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United States: Abraham Calls for “Immediate Corrective Action” to Improve Security at National LaboratoriesBy Mike Nartker “The Department of Energy views security as the critical responsibility of the national laboratories, and we treat any lapse or failure as significant,” Abraham said in a press statement. “Therefore, I have directed NNSA Administrator [Linton] Brooks to launch a comprehensive security overhaul at the national labs and to put in place any immediate changes he deems necessary,” he added. One of the three national laboratories — Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico — announced yesterday new management changes prompted by an independent investigation into allegations that internal security investigations were blocked or that investigators experienced retaliation. Among the management changes, which are effective immediately, was the resignation of Dave Nokes, Sandia vice president for national security and arms control, according to a laboratory press release. Nokes resigned at Sandia President C. Paul Robinson’s request, the release said. He will be replaced by Al Romig, currently Sandia vice president for science, technology and partnerships, with a replacement for Romig to be announced soon. “Changes, especially when unexpected, are particularly difficult,” Robinson said in a statement, “but they hopefully serve to assure continued public confidence and support for Sandia and all our programs. This has been a very trying experience. I know the changes we’re making today will make us stronger.” GAO Criticizes NNSA Security Program Management Meanwhile, the U.S. General Accounting Office released a report yesterday criticizing the NNSA for failing to effectively manage its safeguard and security program that oversees security at the three national laboratories, as well as the four U.S. nuclear weapons production sites (see GSN, June 16). According to the May report, congressional auditors found that the NNSA had failed to be “fully effective” in its management of the safeguards and security program in four key areas — defining clear roles and responsibilities for site offices, assessing sites’ security activities, oversight of contractors’ corrective action plans and staff allocation. “As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that its contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and material from individuals seeking to inflict damage,” the report says. Brooks told a House Government Reform subcommittee yesterday, however, that he was confident that security at NNSA sites was effective in preventing potential terrorists from gaining access. Since the NNSA’s creation in 2000, the agency’s management structure has been in “a state of flux,” with a full implementation of a revised management structure not expected to be completed until September 2004, the GAO report says. This “flux” has had an effect on the agency defining site offices’ safeguards and security responsibilities, it says. The lack of a functional management structure, and the resultant confusion over responsibilities, has led to inconsistencies among NNSA sites as to how to conduct security assessments, according to the report. Three of the seven sites use an Energy-required survey approach to assess security, which is a comprehensive review lasting two weeks. The remaining sites, however, instead rely on a surveillance approach, which uses a smaller number of NNSA officials to oversee one or more aspects of a contractor’s security activities throughout the year. These sites have been able to use the surveillance approach, the report says, because the NNSA has not issued guidelines on complying with Energy policy on conducting surveys while it conducts the management reorganization. In addition, the GAO also found that NNSA contractors often do not conduct Energy-required analyses when preparing corrective action plans to fix security flaws, according to the report. Out of 43 such plans reviewed between 1999 and 2002, less than half included a required root cause analysis, and less than 25 percent included required risk assessment or cost-benefit analyses, the report says. “Potential opportunities to improve physical security at the sites are not maximized because corrective actions are developed without fully considering the problems’ root causes, risks posed or cost versus benefit of taking corrective action,” the report says. The NNSA is also facing shortfalls in both security staff and expertise, the GAO report says. Officials at five NNSA sites said they either have or expect to have between two and six vacancies for positions to oversee contractors’ security and safeguards activities, it says. The report found that many such vacancies occur because staff members are reluctant to be relocated to areas seen as less desirable and because the NSSA has frozen hiring activities because of budget constraints. In its report, the GAO made several recommendations to improve security management, such as the formalization of the responsibilities of site offices to conduct oversight and the use of the survey approach at all sites to conduct security assessments. The GAO also recommended that the NNSA ensure that contractors develop corrective action plans based on root-cause, cost-benefit and risk-assessment analyses; and that the agency develop a plan to allocate security staff at sites to provide effective long-term oversight. During yesterday’s National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee hearing, Brooks said he agreed with most of the issues the GAO raised in its report and its recommendations. “I believe the GAO did concentrate on the right things. I believe most things in life are a question of management, and this is clearly a question of management,” Brooks said. “If we do not get the management of safeguards and security right, we will not ever fix the problem,” he said. Brooks said, however, that he disagreed with the GAO’s recommendation that the survey approach to conducting security assessments should be the only method used at NNSA sites. He defended the surveillance approach, calling it “equally effective,” and said Energy policy should be modified to legitimize the use of the surveillance method. Brooks also said the NNSA had developed several new measures to help improve security, which the agency would soon formally announce. The new measures include increased U.S. and contractor security experts and directives to site managers to increase surveillance and to file periodical reports to Brooks himself. In addition, the NNSA plans to systematically re-examine a number of external reviews conducted on the agency to determine if recommendations were implemented, as well as create two panels to review physical security problems and personnel concerns, Brooks said. The panels will be headed by outside experts, he added.
From June 25, 2003 issue.Iran: Washington Works Through U.N. to Stifle TehranAfter heavily criticizing the United Nations over the crisis in Iraq, U.S. officials are attempting to use U.N. channels to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, the Washington Post reported Monday (see GSN, June 24). Many of the other options available to Washington, including possible military action, are unattractive to U.S. officials, the Post reported. A senior State Department official described a recent report on Iran’s nuclear development from the International Atomic Energy Agency as “factual” and “devastating.” Iran has a “lot of explaining to do,” the official added (Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, June 23). Iranian Opposition Alleged to be Terrorists A classified report, prepared three weeks ago by France’s intelligence agency, said that an Iranian opposition group was planning attacks in France against Iranian government targets. French authorities last week arrested 150 members of the People’s Mujahedin, also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq, which the U.S. State Department has formally identified as a terrorist organization. Most of the suspects were released, however, because of a lack of tangible evidence of terrorist plotting. The group allegedly had plans to attack Iranian embassies and assassinate former members of the group who are now linked with Tehran (Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, June 23).
From June 25, 2003 issue.North Korea: Reactor Construction Will Likely End SoonConstruction of two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea will most likely be suspended, a South Korean official said today (see GSN, June 20). “The issue in point is when and how to halt (the project),” the official said. The reactors are being built as part of the defunct 1994 Agreed Framework, under which North Korea agreed to halt nuclear weapons development. “As the United States is demanding a halt, we’re finding it more difficult to say that the project should continue,” the official added. Seoul is pushing for a small continuation of construction, even as Washington and Pyongyang are locked in a nuclear standoff. U.S. officials are pushing for a complete halt to the work (Yonhap News Agency/BBC Monitoring, June 25). Former Presidential Aides Indicted Two former South Korean presidential aides and a leading business executive have been indicted on charges that $100 million was transferred to Pyongyang before a 2000 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. The South Korean president was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, largely as a result of the 2000 meeting. Independent counsel Song Doo-hwan handed down the indictments against Park Jie-won, a former chief of the presidential staff, and Lim Dong-won, a former head of the South Korean intelligence service. Chung Mong-hun, the chairman of Hyundai Asan, was also indicted. “In pre-summit talks, the government promised to provide $100 million to North Korea, and Hyundai group was asked to transmit the money for the government,” Song said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 25). Anniversary Marked With Rhetoric North Korea marked the 53rd anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War by criticizing the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. “The U.S. seeks to fish in troubled waters by driving South Korea as cannon fodder or a shock brigade in its aggression of the D.P.R.K.,” said the state-run Korean Central News Agency (Agence Presse-France, June 25). Pakistani Nuclear Aid A “No-Go” During a meeting yesterday, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and U.S. President George W. Bush discussed U.S. allegations that Pakistan provided nuclear aid to Pyongyang. “He basically made it clear that he understood that any sort of contacts in any sort of military-related field, whatever they are, are a ‘no-go’ area,” said a senior Bush administration official (Agence France-Presse II, June 25).
From June 25, 2003 issue.CTBT: Oman Ratifies TreatyOman ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty June 13, according to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, bringing the total number of treaty ratifiers to 102 (see GSN, May 12). Oman is not one of the 44 nations that must ratify the treaty before it can enter into force. Of those 44 nations, 31 have ratified the treaty (CTBT Organization release, June 25).
From June 24, 2003 issue.Pakistan I: F-16s Will Not Be Included in Proposed Aid Package, Bush SaysBy Mike Nartker After a meeting with Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf today at Camp David, Bush announced that he would seek congressional support for a five-year, $3 billion economic and security assistance package. Of that $3 billion, half would go to defense-related matters, Bush said. The sale of F-16s though, which has long been a sticking point in U.S.-Pakistani relations, would not be included, he said. “In the package that we discussed … half of that money goes for defense matters, of which the F-16 won’t be a part,” Bush said. “Nevertheless, we want to work closely with our friend to make sure that the package meets the needs of the Pakistan people,” he added. In the late 1980s, Pakistan ordered 28 F-16s, but the United States embargoed arms sales to Pakistan in the early 1990s because it could no longer certify that Islamabad did not possess nuclear weapons. Improvements in U.S.-Pakistani relations following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and Islamabad’s increased role in the war on terrorism, however, spurred Bush to lift the embargo and increased speculation that the fighters would be provided. Musharraf today praised the proposed aid package, saying it “exemplifies the U.S. commitment” to long-term involvement with Pakistan. “We look forward to diverse programs of cooperation in the economic, commercial, political and the defense sector,” Musharraf said. “We also expect greater people-to-people contact and close interaction between the parliaments of the two countries to promote the cause of democracy,” he said. In addition to the new financial aid package, Bush and Musharraf discussed the need to stop cross-border terrorism in the disputed province of Kashmir — a potential flashpoint between India and Pakistan. Bush praised both Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for recent moves to reduce tensions between the two nuclear-armed countries. Both Bush and Musharraf said that the issue of Kashmir would have to be addressed in any larger Indian-Pakistani peace efforts, with Musharraf saying Kashmir was a “core issue.” Musharraf reportedly last week criticized Indian suggestions that the topic of Kashmir be one of several issues discussed in any talks (see GSN, June 19). In addition, Bush said, the United States would remain actively involved in seeking peace in South Asia. “I assured the president that the United States will do all we can to promote peace,” he said. Ultimately, however, peace and stability in South Asia will be dependent on India and Pakistan themselves, Bush said. “The truth of the matter is, for there to be a final agreement, it’s going to require leadership from the both the Pakistan government and the Indian government,” he said.
From June 24, 2003 issue.Iran: IAEA Equipment in Place at Natanz Uranium Enrichment FacilityThe International Atomic Energy Agency has installed monitoring equipment at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran, Agence France-Presse reported yesterday (see GSN, June 23). The agency has asked Iran not to introduce uranium into the facility, which is at the center of U.S. allegations of nuclear weapons development. “The IAEA has all its safeguards equipment in place (at Natanz), and if Iran did try to move anything in, they would see it,” said a diplomat in Vienna. Iran has denied allegations that its nuclear development program is a cover for a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA recently reviewed a report on Iran’s nuclear program. Another report, due in September, is “likely to be more conclusive, and expectations are going to be much greater from (IAEA) member states,” a diplomat said. The September report will probably investigate whether Iran has already used uranium to test enrichment centrifuges and why Tehran is building a heavy water nuclear plant at Arak (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, June 23). Intelligence sources in the Middle East, however, said that Iran has already introduced uranium to four centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric facility, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported this week (see GSN, June 12). The centrifuges were allegedly tested to prepare for the larger facility at Natanz. The recent IAEA report says that 1.9 kilograms of uranium, previously imported from China, is missing. Iranian officials said the uranium was lost through leaking valves on a storage container (Koch/Ben-David, Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 25).
From June 24, 2003 issue.Pakistan II: Authorities Arrest Two Found With Nuclear DocumentsPakistani military intelligence last week arrested two Italian nationals who were found with classified documents related to Pakistani nuclear facilities, authorities said Saturday (see GSN, June 19). The two men were arrested in southern Pakistan on suspicion of collecting information about the Pakistan Atomic Energy Center in the city of Dera Ghazi Khan, said District Police Officer Qamar-uz-Zaman. Since the arrest, all foreigners have been banned from entering the city without special permission, Zaman said (Agence France-Presse, June 21 in FBIS-NES, June 23).
From June 24, 2003 issue.South Asia: State Department Clarifies End of SanctionsBy Mike Nartker The notice re-expressed the department’s policy of considering export license requests for defense-related exports to India and Pakistan on a case-by-case basis, rather than the previous policy of denial established in 1998. The notice does not represent a new shift in U.S. policy, but instead seeks to clarify lingering uncertainties about the status of U.S. sanctions against India and Pakistan, a State Department official told Global Security Newswire yesterday, calling the notice an “item of good government.” In 1998, the United States imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan after the two countries each conducted nuclear weapons tests. In 2001, soon after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush waived those sanctions on the basis that they were no longer in the U.S. national security interest, according to last week’s Federal Register notice. Last year, U.S. sanctions that were imposed on the Pakistani Defense Ministry and the Pakistani Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission for engaging in ballistic missile-related cooperation with Chinese entities expired, the notice said. The State Department official said he was unaware of any particular significance to the timing of the issuing of last week’s notice, citing the time often needed to prepare such measures. The official also said he was unaware of any requests from either India or Pakistan for such a clarification of U.S. policy.
From June 23, 2003 issue.Iran: Tehran Prepared to Negotiate Over Additional ProtocolIran is apparently moving away from a showdown over its nuclear development and is prepared to hold talks with U.N. officials, Reuters reported today (see GSN, June 20). “We will definitely try to cooperate more than before with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and give them the necessary assurances about Iran’s activities,” said Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran’s nuclear agency. The United States has accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons, but Iran says it is only developing peaceful nuclear power technology to meet the demands of a growing population. Aghazadeh said Iran is not necessarily opposed to signing the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear activities. “We have never said we don’t want to sign the Additional Protocol … Our view about the protocol is positive,” he said. “Naturally, the way we will choose is the way of cooperation and reaching an acceptable settlement for both sides,” he added (Paul Hughes, Reuters, June 22). Aghazadeh said he wants to begin negotiations for the nuclear inspections soon, but “there are ambiguities that need to be removed” from the Additional Protocol. Iran will “study the demands of the agency” and “wishes to commence discussions with the IAEA as soon as possible,” he added (Agence France-Presse/Washington Times, June 22). The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said that some segments of Iran’s leadership support the protocol. “There is support inside Iran — in some parts of the government — for an additional protocol,” ElBaradei said. “The longer there are negative doubts, the worse it is for Iran. If I were in their shoes I’d take a peace offensive,” he added (Roula Khalaf, Financial Times, June 23).
From June 23, 2003 issue.United States I: Senator Criticizes Energy Department on Sandia SecurityA U.S. senator has accused the U.S. Energy Department of failing to fulfill promises to investigate security problems at Sandia National Laboratories, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, March 21). In a letter sent Friday to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) cited a long list of reports of fraud and security problems at the facility. While the letter did not provide much detail into the exact nature of the security problems, it did mention the loss of keys “to every lock at the lab right up to the glass doors to the reactor.” “You need to address these and other security matters at the nuclear weapons labs,” Grassley said in the letter. “The labs are in harm’s way,” Grassley said in the letter. “There is plenty of loud thunder. Lightning will surely follow. The labs are in danger of getting zapped,” he said. In addition, Grassley also said that two investigators who raised questions about security at Sandia, Pat O’Neill and Mark Ludwig, have reported that they were transferred to work in a rodent-infested trailer, that they were reassigned to noninvestigative work and that they had their annual pay raises reduced. National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman Anson Franklin said that security at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories is the highest priority of both the NNSA and the energy secretary. “We have multiple and redundant means at each facility to ensure that our secrets and materials are not at risk,” Franklin said (Matthew Wald, New York Times, June 23).
From June 23, 2003 issue.United States II: Energy Department to Hold Hearings on Sites for Proposed Pit FacilityThe U.S. Energy Department is expected to hold public hearings this week in Amarillo, Texas, on the department’s proposed sites for a facility to produce new “pits,” or triggers, for nuclear weapons (see GSN, June 3). One of the sites the department is considering for the Modern Pit Facility is the Pantex Plant in Texas, where nuclear warheads are assembled and dismantled, according to the Associated Press. Other sites under consideration include the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Carlsbad site in New Mexico, the Nevada Test Site, and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Energy officials are expected to decide by April of next year whether and where to proceed with the facility’s construction, AP reported. Construction is slated to begin in 2011 and is expected to be completed by 2017. The facility would then be set to begin producing new nuclear weapons triggers in 2020 and could produce between 125 to 450 triggers per year (Associated Press, June 23).
From June 20, 2003 issue.Iran: Tehran Says Nuclear Development Will ContinueResponding to an International Atomic Energy Agency statement asking Iran to show restraint in its nuclear program, Tehran said yesterday that it would continue with scheduled plans to add nuclear materials to a uranium enrichment plant (see GSN, June 19). The 35-member IAEA board of governors yesterday appealed to Iran to hold off from putting nuclear material into the enrichment facility “as a confidence-building measure.” Iran’s IAEA representative, Ali Akbar Salehi, said the nuclear development would continue and that Iran would not accept additional inspections of its facilities. “Iran is already being fully cooperative. We are happy that the board did not yield to pressure to adopt a resolution (condemning Iran),” he said. “The U.S. is probably not very happy with the outcome because they wanted a resolution and they were not able to get (it) … The reason the resolution failed is that everyone knew there were political motivations behind it,” he said (Financial Times, June 20). Salehi said Iran was opposed to allowing more intrusive international monitoring of its nuclear activities, but he reiterated that Iran would cooperate with existing IAEA activities in the country. “We cannot bind ourselves to doing more than we are already committed to,” Salehi said. “The process of cooperation with the IAEA will go on unhindered,” he added (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, June 19). The U.S. representative to the IAEA, Kenneth Brill, said the statement released yesterday by the board of governors sent a message of concern to Iran. “I’m very satisfied with the outcome,” Brill said. “We have an important message from the board that supports the U.S. position and concern about the Iranian program,” he said (Richard Bernstein, New York Times, June 20). IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said yesterday the agency needs more information about Iran’s nuclear development efforts. He also repeated his appeal for Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities by IAEA officials. “The jury is still out,” ElBaradei said. “We still have a lot of work to do and we will be hopefully in a much better position to make a judgment by September or earlier if we can,” he added (IAEA release, June 19). Russian President Vladimir Putin said Iran is close to signing the Additional Protocol, Agence France-Presse reported today. “According to information that we have in hand, the leadership of Iran is ready to join all protocols, to all demands of the IAEA, concerning control of (Iran’s) nuclear program,” he said. “We will build our relations with any country — including Iran — based on their openness in relation to the IAEA,” Putin added (Agence France-Presse, June 20). The president of TVEL, the Russian nuclear fuel producer that is slated to supply nuclear material to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, said that the deal is contingent on Iran’s compliance with the IAEA. “No fuel will be supplied until Iran’s entire nuclear industry is put under IAEA monitoring,” said Alexander Nyago (Interfax, June 18 in FBIS-SOV, June 18). Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reportedly telephoned Putin to assure him that Iran was not developing or procuring nuclear weapons technology (Financial Times). Bolton Says Military Action Possible The United States has the right to use military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons but the thought is “far from our minds,” U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton told BBC today. U.S. President George W. Bush “has repeatedly said that all options are on the table. But that (military action) is not only not our preference, it is far from our minds,” Bolton said. He added, however, that a military strike “has to be an option” and said that Iran is “pursuing multiple routes to nuclear weapons, and we need to get that stopped” (Agence France-Presse, June 20).
From June 20, 2003 issue.North Korea: Washington Pushes for Security Council CondemnationThe United States has prepared a draft document that it hopes will push the U.N. Security Council to censure North Korea for developing nuclear weapons, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 19). John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, discussed the draft with Russian, British and French diplomats Wednesday. Negroponte met separately with Chinese diplomats yesterday, according to AP. China has opposed any Security Council action on North Korea, and it reiterated that stance Wednesday. In the draft, which would take the form of a statement from the council, Washington criticizes North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs “and the actions the regime has taken since last October when it acknowledged it was pursuing a uranium enrichment program.” “The council calls upon the D.P.R.K. to immediately and completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner, and come into full compliance with its obligations” under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Although Negroponte refused to discuss the negotiations over the draft, he said “we will certainly continue to pursue” the effort (Associated Press/USA Today, June 20). The United States has informed Japan, South Korea and other partners about its effort to gain Security Council condemnation of North Korea’s actions. Traveling to a meeting of Asian and Pacific states this week, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “we will make judgments in the weeks ahead as to whether we want the U.N. to take any action” (Kyodo News Agency, June 19). North Korea, meanwhile, said again this week that it plans to develop a nuclear deterrent to a U.S. invasion. “The D.P.R.K. will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defense as a just self-defense measure to cope with the U.S. strategy to isolate and stifle the D.P.R.K.,” the state-run Korean Central News Agency reported Wednesday (Korean Central News Agency, June 18 in FBIS-EAS, June 18).
From June 20, 2003 issue.NPT: Former Officials Say Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty BatteredBy David Ruppe To be effective, “the NPT must continue to be taken seriously by all of its members … and that means the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, need to be serious about their own NPT obligations,” former Undersecretary of State John Holum said in prepared remarks presented to a bipartisan congressional task force on nonproliferation issues. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty needs stronger safeguards and more rigorous enforcement, he said. It is also challenged by risks posed by nonmember nuclear aspirants and from the failure of nuclear weapons states “to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament,” Holum said. Although treaty parties agreed to a permanent extension to the treaty in 1995, that “clearly did not end the nonproliferation struggle,” he said. The Basic Bargain Thomas Graham, former general counsel of the defunct Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said the treaty was made possible through a “basic bargain” between the nuclear states at that time and the rest of the world. The former would agree to share peaceful nuclear technology and gradually move toward nuclear disarmament, and the latter would renounce efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Graham offered a snapshot of what the world might look like without the treaty. Had the treaty not existed, he said in prepared remarks, “there could be as many as 50 nuclear weapons states today.” He cited a recent International Atomic Energy Agency estimate that 60 to 70 states around the world currently have the capability to build nuclear weapons. “In such a world, every conflict would carry with it the risk of going nuclear, it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hand of terrorists because they would be so numerous and so widespread and indeed civilization as we know it would hang in the balance every day,” he said. Half of the Bargain Graham said the bargain was not being sufficiently honored by the nuclear weapons states, citing the United States in particular. While 183 nations have signed on to refrain from nuclear arms, he said, “we have to face the fact that the nuclear weapons states have not fully lived up to their half of the NPT basic bargain.” He cited four issues on which non-nuclear treaty parties had expected progress: * entry into force of the nuclear test ban treaty, which the Bush administration has rejected; * deep reductions in nuclear weapons; * a treaty terminating the production of fissile material; and * a legally binding agreement for nuclear states to refrain from using nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states. Graham noted that the nuclear powers in 1995 had recommitted to those goals in exchange for an agreement on a permanent extension to the treaty. On the fourth point, he cited a Bush administration policy in particular. “The United States, in its recent Nuclear Posture Review, indicated it did not believe itself bound by these assurances in that five states that were then NPT non-nuclear weapons states (Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea) were singled out as possible targets of U.S. nuclear weapons,” he said. Holum criticized the administration for its interest in possibly developing new low-yield nuclear weapons and for abandoning the START II Treaty and other disarmament goals by instead signing the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty last year. That treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, codified “low-hanging fruit” agreed to in 1997, he said, but it “actually slows the pace of [nuclear arms] reductions, and will leave higher numbers available at the end.” It also requires no destruction of warheads or delivery platforms, he said. “As you evaluate these programs, I invite you to measure their security rationale against the risks they pose to the NPT regime and the global consensus on nuclear nonproliferation,” he said. Administration’s Different View Bush administration officials have also expressed an interest in a strong NPT and suggested it is in jeopardy, but have argued the threat is weakened by insufficiently rigid enforcement and not by a lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. The treaty is “dangerously out of balance,” said Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf at a preparatory meeting for the 2005 NPT review conference in April (see GSN, April 28). “Without strict enforcement, the international confidence that has underpinned the treaty will dissolve, and the basis for peaceful sharing of nuclear technology will be destroyed,” he said. Wolf said the United States “remains firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT,” and cited the Moscow Treaty and “other U.S. actions” as evidence of the United States moving to “promote the goal of nuclear disarmament.” “Disarmament continues, and in fact took a significant step forward with the signing of the Moscow Treaty,” he said. “In two decades, the United States will have eliminated or decommissioned three-quarters of its strategic arsenal. We have also given up whole classes of tactical nuclear weapons, and we have withdrawn remaining stocks from almost every overseas site,” Wolf said.
From June 20, 2003 issue.Russia: Moscow to Maintain All Aspects of Nuclear Triad, Defense Official SaysA senior Russian military official has said Russia plans to maintain all three aspects of its nuclear triad — air-, ground- and sea-based nuclear weapons — for the foreseeable future, Interfax reported yesterday. “Russia will definitely keep its nuclear triad by the date set for the fulfillment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and in the following years,” said Col. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff. Baluyevsky also said he believed Russia would fulfill its Moscow Treaty obligations by the 2012 deadline (see GSN, June 5). “We will definitely fulfill this document,” he said (Interfax/CDI Russia Weekly, June 19). For further information, see: U.S.-Russia Nuclear Reduction Treaty Text (U.S. State Department)
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