Iran:  U.N. Inspectors Conducting Environmental Studies

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are in Iran today to collect environmental samples, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Aug. 8).

The inspectors will collect water, air and soil samples, which will be sent to Vienna and tested for radioactive traces.  The IAEA is investigating U.S. allegations that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear weapon under the guise of a civilian energy program.

Inspectors conclude their work Thursday, and the testing results will be revealed in a Sept. 8 report from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei (Agence France-Presse/Pakistan Business Recorder, Aug. 13).

A senior Iranian official, meanwhile, said he expects “positive” results by September over negotiations on the Additional Protocol to Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  The protocol would allow the agency to conduct more intrusive monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities.

“We have had good negotiations with Mohamed ElBaradei and I believe it is possible that, before September, we will have positive results on this matter,” said the country’s nuclear chief, Gholamreza Aghazadeh.  “I think we will assuage international fears and in return, we expect (the international community) to stand by its commitments,” he added.

Aghazadeh said that last week’s visit by IAEA legal experts dealt with “significant” uncertainties, but “the discussions must continue” (Agence France-Presse/Space War, Aug. 13).

Back to top

United States:  Energy Department Might Not Release Disbanded Committee’s Report

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON ð— Weeks after the U.S. Energy Department’s nuclear weapons agency dismissed its independent expert advisory committee, the agency is now evaluating whether to release the principal report by that committee, officials said this week (see GSN, July 30).

“The options are you’ll either get the whole report or a sanitized version, or the report will be withheld as ‘Official Use Only,’” said an Energy Department official who asked not to be identified.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s 15-member advisory committee finished a report on the agency’s activities this past spring.  The Federal Advisory Committee Act requires that reports by such committees be made public.

NNSA officials have refused to release it so far, however, saying it is being scrutinized by the administration’s general counsel’s office.

“Apparently they’re giving it to someone who’s looking over every word.  They’ve brought a specialist in … a special lawyer with an extra large magnifying glass,” the official said.

NNSA’s defense programs office has recommended that the 35-page document be withheld on grounds that information contained in it is “dated” and “sensitive,” the official said.

The freezing of the report and NNSA’s recently reported decision to dissolve the committee in late June have drawn criticism from Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass).

U.S. law requires NNSA to “release copies of any reports, where possible, and send such copies to the Library of Congress,” he said in a July 29 statement.

“When [the committee members] submitted the report, they were originally told it would be publicly released.  Then it was immediately stamped ‘For Official Use Only.’  Now, some year and a half later, [NNSA is] finally deciding to do something about it and it’s undergoing a review from the general counsel’s office,” said Markey spokesman Benn Tannenbaum.

Department Seeks to “Close Itself Off”

Markey, in a July 29 letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, inquired why the report had not been released, why quarterly meetings of the committee ended in May 2002 and why the committee was dismissed in June through e-mail rather than through notification in the Federal Register as required by advisory committee act.

“The Advisory Committee was created under the auspices of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which means that Congress and the public must be kept informed about the activities — including disbanding — of the committee,” he wrote.

Markey added that the Energy Department has endorsed legislation passed by the House this year that would exempt it from the FACA requirements.

That, coupled with the dismissal of the committee, he wrote, “suggest that the Department of Energy is seeking to close itself off from any independent outside expert advice regarding its nuclear weapons programs.”

NNSA spokesman Bryan Wilkes said NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks would continue to receive advice from a three-member group called the Nuclear Weapons Council, which consists of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the undersecretary of energy for nuclear security.

“I am uncomfortable with this situation, as the NWC is composed entirely of government officials, and therefore is not really suited to perform the functions of a federal advisory committee,” Markey wrote.

He described the committee, appointed by former NNSA Administrator John Gordon, as “the one forum for honest, unbiased external review of its nuclear policies.”

Controversial Subjects

The committee’s charter required it to evaluate and make recommendations on NNSA activities, including assessments from a policy, performance and scientific perspective of programs, projects and facilities.

Committee members contacted said they did not recall anything particularly controversial about the report.

“I don’t think we were exactly trying to burn the house down or anything.  I think we were trying to work within the system and be constructive.  So I don’t think there is anything terribly earthshaking in the report,” said Ellen Williams, a University of Maryland physics professor.

The committee did, however, review two initiatives the Bush administration is advocating this year that have been politically controversial:  reducing the time needed to prepare for a nuclear test and the Advanced Concepts Initiative, which could include research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons for attacking bunkers and on warheads for destroying deeply buried chemical and biological weapons.

Committee member and University of California at Berkeley professor Raymond Jeanloz said the report, the final version of which he has not seen, might challenge some assumptions the administration has used to argue for those initiatives.

He said, for instance, while administration officials have urged reducing legal restrictions on research and development ostensibly to enable nuclear weapons designers to exercise their skills, the committee found that the initiative mainly involved using old designs.

“Either they’re really going to start working on advanced concepts that are really new designs, in which case it seems like they are pushing toward resumption of nuclear testing if we ever put those designs into stockpile.  Or, alternatively, this whole story about how we need advanced concepts to exercise the creativity of our designers is really a sham,” he said.

Jeanloz said further that the preparation time for resuming nuclear tests was found to be not a question of physical readiness, but rather of diagnosing a suspected problem and developing a test to deal with it.

The committee was told by the national nuclear laboratories that “the nation would be able to perform a test in 3 to 6 months” if the goal was simply to produce an explosion, he said.

“From the labs’ point of view, until they know why they would have to have a test to address some hypothetical technical problem, they don’t know how long it would take them.  So this whole business of a three-year, or a one-and-a-half year, or a half-year delay before they can test is incredibly artificial,” he said.

Jeanloz and other committee members said they have not yet concluded that the NNSA’s delay indicates an attempt to suppress the results of the report.

“I don’t think NNSA is trying to bury things right now.  I think they’re confused, and in a state of confusion, they can end up doing what I think would hurt them in the long run, which is not to release this whole thing,” Jeanloz said.

“At this point, one can say either they are trying to do something illegal or they are just being slow and not being very responsive because that’s their nature.  I just don’t know,” said Sidney Drell, a professor of theoretical physics at Stanford University.

Back to top

North Korea:  Washington Might Offer Economic Concessions

Washington might offer economic concessions to North Korea if Pyongyang abandons its nuclear weapons ambitions, the New York Times reported today (see GSN, Aug. 12).

The economic assistance would only arrive after North Korea scrapped its nuclear weapons program, according to a Bush administration official.

“There’s no such thing as you-do-this and suddenly Ed McMahon shows up with a check for $10 billion,” the official added.

The United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia are scheduled to meet in Beijing Aug. 27 to 29 for talks on defusing the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

“There are a lot of ideas being discussed,” said an Asian diplomat.  “The question is how they will be packaged, and in what sequence.  The United States clearly wants its concerns addressed at an early stage, while the North Koreans want their concerns addressed at an early stage,” the diplomat added (Steven Weisman, New York Times, Aug. 13).

North Korea demanded a nonaggression pact from the United States and said it would not agree to an early inspection of its nuclear facilities.

“It is clear that as long as the U.S. insists on its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K., the latter will not abandon its nuclear deterrent force,” a North Korean spokesman said.  “An ‘earlier inspection’ is impossible and unthinkable before the U.S. abandons its hostile policy against the D.P.R.K.,” he added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Aug. 13).

Russian officials, meanwhile, held negotiations with North and South Korean diplomats today to prepare for the late August talks.

“We are counting on finding out about the moods of Pyongyang and Seoul and the ideas they intend to put forward,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov.  “In a way Moscow is in a better position to do this, since we conduct regular contacts with North Korea,” he added (Steve Gutterman, Associated Press, Aug. 13).

Back to top

CTBT:  Palau Signs Treaty

Palau signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty yesterday, according to the CTBT Organization (see GSN, Aug. 11).  To date, 168 nations have signed the treaty and 104 have ratified it, including 32 of the 44 nations whose ratifications are necessary for the treaty to enter into force (CTBT Organization, Aug. 13).

Back to top

North Korea:  Diplomats to Meet Ahead of North Korea Talks

As they prepare for six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis, U.S. diplomats will host South Korean and Japanese envoys in Washington tomorrow (see GSN, Aug. 11).

The preliminary talks are expected to take place tomorrow and Thursday, according to State Department spokesman Philip Reeker.  The six-way talks are scheduled to begin later this month, perhaps Aug. 26 or 27 (BBC online, Aug. 13).

During the three-nation talks this week, diplomats are discussing how to convey their positions to North Korea most effectively.

“It is still undecided whether the three nations will make a joint proposal or go to the (multilateral) talks with individual offers.  This will be determined in Washington this time,” said South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck (Seo Hyun-jin, Korea Herald, Aug. 12).

Bolton Will Not Attend

After angering Pyongyang recently with harsh criticisms of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, top U.S. arms control official John Bolton will not take part in the negotiations, Reuters reported today.  U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said, however, that many in Washington supported Bolton’s comments.

“Mr. Bolton was not scheduled and will not be participating in these talks,” Armitage said (Michelle Nichols, Reuters, Aug. 12).

China, meanwhile, announced its support for a Russian plan to guarantee North Korea’s security in exchange for Pyongyang scrapping its nuclear weapons program.  Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov met in Beijing Monday (Kyodo News Agency, Aug. 12).

Back to top

Iraq:  United States Shuts Down Iraqi Nuclear Agency

U.S. officials Saturday shut down the Iraqi Nuclear Energy Organization, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency (see related GSN story, today).

As a replacement, the United States has established the Iraqi Science and Technology Ministry, IRNA reported.  The ministry will be headed by former Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidhr Hamza, who defected to the United States in 1990 (see GSN, April 15; Islamic Republic News Agency, Aug. 10).

Back to top

United States:  Los Alamos Workers Contaminated

Two workers at the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico have suffered skin contamination and might have inhaled plutonium-238, Energy Daily reported today (see GSN, July 23).

The incident occurred Aug. 5 as the workers were taking inventory of older plutonium cans at the Los Alamos facility.  The laboratory disclosed the situation Friday.

Officials said they have not yet discovered the source of the leak that caused the contamination, but plutonium-238 is so fine that even small defects in the plutonium containers could allow a release, Energy Daily reported.

Testing revealed contamination on the head of one worker and on the head, neck and shoulders of another worker.  Both also had nasal contamination, which indicates that they might have inhaled the plutonium (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, Aug. 12).

Back to top

North Korea:  Three-Day Nuclear Talks Set to Begin Aug. 25

Six-nation talks to defuse the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula are scheduled to begin Aug. 25 and to last three days, the Sydney Morning Herald reported today (see GSN, Aug. 8).

The talks will also involve more senior officials than those who took part in an inconclusive April meeting, according to Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi.  The talks are not expected to produce an immediate solution to the crisis, the Morning Herald reported.

The negotiations are “just a beginning,” according to Chinese President Hu Jintao (Hamish McDonald, Sydney Morning Herald, Aug. 11).

Meanwhile, Russia will hold talks with North and South Korea in Moscow this week, according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov.

“The consultations will begin literally the day after tomorrow,” Losyukov said yesterday.  “We are working on the possibility of conducting a similar meeting with Japan in the near future,” he added (Reuters/Pakistan Business Recorder, Aug. 11).

Another senior Russian official dismissed reports that North Korea agreed to multilateral talks only after receiving assurances they would be allowed to meet with U.S. diplomats directly.

“The North Korean side has put forward no conditions, and to my understanding Pyongyang is interested exactly in six-way talks,” said Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov (Reuters/Planet Ark, Aug. 8).

Back to top

United States I:  Nuclear “Bunker Busters” May Disperse WMD Agents, Not Destroy Them, Expert Says

By Shawn M. Schmitt
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — An explosion caused by low-yield nuclear “bunker-busting” devices meant to destroy deeply buried chemical and biological weapons would probably not sterilize those agents, but rather would disperse them into the surrounding environment, a Council on Foreign Relations expert said recently (see GSN, Aug. 8).

According to Robert Nelson, senior fellow in science and technology at the council, a nuclear weapon used to attack an underground storage facility would not emit enough heat to properly destroy all the chemical or biological agents that may be stored there.  Because low-yield nuclear weapons would probably need to bore through several feet of solid rock to reach their target, the surrounding earth would simply absorb much of the heat from the nuclear explosion.

The U.S. understanding of the heat produced by nuclear explosions was developed during Cold War-era atmospheric nuclear tests, Nelson said, and many low-yield weapon development advocates may be under a false impression that an underground explosion would produce the amount of heat necessary to disarm the hazardous weapons.

This year, the Bush administration has asked Congress to lift a 1994 ban to allow the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, those with yields below five kilotons.

“The scenarios for bunker busting [and] agent defeat that proponents use to justify new weapons are either ineffective, or only marginally more effective, than conventional alternatives,” said Nelson, who has written a paper on the topic that will be published in the journal Science & Global Security.  “Using a nuclear weapon to destroy CBW [chemical and biological weapons], for example, is more likely to disperse active agent into the environment,” he added.

The U.S. military’s precision-guided weaponry won’t help either, Nelson claimed.  Even the most technologically advanced missiles would still have to hit any chemical and biological weapon cache head-on, with little room for error.

According to Nelson, even if a bunker buster missed its target by only a few feet, there would be a strong possibility that the targeted agents could be released.  The chances for success are decreased even further, Nelson said, when one further considers the uncertainty of military intelligence and the possibility of an enemy routinely shifting the location of its underground stockpiles.

In addition, Nelson noted, the fallout from a low-yield explosion could produce devastating effects and could contaminate civilians and members of the U.S. military in the theater with radiation or dispersed WMD agents.

“Everyone seems to agree that earth-penetrating weapons would produce a lot of fallout,” he said.  “I was surprised at the agent-defeat scenario.  My intuition was wrong like everyone else:  I assumed the heat would sterilize the germs.  But our intuition based on air explosions like the Hiroshima weapon is just wrong when you detonate below ground, where the density of dirt is 2,000 times higher than air.

“There just isn’t enough heat available to sterilize more than a few percent of the material ejected from the crater,” Nelson added.

Nelson said the best way to ensure that chemical and biological agents are properly secured is to seal off the site and sterilize the weapons using conventional means.

“If they are buried underground, the best thing to do is to leave [them] there” until military crews can safely disarm them, he said.

Nelson released his findings during a recent press conference to launch the new book Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, to which he contributed a chapter that focused on the low-yield nuclear issue.  Nelson said officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration are aware of his pending paper, but they plan to conduct their own study.

Resumed Testing Could Answer Questions

Heritage Foundation Fellow Baker Spring said Nelson’s assertions may very well prove true, and the United States could only learn for certain if it resumed nuclear testing.

Nelson said he isn’t opposed to “conceptual” work inside laboratories, but he opposes a U.S. return to explosive testing or the deployment of new weapons.

“By returning to new weapon development and/or testing, the United States would signal that it is still interested in finding new uses for nuclear weapons — especially low-yield tactical or battlefield weapons to be used in Third World conflicts,” he said, noting that various countries may decide to counter the perceived threat from the United States by building and testing their own weapons.

“Russia and China would likely test if the U.S. tests,” Nelson said.  “Russia is also more dependent now on its nuclear forces given that NATO has such conventional superiority.  A renewed U.S. program would give ammunition in Russia and China to their nuclear proponents who wish to develop new weapons of their own,” he said.

Spring, however, said he suspects Nelson’s research is a political work disguised as a scientific study.

Nelson’s technical argument “asserts the ineffectiveness of the weapon prior to testing it,” Spring said.  “Dr. Nelson may well be right.  He believes strongly in his position, so he should have no fear of being proven wrong by the testing program.  Indeed, I suspect he does not fear being proven wrong.  I suspect what he fears is that the testing program itself has policy implications he dislikes,” he added.

“Though I have a different view in this case, there is nothing wrong with Dr. Nelson arguing for a particular policy.  What is wrong is to hide policy arguments behind technological arguments and use the supposedly unassailable technological arguments to imply that all informed and reasonable people must agree to support the same policy position,” Spring said.  Unless direct and compelling policy arguments against undertaking development and testing of this class of weapons are made, it is my view that the program should go forward.”

Back to top

Japan:  Taboo Eases on Discussing Nuclear Weapon Possession

The Japanese taboo of discussing the development of nuclear weapons is disappearing, the Associated Press reported Saturday (see GSN, Feb. 20).

“People are clearly waking up to the idea,” said opposition lawmaker Shingo Nishimura, who was forced to step down in 1999 as vice minister for defense after he suggested that Japan should consider acquiring nuclear weapons.

Senior ruling party officials Yasuo Fukuda and Shintaro Abe have suggested this year that Tokyo consider the nuclear option, AP reported.

“Japan must start saying right now that it might go nuclear,” said Tadae Takubo, a professor of policy at Kyorin University.  “For a nation to entirely forsake nuclear weapons is like taking part in a boxing match and promising not to throw hooks,” Takubo added.

While the discussion of nuclear weapons is becoming more acceptable, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Japan will not seek a nuclear capability.

“Our country’s stance on this will not change,” he said.  “We will do our utmost to advance the call for smaller nuclear arsenals and nuclear nonproliferation while working toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons,” Koizumi added (Yuri Kageyama, Associated Press/Boston Globe, Aug. 9).

Back to top

Russia:  Moscow to Begin Testing Bulava SLBM in 2004

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Alexei Moskovsky has said Russia plans to begin testing the new Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile next year, Jane’s Defense Weekly reported today (see GSN, Aug. 7).

Russia is set to begin testing the Bulava SLBM in 2004 on a Typhoon-class submarine, Moskovsky said.  The missile is then set to be installed on three Borey-class submarines, which are scheduled to be operational by 2010, he said. 

Each Borey-class submarine will be armed with 12 Bulavas, Russian defense industry sources said.  Each Bulava, designed to have a range of more than 8,300 kilometers, is expected to be equipped with multiple warheads, according to Jane’s.

The Borey-class submarine has a displacement of 17,000 tons, measures 170 meters in length and has a crew of 130, Jane’s reported.  The submarine is equipped with both a nuclear reactor for high speeds and a low-noise electric engine.  The submarine is also equipped with the latest in underwater noise reduction measures, project officials said (Nikolai Novichkov, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Aug. 13).

Back to top

United States II:  GAO Finds Management Problems With Stockpile Maintenance

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Congressional auditors have found budgeting, cost accounting and management problems associated with a U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to extend the operational life of U.S. nuclear weapons, according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report released Friday (see GSN, Aug. 5).

In 1996, the U.S. Energy Department created the Stockpile Life Extension Program, which is now conducted by the NNSA’s Office of Defense Programs.  The purpose of the program is to use a standardized approach to refurbish nuclear weapons to extend their operational life. 

As of May, three types of nuclear weapons were undergoing research activities in advance of their refurbishment — the W-80 warhead, the B-61 bomb and the W-76 warhead, according to the report.  The W-80 is intended for use on a cruise missile launched from an attack submarine or B-52 bomber and is scheduled to begin refurbishment in February 2006.  The B-61 bomb is designed to be carried on the B-52 and B-2 bombers and is expected to begin refurbishment in June 2006.  The W-76 warhead is designed to be used on the Trident 2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and is scheduled to begin refurbishment in September 2007.

In its report, the GAO said there are opportunities to improve the budgeting, accounting and management of the stockpile extension program.  The report also says that NNSA officials agreed with the need to improve the management of the program.

The GAO found the NNSA budget for the stockpile extension program to be neither comprehensive nor reliable, the report says.  For example, the NNSA fiscal 2003 budget for the program was developed by broad function, such as research and development activities, instead of by an individual weapon system or program, such as the stockpile extension program, it says. 

The report did find, however, that the NNSA has begun to create a more comprehensive picture of the stockpile extension program for fiscal 2004.  In its fiscal 2004 budget, the NNSA attributed a larger portion, but not all, of life-extension work to the stockpile extension program, the report says.  It recommends that the NNSA further improve budgeting procedures associated with the stockpile extension program by including it as a formal section in the overall NNSA budget submission.

The NNSA also lacks a system for tracking refurbishment costs, according to the report.  It says that the NNSA has yet to create a cost accounting system that provides full costs of refurbishment activities.  Instead, the NNSA has several systems to track various portions of refurbishment costs, but these are used for various purposes and cannot be reconciled with each other, the report says, adding that the NNSA administrator should improve cost accounting procedures associated with the stockpile extension program.

In addition, there are other management concerns related to the planning, organization and oversight of cost and schedule factors for the stockpile extension program, the report says.  For example, the NSSA has yet to prioritize the stockpile extension program among other Office of Defense Program activities or to prioritize the various refurbishment activities, it says.  The report also says that the NNSA lacks an adequate process to report cost and schedule changes against established baselines.  The GAO has recommended that the NNSA begin improving specific management-related activities associated with the program.

Back to top

CTBT:  Kyrgyzstan Ratifies Treaty

Kyrgyzstan has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced last week (see GSN, July 23).

In a statement released Aug. 6, the ministry praised Kyrgyzstan’s decision to ratify the CTBT, saying the move was “another step toward ensuring the universal nature of this treaty, which is one of the important tasks facing the international community now” (Russian Foreign Ministry release, Aug. 6).

When Kyrgyzstan submits its ratification to the United Nations, it will become the 105th party to the treaty.  Kyrgyzstan is not one of the 44 nations that must ratify the treaty before it can enter into force.  Of those 44 nations, 32 have ratified the treaty (CTBT Organization).

Back to top

United States-United Kingdom:  British Lawmaker Suspects Secret Nuclear Weapons Collaboration

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — British lawmaker Alan Simpson suspects the United States and the United Kingdom have been secretly collaborating to research and develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, including possibly low-yield ones.

“I think that is not only what is possible, I think that is what has been going on for some time.  That is my belief,” he said in a recent interview with Global Security Newswire. 

Simpson, who opposes developing such weapons, saying they might encourage insecurity and proliferation by some states, said his suspicions are fueled by more than 250 exchange visits by U.S. and British nuclear weapons scientists last year.

“We know that [there have been] transfers of huge numbers of staff between the U.S. and the U.K. programs,” he said.

A Labor Party backbencher who is one of the Labor government’s most outspoken critics on national security issues, the House of Commons member said his case is bolstered by previous secret U.S.-British nuclear weapons collaboration and the Bush administration’s push to develop nuclear weapons for attacking underground bunkers and incinerating chemical and biological weapons stores.

In addition, he said the government has dodged his requests for more information.

Spokesmen for the British and U.S. nuclear weapons establishments rebutted elements of Simpson’s charges but refused to comment on the nature of the scientific exchanges.

“The U.K. is not planning any new nuclear weapons, nor are we modifying current systems to lower their yield,” said Alan Price, head of communications for the United Kingdom’s national laboratory, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), in e-mailed comments.

“Cooperation takes place across areas of mutual scientific interest, but we do not comment on the details,” he said.

“I think it’s quite hard to pin down exactly what they’re doing because it’s such a secretive area,” said Nicola Butler, an analyst with the Acronym Institute.

“Having said that, I think the U.K. is following very closely what the Bush administration is doing because … the U.K. [nuclear weapons capabilities are] so dependent on the U.S., she said.

No Channeling

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman Bryan Wilkes denied a specific point of Simpson’s theory, saying U.S. scientists were not involved in any work on nuclear weapons with yields below five kilotons, an activity that has been prohibited by a 1993 law.

“We’re not breaking the law,” he said.

Commenting on Simpson’s charges, he said, “The implication is we’re not able to do [the research], but there are all of these visits, so ‘Could it be the Americans are getting this done through their allies?’” Wilkes said.

“I don’t know about the Brits … but we’re just not doing any work on it at all, even vicariously.  We’re not doing it through anybody, or channeling it, or anything like that,” he said.

Responses Questioned

Using a standard parliamentary procedure for obtaining information, Simpson in recent months has submitted lists of questions regarding the exchange visits and various activities of the AWE.

According to responses provided by government ministers, AWE staff in 2002 made 182 visits to U.S. government and contractor facilities and U.S. officials made 103 visits to similar facilities in the United Kingdom.

Such visits by AWE staff increased throughout the 1990s, from 110 in fiscal 1991 to 136 in fiscal 1995, and to 235 in fiscal 1999, according to a 1999 report jointly produced by Simpson.

The British government also identified U.S. sites that AWE staff visited, including the three major U.S. national nuclear laboratories, other university research laboratories, a dozen U.S. corporate facilities, and some military and Energy Department locations.

The government refused, however, to explain the purposes of the visits, citing a national security exemption law.  The NNSA similarly would not disclose their nature in response to questions from GSN.

The refusal, Simpson said, implies some controversial work is underway, beyond the cooperative stockpile maintenance work the two countries admit to.

If the exchanges were only for ensuring the stability of the existing stockpile, Simpson said, “you would have thought that it was in their interests, not just domestically but internationally, to be seen to be having a vigorous program about the maintenance and security.”

Simpson put his suspicions directly to the government, asking, “whether scientific endeavours at AWE include research on new designs for nuclear warheads.”

“The reply I got was rather vague and evasive …  They weren’t answering that,” he said.

The response, similar to one provided GSN by AWE’s Price, said there were no “plans” for a new weapon and that the government was pursuing a policy of maintaining capabilities to build new weapons if such a plan emerged.

“There are no current plans for any replacement for [the] Trident [strategic ballistic missile] and no decisions are yet needed.  In line with the 1998 Strategic Defense Review, it is our policy to maintain the capability to design and produce a successor weapon should this prove necessary,” the government said.

Some Work Permitted by Policies

That response was significant not just for its indirectness, Simpson said, but because it referenced an ambiguity in current British policy that might permit such work, short of actually building the weapons.  British scientists may be designing and developing a new weapon under the rationale of maintaining skills and capabilities to do so, he said.

“What they don’t say is that this minimum capability is to design and produce a successor [to Trident], and I think that gives them a fairly broad umbrella that they can shelter under,” Simpson said.  “I don’t know how you can maintain a capability to design and produce a successor generation if you are not doing work on what that successor generation might be like,” he added.

Price told GSN the United Kingdom maintains a “robust capability” to ensure the safety and reliability of the current British nuclear arsenal, consisting of fewer than 200 Trident warheads.

The United States has had a similar policy since the mid-1990s, following its decision to halt nuclear test explosions and to create the Stockpile Stewardship program in their place.  The September 1994 Nuclear Posture Review stated a still-existing Energy Department requirement to “maintain the capability to design, fabricate and certify new warheads.”

NNSA spokesman Wilkes acknowledged that under that policy U.S. scientists could design, research and develop new nuclear weapons, as long as they have yields greater than five kilotons.

“There’s nothing prohibiting us,” he said. 

No Formal Involvement

Simpson said his allegations are supported by the secret U.S.-British collaboration during the 1960s and 1970s to upgrade the Polaris ballistic missile, the Trident missile’s predecessor.  The work occurred over 12 years, involved 5,000 people at one point, and cost more than 1 billion pounds, before the British government acknowledged its existence and cost, he said.

“It was done in almost complete secrecy.  Congress didn’t even discover that this program was even in existence until the new weapons system was almost in existence,” he said.

Currently, neither nation has publicly indicated any plans to develop specific new nuclear weapons.

However, the Bush administration has expressed an interest in developing or modifying nuclear weapons to produce new capabilities.  It is pursuing congressional approval this year to continue research on modifying an existing higher-yield bunker buster and to research and develop new nuclear weapons, including low-yield ones, through a program called the Advanced Concepts Initiative.

The “current weapons stockpile cannot hold at risk a growing category of potential targets deeply buried in tunnel facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear or command and control facilities,” said then-NNSA Administrator John Gordon in congressional testimony last year.

He said the goal was to produce options for future “production and deployment.”

The initiatives this year, though, have become politically charged, with congressional Democrats and some Republicans expressing criticism.  Bush administration officials now say they seek removal of the 1994 ban on low-yield production only to foster scientific freedom.

“We do not have anything specific in mind,” Wilkes said.

The aim, he said, is to eliminate overly restrictive constraints on scientific inquiry: “Scientific freedom.  Rights for scientists.”

Advanced Concepts Initiative

Simpson asked the British government if the United Kingdom is contributing to or receiving research and development information from the Advanced Concepts Initiative.

The government responded, “Exchanges of information on a wide field of technologies take place between the United Kingdom and the United States under the auspices of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement.  There is no formal U.K. involvement in the U.S. Advanced Concepts Initiative or the Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts research program under the 1958 agreement.”

Simpson says he opposes developing such weapons that might be used for purposes other than deterrence and retaliation, and believes their development should be disclosed and debated within British society.

Otherwise, “You create on the international level a degree of uncertainty and confusion amongst your allies and potential enemies about whether you’re lowering your own threshold within which you would be prepared to use nuclear weapons,” he said.

With respect to suspected proliferators North Korea and Iran, he said, “If you were in those countries, and you were looking at what both the U.S. and the U.K. were able to get away with in terms of the development of substrategic nuclear weapons, would you feel reassured that you would be safe or not from the threat of attack or the actual attack with nuclear weapons?”

Back to top

United States I:  The Pros and Cons of New Nuclear Weapons

By James Kitfield

National Journal

Even as anti-nuke demonstrators were organizing protests around the country to commemorate the early August anniversaries of the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the U.S. Strategic Command held a little-publicized meeting of senior Bush administration officials yesterday to advance plans for a new generation of nuclear arms.  Proponents of the plan argue that the United States needs to tailor smaller, “bunker-buster” nukes in order to threaten underground nuclear facilities that may be built by such nations as North Korea and Iran.  Opponents counter that manufacturing a new generation of nuclear weapons will deal a severe blow to the international arms control regime and break down the firewall separating nuclear and conventional arms, leading to greater nuclear proliferation and the increased possibility of a nuclear war.  What both sides agree on, however, is that nuclear proliferation is emerging as the single greatest threat to U.S. national security, and that America is at a crossroads in determining how to deal with it.

In recent interviews, National Journal correspondent James Kitfield spoke with leading voices on both sides of the argument.  C. Paul Robinson is director of Sandia National Laboratories, one of the nation’s three primary nuclear weapons labs, and a former chief negotiator at the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva during the 1980s.  Joseph Cirincione is director of the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, and a co-author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction.  Following are edited excerpts of their separate interviews.

National Journal:  The one point of agreement that emerges in the debate about the Bush administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review is that the fundamental equation of nuclear deterrence has been forever altered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear technology, and the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  Is that a fair assumption?

C. Paul Robinson:  Deterrence has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and we’re still sorting out what that means for our nuclear posture and the future.  As Russia becomes more of a friend than an enemy, we are no longer confronted with a nation that threatens our very existence.  I spent many sleepless nights during the Cold War worrying about stability matrixes and first-strike, “use-them-or-lose-them” calculations.  That kind of Armageddon scenario is now a distant worry.

I still worry, however, about the proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies from Russia, because in many respects it’s a Third World nation now, and in the Third World everything is for sale.  I regret that as a nation we haven’t been bolder in developing a Marshall Plan for Russia that would help it reach at least a minimum level of prosperity, which is the best antidote to that kind of proliferation.  That problem is related, in turn, to what I believe is our greatest emerging threat — rogue states armed with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

NJ:  Given such seismic events as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Sept. 11 terror attacks, doesn’t it make sense to re-evaluate our strategic ability to deter aggression?

Joseph Cirincione:  Absolutely, and we should be taking a new look at our deterrence posture.  But it’s important for people to understand that this is not what the Bush administration is doing.  The January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review directed the departments of Energy and Defense to begin development of new nuclear weapons, and to formulate new policies to accommodate such weapons.  As a result, the nuclear weapons labs have re-established advanced-warhead concept teams to explore modifications of existing weapons, and to develop low-yield weapons and nuclear earth-penetrators that can be used against hardened targets.  So the Bush administration has already decided that we need new nuclear weapons, and they are now going ahead implementing policies to reach that goal step by step.  They understand that this is a very controversial decision, however, so they have adopted “salami” tactics — they are slicing off a little bit at a time.

NJ:  Are the labs developing new nuclear weapons?

Robinson:  That depends on how you define “new.”  If we take a warhead off the shelf that we designed and tested in the past, and then put it on a new delivery vehicle, is that a new nuclear weapon?  We will probably have to manufacture new copies because we produced only a few originally, but it is not a new design, nor will we need to test it.  I can categorically state that no one is proposing returning to nuclear testing.

The main point is that the world is not static.  Over the past decade, nations have gone to school on our conventional military capabilities, and many of them have adopted a strategy of moving their high-value targets out of our reach by locating them in deeply buried tunnels and inside mountains.  If you want to know who the main culprits are, just look at which nations are buying these huge tunnel-boring machines.  You’ll find that North Korea, Iran, Syria and Libya have all built a lot of underground facilities.  We keep having to relearn this lesson that the world is not stupid, and potential adversaries will constantly take actions to better their strategic position and counter our strengths.  I would argue that the United States must respond by maintaining a robust deterrent against whatever is hidden in those underground facilities.

NJ:  Does the United States need a low-yield, nuclear bunker buster to hold an enemy’s underground facilities at risk?

Cirincione:  This argument that we need mini-nukes as earth penetrators is based on a lie.  Every independent study done on this issue has concluded that for any target buried more than 50 yards underground, you would still need a very large nuclear warhead.  Mini-nukes of a kiloton or less just don’t get the job done.  The big nukes you would need in order to reach a truly deep underground bunker, meanwhile, would kick up so much dirt that you would have a major problem with radioactive fallout.

More to the point, there are multiple ways of attacking underground facilities using conventional weapons that would be more effective.  With repeated precision strikes using conventional earth-penetrating bombs, you can bore deeper and deeper until you reach your target.  You could use high-temperature thermo-baric weapons that have the advantage of destroying biological and chemical agents and pathogens.  You could use precision-strike or Special Operations forces to seal the exit and entrance tunnels to an underground facility.

NJ:  Are there viable conventional alternatives to nuclear bunker busters?

Robinson:  Our primary focus is still to accomplish this with conventional weapons, and we work hard on that problem.  Nuclear weapons remain a blunt instrument of last resort.  We’ve conducted more than 4,000 penetrator tests at Sandia since the 1960s, however, and we have a lot of data on the problem.  Basically our tests show that conventional penetrators don’t work very well.  In the aftermath of the bombing campaign against Serbia, for instance, we discovered that we did very little to no damage against buried targets.

So if we can find ways to strike these buried targets with conventional weapons, we will.  If we can’t, however, we need to look at what can be accomplished with a nuclear earth-penetrator that causes the least possible amount of collateral damage.  That leads you away from two-stage, thermonuclear weapons to smaller-yield, lighter weapons with high reliability.  A national command authority confronted in a crisis with the prospect of killing 40,000 people with a thermonuclear weapon in order to take out a bunker is probably going to decide not to.  If we could design a bunker buster that would kill an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 people, on the other hand, the answer would probably be yes if the situation was critical.  Those are the weapons the Bush administration gave us the OK to begin researching about a year ago, because our scientists felt handcuffed by restrictions that were in place at the time.

NJ:  Would rogue nations be deterred from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, or building underground bunkers, if they knew their facilities could be reached by nuclear earth-penetrators?

Cirincione:  The Bush administration has adopted this arrogant attitude that the United States can take the dramatic step of developing these weapons, and there will be no international repercussions or imitators.  If the most powerful nation the world has ever known says it needs a new class of nuclear weapon to defend itself against weapons of mass destruction, however, why don’t other countries also need them?  Why doesn’t Iran, which has actually been attacked by chemical weapons?

The real danger of this concept is that it blurs the lines between nuclear and conventional weapons, making nukes just another tool in the toolbox that could be used for tactical battlefield purposes.  In that sense, this argument is less about deterrence than war fighting.  We already have plenty of doomsday weapons in our arsenal if all we’re trying to do is scare people.  They are planning on using these weapons.  And if the United States were to use them, it would cross a threshold that has not been breached since the Truman administration.  That in turn would encourage other nations to develop and use nuclear weapons in a similar manner.  That’s not in the United States’ national security interests.  Given that we have never accepted a nuclear weapon into our arsenal without testing — with the exception of the Hiroshima bomb — the path the Bush administration is on also greatly increases the likelihood that the United States will return to nuclear testing, which would be a terrible blow to the nonproliferation regime.

NJ:  Will developing a nuclear bunker buster likely lead to new testing?

Robinson:  I don’t think we will need new testing, because the warhead we are talking about has already been tested.  As I said earlier, we would need to start production of new warheads again.

I continue to abide by my statements that we’re a long way from going back to nuclear tests.  Having said that, I helped write the safeguards that were written into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification protocols, which essentially stated that the president of the United States would withdraw from the treaty and return to testing if a serious problem developed in the U.S. nuclear arsenal that required testing for a solution.  The point I’m making is, the United States has been willing to abide by these treaties only as long as they do not conflict with our essential security posture.

NJ:  How do you respond to arms-control experts who charge that remanufacturing a new class of nuclear bunker busters violates the Nonproliferation Treaty, which commits the United States to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race” and “to nuclear disarmament?”

Robinson:  I was in the Reagan administration when we debated what exactly was meant by Article VI of the NPT, and it seems to me that the end state of total nuclear disarmament that the treaty envisions will occur around the same time that the lamb lies down with the lion.  And I always argued that even at that point, the lamb still won’t get much sleep.

In truth, I believe that the NPT was intended more as a confidence-building measure than as a real arms-control treaty that we were willing to bet our country’s survival on.  We would never have negotiated an arms control treaty with the ridiculous verification inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency prescribed in the NPT, which missed the programs in Iraq and Iran and even Israel.  Where has the IAEA spent the most money in terms of inspections?  In Germany, Canada, and Japan.  Why?  Because it is a confidence-building measure among friendly countries eager to prove they are not violating it.  It was never set up to catch cheaters.  That’s why I disagree with people who infer that the NPT is a real arms control treaty.  It’s not.

NJ:  Is the NPT more a gentlemen’s agreement than an arms control treaty?

Cirincione:  That’s just nonsense.  President Bush just negotiated a treaty on strategic nuclear weapons with Moscow that has no verification regime, yet he still insists that it’s vital to our national security.  The NPT was the beginning of what became a comprehensive, interlocking network of treaties, agreements and enforcement mechanisms designed to stop the proliferation of not only nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons.  It established a legal and diplomatic framework for a non-nuclear future, and it has worked.  Instead of the 20 to 25 nuclear nations that President John F. Kennedy predicted, we now have eight worldwide.  That’s still eight too many, but that’s not a bad track record.

As the nuclear states continue to move toward ever-smaller arsenals as called for in the NPT, we will continue to devalue nuclear weapons globally.  That’s the whole crux of the matter: Given our overwhelming conventional military superiority, the United States is more secure in a world where nuclear weapons are devalued and dwindling as opposed to a world where we and others are developing new nuclear weapons for new uses.

Now, there are certainly enforcement problems with the nonproliferation regime, as there are with all international and national laws.  Does that automatically mean the laws are useless?  No, it means we need to get better at enforcement and adapting them to new circumstances.  There’s no question that we need to toughen IAEA inspections and to take a fresh look at some of the fundamental tenets of the nonproliferation regime.  Some people in the Bush administration think the first thing you do in such a circumstance is tear down the bridge you’re standing on.  I argue instead that we need to strengthen the bridge.

NJ:  Do you credit the NPT for slowing the march of nuclear proliferation?

Robinson:  I think the North Atlantic Treaty extending our nuclear umbrella to our European allies did much more to prevent nations from going nuclear than the NPT, and will do more in the future as more Eastern European nations join NATO.  That’s why I argue that we should also extend that umbrella further from Japan to encompass Southeast Asian nations such as South Korea, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines.

NJ:  Do you ever worry that the United States’ aggressive strategy of pre-emption, coupled with our overwhelming conventional military capability, might convince some nations that nuclear weapons are their only deterrent against us?

Robinson:  The National Security Strategy lays out very carefully the conditions that might prompt pre-emption, which are basically limited to those instances when the threat of many American deaths is imminent and you have the nexus of rogue states with weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorists.  Having said that, a friend of mine recently pointed out that the United States was not deterred from going to war by Iraq’s supposed arsenal of chemical and biological weapons.  We haven’t responded nearly as quickly to North Korea’s announcement that it has nuclear weapons.  Some people could draw the lesson that the United States can be deterred by nuclear weapons, but not by chemical or biological ones.  I can’t argue with that conclusion.

Back to top

North Korea:  Washington Ready to Offer Nonaggression Agreement

The Bush administration announced yesterday that it is prepared, with its allies in the region, to offer a joint written nonaggression guarantee to North Korea, the Washington Times reported (see GSN, Aug. 7).

“There should be ways to capture assurances to the North Koreans — from not only the United States, but we believe from other parties in the region — that there is no hostile intent among the parties that might be participating in such a discussion,” said U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, noting that an assurance may a be more practical alternative to a formal treaty because a treaty would have little hope of being approved by Congress.

“When one comes up with such a document, such a written assurance, there are ways that Congress can take note of it without it being a treaty or some kind of pact.  A resolution is something like that — taking note of something,” he added.

Diplomats from South Korea and Japan, meanwhile, are scheduled to visit U.S. officials next Wednesday and Thursday to plan their negotiating strategies in talks with North Korea (Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times, Aug. 8).

“I believe the United States has arranged its proposal to North Korea between yesterday (Wednesday) and today,” said Wi Sung-lac, director general for the North American Affairs Bureau in the South Korean Foreign Ministry (Korea Herald, Aug. 8).

Chinese vice foreign minister Wang Yi, meanwhile, has arrived in North Korea to discuss the impending talks (James Brooke, New York Times, Aug. 8).

Back to top

United States II:  Conference Examines Bush Plans for Nuclear Weapons; Gore Lashes Out at White House

U.S. officials held a one-day conference yesterday to discuss U.S. nuclear policy and possible changes to the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal.  Officials from the U.S. Defense and State departments, the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the National Security Council, the Air Force and the Navy were expected to attend the closed meeting (see GSN, Aug. 5).

Pentagon spokesman Maj. Michael Shavers said the meeting would address ways to maintain the reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without testing them, but a leaked agenda included the discussion question, “What is the uncertainty in confidence and potential risk threshold for a test recommendation — what would demand a test?” (CBSNews.com, Aug. 7).

The agenda also indicated that officials would discuss the viability of low-yield nuclear weapons (BBC News, Aug. 8).

In comments on U.S. nuclear weapon policy prepared for a speech yesterday, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore yesterday lashed out at the Bush administration plans.

“This administration has rejected [the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] and now, incredibly, wants to embark on a new program to build a brand new generation of smaller (and it hopes, more usable) nuclear bombs.  In my opinion, this would be true madness,” Gore said (Federal News Service transcript, Aug. 8).

Back to top

Iran:  Inspectors Due in Iran Next Week

A team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to visit Iran next week to discuss the Additional Protocol, which would allow for greater international monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities (see GSN, Aug. 6).

Iranian officials are currently debating the merits of the protocol agreement.

The team will also carry out some inspections, allowed by current agreements, in the next few days, according to the IAEA (IAEA release, Aug. 8).

Back to top

United States III:  Air Force Conducts Successful Minuteman 3 ICBM Test

The U.S. Air Force Wednesday successfully tested a Minuteman 3 ICBM, according to the Santa Maria Times (see GSN, June 11).

The missile, armed with three dummy warheads, was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California toward targets southwest of the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean (Janene Scully, Santa Maria Times, Aug. 8).

Russia’s early warning system registered the Minuteman test, according to ITAR-Tass (ITAR-Tass, Aug. 6 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 6). 

Back to top

North Korea:  Pyongyang Wants Talks in Early September

North Korea wants to hold multilateral talks on the current nuclear standoff during the first week of September, Reuters reported today (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The talks, which will include the United States, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan, are set to be held in Beijing.  China, however, is pushing for the negotiations to begin on Aug. 21 or 25.

The United States also favors August talks, before the September U.N. General Assembly meeting begins in New York, according to a report in the Yomiuri Shimbun.

A senior Japanese official said Wednesday that negotiations could take place this month.

“Late August has not been ruled out,” he said (Reuters, Aug. 7).

Back to top

South Asia:  India, Pakistan Could Hold Talks After Next Month

Pakistan may soon suggest several dates for the resumption of peace talks with its South Asian rival India, the Times of India reported today (see GSN, July 10).

Pakistan could “shortly” propose two or three dates for talks between the Pakistani and Indian foreign secretaries, a diplomat said.  Such talks are expected to be held after a U.N. General Assembly session scheduled to begin next month, according to the Times.  A Pakistani newspaper has reported that India wants the talks to be held in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad (Times of India, Aug. 7).

Back to top

Russia:  Moscow to Construct Three New Ballistic Missile Submarines by 2010

Russia plans to build three new ballistic missile submarines by 2010, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Col. Gen. Alexei Moskovsky said Tuesday (see GSN, July 1).

Moskovsky said Russia plans to construct three new Borey-class submarines armed with Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles (Interfax, Aug. 5 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 5).  The Russian newspaper Pravda reported in May that the Borey-class submarine can launch missiles from a submerged depth of 55 meters while the submarine is moving at a speed of up to 6 knots.  The submarine can also operate for 100 days without docking, Pravda reported (Pravda, May 26). 

Last year, Russia completed work on the Dmitri Donskoi, a modified Typhoon-class submarine that was to serve as a trial platform for the Bulava missile, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Nuclear Notebook.  The Bulava is the naval version of the Topol-M ICBM (Mike Nartker, GSN).

Back to top

Libya:  Russia to Increase Nuclear Cooperation

Russia plans to increase its nuclear cooperation activities with Libya, Interfax reported Monday (see GSN, Aug. 5).

The two countries have agreed that Russian experts will help resume work on the earlier-planned Sultan nuclear power plant at the Gulf of Sidra, as well as upgrade the Tajura nuclear research center, a diplomatic source in Moscow said.  Russia also welcomed Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi’s recent suggestions that he is willing to allow international inspectors to visit Libyan sites, a high-ranking Russian diplomat said (Interfax, Aug. 4 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 4).

The Tajura facility houses a 10-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor and currently operates under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Deadly Arsenals.  The Sultan nuclear plant was originally intended to be a 440-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor, but was suspended (Mike Nartker, GSN, Aug. 7).

Back to top

About Newswire  |  Contact National Journal  |  Re-Use Guidelines

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  GET INVOLVED  |  SITE MAP