U.S. Response:  White House Proposal to Expand Laboratory Capacity Suffers From Undue Secrecy, Poor Oversight, Critics Say

A Bush administration proposal to build new laboratories throughout the United States to conduct research on biological weapons agents has come under criticism for undue secrecy from residents in the proposed areas where the new laboratories would be built, United Press International reported last week.  In addition, the proposal has also been criticized for giving more people access to dangerous agents and for poor oversight (see GSN, June 25).

The $2.5 billion proposal would seek to double the approximately 20 existing high-security biological laboratories, according to UPI.  Many of these new facilities would be constructed at university campuses and in urban areas.  Area residents and political action groups oppose the proposal, however, because of the high level of secrecy surrounding what pathogens would be studied at the new laboratories and whether the danger to the surrounding areas has been fully considered.

In interviews with UPI, area residents of proposed sites for the new laboratories, such as Davis, Calif.; Boston; Long Island, N.Y.; and Portland, Ore., have said they believed that many of the potential dangers surrounding the new laboratories have not been made public.  The legislation calling for the new laboratories, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, however, makes it illegal for U.S. agencies to release information about who has agents or what activities they are conducting, UPI reported.  In addition, such information has also been exempted from the Freedom of Information Act, and those who release such information face fines of up to $250,000.

Information on security problems at laboratories, such as theft of agents, cannot be released, according to UPI.  Information on the accidental release of agents or toxins will also not be provided.

Supporters of the new laboratories, however, have said that area residents’ concerns are exaggerated.

“We’ve built these laboratories in ways that they can be operated safely,” said Ron Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology.  “Is anything absolutely failsafe?  Probably not.  Do we have an excellent system of redundancy and safety?  Yes,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI, July 2).

Expanded Access

Critics of the new laboratory proposal have also said that the construction of new facilities will give thousands of additional people access to dangerous pathogens, increasing the risk that some agents might be stolen, according to UPI.

Each new proposed biological defense facility would have between 150 and 300 scientists, resulting in a total of up to 6,000 additional people with access to dangerous pathogens, according to the Sunshine Project, a private study group in Austin, Texas.  Many of the proposed laboratories would be located at college campuses, urban areas or industrial parks where perimeter security would be more difficult to maintain than at military sites, UPI reported.

Richard Ebright, a microbiologist at Rutgers University’s Waksman Institute, said he believes that an increase in laboratories would increase the risks of pathogen proliferation.

“Each new facility that maintains stocks of agents for biowarfare or bioterrorism becomes a potential source of deliberate or accidental releases, and each additional person trained in handling those agents and possessing those agents becomes an additional possible point of deliberate or accidental release,” Ebright said.

One concern, according to Ebright, is that new regulations on who can possess and use biological weapons agents require only minimal background checks.  Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the attorney general is required to conduct a search of “criminal, immigration, national security and other electronic databases” to determine if the individual is associated with a terrorist group or is a foreign agent, according to UPI.  The person also cannot fall under several other criteria, such as conviction of a felony, being an illegal alien or having been judged to be mentally ill.

The law does not appear to require, however, the types of interviews typical for those seeking to receive high-level security clearances, according to UPI.  In addition, once a person is registered to handle pathogens, they can then submit a list of others to be approved on an expedited basis.  Those who are registered also do not need to undergo another background check for five years.

Supporters of the White House proposal, however, have said that the expansion is necessary to conduct research into vaccines and treatments against biological weapons agents. 

“We are not talking about training people on how to weaponize materials,” Atlas said.  “What we are talking about is training people on how to find vaccines and therapeutics,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI, July 1).

Poor Oversight

According to critics, the Bush administration’s proposal suffers from poor oversight, which could lead to duplication and poor implementation, UPI reported.

The administration’s biological defense program, which includes the laboratory expansion project, is administered by nine U.S. agencies, including the Defense and Energy departments, the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  There is no organization that is responsible overall for the laboratory expansion project, however, nor have public hearings been held to examine whether different laboratory construction plans complement or duplicate each other, according to UPI.

“We are in need of an overarching look at what labs are needed and where,” said Marylea Kelley, executive director of Tri-Valley CAREs, a watchdog group that opposes the development of an Energy Department biological defense laboratory at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  “This is being played out in community after community across the nation,” Kelley said.

For example, a section of Maryland could be home to several high-security biological defense laboratories, UPI reported.  The U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, located at the Edgewood Arsenal/Aberdeen Proving Ground, plans to upgrade to a Biosafety Level 3 facility.  At the Aberdeen section of the site, the Battelle Memorial Institute plans to use funding to construct a new Biosafety Level 3 laboratory.  The University of Maryland is seeking an NIH grant to construct a Biosafety Level 4 laboratory at Aberdeen.  At Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md. — located about 85 miles away from Aberdeen — both the Army and NIH operate Biosafety Level 4 facilities, with the NIH planning to construct a second such facility there.  In addition, a private research company that conducts research for the Army has a Biosafety Level 3 facility in Frederick.

John La Montagne, deputy director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said that coordination on the new laboratory projects is currently only conducted through “informal processes” among the various involved agencies.

“There is no coordinating council as such; maybe there will need to be at some point,” La Montagne said.  “At the moment it’s done through informal processes between the agencies,” he said.

La Montagne also said that some duplication might be beneficial, noting the positive effects duplication has in general science.

“In the real world of scientific research ... or any kind of human endeavor, there is invariably going to be some level at which one could argue that this person is doing something similar to another person,” La Montagne said.  In science we generally think about that as a positive because it gives an independent confirmation of a laboratory investigation,” he said (Divis/Horrock, UPI II, July 1).

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United States:  More Scientific Experts Needed to Respond to Attack, Study Says

The United States lacks adequate skilled medical and scientific personnel to respond to a biological terrorism attack, according to a public service advocacy group study, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, June 26).

The Partnership for Public Service study will be released tomorrow.  It found that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Food and Drug Administration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Food Safety and Inspection Service lack personnel with necessary skills to respond to a biological attack, the Times reported.

“Based on our interviews with officials from these agencies and other areas of biodefense research,” the study says, “we found that the federal employees responsible for our defenses against bioterrorist attacks constitute a ‘civilian thin blue line’ that is retreating both in terms of capacity and expertise.”

While billions of dollars in U.S. funding has been allocated to improve emergency responders, the United States has sought fewer resources for medical and scientific experts, according to the study.

“We have uncovered a serious underinvestment in the human side of addressing the bioterrorism threat,” Partnership for Public Service President Max Stier said.

The study recommends that the United States increase recruitment of biological defense experts trained in fields such as genetics, infectious disease medicine and microbiology, among others, according to the Times.  The 2001 anthrax attacks placed a heavy burden on the U.S. agencies that responded, and an even larger biological attack would be overwhelming, the study says.

“Perhaps more than any other terrorist threat, bioterrorism will place huge burdens on small pools of medical, scientific and technical expertise,” the study says.  “These organizations are already exhibiting hairline cracks — some would say fractures — that may presage disaster,” it adds (David Johnston, New York Times, July 6).

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Anthrax:  Hatfill Trained DIA Team While Under FBI Investigation

Former U.S. Army biologist Steven Hatfill helped train U.S. intelligence agents and special forces to search for weapons of mass destruction and helped plan security for the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, all while coming under increased FBI scrutiny during the bureau’s investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, July 2).

Hatfill, who has been the public focus of the FBI’s anthrax investigation, helped train an elite Defense Intelligence Agency team on how to search for biological weapons, assisted secret projects conducted by the U.S. Army’s Delta Force unit and participated in at least one U.S. State Department meeting on embassy security in postwar Afghanistan, according to documents and interviews with U.S. officials and Hatfill associates.  In addition, Hatfill received letters of praise for his work from the DIA and the State Department, according to the Post.

In March 2002, Hatfill led a training session for the DIA’s Chemical and Biological Intelligence Support Team at Camp Dawson, W.Va., said agency spokesman Don Black.  The DIA was preparing agents to be sent to Afghanistan and was also training them for possible deployment to Iraq and other countries to search for biological and chemical weapons, the Post reported. 

For Hatfill to be involved in the training program, the DIA had to call on its training contractor Science Applications International Corp. to allow him to participate, even though he had recently lost his security clearance, Black said.  While SAIC had fired Hatfill shortly before the training session began, it agreed to allow him to volunteer after the DIA’s request, a Hatfill associate said.

For Hatfill’s work with the DIA, division leader Esteban Rodriguez sent a letter of commendation on his behalf to SAIC, the Post reported.  The May 1, 2002, letter said Hatfill “consistently displayed unsurpassed technical expertise, unique resourcefulness, total dedication and consummate professionalism.  I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to this ultimate biological weapons expert.”

Hatfill’s work for the Pentagon, done while the FBI investigation into the anthrax attacks intensified, caused tensions between the two agencies, sources close to the investigation said. 

Hatfill spokesman Pat Clawson said yesterday that he could not discuss aspects of Hatfill’s work for the government because it is classified.  Many U.S. agencies, however, see Hatfill as a pre-eminent biological weapons expert, Clawson said.

“If the facts were known, most Americans would be deeply grateful to Dr. Hatfill for his service to our nation,” Clawson said.  “Steve Hatfill knows nothing about the anthrax attacks.  He is a loyal American and patriot who loves his country,” he said (Marilyn Thompson, Washington Post, July 3).

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U.S. Response:  Military Created Mock Biological Facility; Hatfill Involved

Bush administration officials and biological weapons experts have said the United States initiated a secret project in 2000 to help train special operations forces to find and disarm mobile biological weapons laboratories, the New York Times reported today.

The main component in the project was a mock mobile biological facility — real in all aspects but never operational, sources said.  The U.S. Army’s Delta Force unit trained on the mock facility last fall at Fort Bragg, N.C., to learn what to search for while in Iraq and how to respond if it found such a facility, sources said (see GSN, June 27). 

Elisa Harris, a former Clinton administration arms control official, said the mock facility would not violate the Biological Weapons Convention, but she questioned the decision to go through with its construction.

“It will raise concerns in other capitals, in part because the United States has fought tooth and nail to prevent the international community from strengthening the germ treaty,” Harris said.

The U.S. Defense Department has reviewed the mock facility to ensure compliance with the convention, a Bush administration official said.

To design the mock facility, the Pentagon enlisted the help of Steven Hatfill, a former U.S. Army biologist who has been the public focus of the FBI’s investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks, said officials familiar with the project (see GSN, June 30).  Hatfill’s work on the mock facility is a major reason why he has been under such scrutiny by the FBI, officials said.

Hatfill worked on the mock mobile facility while working for U.S. defense contractor Science Applications International Corp., sources said.  In 2000, Hatfill began collecting parts for the mock facility, one biological weapons expert said.  A second quoted Hatfill as saying he had purchased parts for the facility prior to its construction and then stored them at a warehouse.

“It’s all the ordering of equipment that in hindsight looks suspicious,” a third expert said.

Construction of the mock facility began in September 2001, an expert said.  Hatfill supervised the work, which was conducted at A.F.W. Fabrication, a metalworking plant outside of Frederick, Md., and about one mile from Hatfill’s apartment, the Times reported.  That same month, the anthrax attacks began. 

In March of last year, SAIC fired Hatfill.  At that point, the mock facility was about half completed, a source close to Hatfill said.  Hatfill continued to work on the trailer, however, using his own money, experts said.  “He was doing it on his own, using his own money,” one expert said.

As the completed facility was being transported to Fort Bragg, FBI agents stopped it en route to examine it for evidence of anthrax and other biological weapons agents because of suspicions that its components might have been used to produce the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks, according to the Times.  Investigators found nothing, however, to link the mock facility to the attacks, officials and experts said.

After discussions with the FBI, the Pentagon kept the mock facility, which was set up at Fort Bragg last fall for training purposes, according to the Times.  Hatfill conducted some of the training sessions that employed the mock facility, experts said.

Hatfill, who has denied any involvement in the 2001 anthrax attacks, is proud of his work on the mock mobile biological facility and has said it illustrates his desire to aid U.S. biological defense programs, people close to him said.  Hatfill refuses to comment on any secret project or on the possible role he played in such projects, said Hatfill spokesman Pat Clawson (New York Times, July 2).

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United States:  Spokane Ricin Trial Begins

The trial of a Washington state man accused of plotting to kill his wife with ricin began yesterday, the Associated Press reported (see GSN, April 10).

In her opening statement, Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Whitaker said that Kenneth Olsen possessed enough powdered ricin, which is produced from castor beans, to kill up to 7,500 people.  Olsen has also been accused of researching online how to create poisons that could kill without a trace, AP reported.

“The evidence will show Kenneth Olsen had no peaceful purpose in mind” when he made the ricin, Whitaker said.  “Kenneth Olsen produced and possessed ricin with every intent of using it to harm someone,” she said.

Olsen’s defense attorney, John Clark, said his client was simply a computer technician who had plenty of time to satisfy his “irresponsible sense of curiosity” by researching online.  While prosecutors have obtained 20,000 pages of Internet site searches that Olson allegedly made from his work computer over a one-year time period, only about 1 percent of those searches had anything to do with poisons or murder, Clark said.  Most of the searches dealt with essential oils and massage therapy, a career Olsen was thinking of pursuing in the face of layoffs in the computer industry, Clark said.

Prosecutors have said they plan to call about three dozen witness during the trial, which is expected to last up to four weeks, AP reported (John Wiley, Associated Press/Seattle Times, July 2).

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U.S. Response:  Biotechnology Companies Wary of Project Bioshield

Biotechnology companies are skeptical about U.S. President George W. Bush’s Project Bioshield plan, the San Jose Mercury News reported Sunday (see GSN, June 24).

The $6 billion, 10-year effort is designed to provide biotechnology companies with a guaranteed government buyer for vaccines and medicines to counter chemical and biological weapons.  The plan is still being considered in Congress.

Companies are concerned that the incentives and guarantees are not sufficient to spur research in bioterrorism defense.

“The government doesn’t have a good model there that would say why we should be putting our very valuable resources in this area,” said Robert Chess, chairman of California’s Nektar Therapeutics.  “They need to do a lot more work to make it lucrative,” he added.

Biotechnology executives are also concerned about the threat of lawsuits from product testing.  Many products cannot be tested on humans because of their potential side effects.

“Even the threat of a lawsuit can put us out of business,” said Una Ryan, chief executive of Avant Immunotherapeutics in Massachusetts (Heather Phillips, San Jose Mercury News, June 29).

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Threat Assessment:  Influenza Could Be Used as Bioterror Weapon, Scientists Say

A team of scientists says terrorists could turn influenza into a new type of weapon of mass destruction, the Reuters reported today (see GSN, April 18).

The scientists, who currently are close to completing the blueprint for the virus of the 1918 flu epidemic that killed millions globally, say rogue scientists could do the same and create new deadly potent flu strains, according to the Financial Times.

“Taken together with the fact that influenza virus is readily accessible and may be causing more deaths than previously suspected, the possibility for genetic engineering and aerosol transmission suggests an enormous potential for bioterrorism,” the University of Texas scientists wrote in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine.

Although the flu virus is usually transmitted via personal contact, it can also be delivered by way of tiny droplets in the air, the scientists noted.  A terrorist could easily pack the virus into an aerosol can and release it on a passenger airplane, leading to a rapidly spreading worldwide flu epidemic (Reuters, July 1).

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