Iraq:  White House Acknowledges Bush Should Not Have Included Uranium Purchase Claim in State of the Union

The Bush administration yesterday acknowledged that President George W. Bush should not have included a claim in his State of the Union address in January that Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium in Africa (see GSN, July 7).

“Knowing all that we know now, the reference to Iraq’s attempt to acquire uranium from Africa should not have been included in the State of the Union speech," a senior Bush administration official said last night in a statement authorized by the White House.

In March, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that the uranium claim, which was based on documents purporting to show Iraqi efforts to purchase uranium from Niger, was based on forged information, according to the Washington Post.  The Niger claim was further debunked after it was reported that the CIA had sent a former senior U.S. diplomat to the country in 2002 to investigate the claim, and that the diplomat had reported that Nigerien officials had denied the sale.

A classified version of a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD programs, completed in September 2002, includes references to intelligence reports that said Iraq had attempted to purchase uranium from three countries, not just Niger, a senior Bush administration official said.  The other two African countries mentioned were Namibia and Gabon, according to intelligence sources.  They said, however, that the reports about the other countries have not been confirmed and that some analysts consider the information unreliable.

There were reports of “possible attempts” by Iraq to purchase uranium, but “they were all somewhat sketchy,” a senior intelligence official said (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, July 8).

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said yesterday that the White House’s admission that Bush should not have included the Niger claim was “nothing new.”

“There is zero, nada, nothing new here,” Fleischer said.  “We’ve long acknowledged” that the information on the alleged attempted purchase of uranium from Niger “did, indeed, turn out to be incorrect,” he said (David Sanger, New York Times, July 8).

British Intelligence Review

Meanwhile, in an appearance before a parliamentary committee, British Prime Minister Tony Blair defended his decision to draw the United Kingdom into war with Iraq.

“I am quite sure we did the right thing in removing [former Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein because not merely was he a threat ... to the wider world but it was an appalling regime that the world is well rid of,” Blair told a House of Commons liaison committee today.

Blair also denied allegations that the government had “misled Parliament or the people” (Blitz/Burt, Financial Times, July 7).

In addition, Blair denied that a group of his advisers made crucial decisions alone leading up to the war, saying that both the full Cabinet and Parliament had been involved.

“The idea that you get together a couple of people in your office over a cup of coffee and decide to take the country to war is far-fetched,” Blair said (BBC News, July 8).

Yesterday, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee released a report on the findings of its inquiry into the handling of prewar intelligence on Iraq, according to the London Guardian.

In its report, the committee said that government ministers had not misled Parliament about the threat Iraq posed, but that the “jury is still out” about the accuracy of information contained in a September dossier until evidence of alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, or of their destruction, is found.

In addition, the committee said that the United Kingdom might have relied too heavily on U.S. intelligence in making its decision to go to war.

“We conclude that it appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable human intelligence in Iraq and that as a consequence the United Kingdom may have been heavily reliant on U.S. technical intelligence, on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their own,” the report says (London Guardian, July 8).

Hussein — Dead or Alive?

The CIA said yesterday that the voice on a tape played last week by the Arab television network Al Jazeera was “most likely” that of Hussein.

“The CIA’s assessment, after a technical analysis of the tape, is that it is most likely his voice,” an agency spokesman said in a press statement.  “The exact date of the recording cannot be determined,” the spokesman said.    

The speaker on the tape, claiming to be Hussein, says the tape was recorded June 14 and that he is in Iraq.  The speaker also denies that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

“What they called the weapons of mass destruction was nothing but a cover for their plans,” the speaker says.  “I ask the invaders:  Where are these weapons of mass destruction?” the speaker adds.

There is significant background noise on the tape and it may have been produced “many months” ago, a U.S. intelligence official said (Guy Taylor, Washington Times, July 8).

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Iraq:  Former U.S. Envoy Says Bush Administration “Twisted” Intelligence Related to Nuclear Weapons

A former U.S. ambassador to Gabon who was involved in an attempt to verify whether Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from Niger prior to the war said in a New York Times opinion piece yesterday that the Bush administration “twisted” some intelligence related to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program (see GSN, July 3).

“Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat,” Joseph Wilson wrote.

Wilson detailed his trip to Niger last year to verify reports Iraq had purchased uranium from the country in the late 1990s (see GSN, June 13).  Wilson said he met with the U.S. ambassador to Niger, Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, in late February 2002 in the capital of Niamey, who told him that she knew about the alleged uranium sale and that she felt she had dispelled the claim in reports back to Washington.  Wilson then spent more than a week meeting with current and former Nigerien officials and individuals involved in the country’s uranium industry.

“It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place,” Wilson said.

According to Wilson, the structure of Niger’s uranium industry would have made it difficult for Iraq to purchase uranium there.  Niger’s uranium industry consists of two mines, which are operated by an international consortium and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wilson said.  In addition, because the mines are closely regulated, any uranium sale would have required the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and possibly the president, he said.

“In short, there’s simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired,” Wilson said.

Wilson said that before he left Niger he briefed Owens-Kirkpatrick on his findings.  He also said that when he returned to the United States in early March 2002, he “promptly” briefed the CIA, and later, the U.S State Department African Affairs Bureau.  According to Wilson, there should be at least four archived documents on his mission to Niger, including Owens-Kirkpatrick’s report on his briefing in Niamey, a CIA summary of his trip and a reply from the CIA to the office of the vice president, which originally had questions about the alleged sale.  The CIA’s answer to the office of the vice president may have been delivered orally, Wilson said.

“If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why),” Wilson said.  “If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses,” he added (Joseph Wilson, New York Times, July 6).

Iraq May Have Destroyed Weapons of Mass Destruction in 1990s

A U.S. intelligence expert has said that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might have destroyed Iraq’s WMD stockpiles during the 1990s as part of efforts to get U.N. sanctions against the country lifted, according to the London Independent.

“It is almost certain that Saddam ordered the weapons dismantled or destroyed some time in the 1990s,” said Richard Shultz of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.  “Sanctions had seriously impeded the Iraqi efforts to obtain materials and equipment for their WMD programs,” Shultz said.

The WMD destruction was part of a strategy to get U.N. sanctions lifted, a strategy that was disrupted by the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States, according to Shultz.

“The Iraqi strategy was to get sanctions lifted and they mounted a deception ... But then (Osama) bin Laden got in the way,” Shultz said.  “After Sept. 11 the Bush administration turned its attention firmly to Iraq,” he added (Paul Lashmar, London Independent, July 6).

British Intelligence Review

Meanwhile, the British Parliament House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee said today that the British government gave undue importance to a claim made in a September dossier that the Iraqi military could deploy biological or chemical weapons within 45 minutes of receiving an order to do so, according to the Associated Press.

The committee said that the language used in the dossier was “more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents” and that the “jury is still out” on the accuracy of the information included in the report.

A spokesman for Prime Minister Tony Blair, however, defended the September dossier.

“We stand by the September dossier,” the spokesman said.

The committee also found that Blair’s communications director, Alastair Campbell, “did not exert or seek to exert improper influence” when he included the 45-minute claim in the September dossier.  The BBC had previously reported allegations that aides to Blair redrafted the dossier to include the claim and increase the case for war (Michael McDonough, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, July 7).

Blair is scheduled to appear before a separate committee tomorrow to be questioned about the government’s reports on Iraq  (Katherine Baldwin, Reuters, July 7).

Campbell said today that the BBC report that claimed Blair’s aides had exaggerated the information in the September dossier was a “fundamental attack” on Blair’s integrity.

“That is a fundamental attack on the integrity of the government and the prime minister,” Campbell said.  “The BBC has not provided a shred of evidence to substantiate the story,” he said (Michael McDonough, Associated Press, July 7).

The BBC board of governors said yesterday that it stands by the decision to run the story, which was based on a single intelligence source, according to Agence France-Presse.

“The board is satisfied that it was in the public interest to broadcast (Andrew) Gilligan’s story, given the information which was available to BBC News at the time,” the board said in a statement.

The board also said that it had never accused Blair of going to war with Iraq under false pretenses.

“The board wishes to place on record that the BBC has never accused the prime minister of lying, or of seeking to take Britain into war under misleading or false pretences,” the board said.  “The BBC did not have an agenda in its war coverage, nor does it now have any agenda which questions the integrity of the prime minister,” it added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, July 6).

Australia

Prior to participating in the U.S.-led war on Iraq, Australia knew that some U.S. agencies had doubts about claims that Iraq was attempting to rebuild its nuclear weapons program, Australian Prime Minister John Howard said today.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported today that Australia had been informed that the U.S. Energy and State departments had questioned the accuracy of the CIA intelligence that said Iraq had relaunched its nuclear weapons program.  The newspaper reported that former State intelligence official Greg Thielmann had said that the CIA claims were based on evidence that Iraq had purchased aluminum tubes intended for us in gas centrifuges.  He also said that State had not accepted that analysis and that Australia would have received such information.

In a speech to the Australian Parliament in February, Howard quoted a CIA analysis that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program.  Howard earlier today defended Australia’s participation in the war on Iraq, saying that he provided the Parliament with “accurate” information.

Later today, however, Howard issued a statement that said Australian intelligence agencies knew about the doubts surrounding the issue of the aluminum tubes, according to the Associated Press.

“Australian agencies were aware of the debate in the United States about the purpose of the aluminum tubes,” Howard said.  “I made no reference to aluminum tubes in my statement to Parliament of Feb. 4 or subsequently,” he said (Peter O’Connor, Associated Press, July 7).

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Iran:  United States Sanctions Chinese, North Korean Entities

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The United States has imposed sanctions against five Chinese entities and one North Korean entity for allegedly transferring items to Iran that could make a “material contribution” to Tehran’s WMD or ballistic missile efforts, according to a notice published today in the Federal Register (see GSN, May 29).

Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2002, the United States has imposed sanctions against the Chinese firms Taian Foreign Trade General Corp., Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Co., China North Industries Corp. (Norinco) and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corp.  The United States also imposed sanctions against the North Korean Changgwang Sinyong Corp.  The six entities were sanctioned for activities that occurred in the first half of 2002, a U.S. State Department official told Global Security Newswire today.

The United States had previously imposed sanctions on Norinco in May for allegedly aiding Iran’s ballistic missile program — allegations that the company has denied (see GSN, May 27).  The State Department official said today’s announced sanctions were imposed on Norinco for different activities than those that triggered the previous sanctions.

In March, the Washington Times reported that the United States had decided to impose sanctions on Changgwang Sinyong for its alleged role in the sale of North Korean ballistic missiles to Pakistan (see GSN, March 31).  Last year, the United States sanctioned the North Korean company for the sale of Scud ballistic missile components to Yemen (see GSN, Aug. 23, 2002).

The new U.S. sanctions, which took effect June 26, prohibit U.S government agencies from doing any business with the six firms for the next two years.  In addition, private U.S. firms are barred from selling those companies any items that would normally require export licenses under the Export Administration Act or the Export Administration Regulations.

The sanctions are unlikely to have a substantial economic impact on the six entities, the State Department official said, adding that the sanctions do not prohibit U.S. customers from importing commercial goods from the six.  The sanctions are more likely to provide political leverage, however, because of the “embarrassment” resulting from being identified as a proliferator, the official said.

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Iraq:  Internal Intelligence Review Defends Agency Analyses

A U.S. intelligence community internal review has found that while up-to-date and reliable prewar information on Iraqi WMD efforts was often lacking, U.S. intelligence analysts did not exaggerate their findings under White House pressure, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, July 1).

U.S. intelligence analysts had some doubts about the data included in Iraq-related intelligence reports, but still generally agreed that Baghdad had active WMD programs, said Richard Kerr, a former CIA deputy director.  Kerr is the head of a team of retired intelligence officers that is reviewing the performance of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies.  The team has submitted a report of their initial findings to CIA Director George Tenet, AP reported.

Most of the U.S. information on Iraq’s WMD efforts consisted of discoveries made after the 1991 Gulf War, Kerr said.  Once U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998, however, the United States was forced to rely more on information from satellite imagery, intercepted communications and human sources, he said.  While solid information from these sources was often lacking, the information that was obtained seemed to confirm conclusions that Iraq had active WMD programs, Kerr said.

Even with a lack of “hard, detailed intelligence,” Kerr said, “it would have been very hard for an intelligence analyst to determine that there were no weapons of mass destruction programs.  There was a lot of information over time.”

Kerr also said that intelligence analysts often faced increased White House pressure for information that supported the idea that Iraq posed a threat to the United States.  Such pressure, however, is not unusual, he said, adding that the review found that analysts did not change their conclusions in response.

“While there was an awful lot of pressure to try to support various positions, that’s always the case,” Kerr said.  “People are going to prod the intelligence community to try to make them more precise but also to convince them they’re right,” he said.

“They were pretty consistent over a considerable period of time,” Kerr said of the intelligence analysts (John Lumpkin, Associated Press/Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 3).

British Intelligence Review

Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Tony Blair yesterday called on critics to produce evidence to support claims that the British government exaggerated its prewar intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (see GSN, June 27).

Blair denied accusations that the government added material to a September 2002 dossier to include a claim that the Iraqi military could deploy biological and chemical weapons within 45 minutes of receiving an order to do so. 

“If anyone has actually any evidence, let them produce it,” Blair said in response to challenges from an opposition leader in the British Parliament’s House of Commons.  “I think before any claim of that seriousness is made, at least some evidence should be produced,” he said (Jane Wardell, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, July 2).

A confidential letter released to the Commons’ Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which is conducting a review into the British government’s case for war with Iraq, says that Alastair Campbell, Blair’s communications director, suggested 11 changes to the September 2002 dossier, according to the London Guardian.

The letter, sent by Campbell to the committee, is expected to form an important component in the committee’s final assessment, due Monday.  In the letter, Campbell denied BBC claims that he asked that the 45-minute claim be inserted into the report.  The letter also says that six of Campbell’s proposed changes to the report were approved, four were denied and one was already being conducted, the Guardian reported.

Among Campbell’s proposed changes was a suggestion that the report say that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s two sons had, instead of “may have,” the authority to order WMD attacks.  The suggestion was rejected because there was not enough intelligence to support the stronger claim, according to the Guardian.  Also rejected was a suggestion that the report say that Iraq secured uranium.  Instead, the original claim that Iraq “sought” to secure uranium was maintained because of a lack of intelligence (Patrick Wintour, London Guardian, July 3).

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International Response:  Blix Will Chair New WMD Panel

Recently retired chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix will lead a new international commission to promote WMD nonproliferation, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, June 19).

Sweden will host and finance the new commission, which will aim to find new ways to build international cooperation for eliminating weapons of mass destruction and preventing their proliferation, according to the AP.  Blix retired from his U.N. post Monday.

“It is very gratifying that Blix has accepted the presidency.  He has unique experiences and knowledge,” said Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh.  “We must do everything to counter the threats of weapons of mass destruction,” she added.

Blix is expected to begin assembling the commission this fall and the first recommendations are expected in 2005 (Tommy Grandell, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, July 3).

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