspector to Advise WMD Hunt

Meanwhile, CIA Director George Tenet yesterday announced the appointment of former U.N. chief nuclear inspector David Kay to advise on the continuing search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Kay, who has been named special adviser for strategy regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, will be in charge of refining the overall U.S. search for banned weapons, according to a CIA press release.  The Defense Department’s Iraq Survey Group, which will soon take over the search, will provide direct support to Kay, the CIA said.

“David Kay’s experience and background make him the ideal person for this new role,” Tenet said in a statement.  “His understanding of the history of the Iraqi programs and knowledge of past Iraqi efforts to hide WMD will be of inestimable help in determining the current status of Saddam Hussein’s illicit weapons,” he added (CIA release, June 11).

Some senior officials appear to be concerned that Kay’s appointment will be seen as turf war between the CIA and the Pentagon, according to the New York Times.  The precise working relationship between Kay and U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, who heads the Iraq Survey Group, is still being determined, officials said.

The decision to appoint Kay was done to help coordinate the work in Iraq of all U.S. agencies with expertise on weapons of mass destruction, a senior Bush administration official said.  “This is about bringing all of the resources of the United States to bear on a challenging and important task,” the official said (James Risen, New York Times, June 12).

U.S. Intelligence

The chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees yesterday announced that reviews of prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq would be conducted in closed sessions.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) yesterday indicated concerns that a public investigation into Iraq-related intelligence could be used for partisan purposes.

“I will not allow the committee to be politicized or to be used as an unwitting tool for any political strategist,” Roberts said.

Democrats, however, criticized the decision to conduct the review in private.

“Even while the search (for the weapons) continues, the American people need and want to know whether our government was accurate and forthcoming in its prewar assessments,” Senator John Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) said.

Roberts, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-Va.) and House Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Porter Goss (R-Fla.), all denied that the Bush administration had pressured them to conduct a closed review of prewar intelligence documents provided by the CIA. 

Some observers have called on the committees to investigate other documents besides those provided by the CIA, and to hear testimony from former intelligence analysts, officials and experts who have criticized the White House’s handling of Iraq-related information, according to the Los Angeles Times.  Democrats have also called for the review to focus on work conducted by a team of Pentagon-assembled analysts that investigated Iraq-related intelligence.  While the Pentagon team determined that there was a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, its reports have never been shared with congressional oversight panels (Brownstein/Miller, Los Angeles Times, June 12).

CIA Disputed Niger Claim

A claim that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from Niger, which U.S. President George W. Bush cited in his State of the Union address last year, was disputed by a CIA-directed mission to Niger in early 2002, according to senior Bush administration officials and a former U.S. official (see GSN, March 28).

The CIA, however, did not share the results of its investigation into the Iraq-Niger link with the White House or other agencies, the officials said. 

In February 2002, the CIA sent a retired U.S. ambassador to Niger to the country to investigate the alleged attempted purchase, according to the officials.  While there, the CIA’s envoy spoke with the president of Niger and other officials mentioned as being involved in the attempted purchase, some of whose signatures were allegedly on related documents, according to the Washington Post. 

Upon his return, the envoy told the CIA that the uranium purchase story was false, sources said.  The envoy believed that documents purported to be related to the purchase were forged because the “dates were wrong and the names were wrong,” the former U.S. official said.

The CIA, however, did not include details of the envoy’s report nor his identity, which would have added credibility, in agency intelligence reports that were shared with other agencies, the Post reported.  Instead, the CIA said that Nigerien officials had denied that the attempted purchase had occurred, a senior Bush administration official said.

The CIA’s action, which has been previously unreported, was the result of “extremely sloppy” handling of a piece of evidence in the U.S. case against Iraq, a senior intelligence official said.

The official defended, however, the overall U.S. case against Iraq.  “It is only one fact and not the reason we went to war.  There was a lot more,” the official said.

A senior CIA analyst, however, said the case “is indicative of larger problems” in the handling of intelligence related to Iraq’s suspected WMD programs and links to terrorism. 

“Information not consistent with the administration agenda was discarded and information that was (consistent) was not seriously scrutinized,” the analyst said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, June 12).

INC Supplied Sources

Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, said yesterday that his group helped three Iraqi defectors provide the CIA with information on Iraqi WMD programs.

“We provided exactly three people to the U.S. who we thought could provide information about the weapons programs,” Chalabi said.

In 2001, the INC set up a meeting in Bangkok between U.S. intelligence officials and Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, an Iraqi engineer, according to the Washington Times.  Al-Haideri provided the INC with information on Iraqi weapons-storage facilities, Chalabi said. 

The second defector the INC worked with was Mohammed Harith, who met with U.S. intelligence officials in Jordan and provided information on Iraqi mobile biological facilities, the Times reported.  U.S. intelligence officials rejected the third defector, an Iraqi physicist who was involved in isotope separation efforts.

“They talked to him briefly and they didn’t want to talk to him any more and told us about that,” Chalabi said.  “That is it.  That is the extent of our intelligence provided by the INC to the United States’ government on weapons of mass destruction,” he said (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, June 12).

British Intelligence

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw will appear before the British Parliament’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which is conducting an inquiry as to whether British Iraq-related intelligence was exaggerated to build support for war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said yesterday (see GSN, June 10).

In “accordance with convention,” however, Blair said that neither he nor any of his staff would appear before the committee.  Blair also said there was not “a shred of truth” in the allegations that the government had exaggerated its intelligence information (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 11).

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International Response:  Officials Discussing Ways to Stop WMD Shipments

Eleven nations, including the United States, are scheduled to meet in Madrid today to discuss modifying international law to make it easier for authorities to board and seize cargo vessels suspected of transporting WMD materials (see GSN, June 2).

The meeting is the first, informal gathering of “a small group of like-minded countries” to discuss the “Proliferation Security Initiative” that U.S. President George W. Bush proposed late last month, a senior U.S. State Department official said yesterday.  The United States hopes the meeting will help improve intelligence sharing between countries to better block shipments of weapons and nuclear material, the official said.

The new measures are being pursued because countries that don’t belong to nonproliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, do not violate any laws if they transfer weapons technology, said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

For example, Spanish soldiers stopped a North Korean ship in December that was transporting ballistic missiles to Yemen, but the shipment was allowed to proceed after authorities determined that the sale was not illegal.

One purpose of today’s meeting is to discuss whether new international law is needed to grant the authority to block transfers of weapons that are not banned under international law, diplomats said.  Without legal authority, the seizure of a ship or airplane could be seen as an act of war, according to the Los Angeles Times.

“We want to talk about our mutual understanding of the rules of the road, what the permissible bases for interdiction are,” the State Department official said.

Under international maritime law, countries can board a suspect ship with the permission of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing, or board ships that are flying no flag, the official said.

“One thing we’re going to explore is whether those authorities need to be supplemented,” the official said (Efron/Demick, Los Angeles Times, June 12).

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Iraq:  Blix Attacks U.S. Critics

U.N. chief weapons inspector Hans Blix yesterday openly criticized members of the Bush administration, saying some within the U.S. Defense Department had orchestrated a smear campaign against him (see GSN, June 10).

“I have my detractors in Washington.  There are bastards who spread things around, of course, who planted nasty things in the media.  Not that I cared very much,” Blix said in an interview with the London Guardian.  “It was like a mosquito bite in the evening that is there in the morning, an irritant,” he added.

While describing his overall relationship with the United States as “good,” Blix said the Bush administration “leaned” on inspectors to prepare reports that would gain the United States support within the U.N. Security Council for attacking Iraq.  For example, the United States was angered that inspectors did not “make more” of discovered cluster bombs in Iraq, he said.

Blix said he was convinced that there were officials within the Bush administration that “say they don’t care if the U.N. sinks under the East River, and other crude things.”  Instead of seeing the United Nations as a collective body, the United States now sees it as an “alien power, even if it does hold considerable influence within it.  Such (negative) feelings don’t exist in Europe where people say that the U.N. is a lot of talk at dinners and fluffy stuff,” Blix said (Helena Smith, London Guardian, June 11).

Blix yesterday also defended U.N. inspectors’ efforts prior to the war in Iraq.  “I would say that I think the criticism that was directed to us was misdirected,” he said in an interview with the Associated Press.

With no weapons of mass destruction found so far in Iraq, Blix said an important question now is why Iraq chose not to cooperate with the United Nations for so long.

“I have speculations, one could be pride,” Blix said.  “Saddam Hussein regarded himself as an emperor of Mesopotamia, some said, and he regarded inspectors as impostors,” he said.

Blix nevertheless praised Hussein’s ouster.

“He was an ancient-type ruler who got control of a country with an oil income and could use 21st century weapons,” Blix said.  “That was a very dangerous combination, and I think we all feel a great relief that he is put out of action,” he said (Edith Lederer, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, June 10).

Opposition Leader Defends Intelligence

Meanwhile, Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, yesterday defended information he provided to Washington on Iraq’s WMD programs, denying that he had exaggerated the threat (see GSN, May 27).

“We gave very accurate information, and we produced people who we handed over to the United States who told them very significant things,” Chalabi said.  “The only tangible things they have found are the mobile labs, which our defectors talked about,” he said.

U.S. authorities will find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction once they find Hussein, who Chalabi claims is still alive, he said. “The weapons and Saddam are one and the same thing,” he said (Colum Lynch, Washington Post, June 11).

DIA Defends Report

U.S. Navy Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, last week denied that a 2002 DIA report indicated that the agency did not believe Iraq possessed a chemical weapons program prior to the war (see GSN, June 6).

The classified report, which was leaked to the media June 6, said there is “no reliable information” as to whether Iraq at the time was producing or stockpiling chemical weapons.  All the report meant, however, was that the DIA could not identify specific facilities that were involved in producing chemical weapons, Jacoby said.

“It is not, in any way, intended to portray the fact that we had doubts that such a program existed … was active, or … was part of the Iraqi WMD infrastructure,” Jacoby said.  “We did not have doubts about the existence of the program,” he said (U.S. State Department release, June 9).

United Nations Appoints New UNMOVIC Acting Head

The United Nations yesterday appointed Demetrius Perricos as acting executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. 

Perricos, currently serving as Blix’s deputy and director of planning and operations, will assume his position July 1.  Diplomats believe U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan will not appoint a new executive director to UNMOVIC until the United States agrees to allow inspectors to return to Iraq, Reuters reported (Reuters/Business Recorder, June 11).

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International Response:  Australia Group Adds New Pathogens to Control List

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A group of 33 industrial nations agreed last week to restrict the export of a number of human pathogens that could be used to create biological weapons, the Australian Foreign Ministry announced Friday (see GSN, Oct. 28, 2002).

The Australia Group — an informal network of countries that coordinate export controls on dual-use items that could be used to create biological or chemical weapons — agreed at its annual meeting in Paris to add 14 pathogens to the group’s biological control list, the ministry said in a press release.  The pathogens include 12 types of viruses, such as encephalitis and hemorrhagic fever, as well as two types of bacteria, according to the U.S. State Department.  The pathogens were selected because they are sufficiently dangerous to humans to pose the risk of being used as biological weapons, a State Department official told Global Security Newswire yesterday.

At last week’s meeting, the group also agreed to several additional nonproliferation measures.  Group members endorsed a cooperative program to engage countries in the Asian-Pacific region on biological and chemical export-control issues, according to the Australian Foreign Ministry.  The plan could also include group members helping Asian-Pacific countries to develop or strengthen national biological and chemical export control laws, the State Department official said.

The official denied that the Asian-Pacific region posed a greater risk for biological and chemical proliferation, saying that Australia’s position as chair of the group was a factor in the region being chosen as the target of the first action plan.  The United States hopes similar plans for other regions will also be developed, the official said.

Australia Group members agreed to new procedures to improve transparency and information sharing, the ministry said in its release.  These new procedures include mandatory information-sharing among members on the implementation of group-related export controls, the State Department official said.  In addition, group members approved a new guide to help national compliance and enforcement officers to detect and prevent illegal transfers of controlled items.

“I welcome the continued high priority placed by members of the Australia Group on preventing the spread of CBW in the fight against terrorism and their commitment to strengthening export-control measures,” Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said in a statement.

The United States believes, however, that more work remains to be done through the group to address chemical weapon-related issues, according to the State Department official.  The group was unable to reach a consensus at this year’s meeting on adding additional chemical precursors to the group’s control list, the official said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security has modified the U.S. Export Administration Regulations to incorporate decisions made by the Australia Group at its annual meeting last year, according to a final rule published yesterday in the Federal Register (see GSN, June 21, 2002).

Under the final rule, which took effect yesterday, eight new toxins have been added to the U.S. Commerce Control List.  The bureau has also lowered volume limits for controlled fermenters from 100 liters to 20 liters.

In addition, the bureau has also modified licensing policy provisions in the Export Administration Regulations to make them more consistent with guidelines the Australia Group adopted last year.  Now, the bureau will consider several new factors before an export license will be granted, such as the reliability of the parties involved in the transfer, relevant information about proliferation or terrorism activities, the risk of diversion of the transferred items and the applicability of other export control or nonproliferation agreements.

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German Response:  Berlin Withdraws WMD Team From Kuwait

Germany is pulling a specialized WMD detection team out of Kuwait, German Defense Minister Peter Struck said today (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2002).

The German unit includes 60 personnel and six modified armored vehicles.

“This was a combined joint task force — the United States, the Czech Republic and Germany posted defense forces against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to Kuwait,” Struck said.  “Now that the Americans and Czechs have left, there is no longer a combined joint task force,” he added (Associated Press, June 11).

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Iraq:  Bush Says WMD “Program” Will be Found, Refines Previous Claims

U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday said coalition forces would find evidence that Iraq had WMD programs prior to the war, moving away from earlier claims that Iraq possessed actual weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, June 9).

“Iraq had a weapons program,” Bush said.  “Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program.  I am absolutely convinced, with time, we’ll find out that they did have a weapons program,” he said.

Critics, however, have said the word “program” is too imprecise, according to Newsday.

“It can mean anything,” said Mel Goodman, a retired CIA analyst.  “It can mean documents, anything; no matter how benign, they will find some various purpose for it,” he said (Knut Royce, Newsday, June 10).

Prior to the war in Iraq, Bush often made concrete claims that Iraq possessed actual biological and chemical weapons, according to the Los Angeles Times.  For example, in an Oct. 7 speech, Bush said Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons” (see GSN, Oct. 8, 2002).

“If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today ð— and we do —does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?”  Bush said then.

Shortly before the war, Bush again made claims that Iraq possessed actual weapons, the Times reported.  On March 17, Bush said “intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised” (see GSN, March 18).

Bush yesterday denied that a failure to find actual weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would damage U.S. credibility.

“The credibility of this country is based upon our strong desire to make the world more peaceful, and the world is now more peaceful after our decision” to remove Hussein, Bush said.

The lack of concrete proof of the death of Hussein is making it more difficult to obtain evidence that could aid the WMD search, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday.

“To the extent it’s not proven that he’s not alive, there are a lot of people who might fear that he could come back,” Rumsfeld said, referring to Hussein.  “And if they fear that he could come back, they might be somewhat slower in an interrogation to say what they know,” he said (Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times, June 10).

Bush yesterday also defended prewar administration claims that Hussein and al-Qaeda were connected. 

The New York Times reported yesterday that two captured senior al-Qaeda operatives have denied any such link during interrogations.  Bush said yesterday, however, that the Times had ignored evidence that an al-Qaeda operative hiding in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was responsible for the murder last year of Laurence Foley, a U.S. aid official, in Jordan.

“I guess the people that wrote that article forgot about al-Zarqawi’s network inside of Baghdad that ordered the killing of a U.S. citizen named Foley,” Bush said (David Rennie, London Telegraph, June 10).

Iraq Survey Group to Begin Search Soon

Meanwhile, the Iraq Survey Group could begin Saturday to search for evidence of Iraq’s WMD efforts, according to Reuters.

The group will replace the U.S. military’s 75th Exploitation Task Force, which so far has found no conclusive evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.  The Iraq Survey Group, headed by Army Maj. General Keith Dayton, director of operations for the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, will have a staff of 1,400, consisting mainly of Americans, officials said.  A British national may be named as the group’s second-in-command, they said.

While the United States has long opposed a formal U.N. role in the WMD search, up to 50 former U.N. inspectors have been recruited to join the group, a defense official said.  It is “hugely important” that the group include “a large number of people with all the historical experience with previous inspections,” said former U.N. chief weapons inspector Terence Taylor (Reuters/Boston Globe, June 10).

The U.S. military units that made up the 75th Exploitation Task Force are now being given time off or being assigned to other duties than the WMD search because there are no more sites to investigate, according to the Associated Press.

“It doesn’t appear there are any more targets at this time,” said Lt. Col. Keith Harrington, whose team has been cut by more than 30 percent.  “We’re hanging around with no missions in the foreseeable future,” he said (Dafna Linzer, Associated Press/Philadelphia Inquirer, June 10).

British Intelligence

British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director, will not allow themselves to be questioned by the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee regarding allegations that the government exaggerated prewar intelligence on Iraq, the prime minister’s office said yesterday.

The committee last week asked if Blair and Campbell would answer questions in their inquiry as to whether intelligence was exaggerated to boost support for war, according to the London Independent.  A spokesman for Blair said, however, that neither man would appear before the committee.  Instead, Blair will meet with members of the Intelligence and Security Committee when they publish an annual report on the British intelligence services today, the Independent reported.  That committee, which has also announced that it will conduct an inquiry into Iraq-related intelligence, conducts its work in private and can have its reports censored by the government (Paul Waugh, London Independent, June 10).

Iran Backs United States on WMD Claims

In a rare moment of agreement with the United States, Iran has concurred with the U.S. assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to the war, according to an Iranian official with ties to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

“Yes, we agree with the Americans,” the Iranian official said.  “Our intelligence indicated that Iraq did possess weapons of mass destruction and was hiding them from the U.N.,” the official said.

While Iran does not know what happened to such weapons, there are concerns that they might have been smuggled into local black markets, according to the official.

“We know other items, once under military control (such as broadcast transmission equipment), have found their way onto the black market,” the official said.  “We have people coming to Tehran from Baghdad with catalogs of items (stolen from the Iraqi government) offering them for sale,” the official said, adding that no chemical or biological weapons have so far been discovered (Stewart Stogel, Washington Times, June 10).

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Iraq:  IAEA Begins Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear Complex

An International Atomic Energy Agency team yesterday began inspecting parts of the Tuwaitha complex, the main site in Iraq’s former nuclear program, to determine the extent of looting of radioactive materials there (see GSN, June 6).

The seven-member team surveyed a three-building storage center at the complex known as Site C, according to Reuters.  The IAEA team was accompanied by U.S. troops (Reuters/Business Recorder, June 9).

Area residents said that looters emptied barrels taken from the complex and then sold them to people who knew nothing about Iraq’s former nuclear efforts.  The barrels were then used to store food and water, and were also washed in the nearby Tigris River, all of which has raised health concerns, according to Agence France-Presse.

A U.S. military spokesman said, however, that the Tuwaitha site posed minimal health risks.

“Our initial assessment is that the risk for health effects is not large,” the spokesman said.  “We have had folks there at the site, my deputy went there and his teeth are still there, and his hair is still in,” the spokesman added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 7).

Weapons Programs

Meanwhile, a former senior Iraqi intelligence officer has said the Iraqi intelligence services established a network of small laboratories after 1996 with a goal of someday resuming full biological and chemical weapons production.

Each weapons team consisted of up to four scientists who were unknown to U.N. inspectors, the officer said.  The teams worked on computers and conducted experiments in bunkers and safe houses around Baghdad, the officer said.

The former intelligence officer said he worked mainly “on the money side” of the effort since the 1980s, which helped to fund a network of local trading companies that were covertly operated by Iraqi intelligence operatives to obtain materials for weapons programs.  The officer said he made several trips between the mid-1990s and 2001 to help oversee the clandestine acquisition network.  He also said he obtained money for the effort from secret bank accounts in Egypt, Jordan, Switzerland and other countries.

The small weapons laboratories did not produce any actual weapons, nor do any weapons now exist in Iraq, the officer said.  The teams did, however, create plans to quickly begin WMD production if U.N. sanctions were lifted, the officer said.

“We could start again anytime.  It’s very easy.  Especially biological,” the officer said.  “The point was, the Iraqis kept the knowledge,” he said.

U.S. troops, however, “will never find anything here.  Only oil,” the officer said (Bob Drogin, Los Angeles Times, June 8).

Mobile Laboratories Questioned

Some U.S. and British intelligence analysts are skeptical of the Bush administration’s claims that two trailers discovered in Iraq were mobile biological facilities, according to the New York Times.  Instead, they said the White House claims were marked by a rush to judgment (see GSN, May 29).

“Everyone has wanted to find the ‘smoking gun’ so much that they may have wanted to have reached this conclusion,” said one intelligence expert who has seen the trailers.  “I am very upset with the process,” the expert said.

The trailers lacked equipment for steam sterilization, normally required for any type of biological agent production, analysts said.  The lack of such a piece of equipment would increase the risk of contamination, thereby producing failed weapons agents, according to the Times.  The trailers also only had the ability to produce small amounts of biological agents in liquid form, which would then have to be furthered processed at another facility, according to analysts.  In addition, the trailers lacked equipment to easily remove germ fluids from the processing tanks onboard.

The CIA stands by its assessment, made in a white paper released last week, that the trailers were most likely for use to produce biological weapons agents, according to an agency spokesman.

Skeptics “are entitled to their opinion, of course, but we stand behind the assertions in the white paper,” CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said (Miller/Broad, New York Times, June 7).

U.S. Intelligence

A number of top Bush administration officials have recently defended the U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prior to the war, according to reports.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice yesterday said the White House had made the best judgment on Iraq’s suspected WMD efforts as it could with the information it had, and that previous CIA directors had made the same assessments since 1996.

“Successive CIA directors, successive administrations, have known that we had every reason to judge that he had weapons of mass destruction,” Rice said on NBC’s Meet the Press, referring to ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Both Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell yesterday denied that the Bush administration had exaggerated Iraq-related intelligence in order to increase support for war.  They both said more time is needed to find evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs, according to the New York Times.

“The fact is this was a program that was built for concealment,” Rice said.  “We’ve always known that.  We have always known that it would take some time to put together a full picture of his weapons of mass destruction programs,” she said (David Sanger, New York Times, June 9).

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week also defended U.S. intelligence on Iraq, saying the current weapons search in Iraq will validate a presentation made by Powell in February to the U.N. Security Council.

“(The intelligence has) been enriched as they’ve gone through this past period of years, and that I believe that the presentation made by Secretary Powell was accurate and will be proved to be accurate,” Rumsfeld said, adding that the Pentagon would cooperate if the U.S. Congress began an inquiry into Iraq-related intelligence (U.S. Defense Department release, June 6).

Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) yesterday criticized the U.S. intelligence on Iraq’s WMD efforts, saying U.S. credibility was at stake if such weapons were not found.

The likely presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction “was turned into a certainty over and over and over again by the administration,” Levin said.  If such weapons are not found, “the credibility and reliability of our intelligence is going to be challenged in the future, and it’s going to be much more difficult for us to lead the world,” he said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, June 9).

British Intelligence

Meanwhile, British intelligence officers have said they have a “smoking gun” that proves that British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s staff pressured them on Iraqi WMD-related intelligence, according to the London Independent.

“A smoking gun may well exist over WMDs, but it may not be to the government’s liking,” a senior source said.  “Minuted details will show exactly what went on.  Because of the frequency and, at times, unusual nature of the demands from Downing Street, people have made sure records were kept.  There is a certain amount of self-preservation in this, of course,” the source added (Sengupta/McSmith, London Independent, June 8).

In addition, British Home Secretary David Blunkett said yesterday that a dossier on Iraq’s efforts to conceal WMD programs should not have been published (see GSN, Feb. 7).

The dossier, which included information taken from a graduate student’s thesis that had been published online, was prepared by Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director, Blunkett said.  Campbell had previously written the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service to apologize for discrediting the service by releasing the dossier, according to the London Telegraph.

Campbell promised the British intelligence services that the government would take “far greater care” in using material prepared by them in the future (George Jones, London Telegraph, June 9).

Al-Qaeda Operatives Deny Iraqi Connection

Two high-ranking al-Qaeda operatives in U.S. custody have separately denied that their organization worked with Hussein, according to several intelligence officials.

Abu Zubaydah, captured in March 2002, said during interrogations that the idea of working with Hussein had been discussed among al-Qaeda leaders, but terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden rejected the proposal because he did not want to be beholden to Hussein, according to an official who has read the CIA classified report on the interrogation (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2002).  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was captured in March of this year, also has said during interrogations that al-Qaeda had no desire to work with Iraq, according to the New York Times (see GSN, May 12).

The CIA has refused to comment on what the two men might have said during interrogations.  A senior intelligence official played down the reports, saying that statements made by captured al-Qaeda operatives must be taken with a high degree of skepticism (James Risen, New York Times, June 9).

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South Africa:  “Dr. Death” Seeks Reinstatement in Military

Wouter Basson, the former head of apartheid-era South Africa’s “Project Coast” biological and chemical weapons program, has begun seeking reinstatement in the South African military, the South African Press Association reported last week (see GSN, April 12, 2002).

Basson — dubbed “Dr. Death” by the media — said his reinstatement would make him the highest-ranking general in terms of experience and academic qualifications.  He is currently employed as a cardiologist at a private Cape Town hospital, according to the Press Association.

Basson was acquitted last year of 46 criminal charges, including murder and attempted murder, stemming from his involvement with Project Coast.  Last week, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal refused to grant the state an opportunity to retry Basson (South African Press Association, June 5 in FBIS-AFR, June 5).

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U.S. Response:  Russia Complains of Continuing Aid Restrictions

Russia’s Foreign Ministry expressed frustration Friday with restrictions placed on U.S. nonproliferation aid to Moscow (see GSN, Jan 14).

Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko began by praising $450 million in U.S. aid recently approved by each house of Congress, in particular the congressional authorization to fund a chemical weapons destruction plant in Shchuchye.  Yakovenko disagreed with some regulations, however, including a U.S. requirement that $100 million in funds for Shchuchye be matched with a $50 million donation from Russia or a third party.

“We could not but take note of the fact that the American side continues the policy of setting forth additional unjustified conditions pertaining to the expansion of its assistance to the Russian projects.  Particularly disquieting is the fact that the list of these conditions is not decreasing, but on the contrary increasing,” he said.

Yakovenko said the restrictions were in place despite a “considerable buildup” in Russian funding.

“The American decisions are creating some additional difficulties for us,” he added (Russian Foreign Ministry release, June 6).

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