Iraq:  Hussein Destroyed Weapons in Mid-1990s, Aide Says

An aide to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has said Iraq destroyed its WMD stockpiles years prior to the recent war with the United States, but maintained an ambiguous stance over their existence in an effort to appear strong, the Associated Press reported Friday (see GSN, Aug. 1).

By the mid-1990s, “it was common knowledge among the leadership” that Iraq had destroyed its stockpiles of chemical weapons and had discontinued its biological and nuclear weapons programs, according to the aide.  Hussein believed, however, that a deliberate ambiguity over the fate of the weapons of mass destruction would deter a U.S. attack, the aide said.

“He repeatedly told me:  ‘These foreigners, they only respect strength, they must be made to believe we are strong,’” the aide said.

Some experts believe that Iraq released false information about its WMD programs to help create the impression that it still possessed such weapons, U.S. Defense Department intelligence experts said.

“That explanation has plausibility,” said Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation.  “But the disposition of those missing weapons and materials still has to be explained somehow,” he added (Slobodan Lekic, Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Aug. 1).

Niger Repeats Denial of Uranium Sale to Iraq

Meanwhile, Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja yesterday reiterated that his country did not attempt to sell uranium to Iraq, as has previously been alleged by the United States and the United Kingdom (see GSN, July 29).

Prior to the war, both the United States and the United Kingdom cited Iraq’s alleged attempts to obtain uranium from Africa as evidence that Hussein was seeking to relaunch his nuclear weapons program.  However, a major piece of evidence used to back that claim — documents purporting to show an attempted Iraqi purchase of uranium from Niger — was later determined to be false (see GSN, July 30).

Tandja yesterday again denied that his country had any involvement in a uranium sale to Iraq.

“Against our wishes our country has been front-page news over an affair of the sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq: this affair is nothing else than an accusation without foundation,” Tandja said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Aug. 3).

Tandja also called on the International Atomic Energy Agency to publicly clear Niger of any involvement.

The IAEA should “publicly wash Niger of all suspicions before the U.N. Security Council,” Tandja said.  “Without that, our country can only remain harmed and hampered by a situation in which it isn’t implicated in any way,” he said.

The IAEA refused yesterday to comment on Tandja’s request, saying it still needed to be formally made.

“It’s an unusual request,” IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.  “We’d have to get it formally in writing and then see what we would do with it,” she said (Associated Press/Globe and Mail, Aug. 3).

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International Response:  Legal Authority Is Uncertain for U.S.-Led Cargo Interdiction Effort

U.S. officials have said there is debate over how much legal authority exists under which to conduct the Proliferation Security Initiative — a U.S.-led effort to interdict suspect shipments of WMD-related cargo, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, July 23).

Some U.S. officials have said that current laws allow for most of the effort, and all that is needed is better coordination and enforcement.  Legal experts, however, differ over what existing laws allow, the Post reported.

Under current international law, countries may board ships with the permission of the country whose flag the ship is flying, or if the ship is unmarked, according to the Post.  Ships carrying illicit cargo — such as illegal drugs — or those transiting between countries with established agreements, can also be stopped and captured.

“The plan is to use existing authorities in the first instance, because if you do that in a proactive way by sharing information with others and being prepared to move, you’ll have an 80 to 85 percent solution,” a White House official said.

However, there currently is no international ban on shipments of WMD-related materials, according to the Post.  To address this, some legal experts have recommended that the United States work within the United Nations to expand the current legal authority.

“More important than adding one country after another to the president’s initiative, you need to get something through the U.N. Security Council,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.  “The reason is, if you’re going to get international common usage, that is the most efficient way to make that happen,” he said.

U.S. officials said the Bush administration has no plans to seek U.N. approval for seizures of WMD-related cargo because of concerns that such a move would trigger debate over what would qualify for interdiction.  They also said that the initiative would not result in the creation of a large-scale international system, such as a task force or an enforcement mechanism.

“It’s not like there’s going to be some big unveiling, where the marker will come down and all of a sudden we’re going to be out there looking for bad guys shipping around bad things,” a U.S. Defense Department official said.  “We’re doing that now,” the official said.

There are also concerns over the U.S. motive for the initiative, according to the Post.  While Bush administration officials have said the initiative is meant to be a global effort, some countries are concerned that it is a covert attempt to establish a blockade around North Korea, the Post reported.  In a speech last week, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton explicitly linked the effort to both North Korea and Iran. 

Initiative members are planning to enlist more members by targeting costal Asian and Middle East countries, as well as those countries whose flags are most often used by traffickers, officials said (Bradley Graham, Washington Post, August 3).

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U.S. Response:  Scientists Studying Use of Fish to Detect Biological, Chemical Agents

Researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Center for Water Security are examining whether a species of fish could be used to help detect toxins placed in the U.S. drinking water supply by terrorists, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, May 29).

Center scientists are studying whether zebrafish could be used to detect the presence of toxins in water, according Michael Carvan, head of the project.  The fish are genetically modified to glow when they encounter different types and levels of chemicals, AP reported. 

For example, scientists expose the fish to high levels of E. coli.  Only those fish with the gene to react to high levels of the bacterium should glow, while others should remain a dull gray, AP reported.

More work still needs to be done, however, before the fish could be used to test water supplies, Carvan said.

“We can get them to light up,” Carvan said.  “But they don’t pass that trait onto the next generation,” he said (Tim Cigelske, Associated Press, Aug. 4).

Researchers at the Office of Naval Research and Duke University are also working on ways to modify organisms to react to the presence of certain materials, such as toxins and pathogens, according to New Technology Week. 

The scientists are working to develop a method to produce proteins that could link to molecules of a substance to be identified.  Those proteins, which could also include a fluorescent molecule to glow in the presence of the substance, could then be inserted into organisms for use as chemical and biological detectors (Dave Ahearn, New Technology Week, Aug. 4).

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Iraq I:  Top U.S. Weapons Hunter Cites Progress, Bioweapons Focus

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is seeing considerable progress, with Iraqi informants leading searchers to sites not previously known to have been part of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s weapons program, the CIA’s top analyst in the hunt said here yesterday.

Speaking late yesterday afternoon after a 2«-hour Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, David Kay said U.S., British and Australian weapons hunters are “concentrating initially on biological [weapons programs] and on the role of the intelligence and security services.”

However, at an earlier briefing that followed a similarly lengthy hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Kay did not deny that evidence of Iraqi chemical or biological weapons stockpiles is lacking thus far.

Asked about a July 15 House of Representatives Intelligence Committee press release indicating that evidence to date did “not point to the existence of large stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons,” Kay did not respond directly even though the release came at the end of a committee mission to Iraq and cited Kay as its main source on weapons programs.

“I’m sure if they put it out, it was a factual statement,” he said.

“Surprise” Could be Ahead; Kay Outlines Evidence Criteria

In both briefings to the press, Kay repeatedly indicated a “surprise” announcement may be coming.

Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), who is also a member of the Armed Services Committee, echoed that thought.

“I would not be surprised if there is a surprise, and it would end up changing a lot of people’s minds,” Roberts said.

Kay cautioned, though, that no significant find will be made public unless three criteria are met: multiple Iraqis providing information about the find, multiple documents explaining it and physical evidence showing a connection to weapons of mass destruction activities.

Progress Cited, but Patience Urged

Kay and key members of the two committees referred variously to “solid,” “significant” and “good” progress being made in the hunt for banned arms.  The head of the U.S. Iraqi Survey Group, Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, said it is “phenomenal what we’re finding.”

All of them cited in particular what they called a new level of cooperation from Iraqis with knowledge of Hussein’s alleged weapons programs.

“We are actively exploring sites based on leads from document exploitation and Iraqis who are collaborating with us,” Kay said yesterday morning.

“There is not a day that goes by since I’ve been there, for five weeks, that we have not had people out on sites.  But it’s not … a sterile list drawn up before the war.  We are being led to these sites by Iraqis and documentation from the Saddam Hussein regime.  It’s the best-type site exploitation I know that you can conduct,” he added.

At the same time, Kay and several senators cautioned that because of Hussein’s alleged efforts to hide his weapons programs and deceive inspectors, patience will be required of those waiting for concrete results in the search.

“This was a program that, over 25 years, spent billions of dollars [and] was actively shielded by a security and deception plan, so it is not something that is easy to unwrap, but we are in the process,” Kay said after the morning hearing.

“We have found new evidence of how they successfully misled inspections of the U.N. and hid stuff continuously from them.  The active deception program is truly amazing, once you get inside it.  We have people who participated in deceiving U.N. inspectors now telling us how they did it,” he added.

Senators Express Concern Over Prewar Claims

Although all expressed some degree of confidence in the current search, some senators suggested the Bush administration’s prewar claims about Iraqi weapons programs may not have been justified.

“In the course of the weeks and months prior to the initiation of force,” said Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-Va.), U.S. lawmakers “were given facts to the effect that in all likelihood, the discovery of these weapons and the programs supporting them would be somewhat easier than facts and reality now prove to be the case.”

The intelligence panel’s senior Democrat, John Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), drew a distinction between finding weapons “programs” — the term now in favor at the White House and among the weapons hunters — and actual weapons.

“Are they going to lead to what it is we went to war for?” Rockefeller asked.

“Programs don’t do it.  Programs cannot be fired.  Programs can’t get somewhere in 45 minutes.  Programs are not weaponized.  Programs aren’t what we were told about,” he said.

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Iraq II:  Army Learns Lesson on Search for WMD in Iraq

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army should have moved quickly following the recent war in Iraq to secure sites that might have contained information on Baghdad’s suspected WMD programs, according to a 281-page after-action report that detailed activities by the Army’s Third Infantry Division, which spearheaded the successful invasion and has remained there to stabilize the country.

“One of the reasons for the attack on Iraq was to expose key weapons of mass destruction facilities,” the report says.  “During the transition from combat operations to support and stability operations, we did not attempt to secure these key facilities before looting started,” it continues.

The report does not say why Third Infantry forces did not act to secure suspected weapons of mass destruction facilities and did not suggest who might have been responsible for that.

The report’s conclusion says that securing the sites might have prevented the looting and prevented the loss of clues to suspected WMD programs and stockpiles.

“The looting, in essence, turned the facilities into crime scenes.  The visible clues that may have provided a detailed analysis of WMD production, research and development (R&D), or storage were either deployed or carried away by the local populous,” it says.

The report recommends: “All future SSE [Secure Sensitive Exploitation] facilities should be secured by ground combat or special forces soldiers.  This would allow for a detailed exploitation instead of a crime scene investigation.”

The report praises the mechanized division’s overall performance in rapidly reaching Baghdad and helping to take over the country.

“Operating considerably beyond existing doctrine, the Third Infantry Division proved that a lethal, flexible and disciplined mechanized force could conduct continuous operations over extended distances for 21 days,” it says in an introduction.

“The lessons learned about offensive operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom will enable the Army to grow and further develop its existing capabilities,” it says.

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U.S. Response:  White House Used Iraq War to Promote Pre-Emption Doctrine, Senator Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — While supporting the decision to invade Iraq, U.S. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) yesterday accused White House “ideologues” of hijacking the war to advance the Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive action (see GSN, June 5).

During an address at the Brookings Institution, Biden defended his decision to support a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, saying he “would vote that way again today.”  Biden, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he supported the resolution because former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had violated the terms of the surrender agreement reached at the end of the 1991 Gulf War and had failed to comply with U.N. inspections — a condition of that agreement.

“When he [Hussein] refused, it became the fundamental right of the international community to enforce those rules,” Biden said.

Biden accused “ideologues” within the Bush administration, however, of using the war with Iraq as an attempt to establish a new doctrine of pre-emptive action against those states seen as threats to U.S. security. 

“Iraq was to be the test case,” Biden said.  “In my view, Iraq wasn’t about pre-emption, it was about the enforcement of a surrender agreement,” he said.

The United States should maintain a right to use pre-emptive action to ward off an imminent threat, Biden said.  However, the result of using Iraq to elevate pre-emption to the level of a “doctrine,” as some supporters have labeled it, resulted in a lack of international support for the overthrow of Hussein, he said.

“Making Iraq the case for pre-emption, putting it at the heart of our foreign policy, made it harder to get the world to join us,” Biden said.  “Why?  Because not one of our allies wanted to validate the pre-emption doctrine,” he said.

Biden also said that elevating the concept of pre-emptive action to the level of an official doctrine could jeopardize U.S. nonproliferation efforts.  Such a move “sends a message to our enemies that their only insurance against regime change is to acquire weapons of mass destruction as quickly as they can,” he said.

In addition, the use of pre-emptive action requires a basis in intelligence able to “stand up to world scrutiny,” he said.  Biden criticized Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz for saying earlier this week that the United States may have to act on “murky” intelligence to prevent future terrorist attacks (see GSN, July 28).

“Murky intelligence is hardly enough to meet that standard,” Biden said.

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Iraq III:  White House Orders New Intelligence Report

The Bush administration has ordered the CIA to prepare a new national intelligence estimate on Iraq to determine the extent of militia resistance to U.S. forces there and the likelihood of the formation of a stable, democratic government, the Boston Globe reported yesterday (see GSN, July 31).

The last NIE, prepared by the CIA in October 2002, focused on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and has come under increased scrutiny due to criticism over the White House’s handling of prewar intelligence.

The Bush administration has now asked the CIA to assess the “sources of instability” in Iraq, including the influence of fighters arriving in Iraq from other Arab nations and the attempts of Iran to establish a Shiite Muslim-led government there, a senior intelligence official said.  The new assessment is also expected to examine the attitudes of the Iraqi population and whether a democratic government can be formed, intelligence sources said (Bryan Bender, Boston Globe, July 31).

No New Evidence Found to Support Aluminum Tubes Claims

Meanwhile, no new evidence has been found to support claims made by the White House prior to the war that Iraq attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes for use in centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to USA Today (see GSN, July 16).

A claim made by U.S. President George W. Bush in his January State of the Union address that Iraq sought to obtain uranium from Africa has been the focus of growing controversy as reports come out that there were doubts within the administration over the strength of the claim.  Relatively little attention has been paid to the aluminum tube claim, however, which Bush also made in his address, according to USA Today.

Coalition forces in Iraq have so far found no new evidence to support the aluminum tube claim, which was heavily debated prior to the war, USA Today reported. 

A week after Bush’s speech, however, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a presentation on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to the U.N. Security Council, in which he acknowledged that there were “differences of opinion” over the intended use of the aluminum tubes, White House officials said.  The administration continues to stand by its assessment that the tubes were intended for use to enrich uranium, USA Today reported.

“There was a very open discussion about that,” White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett said last week.  “It is an assessment which (CIA Director George Tenet) and the CIA stand by to this day,” he said (Nichols/Diamond, USA Today, Aug. 1).

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China:  Beijing Must Improve Nonproliferation Efforts, U.S. Official Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A senior U.S. official last week called on China to improve its nonproliferation efforts, and in particular to curb its ballistic missile exports.  Citing such exports as the “most significant proliferation concern” the United States has with China, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter said, “The government of China has not done enough to ensure that all Chinese entities abide by the nonproliferation commitments the Chinese government has made” (see GSN, July 3).

During a hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, DeSutter outlined China’s efforts to stem WMD and ballistic missile proliferation, as well as continuing U.S. concerns.  China is of particular concern to the United States because of its advanced technological capabilities, DeSutter said.

“While there are many buyers in the market for WMD and missiles, there are only a handful of states with the capability to be dealers in that market,” DeSutter told the commission.  “China’s sophistication with many of these technologies has made it possible for Chinese entities to become key exporters of WMD and missile technology,” she said.

Missile Proliferation

In August 2002, China released its missile export control list, a move that came as a “significant and welcome step,” DeSutter said (see GSN, Sept. 3, 2002).  She added, however, that the United States has several concerns about remaining deficiencies in China’s missile export control system.  For example, the Chinese control list is not as comprehensive as the annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which seeks to reduce missile proliferation by establishing common export-control regulations among members.  In addition, DeSutter said, the Chinese regulations do not prohibit the export of complete missile-production facilities, as does the MTCR.

The United States is also concerned with China’s implementation of its missile-related export regulations, DeSutter said.  China is apparently not enforcing controls at its borders, allowing illegal transfers to go undetected, she said.  China also lacks an effective end-use verification system to ensure that legitimate transfers are not diverted, DeSutter said, adding that effective implementation could be a field of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.

China has not done enough to crack down on so-called “serial proliferators” — those Chinese entities that have a record of proliferation activities, DeSutter said.  One such entity is the North China Industries Corp. (Norinco), which the United States has sanctioned several times for alleged exports of missile technologies to Iran, she said.

“For some time, we have been alerting the Chinese government to our concerns about the activities of Norinco,” DeSutter said.  “Nonetheless, the Chinese government appears to have taken no action to halt Norinco’s proliferant behavior,” she added.

Underscoring the various U.S. concerns with China’s attempts to prevent missile proliferation is a concern that China does not take the issue seriously, according to DeSutter.

“The Chinese government appears to view missile nonproliferation, at least in part, not as a goal in and of itself, but as an issue that needs merely to be managed as part of its overall bilateral relationship with the United States,” she said.

WMD Proliferation

The United States also has concerns regarding China’s WMD nonproliferation efforts, according to DeSutter. 

There is concern that Beijing has joined international nuclear nonproliferation regimes in such a way as to allow it to continue to “lawfully circumvent” those regimes’ intentions, DeSutter said.  For example, while China has joined the Zangger Committee, it has not joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group — a “significant” distinction, since this allows China to continue to export nuclear-related items to safeguarded nuclear facilities in countries of concern, such as Pakistan, she said.

Concerning chemical weapons, the United States believes that China has both not revealed the full extent of its chemical weapons program and that it possesses a “moderate inventory” of chemical weapons agents, DeSutter said (see GSN, Oct. 21, 2002).  She said the United States plans to soon discuss with China a proposal, developed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to increase industrial inspections at facilities that produce chemicals not directly covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In addition, there is also concern that China has maintained a biological weapons program despite its membership in the Biological Weapons Convention, according to DeSutter (see GSN, Oct. 18, 2002).

“The United States believes that China’s consistent claims that it has never researched, produced or possessed BW [biological weapons] are simply not true,” she said.

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British Response:  WMD Proliferation Set to Gain Priority in British Defenses

British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon has said that combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is set to become an increasing duty of the British military, Navy News Week reported today (see GSN, July 18).

Hoon is expected to publish a report this fall outlining British plans for the military over the next 30 years.  The white paper predicts that the proliferation of WMD-related technologies will make it easier for countries and terrorist organizations to develop such weapons, Hoon said.

“Countering proliferation and terrorism will continue to take up more of the armed forces’ effort,” Hoon said.  “The threat from nonstate actors will continue to require multilateral responses.  There is a danger that the next 30 years will see the emergence of new WMD powers as the technology proliferates and technical advances make production easier,” he said.

Increased WMD proliferation and its impacts will require the British military to be able to respond quickly to unforeseen events, Hoon said.

“We do not have an infallible ability to read the future,” Hoon said.  “We can therefore be clear that the overriding characteristic that we shall look for in our armed services over the next 30 years is the ability to respond to events and security challenges with speed, precision and flexibility,” he said (Gene Koprowski, Navy News Week, July 28).

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