Nuclear Weapons 
IAEA Board Debates Deadline for Iranian Nuclear CooperationFull Story
Payment Dispute Slows Talks on  Bushehr Spent FuelFull Story
Poor Management, Training, Hampers Lawrence Livermore Laboratory’s Security ForceFull Story
Former U.S. Envoy Explains Resignation, Calls for Bilateral TalksFull Story
U.S. Air Force Conducts Minuteman 3 ICBM TestFull Story
IAEA Extends Meeting to Continue Discussion on Iran; U.S. Seeking “Last Chance” UltimatumFull Story
North Korea Pledges to Increase Nuclear CapabilityFull Story
ICBM Conversion Program Is Down to One Titan 2 RocketFull Story
IAEA Board Begins Meeting; U.S. Drops Effort to Report Iranian Nuclear Program to U.N.Full Story
Former U.S. Envoy Calls for Direct Talks With North KoreaFull Story
Washington Consults With Allies on Security Assurance for North KoreaFull Story
Orbital Wins Contract to Develop Advanced Earth Penetrator Test RocketFull Story
Lockheed Martin Announces New Ship-Based Missile Tracking Antenna SystemFull Story
IAEA Seeks Iranian Clarifications on Heavy Water ReactorFull Story
CTBT Conference Ends, Issues Declaration Calling for Universal Treaty RatificationFull Story
Bush Authorizes Concessions to North KoreaFull Story
Washington Investigates French Company for Iran ShipmentFull Story
U.S. Energy Department to Issue Fewer Polygraph Tests, Official SaysFull Story
IAEA Contradicts Iranian Claims on Testing MethodsFull Story
China Appears Ready to Ratify CTBT, Conference Official SaysFull Story
China Continues to Pin Talks Failure on WashingtonFull Story
Washington Pushing IAEA for Strong Resolution on IranFull Story
Indian Nuclear Authority Orders Military to Transfer Control of Arsenal to New CommandFull Story
Russian Nuclear Material Used in Cancer ResearchFull Story


Recent Stories: Nuclear Weapons

From September 10, 2003 issue.

IAEA Board Debates Deadline for Iranian Nuclear Cooperation

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

VIENNA — International Atomic Energy Agency governing board members unexpectedly adjourned current talks here before noon today and are now holding behind-the-scenes discussions on a U.S.-backed proposal that would give Iran until Oct. 31 to address allegations that it is covertly conducting activities that appear related to nuclear weapon development (see GSN, Sept. 9).

France, Germany and the United Kingdom yesterday submitted the draft resolution, which was obtained today by Global Security Newswire.  The United States and Japan have associated themselves with the measure, as have at least 10 other countries on the 35-member board, according to diplomats.

A competing South African resolution, which has no other official sponsors but is apparently supported by a number of Nonaligned Movement countries, would have the board call on Iran to step up cooperation with the IAEA but, under the version seen today by GSN, would set no deadline.

Speaking on behalf of the NAM, Malaysian Ambassador Hussein Haniff told Reuters today that setting a deadline for Iran would also imply a deadline for the IAEA.

“We want to give [IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei] a free hand to decide,” he said, adding, “If you have a specific deadline, then there is also a sense that you’re telling (ElBaradei) that you must complete your job by that time.”

Iranian envoy Ali Akbar Salehi said Iran has objections to both texts but that the South African draft is “more negotiable.”

“This business of a deadline, this idea of a deadline, is just absurd,” Salehi said.

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi also criticized the U.S.-European position, according to Agence France-Presse.

“The posture of certain countries is irresponsible and arrogant,” he said, adding, “If the extremists take control of the matter and do not recognize our legitimate rights to have peaceful nuclear activities, we will then be obliged to review the situation and the current level of cooperation with the agency.”

The board has now wrapped up its whole agenda for the meeting except for an item on Iran’s nuclear programs.  It is expected to reconvene tomorrow morning to discuss Iran.

ElBaradei told reporters just after the board adjourned that “intensive consultations” are taking place.

“There’s a broad agreement that the board would like to see a deadline,” he said, adding that he thinks “Iran should come with an immediate, complete declaration.”

The United States has been the leader in pushing for international action to counter Iran’s alleged bid to develop nuclear weapons under cover of legitimate nuclear activities.  The U.S.-backed draft would have the board call on Iran to “provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency,” “ensure there are no further failures” in reporting of nuclear activities, and suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing programs “as a confidence-building measure.”

Under the draft, the board would deem it “‘essential and urgent’ … that Iran remedy all failures identified by the agency and cooperate fully with the agency to ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003.”  A Western diplomat said the deadline would give Iran a “significant enough period of time … to comply.”

The “necessary actions” in question, according to the draft, include “a full declaration of the sources and types of all imported material and components relevant to the enrichment program”; “unrestricted access” for IAEA inspectors to conduct facility visits and environmental sampling; the resolution of a contradiction between IAEA experts’ assessment that Iran must have introduced uranium into centrifuges before June and Iran’s claim that it did not do so; the provision of “complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments”; and all other actions deemed necessary by the agency.

The board would also call on Iran to “promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement” the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would allow more intrusive monitoring by the agency.

The language on the Additional Protocol is one of several key areas where the U.S.-backed draft differs from the South African text.  The former draft would have the board urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol immediately rather than waiting until it can be signed and ratified, while under South Africa’s draft, the board would ask Iran only to “consider” such interim implementation.

In general, the South African draft implies patience on the board’s part and highlights countries’ right to nuclear energy, while the U.S.-backed text seeks immediate and dramatic action from Iran and stresses the IAEA’s responsibility for helping to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.  South Africa repeatedly refers to further work that is necessary in order for the board to reach any conclusions about Iran, while the Europeans stress Iran’s alleged failures to comply with IAEA requests and cite Iran’s “heavy responsibility to the international community regarding the transparency of its nuclear activities.”

Both resolutions would have ElBaradei report back to the board at a meeting in November on Iran’s compliance.

“I don’t think it [the South African text] really rises to the same level … of gravitas” as the European draft, said the Western diplomat.  Asked whether the matter will come to a vote, rather than being decided by consensus, the diplomat said, “I’m afraid so.”

Salehi scoffed at the idea of a measure not supported by the whole board.

“If there is a resolution adopted that is not in accordance with our … wishes, then that resolution … is just to be kept in the archives,” he said.


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From September 10, 2003 issue.

Payment Dispute Slows Talks on  Bushehr Spent Fuel

Negotiations between Moscow and Tehran on an agreement to return spent fuel from Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor to Russia are stalled over a payment dispute, the Associated Press reported today (see GSN, Sept. 8).

Russia is helping Iran build the Bushehr plant and is planning to supply the plant with nuclear fuel.  Russian officials are insisting, however, that Iran return the spent fuel so that it cannot be reprocessed and used to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran is demanding compensation for the nuclear fuel it returns to Moscow, according to Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Govorukhin, but  Russian leaders would not accept the deal, he said.

“Iranians believe they must get paid for the nuclear fuel being returned to Russia for storage and reprocessing, considering it their property,” Govoruhkin said.  If Iran will not alter its position, he added, Russia intends to charge a higher original price for the nuclear fuel it ships to Iran (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Sept. 10).


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From September 10, 2003 issue.

Poor Management, Training, Hampers Lawrence Livermore Laboratory’s Security Force

The guard force at the U.S. Energy Department’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California is not fully staffed, nor has it been fully tested, to defend against the type of terrorist attack the facility could face, the Tri-Valley Herald reported Sunday (see GSN, Feb. 27).

While the facility’s security force is considered to be the best it has been in five years, it is still recovering from its dismantlement in the early 1990s, according to the Herald.  At that time, budget cuts forced Lawrence Livermore to turn over security responsibilities to local law enforcement, but the Energy Department re-established the facility’s Special Response Team in 1998.

Since 1998, however, the team has faced management problems, low pay and weak oversight, resulting in poor morale and training, the Herald reported.  Some team members have questioned its effectiveness if a band of terrorists were to attempt to attack the facility, which contains large amounts of nuclear material.

“Some guys I know I can count on.  But there are some guys I know who are going to tuck tail and run,” said team member Rodney Harrison.  “They’re headed out Westgate Drive.  They’ll say, ‘I didn’t sign up for this,’” he said.

In May, the Energy Department revised the Design Basis Threat, which is the type of terrorist attack a facility must be able to defend against.  At Lawrence Livermore, the DBT increased by 50 percent, envisioning an attacking terrorist force consisting of about 10 members assumed to be suicidal and heavily armed, conducting an attack with a large truck bomb, chemical weapons, or both, according to the Herald.

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration acting security chief Toby Johnson said he did not know when the guard forces at Lawrence Livermore and other sites would be able to defend against the revised DBT.

“I can’t make an expression of confidence,” Johnson said.  “I think we would say we felt we were generally in good shape against the old design basis threat.  We don’t have enough information on the new one yet,” he added. 

Former Energy security consultant Ronald Timm said he did not believe Lawrence Livermore’s security force was capable of defending against the new threat.

“I can tell you right now, your SRT (Special Response Team) is not adequate out there to meet the new threat,” said Timm, president of RETA Security Inc..  “Anybody who says it’s business as usual is just lying to themselves,” he said.

An Energy spokesman expressed confidence that Lawrence Livermore’s security force could repel a terrorist attack.  “We feel the nuclear material is adequately protected,” said John Belluardo, spokesman for the department’s Livermore Site Office.

Lawrence Livermore security officers expressed doubts that terrorists would even attempt to attack the facility. 

“History is on our side: It hasn’t happened,” said Kory Porter, deputy leader of the laboratory’s Protective Force Division (Ian Hoffman, Tri-Valley Herald, Sept. 7).


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From September 10, 2003 issue.

Former U.S. Envoy Explains Resignation, Calls for Bilateral Talks

Jack Pritchard, a former U.S. State Department expert on North Korea, wrote today that his recent resignation was not a protest to the Bush Administration’s policy toward Pyongyang but rather a reaction to being shut out of the multilateral talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis (see GSN, Sept. 8).

In a Los Angeles Times commentary, Pritchard said, “I was brought into this administration precisely because of my experience in dealing with North Koreans, but was now perceived as too soft on North Korea.  I had tendered my resignation April 18 when I was not selected to lead the trilateral talks in Beijing.  Secretary of State Colin Powell asked me to stay on for a while and, out of enormous respect for him, I did,” Pritchard wrote.

He repeated earlier criticism of the White House refusal to participate in direct talks with North Korea.

“It is not possible to have serious, sustained discussion in a plenary setting over a few days.  Six delegations, 24 interpreters and many note-takers guarantee that the reading of scripted remarks is about the only thing that will take place in open session,” he wrote.  “The structure of the six-party talks is useful and will ultimately be a significant part of the solution, but we must be able to engage the North Koreans at length,” he added (Jack Pritchard, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10).


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From September 10, 2003 issue.

U.S. Air Force Conducts Minuteman 3 ICBM Test

The U.S. Air Force today test-launched a Minuteman 3 ICBM, officials said (see GSN, Aug. 8).  The missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and traveled 4,800 miles to the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean, base spokesman Lloyd Conley said (Associated Press/Newsday, Sept. 10).

The test missile was expected to carry three unarmed re-entry vehicles (Air Force release, Aug. 28).


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From September 9, 2003 issue.

IAEA Extends Meeting to Continue Discussion on Iran; U.S. Seeking “Last Chance” Ultimatum

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

VIENNA — The United States today called on the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors to take immediate action to counter Tehran’s alleged efforts to frustrate the agency’s work in Iran, while Iranian envoy Ali Akbar Saleh defended his country’s record and criticized the United States for trying to “politicize” the matter (see GSN, Sept. 8).

Amid widespread concern that Iran is seeking to enrich uranium for use in an eventual nuclear weapon, U.S. diplomats are working on the sidelines of the meeting to develop a resolution on Iran to which board members are generally amenable, U.S. Mission spokesman Michael Garuckis said.  Board meetings typically last two days but this one appears likely to run into a fourth or even fifth day over the Iran question.

Garuckis said the United States hopes to introduce a resolution tomorrow, meaning that action on the text would not take place before Thursday.  In addition, according to a Western diplomat, there appears to be a possibility that another country could introduce a separate resolution on Iran.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said the formal talks are going “very well.”  Speaking to reporters after this morning’s session, ElBaradei said there are “a number of very important issues that need to be resolved.”

Washington has all but dropped a bid to have the board find Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and send the matter to the U.N. Security Council.  Garuckis said the decision not to seek a finding of noncompliance was a “pragmatic” one.

Representing the Nonaligned Movement, which earlier this year prevented the matter from being referred to the council, a Malaysian statement today said the Iran question should “be resolved through constructive dialogue within the framework of the agency.”

According to a text provided by the U.S. delegation, U.S. envoy Kenneth Brill said at the closed meeting that the “facts already established would fully justify an immediate finding of noncompliance by Iran” with its IAEA safeguards agreement.

“We have taken note, however, of the desire of other member states to give Iran a last chance to stop its evasions, and have agreed today to join in the call on Iran to take ‘essential and urgent’ actions to demonstrate that it has done so.  Passing a resolution on this issue that firmly backs the IAEA’s efforts is the least the board could credibly do to meet its responsibilities,” Brill said.

The process, Saleh told reporters after this morning’s session, will influence Iran’s decision about whether to sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, which would open up the country’s nuclear facilities to more intrusive IAEA monitoring.  ElBaradei said this morning that he “would hope that Iran would be in a position to conclude that protocol as soon as possible.”

“It very well depends upon the outcome of the board,” Saleh said, adding that a “fair and balanced” text on its nuclear programs could speed up the Additional Protocol process.

“If things are totally against ... the statute and the just and the balanced stance of the agency ... we will have to think carefully to our cooperation,” he said.

He added, though, “We have gone beyond our obligations.  It is as though we have already signed the Additional Protocol.”

Brill said ElBaradei’s recent report on Iran (see GSN, Sept. 4) and other IAEA findings show Iran has failed to heed to board’s June call for “open questions” to be resolved and for better cooperation with the IAEA (see GSN, June 19).  The U.S. stance was largely shared by Canada, which said “the nature of Iran’s nuclear program” and the country’s “evasiveness ... only [make] sense in the context of nuclear weapons ambitions,” and the European Union, which said the IAEA report “confirms that reporting obligations under Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA were not met.”

Brill said that at an Aug. 29 meeting of countries including Iran, it became clear that “the report is in error in saying Iran agreed to provide the agency information about its foreign suppliers of centrifuge information.”

Saleh, citing Iran’s claim that “intermediaries” were involved and suggesting the transaction took place too long ago to be investigated now, confirmed that the IAEA report erred in indicating Iran would name its suppliers.

Brill also listed other concerns, including a discrepancy over when Iran began developing centrifuges to enrich uranium; contradictory Iranian statements about whether its centrifuge program has benefited from help from other countries, which Iran now says it has; Iran’s claim never to have introduced nuclear material into centrifuges before the IAEA took samples earlier this year, which contradicts IAEA inspectors’ view that Iran’s program could not have reached the level it has without tests using nuclear material; and Iranian design information on a heavy water facility that includes no mention of hot cells, even though they would be necessary to the facility’s stated purpose (see GSN, Sept. 5).

“There are today more open questions about Iran’s nuclear program than there were on June 6.  The more the agency has looked underneath the surface of Iran’s program, the less the explanations offered have hung together in a plausible way,” Brill said (see GSN, June 9).  He added that Iran’s “cooperation with the agency has at best been episodic and reluctant and has frequently featured delay, denial of access and misinformation.”

“We’re looking for a resolution that’s going to give the IAEA a strengthened hand,” said Garuckis.  He said the board should tell Iran, “This is your last chance. ... Please don’t cross this line.”


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From September 9, 2003 issue.

North Korea Pledges to Increase Nuclear Capability

During a parade today celebrating North Korea’s 55th anniversary, the beleaguered country’s army chief said Pyongyang would continue to develop nuclear weapons, Agence France-Presse reported (see GSN, Sept. 8).

“The D.P.R.K. will continue to increase its nuclear deterrent force as a means for just self-defense in order to defend the sovereignty of the country as the United States has not yet shown its will to drop its hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K. despite the D.P.R.K.’s good faith and magnanimity,” said Kim Yong Chun, chief of the general staff of the Korean People’s Army.

The anniversary parade, however, did not feature any new missiles and North Korea did not test a nuclear weapon on its birthday, as some observors had feared (see related GSN story, today).

“There was no military technical hardware in the parade.  Only uniformed military units marching in columns,” said Polish Ambassador to North Korea Wojciech Kaluza (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 9).

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, meanwhile, brought eight new ministers into  to his 31-member cabinet last week, a relatively dramatic change in the usually rigid North Korean leadership.

“They are less ideological and more oriented toward improving the economy,” said a senior South Korean official.  “We are seeing a rapid rise of the technocrats.  These are pragmatic people,” the official added.

The last cabinet shakeup was in 1998, the Los Angeles Times reported.

Among the appointees was a new prime minister, Pak Pong Ju, a 64-year-old former chemical industries minister.  Pak was part of a delegation that visited Seoul last year.  Some observers, however, do not believe that the infusion of technology friendly ministers signals a move forward for North Korea.

“I’m not optimistic that these technocrats will be able to do much,” said Cho Myong Chol, a former economics professor at Kim Il Sung university in Pyongyang who defected to South Korea.  “Kim Jong Il seems to think he can solve the problems of his country through technology and not through real change in the system,” Cho said (Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9).


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From September 9, 2003 issue.

ICBM Conversion Program Is Down to One Titan 2 Rocket

After a Titan rocket derivative was used to launch a spy satellite in Florida yesterday, only one former Titan 2 ICBM remains in Lockheed Martin’s hands (see GSN, July 23).

The launch, slightly delayed by a fuel leak and bad weather, took place at about 12:30 p.m., according to Florida Today (Chris Kridler, Florida Today, Sept. 9).

In 1986, Lockheed Martin was given a contract to refurbish 14 Titan 2 ICBMs and make them ready for U.S. government space launch use, according to a company release (Lockheed Martin fact sheet).


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From September 8, 2003 issue.

IAEA Board Begins Meeting; U.S. Drops Effort to Report Iranian Nuclear Program to U.N.

Concluding that it has inadequate international support, the United States has apparently abandoned efforts to have the International Atomic Energy Agency report that Iran is not complying with its nuclear safeguards agreement, diplomats said Friday.

Instead, the United States now plans to submit a less strongly worded resolution on Iran’s nuclear program during an agency Board of Governors’ meeting that began today, according to the Associated Press.  The U.S. resolution would call on Iran to provide unrestricted access to its nuclear program, said a senior diplomat.  The resolution could also set a deadline for Iran to fully comply and warn that if does not, then it will be declared in noncompliance, which could result in the issue being reported to the U.N. Security Council, a second diplomat said (George Jahn, Associated Press/Tuscaloosa News, Sept. 5).

The chances that the IAEA board would approve a resolution that left out Security Council involvement are “better than 50-50,” a Western diplomat said (Louis Charbonneau, Reuters/Yahoo!News, Sept. 5).

ElBaradei Opens Meeting

In a statement to the board today, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei set the tone in Vienna by saying Tehran must step up cooperation with the agency in the weeks ahead.

The meeting agenda for the two-day talks is varied, but the focus is expected to be squarely on Iran.

ElBaradei called on Tehran, “in the coming weeks, to show proactive and accelerated cooperation and to demonstrate full transparency by providing the agency with a complete and accurate declaration of all its nuclear activities.”  He urged Iran to take specific measures related to points raised in a report on Iran he submitted late last month to the board (see GSN, Sept. 4).

Iran has claimed that highly enriched uranium particles the IAEA found at the country’s Natanz centrifuge facility represented contamination that came from the country providing the equipment in question.  Numerous reports have indicated the provider was Pakistan.

This morning, ElBaradei said Iran should “provide a complete list of all imported equipment and components stated to have been contaminated with high enriched uranium particles, and — importantly — identify the origin and date of receipt of the equipment, including information about where it has been used or stored in Iran.”

He added that Iran should “resolve questions regarding the conclusion of agency experts that process testing of gas centrifuges must have been conducted in order for Iran to develop its enrichment technology to its current extent.”

Earlier this year, IAEA experts deemed centrifuge technology they observed in Iran to be impossible to develop without conducting tests using nuclear material.  Iran has said it introduced no such material into centrifuges before that time.

ElBaradei added that Iran should provide complete information on any uranium conversion experiments it has conducted, should sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement and, in the meantime, grant the agency access to “all sites and locations that the agency deems necessary to visit” (Joe Fiorill, Global Security Newswire, Sept. 8).

Iran, Russia to Discuss Bushehr Spent Fuel Arrangement Later This Month

Meanwhile, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev has said that Russian and Iranian officials would meet in Vienna later this month to discuss the return of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran to Russia, ITAR-Tass reported today (see GSN, Aug. 6).

The drafting and signing of an agreement on the return of spent fuel from the Bushehr plant, which Russia is currently constructing, “is a purely technical matter,” Rumyantsev said.  Both countries agree that such an agreement is necessary, and the only issue left to resolve is how the spent fuel will be returned, he said.  “We should decide what changes should be made and in what contracts,” Rumyantsev said (Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-Tass, Sept. 8).


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From September 8, 2003 issue.

Former U.S. Envoy Calls for Direct Talks With North Korea

By David McGlinchey
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — A former top U.S. State Department expert on North Korea — who resigned just before August talks on the nuclear crisis — today called for direct meetings between Washington and Pyongyang (see GSN, Sept. 2).

U.S. President George W. Bush has insisted that the United States will only meet North Korea in multilateral negotiations.  Last month’s Beijing talks included the United States, North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, but produced no substantive results.

Days before the Aug. 27 meeting began, Jack Pritchard resigned as the U.S. special envoy for negotiations with North Korea.  He had recently been criticized by conservative lawmakers for not delivering a hawkish message in his dealing with Pyongyang.  At a Brookings Institution panel discussion today, Pritchard said the attempt to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis with multilateral talks alone “is ludicrous, it cannot happen.”

“The prospect for success, unless the format is altered, is grim,” he said.

Pritchard said that before the six nations come together to put their stamp on a diplomatic solution, contentious issues must be addressed in direct negotiations.

“Does that mean that we will resolve the problem bilaterally?  No … but we will lay the groundwork,” he said.  Pritchard referred to the current negotiations as “drive-by meetings.”

He also called for the Bush administration to appoint a full-time envoy to handle negotiations and coordinate diplomacy with regional allies.

At the same panel discussion, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke said the nuclear crisis is unlikely to deteriorate into an armed conflict, even though negotiations are not progressing smoothly.

“The chances of a war on the Korean Peninsula are minimal to nil,” Holbrooke said.  He said that North Korea understands it would most likely be defeated if it launched an attack into South Korea.  The U.S. military, meanwhile, is too heavily committed in Iraq to support an attack against Pyongyang, according to Holbrooke.


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From September 8, 2003 issue.

Washington Consults With Allies on Security Assurance for North Korea

The United States will discuss with its allies how to address North Korea’s security concerns and persuade the reclusive nation to abandon its nuclear weapons program, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said yesterday (see GSN, Sept. 5).

“Right now, the first challenge before us is to get North Korea to say clearly that they are prepared to give up entirely their nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner,” Powell said on the ABC television program This Week.  “And we know what they want from us — the only thing they have asked for from us, the United States, is some sort of security assurance,” he added.

Powell said that the current U.S. policy was not focused on overthrowing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

“We will have to make a judgment with our allies, over the next few weeks, before the next meeting, as to what kind of security assurance would be satisfactory for all of us to provide to the North Koreans,” Powell said (Associated Press/Yahoo!News, Sept. 7).

South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan said that he expects Washington to “actively” address North Korea’s concerns.  Yoon recently met with U.S. leaders in Washington.

“I was told (at talks with U.S. President George W. Bush on Thursday) that the United States was actively considering and preparing to address the issue of North Korea’s security concerns,” Yoon said.  “I think that the United States may come up with its proposal at the next round of six-nation talks,” he added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 8).

A top Russian diplomat is scheduled to visit Pyongyang this week to discuss the nuclear crisis with North Korean leader Kim.  Konstantin Pulikovski is slated to arrive tomorrow for a four-day visit (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 8).


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From September 8, 2003 issue.

Orbital Wins Contract to Develop Advanced Earth Penetrator Test Rocket

The U.S. defense contractor Orbital Sciences Corp. announced last week that it has received a U.S. Air Force contract to develop a suborbital rocket for use in testing an advanced earth penetrator.

The contract, worth up to $7.5 million, covers the design and procurement of long-lead hardware in support of the Air Force’s Missile Technology Demonstration-3B program, according to a company press release.  The MTD-3B program uses Global Position System information to provide guidance and velocity information for high-speed earth penetration tests.  The contract also includes options for rocket fabrication, test and launch.  The rocket is scheduled to be tested in 2006  (Orbital Sciences release, Sept. 4).


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From September 8, 2003 issue.

Lockheed Martin Announces New Ship-Based Missile Tracking Antenna System

The U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin announced last week the development of a new antenna system that can be installed on ships to track ballistic missiles, according to Navy News Week (see GSN, Aug. 9).

The S-Band Mobile Array Telemetry (SMART) antenna system has a range of 1,100 nautical miles and can track eight independent targets, Navy News Week reported.  The system could be used to track tests of the Trident 2 ballistic missile (Navy News Week, Sept. 8).

 


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From September 5, 2003 issue.

IAEA Seeks Iranian Clarifications on Heavy Water Reactor

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — The International Atomic Energy Agency has asked Iran to explain why it has not declared plans to acquire “hot cells” for handling highly radioactive material at its planned heavy water reactor at Arak.  The agency request was described in a confidential report on Iran submitted last week by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency’s Board of Governors (see GSN, Sept. 4).

The absence of hot cells from design plans Iran submitted to the agency in August is “contrary to what would be expected, given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility,” the report says.  According to the report, Iran has said it is building the heavy water reactor as a “research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D [research and development] to replace the old research reactor in Tehran.”  The reactor is scheduled to begin construction next year.

In explaining its request for clarification from Iran, the IAEA also made reference to recent reports of Iranian efforts to import equipment that could be used in hot cells.

The request comes amid widespread allegations that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons even as it claims it is maintaining its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments.  While a heavy water reactor could be used to produce isotopes and for research, such reactors are also among the most popular for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Experts said the inconsistencies inherent in Iran’s description of the heavy water reactor, while not damning in isolation, constitute an important plank in the case against Iran.

“It’s a curious thing with the Iranian story in general that everything kind-of-sort-of makes sense by itself, but … all together, it’s starting to look really suspicious,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Project Director Ivan Oelrich said yesterday.

Oelrich said isotope production and research is “certainly a plausible explanation for what they’re doing” but that the “buildup” of inconsistencies in Iran’s claims gives pause.

Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright said Iran’s explanations of its heavy water activity are “just viewed as not very credible. … It inevitably increases suspicions that they had some secret plutonium activities going on.”

According to the IAEA report, Iranian officials have said they tried repeatedly to import a reactor to produce the isotopes and conduct research but failed and “concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor” using indigenously produced uranium dioxide.

Albright said, though, that if Iran came into compliance with its NPT obligations and signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, “It’s quite likely that they could import a research reactor.”  He added that Iran’s stated purposes could be served by a 10-megawatt reactor — the planned Arak facility is a 40-megawatt reactor — and that if it is making isotopes, the country would do better to use enriched uranium than the natural uranium planned for Arak.

Asked about the hot cells, Albright said, “Again, it’s just one of these things —  are they trying to avoid a discussion of reprocessing? … I’m just waiting for them to say, ‘Yeah we’re going to build a reprocessing plant.”

Nevertheless, added the former U.N. inspector, “The evidence that there is secret reprocessing activity is lacking right now.”

Heavy water activity in Iran first came to light in August of last year with the revelation by the National Council of Resistance of Iran of a heavy water production facility at Arak, which was subsequently visited by the IAEA. 

After denying for a time that the heavy water production implied eventual use in a reactor, Iran presented details in July on the Arak reactor and submitted updated design information to the IAEA Aug. 4.  In a letter dated Aug. 19, Iran told the IAEA it decided two decades ago to begin heavy water research and development and conducted laboratory experiments in the mid-1980s, finally deciding in the mid-1990s to build a reactor.


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From September 5, 2003 issue.

CTBT Conference Ends, Issues Declaration Calling for Universal Treaty Ratification

A three-day meeting in Vienna of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signatories ended today with the issuing of a final declaration calling for universal ratification of the treaty (see GSN, Sept. 4).

In the final declaration, delegates reaffirmed “the importance of the treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation,” according to a CTBT Organization press release.

The declaration also contains 12 measures to help promote the treaty’s entry into force, including the creation of regional seminars to “increase awareness” of the treaty’s role, the CTBT Organization release said.  The declaration also recommends that the organization’s Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide legal aid to countries with respect to treaty ratification and implementation, as well as establish a contact point to improve information sharing.

Conference delegates also expressed concern that the treaty had still not entered into force seven years after opening for signature, according to the release.  They stressed the need for the 12 countries that need to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force to promptly do so (CTBT Organization release, Sept. 5).


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From September 5, 2003 issue.

Bush Authorizes Concessions to North Korea

U.S. President George W. Bush authorized U.S. diplomats last week to say that Washington is prepared to offer incentives to North Korea, including easing sanctions and a possible peace treaty, but some U.S. officials are not certain North Korea understood the U.S. position, according to reports (see GSN, Sept. 4).

Under the U.S. offer, the potential assistance would be administered gradually as North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons capability, officials said.  Bush had previously said that North Korea would receive no assistance until it completely dismantled its nuclear infrastructure and gave up its nuclear weapons.

“We’re going to give these talks a real chance,” national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said last night.  “This is the best opportunity for getting a resolution for a long time,” she added.

She tempered her remarks, however, by saying that “a lot depends on North Korean behavior” (David Sanger, New York Times, Sept. 5).

A senior U.S. State Department official, however, said that North Korea might not have understood the new overtures, which were made last week during six-nation talks in Beijing.

“I am disappointed because their presentations were quite prescripted.  They seemed to have little to do with what we were saying, or what others were saying,” the official said (Sonni Efron, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5).

During the talks North Korea reportedly twice threatened to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities, according to a senior State Department official.

“These words are very disturbing.  And I hope that Pyongyang realizes that provocative actions can and will have consequences, whether it’s to the atmosphere of the talks, or something more than that,” the official said (Tim Johnson, Knight Ridder, Sept. 5).


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From September 5, 2003 issue.

Washington Investigates French Company for Iran Shipment

U.S. authorities are investigating a French firm that might have illegally shipped pumps to Iran that could be used in Tehran’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the Washington Times reported today (see GSN, Sept. 4).

The cryogenic fluid transfer pumps could be used as part of a cooling system for Iran’s planned nuclear reactors, according to Treasury and Commerce department officials.  Technip-Coflexip might have diverted the pumps in January to Iran’s nuclear efforts, according to the Times.

“That’s the immediate concern,” a Commerce Department official said.  The export of the pumps is controlled, because of their nuclear capabilities, but the equipment can also be used to transfer liquid natural gas to commercial ship containers.

The allegations of nuclear use were made by an unidentified informant, according to the Treasury Department (Bill Gertz, Washington Times, Sept. 5).

United States Drafts Resolution

Days ahead of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors’ meeting, Washington has prepared a draft resolution alleging that Iran has violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  U.S. officials have distributed the draft to some of the 35 nations on the IAEA board to gauge international reaction.

The board meeting is scheduled to begin Monday (Washington Times, Sept. 5).

“We would look for the board to take appropriate action,” said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher (Associated Press/Baltimore Sun, Sept. 5).


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From September 5, 2003 issue.

U.S. Energy Department to Issue Fewer Polygraph Tests, Official Says

The U.S. Energy Department plans to reduce using polygraph tests to screen employees who work on nuclear weapon-related issues, a senior official said yesterday.

In testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Deputy Energy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow said the new policy would probably reduce the number of polygraph tests administered from about 20,000 to 4,500.  Energy has come under fire over the last year for its polygraph policy and has come to agree with some of the criticism it has received, McSlarrow said.  For example, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences panel released a report last October saying polygraph testing was too flawed for use in security screening, according to the New York Times.

As a result of the criticism, Energy officials proposed “substantial changes” in the tests’ routine use, McSlarrow said.  The new policy does not mean, however, that the department will cease using polygraph testing all together, he said.

“No one has suggested that we abandon their use, or that we hire people and entrust them with national defense information with no prior checks or reviews whatsoever,” McSlarrow said.

Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) yesterday praised Energy’s decision to revise its polygraph testing policy.

“This is a smart decision,” Domenici said.  “I have been appalled by the DOE’s continued massive use of polygraph tests in the wake of a national study condemning the reliability of these tests.  Our national scientists deserve better,” he said (William Broad, New York Times, Sept. 5).


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

IAEA Contradicts Iranian Claims on Testing Methods

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Contradicting Iranian denials, the International Atomic Energy Agency said last week that uranium enrichment technology visible at the country’s Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) could not have been developed without conducting tests involving uranium hexafluoride.

Iran has acknowledged testing some of its centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride beginning June 25, but has denied introducing the material before then.  The IAEA said last week that full safeguards measures are in place for the current testing.

The agency added, as was reported last week by several media outlets, that IAEA environmental samples taken from Natanz between March and June “revealed particles of high enriched uranium” (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The assertions appear in a confidential report submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors last week by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and obtained yesterday by Global Security Newswire.

Brookings Institution Science and Technology Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies Michael Levi said yesterday “the report is more damning than the press leaks have suggested.”

The report is to be discussed beginning Monday at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, and the matter could be referred to the U.N. Security Council if the board is not satisfied with Iran’s transparency.

“The biggest issue is:  Did Iran enrich uranium?” said Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright.

“What you have in this report,” said the former IAEA inspector, “is a steady drumbeat that says, ‘We still don’t know whether Iran is telling the truth when it says it never enriched uranium in Iran.’”

Also at issue is whether Iran will sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, a move that would permit the agency to conduct more intrusive monitoring of Iranian nuclear activities.  While urging Iran to adopt the measures, many observers say the protocol would be an insufficient check against potential Iranian development of nuclear weapons.

IAEA Findings Contradict Iranian Assertions

Iran has acknowledged that in 1991, China provided it with 1,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, as well as smaller quantities of uranium tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide.

According to the IAEA report, though, officials from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization told IAEA experts who visited the country this summer that the centrifuge facility had been developed with information acquired from open sources, without conducting any tests involving uranium.  Specifically, Iranian officials told the IAEA last month that “no experiments with inert or UF6 gas were conducted,” according to the report.  Iran first said in February that its tests of centrifuge rotors, as part of design and development work begun in 1997, were conducted without nuclear material.

The Iranian statements are contradicted by the IAEA’s assertion that testing with uranium hexafluoride must have taken place at Natanz.  The IAEA report says its experts concluded that “it is not possible to develop enrichment technology to the level seen at Natanz based solely on open source information and computer simulations without process testing with UF6.”

In a related finding, IAEA experts determined in March that about 1.9 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride was missing from two cylinders at an Iranian site.  Iran has said the loss could have resulted from “leakage from the cylinders resulting from mechanical failure of the valves and possible evaporation,” according to last week’s report.

Levi expressed doubt about Iran’s leakage claim, though, and both he and Albright said the quantity of material in question could be used to test uranium centrifuges.  “It’s enough to operate one test stand for a while,” said Albright.

Meanwhile, the IAEA said in its report that it is waiting to test a third, larger cylinder, but cannot do so until necessary equipment is installed at Natanz by Iran.

“So basically,” Levi said, “the Iranians control the timeline.”

In the case of the highly enriched uranium discovered at Natanz, the finding contradicts Iran’s assertion that, as paraphrased in the IAEA report, “no nuclear material was introduced to the PFEP prior to the agency’s having taken its first baseline environmental samples.”  The IAEA’s sampling was completed before June 11, when it submitted results to Iran, and Tehran denies introducing uranium hexafluoride into a centrifuge before June 25.

Iran said last month that the enriched uranium particles found at Natanz “must have resulted from contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been imported by Iran,” according to the report.

In media reports, experts have identified Pakistan as the foreign source in question, a charge Pakistan has denied.  Albright said yesterday that last week’s report appears to support the charge.

“The finger points at Pakistan as the source … probably not the government, but scientists or companies or agents of Pakistan,” he said.

IAEA Work Continues

“Additional work is … required to enable the agency to arrive at conclusions about Iran’s statements that there have been no uranium enrichment activities in Iran involving nuclear material.  The agency intends to complete its assessment of the Iranian statement that the high enriched uranium particles identified in samples taken at Natanz could be attributable to contamination from imported components,” the report reads.

“Iran has agreed to provide the agency with all information about the centrifuge components and other contaminated equipment it obtained from abroad, including their origin and the locations where they have been stored and used in Iran, as well as access to those locations, so that the agency may take environmental samples,” the IAEA went on.

One location where the IAEA has already taken such samples is a Kalaye Electric Co. facility in Tehran.  IAEA inspectors took the samples last month “with a view to assessing the role of that company in Iran’s enrichment R&D [research and development] program,” according to the report, but the facility had undergone “considerable modification” since a prior visit in March, a fact experts called suspicious.

The results of sampling on the Kalaye premises were not yet available when the IAEA report was issued last week.

Additional Protocol, Other Measures Sought

In remarks issued in response to last week’s media reports on the director general’s report, the IAEA said that “ultimately … the only way to build high confidence in the peaceful nature of their nuclear program is for Iran to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA.”

Albright said Iran “has to demonstrate transparency and implement the protocol.”  He dismissed concerns that a failure to sanction Iran for its acknowledged past omissions in reporting and for the inconsistencies implicit in the latest IAEA findings could set a bad example.

“You’re so used to being lied to,” said Albright, “that progress is when people start telling you the truth.”

Levi said the protocol could be useful if accompanied by further concessions from Iran.

“There’s a point in concluding an Additional Protocol if it is concurrent with Iran giving up everything except the Bushehr power plant,” he said, referring to Iran’s major nuclear power plant, which is currently being built by Russia.

Albright said the Bush administration would like to see Iran give up even the Bushehr facility but that there is “no way” Iran will halt work at the facility.  As for Natanz, he said, “many countries cannot live with Iran operating” the facility, but “you have to offer Iran something” in return for shutting Natanz down.

The concern about Natanz stems from the facility’s high potential for producing nuclear weapon material.  In an article in the September/October issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Albright and ISIS colleague Corey Hinderstein estimate that the eventual production capacity at Natanz would fall far short of the amount needed to fuel all the reactors Iran says it plans to build, but that “the same capacity would be sufficient to produce about 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually.”

“At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for roughly 25-30 nuclear weapons per year,” they write, adding that Iran could also make low-enriched uranium fuel at Natanz for a time, eventually gaining the capacity to “produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in a few days.”

Levi said Iran should be required “at the very least … [to] halt further work until the further tests can be done” by the IAEA, but he expressed doubt about whether the IAEA board in its current form would remit the matter to the Security Council, where the threat of economic and other sanctions could sway Iran.  In June, 15 Nonaligned Movement (NAM) countries on the board prevented the matter from going to the council (see GSN, June 19).

“For the NAM,” said Levi, “the priority is … to minimize the barriers to nuclear power. … I don’t know what will convince the NAM folks.”

Levi and Hinderstein write in their Bulletin article that, in order to encourage progress in the matter, the United States and others should offer “incentives” for Iran, Iran’s security concerns should be respected, and Washington and others should seek to restart talks on regional arms control in the Middle East.

The IAEA said in its report that Iran has already demonstrated “an increased degree of cooperation” since June, but the agency added that “information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and that … there remain a number of important outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran’s enrichment program, that require urgent resolution.”

“Continued and accelerated cooperation and full transparency on the part of Iran are essential for the agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by member states,” the report says.


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

China Appears Ready to Ratify CTBT, Conference Official Says

International officials expect China to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty soon, Agence France-Presse reported today (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“They seem ready to ratify,” said Wolfgang Hoffmann, secretary general of the CTBT Organization, the Vienna institution responsible for the implementing the treaty banning all nuclear explosions.  Leading a three-day conference to promote the treaty’s entry into force, Hoffman said, “I got this impression from talks I had last July in Beijing with both sides, civilian and military.”

Other sources close to the conference also said China appears willing to ratify the treaty, AFP reported. 

“The question is no longer whether China will sign the ratification document, but when,” a source close to the conference said.  “If they do this, it will be a big step towards ensuring that the treaty enters into force,” the source said (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 4).

China said today that it hoped the treaty would soon enter into force, but did not say exactly when it would ratify the treaty.

“We attach great importance to (the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) because we believe it has an important role in the nonproliferation process, especially the disarmament process,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.

The treaty was sent to the National People’s Congress for ratification in March 2000.  Although the NPC met in August, the treaty was not discussed, sources said.  The NPC is scheduled to meet again in late October, according to Agence France-Presse.

“We hope for the early ratification and coming into force of the treaty,” Kong said.  “We hope the National People’s Congress in accordance with the relevant legal procedures will go through the procedures,” he said (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 4).

Meanwhile at the Vienna conference, Chinese delegate Zhang Yan said his country had established a national preparatory authority for the implementation of the treaty, according to a CTBT Organization press release.  In addition, China has agreed to host 12 of the international monitoring system facilities that are part of the treaty’s verification regime, Zhang said.

Also during the conference, delegates from several countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro and Sri Lanka, announced their countries’ progress on moving forward on ratifying the treaty (CTBT Organization release I, Sept. 4).  Renald Clerisme, Haiti’s delegate to the conference, said his country’s ratification of the treaty was imminent.

In addition, a number of delegates expressed the need for a strong final document to be issued at the conference’s conclusion, according to a CTBT Organization press release (CTBT Organization release II, Sept. 4).


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

China Continues to Pin Talks Failure on Washington

Echoing comments made several days before by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a Chinese official close to nuclear negotiations said that the United States holds the key to progress on the Korean Peninsula, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, Sept. 3).

“It depends on the United States,” the official said.  “It depends on if the United States can have a more unified position and more specific proposals to induce North Korea back to the negotiating table,” the official added.

A high-ranking South Korean official said that regional powers are attempting to find common ground.

“For us to come to an agreement … all the countries at the table will need to compromise,” the official said.

The talks last week were attended by China, the United States, Japan, Russia, North Korea and South Korea (Pomfret/Faiola, Washington Post, Sept. 4).

South Korea, meanwhile, said that it was opposed to suspending construction on light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.

“We have spent no less than $930 million so far.  If the project is terminated, we would be left with $1.4 billion of losses,” Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun said today.  The United States has expressed concerns about the project, but inherent safeguards make it difficult to use the facilities for military ends, according to Jeong (Agence France-Presse, Sept. 4).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, meanwhile, reaffirmed that North Korean diplomats at the recent six-nation talks said they were prepared to test a nuclear weapon.

“That’s what they said, I don’t know if it was a promise or just a statement,” Powell said (Agence France Presse/Yahoo!News, Sept. 4).

“But the way forward is not helped by threats and truculent statements that are designed to try to frighten the international community or try to frighten us,” he added (CNN.com, Sept. 3).


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

Washington Pushing IAEA for Strong Resolution on Iran

The United States is pushing the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to release a strong condemnation of Iran’s controversial nuclear development, the Financial Times reported today.  The agency’s Board of Governors is scheduled to begin a two-day meeting on Monday (see GSN, Sept. 3).

If the board finds Iran to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the issue would be forwarded to the U.N. Security Council.  Some diplomats, however, believe that Washington is asking for a noncompliance finding to ensure the board at least adopts a strongly worded resolution.

U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Ken Brill said yesterday that Washington wants “a strong resolution that will help the IAEA get Iran to stop violating its NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferattion Treaty] Safeguards Agreement and come clean on what it has been up to” (Roula Khalaf, Financial Times, Sept. 3).


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

Indian Nuclear Authority Orders Military to Transfer Control of Arsenal to New Command

The Indian Nuclear Command Authority has ordered the Indian military to transfer control of India’s nuclear arsenal to the Strategic Forces Command, Aerospace Daily reported today (see GSN, Sept. 2).

The strategic command was created in January, along with the Nuclear Command Authority, as part of India’s efforts to formalize its nuclear command-and-control structure.  The Indian military, however, has been reluctant to make the transfer, saying that the authority is not prepared to receive or implement the command-and-control systems (Bulbul Singh, Aerospace Daily, Sept. 4).


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From September 4, 2003 issue.

Russian Nuclear Material Used in Cancer Research

Researchers at the University of Maryland are attempting to use material from Russian nuclear weapons to fight cancer, the Associated Press reported today.

Scientists want to use a uranium extract to shut down blood vessels that run to cancerous tumors.

“One of the ways that most solid tumors grow is to induce the body to feed it,” said Bruce Line, the university’s director of nuclear medicine.  “If we can stop that process by cutting off the blood supply to tumors, then we can keep the tumor from growing and also help to reduce its size and keep it from eventually taking the patient’s life,” he added.

The Atoms for Peace initiative has provided $800,000 toward the effort, much through the work of Representative Steny Hoyer (D-Md.).

The university expects six to eight shipments of the material in the next few months, according to AP (Associated Press/Washington Times, Sept. 4).


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