Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Iraq:  Officials Toughened British Dossier on Iraqi WMD Days Before ReleaseFull Story
U.S. Response:  U.S. Disarmament Support Should Continue Despite Incomplete Russian Cooperation, Lugar SaysFull Story
North Korea:  Pyongyang Uses Covert Approach to Acquire WMD-Related ItemsFull Story
Iraq:  U.S. Troops Will Stay Until WMD Programs Found, Armitage SaysFull Story
Iraq:  Kay Says Order Was Given to Use Chemical WeaponsFull Story
North Korea:  Taiwan Seizes Suspected WMD Material from North Korean FreighterFull Story
Syria:  Damascus Maintains Suspected WMD ProgramsFull Story
British Response:  Officals Plan Simulated WMD Attack on London SubwayFull Story


Recent Stories: WMD

From August 18, 2003 issue.

Iraq:  Officials Toughened British Dossier on Iraqi WMD Days Before Release

Shortly before releasing a September 2002 intelligence dossier on Iraqi WMD capabilities, British officials strengthened some of the language used to describe the threat in ways that were unsupported by other senior British intelligence experts, the London Independent reported yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 12).

For example, a draft of the dossier said Iraq had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons available “either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production.”  The final version of the dossier, however, said that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons available “both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production.”

Even the title of the dossier was altered to make a more convincing case that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, according to the Independent.  Up until the dossier’s release, it was titled, “Iraq’s program for weapons of mass destruction.”  When the dossier was released, however, the words “program for” were removed from the title.

Glen Rangwala of Cambridge University said the change in the wording of the title of dossier was significant because the inclusion of the word “program” does not indicate that actual weapons of mass destruction existed.  According to Rangwala, some British intelligence experts believed there were only suspected WMD programs in Iraq instead of actual stockpiles (Jo Dillon, London Independent, Aug. 17).


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From August 18, 2003 issue.

U.S. Response:  U.S. Disarmament Support Should Continue Despite Incomplete Russian Cooperation, Lugar Says

U.S. funding of programs to dispose of Russian WMD stockpiles should continue unimpeded despite a lack of full Russian cooperation, the chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee said Friday (see GSN, May 23).

“Our objective, and the Russian objective at the highest level, is to destroy weapons of mass destruction,” Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said on a Moscow visit. 

Since 1992, U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have helped Russia dispose of its weapons of mass destruction.

Lugar met with Russian Munitions Agency Director Viktor Kholstov Friday to discuss U.S.-Russian efforts to accelerate the disposal of Russia’s vast stockpile of chemical weapons, according to the Los Angeles Times (see GSN, April 28).  Lugar was also scheduled to visit the city of Perm, 700 miles east of Moscow, over the weekend to observe the destruction of mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs (see GSN, June 16; David Holley, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 16).

Lugar has warned that Russia’s reluctance to allow U.S. inspectors to visit biological weapons sites could jeopardize continued funding for the threat reductions programs, according to the Miami Herald (see GSN, March 24).

“Russia’s denials with regard to the biological situation offer an avenue where opponents of spending money can say, ‘See, we still really don’t know,’” Lugar said.  “Some members of Congress say, ‘Is Russia complying, literally, to the dotted line, with all the arms control treaties?’” he said.

“It’s not useful to set up conditions in which there has to be 100 percent compliance before we do anything,” Lugar said.

Lugar said he recently met with U.S. President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to seek a presidential waiver that would remove some of the restrictions that some members of Congress want to attach to funding for the threat reduction programs.  Lugar said Friday that he was optimistic that Bush would issue the waiver (Mark McDonald, Miami Herald, Aug. 18).

[EDITOR'S NOTE:  Richard Lugar is on the Board of Directors of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]


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From August 15, 2003 issue.

North Korea:  Pyongyang Uses Covert Approach to Acquire WMD-Related Items

In recent years, North Korea has sought to further its WMD aims by covertly importing related goods and technologies from abroad, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Aug. 13).

The interception earlier this year of a shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes, which could be used to build uranium enrichment centrifuges, helps to illustrate North Korea’s covert purchases, according to the Post.  In early April, the French cargo ship Ville de Virgo docked in Hamburg, where it picked up a shipment of 214 high-strength aluminum tubes apparently purchased by the Chinese Shenyang Aircraft Corp.  Shortly after the ship left Hamburg, however, German intelligence officials learned that the true destination for the tubes was North Korea for use in its nuclear weapons program, the Post reported.

In mid-April, French and German authorities tracked the Ville de Virgo to the eastern Mediterranean and captured the tubes, according to the Post.  German police arrested the owner of a small export firm and discovered plans for North Korea to obtain as many as 2,000 high-strength aluminum tubes, which could have given Pyongyang the ability to produce as many as 3,500 gas centrifuges if it had succeeded, the Post reported.

“The intentions were clearly nuclear,” said a Western diplomat familiar with the investigation.  “The result could have been several bombs’ worth of weapons-grade uranium in a year,” the diplomat said.

Also in early April, a cargo ship left the Japanese port of Kobe Harbor with direct-current stabilizers, which are also used to enrich uranium, according to the Post.  The stabilizers were being shipped to Thailand, where they were then set to be sent to North Korea, the Post reported.  In mid-May, a German manufacturer sold 33 tons of sodium cyanide, which can be used to make tabun, to a buyer believed to be a company based in Singapore (see GSN, May 19).  That shipment as well was to be diverted to North Korea.  Both transfers, however, were blocked.

“There are countries in the world where you can pay $2,000 to a government minister and he’ll sign anything — and then confirm to you that he signed it,” said Rastislav Kacer, a former Slovak deputy defense minister who helped lead an investigation into a covert attempt by North Korea to buy sophisticated radar equipment.  “Documents that are fake can be made to appear very real,” Kacer added (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 15).

Covert Missile Sales

As part of its efforts to generate badly needed hard currency, North Korea allegedly exports ballistic missile-related items and technologies covertly, according to the Washington Post. 

For example, in late June 1999, Indian authorities searched the North Korean freighter Kuwolsan while it was docked in the port of Kandla.  Inside boxes labeled “water refinement equipment,” they found a cache of missile-related items, such as tips of nose cones, machine tools and guidance systems, according to the Post.  They also found in other crates a large number of blueprints for Scud ballistic missiles.  The intended destination of the missile-related items was Libya, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

“In the past we had seen missiles or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale,” an Indian official said.  “This was a complete technology transfer,” the official said.

The missile-related cargo onboard the Kuwolsan might not have been discovered had the ship’s crew not tried to make extra money by picking up a cargo of sugar, according to documents and interviews with officials.  Soon after leaving the North Korean port of Nampo, the ship traveled to two Thai ports to pick up 14,000 tons of sugar to sell along the way, according to records.  When an attempt to sell the sugar to some Algerians collapsed, the ship decided to sell it to an Indian company, requiring the stop at Kandla.

While the ship was sailing to the Indian port, Indian customs officials learned that it might be carrying contraband, according to the Post.  The ship was suspected of carrying weapons or ammunition, possibly to Pakistan.  When the ship arrived in Kandla, Indian port officials were waiting, the Post reported.

“It was crazy,” an Indian investigator said.  “If you’re carrying 200 tons of sensitive equipment, you don’t go picking up extra cargo left and right,” the investigator said (Joby Warrick, Washington Post, Aug. 14).


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From August 14, 2003 issue.

Iraq:  U.S. Troops Will Stay Until WMD Programs Found, Armitage Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. military forces will stay in Iraq until former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s alleged WMD capabilities are found and destroyed, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 12).

Speaking yesterday to the Asia Society Forum in Sydney, Armitage said he had “absolute confidence” that coalition forces in Iraq would find evidence of Hussein’s suspected WMD programs.  The absence of weapons discoveries so far only demonstrates the great lengths Hussein went to to hide WMD programs, he said.

“The fact that it has taken us this long to find the evidence is a chilling reminder that these programs are far too easy to move, and, I believe, far too easy to hide,” Armitage said.

Armitage also praised the efforts of former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay, who is now heading the Iraq Survey Group, which is conducting the WMD hunt in Iraq.  While Kay has made “solid progress,” he too has found that “deception and concealment were an extensive and embedded part” of Iraq’s WMD efforts, Armitage said.

It will take time to find Iraq’s WMD capabilities, including the scientists and equipment used to produce weapons of mass destruction, Armitage said.  U.S. troops will remain in Iraq, however, until they are found, he said.

“[U.S.] President [George W.] Bush has made it crystal clear that we don’t intend to stay in Iraq any longer than is necessary, but I will make it crystal clear to you today that we are not going to leave until we find and destroy Iraq’s capability to produce biological, chemical and nuclear weapons,” Armitage said.

Proliferation Security Initiative

In his remarks yesterday, Armitage also said there is a need for new measures to combat the transfer of goods and technologies that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.  One such measure is the Proliferation Security Initiative, an 11-member effort to interdict shipments of WMD-related cargo (see GSN, Aug. 6).

As part of the initiative, Australia is expected to hold a naval exercise next month to develop interdiction capabilities, Armitage said.  He added that the United States would take part in the exercise, which could also include Italy, Germany and Japan.


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From August 12, 2003 issue.

Iraq:  Kay Says Order Was Given to Use Chemical Weapons

Iraqi military leaders were ordered to use chemical weapons during the recent Iraq war, according to the leader of the team conducting the WMD hunt in Iraq, the Boston Globe reported Friday (see GSN, Aug. 11).

David Kay, leader of the Iraq Survey Group, testified to Congress last week that the team had collected solid physical and documentary evidence that the order was given, according to the Globe.

“They have found evidence that an order was given,” said a senior intelligence official with access to a pending report by Kay.

Kay’s report says that no chemical weapons have yet been found but does not explain why the orders to launch chemical attacks were not carried out, according to the Globe.  A senior defense official said the United States might have persuaded Iraqi commanders to not use chemical weapons by warning them that they could face war crimes charges if they did so.

“We tried to dissuade them in very public ways, and there were clearly covert ways as well,” the official said.

Some officials suggested that the weapons may not have been delivered to front-line units or that they were destroyed by Iraqi officials or U.S. airstrikes, the Globe reported.  Some officials also said the chemical strike orders might have been a ruse intended to deter a U.S.-led invasion.

U.S. officials said they were confident that Kay would both back up the claims that Iraqi units were ordered to conduct chemical attacks and account for the weapons themselves.

“It sounded like they had something that they could hold up and say ‘Here is the reason why it didn’t take place,” a defense official said  (Bryan Bender, Boston Globe, Aug. 8).

Tenet Defends October 2002 NIE

Meanwhile, CIA Director George Tenet has defended an October 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, saying it provided the best assessment of Iraq’s capabilities at the time.

“We have no doubt … that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded and objective assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced,” Tenet said in a statement released yesterday.

The Bush administration has come under increasing criticism for its handling of prewar intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.  The Washington Post Sunday detailed a number of instances wherein White House claims on Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons exceeded available intelligence.

In his statement, Tenet said the U.S. intelligence community agreed on the assessment that Iraq was seeking to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program and on the pieces of evidence included in the NIE to support that claim.  Tenet noted that the now-disputed claim that Iraq sought to obtain uranium from Africa was not included among the evidence used to support the nuclear assessment.

Another piece of evidence oft-cited by Bush administration officials as a sign that Iraq was seeking to develop nuclear weapons — attempts to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes — has also been the subject of intense scrutiny.  The Post reported yesterday that U.S. experts had told U.S. intelligence agencies that Iraq was producing copies of an Italian-made conventional rocket that matched both the alloy and the dimensions of the tubes.  In addition, two U.S. agencies — the U.S. Energy Department and the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research — said during the preparation of the NIE that the tubes were most likely for conventional military uses, according to Tenet.

Even so, Tenet said, all U.S. intelligence agencies agreed that the tubes could have been used to produce gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.  He added that the agencies differed in intent — a natural outcome taking into account that Iraq went to “great lengths” to hide their WMD efforts.

Tenet also said that even though the Energy Department differed on the purpose of the tubes, it still agreed that Iraq was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.  “Obviously, the tubes were not central to DOE’s view on reconstitution,” he said (CIA release, Aug. 11).

British Dossier

Senior British defense officials yesterday told an inquiry panel into the death of former U.N. weapons inspector David Kelly that concerns were raised over the wording of a September 2002 dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Two officials had expressed concerns over the wording of the dossier, which included a now-disputed claim that the Iraqi military could deploy biological and chemical weapons within 45 minutes of receiving an order to do so, Deputy Chief of Defense Intelligence Martin Howard said.  He added, however, that such concerns were “quite normal.”

“There was not a difference of view about whether the intelligence should be included or not, it was more about how the intelligence should be described,” Howard said.

The inquiry was established to investigate why Kelly, who was identified prior to his death as the source for a BBC report that the British government had exaggerated intelligence, died in an apparent suicide, according to the Financial Times (Bob Sherwood, Financial Times, Aug. 12).


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From August 12, 2003 issue.

North Korea:  Taiwan Seizes Suspected WMD Material from North Korean Freighter

Taiwanese customs officials yesterday seized hundreds of barrels of a suspected WMD-related material from the North Korean freighter Be Gaehung, according to the Christian Science Monitor (see GSN, Aug. 8).

Taiwanese customs officials Sunday asked the ship, docked at Kaohsiung Harbor, to unload 158 barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide, according to the Monitor.  Although a private consultant working for North Korea at the port had argued that the cargo should not be unloaded because it was a general chemical product, the barrels yesterday were voluntarily unloaded and then seized.

Yesterday’s seizure is the first instance of North Korean cargo being confiscated since the June creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative — a U.S.-led effort to interdict suspect shipments of WMD-related cargo (see GSN, Aug. 6; Robert Marquand, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 12).


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From August 12, 2003 issue.

Syria:  Damascus Maintains Suspected WMD Programs

Despite recent pressure from Washington, Syria has not moved to rid itself of the weapons of mass destruction the United States suspects it has, the Los Angeles Times reported today (see GSN, July 16).

Visiting Damascus in May, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell cautioned that the United States could impose trade sanctions if Syria did not dispose of its suspected WMD arsenal (see GSN, May 5).

Citing Syrian opposition figures and Western diplomats, however, the Times reported that Damascus refuses to abandon its chemical — and potentially biological — weapons programs.

Syrian President Bashar Assad is hoping that the White House will overlook his country while dealing with other issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rebuilding effort in Iraq and U.S. elections, according to the Times.

“They are playing for time,” said a Western diplomat of the Syrian leadership.

The U.S. Congress is currently debating the Syrian Accountability Act, which would push the president to impose economic penalties on Damascus if Assad refuses to abandon his weapons programs.

Syria has not acknowledged accusations that it has WMD stockpiles (Christian Miller, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 12).


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From August 12, 2003 issue.

British Response:  Officals Plan Simulated WMD Attack on London Subway

The United Kingdom plans to simulate a WMD attack on the London Underground next month, the British Transport Department announced yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 6).

The exercise is scheduled to be conducted at the Bank subway station in London Sept. 7, a department spokeswoman said.  She added that the exercise — scheduled to involve several hundred police, fire and emergency response personnel — was not being conducted in response to a specific threat (Evening Standard/ThisisLondon, Aug. 11).


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